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Introduction 
 
Criminalising the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of the (state) act of aggression, 
has been one of the most important developments in international law. Individuals can now be 
made criminally responsible for the crime of aggression. Individual criminal responsibility for 
the crime of aggression had emerged shortly after the Second World War, when the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) in 1946, the subsequent Nuremberg Trials pursuant to 
Control Council Law no.10 (NMT) in 1946-1949 and the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East at Tokyo (IMTFE) in 1946-1948 indicted, prosecuted and subsequently convicted individuals 
for crimes against peace.1 Many decades after Nuremberg, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) was established, with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
the crime of aggression. 
However, the crime of aggression was not defined in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Rome Statute). Pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute, ‘the Court shall 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with 
articles 121 [amendments] and 123 [Review of the Statute] defining the crime and setting out the 
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a 
provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.’ 
This happened in 2010, at the Review Conference in Kampala, where amendments to the Rome 
Statute for the crime of aggression in Kampala (the Kampala Amendments) were adopted by 
consensus (Resolution RC/Res.6). At present, the ICC is the only international criminal forum 
that may potentially prosecute individuals who plan, prepare, initiate or execute an act of 
aggression, subject to the activation of the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of aggression.   
 This crime is fundamentally different from the other core international crimes in Article 
5(1) of the Rome Statute, i.e. genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. There are two 
significant differences. First, unlike genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression is predicated upon state 
responsibility for an act of aggression.2 This is because the legal definition of the crime of 
                                                
1 It should be noted that ‘crimes against peace’ and the ‘crime of aggression’ are synonymous and are 
used interchangeably.  
2 See Commentaries on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II, Part II, (hereinafter “Commentaries on the 
Draft Code of Crimes”),30. 
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aggression encompasses a state act of aggression as a substantive component of the crime.3 The 
IMT approached the issue by establishing that Germany had committed ‘wars of aggression’ 
against twelve nations prior to assessing individual criminal responsibility of the defendants for 
crimes against peace.4 The need to first establish the existence of aggression committed by the 
state prior to considering the conduct of the defendant has been incorporated in the Kampala 
Amendments.5 Therefore, an individual can only be found criminally responsible for the crime of 
aggression if it has been established that the aggressor state has committed an act of aggression. 
Second, the victim of the crime of aggression is the aggressed state. This is the fundamental 
difference between the crime of aggression and the other core international crimes, as the victims 
of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are natural persons. Arguably, the 
submission that the victim of the crime of aggression is a state does not necessarily affect any of 
the constitutive elements of the crime. Yet, the fact that the victim of the crime of aggression is a 
state, and not a natural person, has symbolic significance: under international law, a state can be 
a victim of an international crime. There is also legal significance, as the norms under 
international law that criminalise aggression serve to protect the aggressed state. Thus, when 
there is a breach of these norms, it is in the legal interest of the aggressed state that legal 
consequences are to be enforced against the perpetrator of the crime of aggression.     
These two aspects of the crime of aggression, i.e. the unique relationship between state 
responsibility and individual criminal responsibility with respect to the crime of aggression, and 
the need to protect the legal interests of the aggressed state under international law, initiated my 
interest to conduct the present study. The crime of aggression has recently attracted considerable 
academic interest, especially in light of the negotiations on the definition of the crime of 
aggression and the conditions under which the ICC may exercise jurisdiction, which had spanned 
over a period of ten years. Stefan Barriga and Claus Kress have made a compilation of all 
relevant documents pertaining to the negotiation history of the Kampala Amendments, Crime of 
Aggression Library: the Travaux Préparatoires of the Crime of Aggression.6 In the specific 
                                                
3 Article 6(a) Charter of the International Military Tribunal has defined crimes against peace as: planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances; Article 8 bis(1) Kampala Amendments has defined the crime of aggression as: 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over 
or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, 
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
4  ‘Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law - International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences’ (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 172, 186–214. 
5 Articles 15 bis (6) – 15 bis (9), Resolution RC/Res.6.   
6 Stefan Barriga and Claus Kress, Crime of Aggression Library: The Travaux Préparatoires  of the Crime 
of Aggression (Cambridge University Press 2012). 
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context of the ICC and the crime of aggression, Carrie McDougall has published a monograph 
on The Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,7 and 
Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi have edited a volume on The International Criminal Court and 
the Crime of Aggression.8 Writing before the proliferation of international criminal tribunals, 
Cornelis Pompe examined the criminalisation of aggression from the Nuremberg Trials to the 
implementation of the ‘Nuremberg Principles’ in Aggressive War and International Criminal 
Law.9 In a similar vein, Kirsten Sellars traces the historical criminalisation of aggression, from 
its origins after the First World War, to the post-war tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo in 
‘Crimes against Peace’ and International Law.10 
With respect to a more general overview of the crime of aggression, several monographs 
have recently been published: Patrycja Grzebyk, Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of 
Aggression; 11  Sergey Sayapin, The Crime of Aggression in International Criminal Law, 
Historical Development, Comparative Analysis and Present State;12 Gerhard Kemp, Individual 
Criminal Liability for the International Crime of Aggression;13 Larry May, Aggression and 
Crimes Against Peace.14  Broadly speaking, these studies examine the prohibition of the use of 
force under jus ad bellum, the historical origins of the norms that criminalise aggression, and 
prosecution in domestic courts and at the ICC.   
 Although any study pertaining to the crime of aggression involves an examination of the 
laws on the use of force (jus ad bellum), existing literature appears to be written from a 
predominantly international criminal law perspective. The position taken in this dissertation is 
that this gives rise to an incomplete understanding of the crime of aggression for the main reason 
that the study of this crime from an international criminal law perspective can only acknowledge 
that individual criminal responsibility is predicated upon state responsibility, without examining 
this special feature of the crime in depth. Yet, this feature is important not only from a 
conceptual perspective, but also from a practical perspective, as a lack of understanding of the 
                                                
7 Carrie McDougall, The Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Cambridge University Press 2013). 
8 Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi (eds), The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression 
(Ashgate 2004). 
9 Cornelis Pompe, Aggressive War: An International Crime (Martinus Nijhoff 1953). 
10 Kirsten Sellars, ‘Crimes against Peace’ and International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
11 Patrycja Grzebyk, Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression (Routledge 2013). 
12 Sergey Sayapin, The Crime of Aggression in International Criminal Law: Historical Development, 
Comparative Analysis and Present State (Springer 2013). 
13 Gerhard Kemp, Individual Criminal Liability for the International Crime of Aggression (Intersentia 
2010). 
14 Larry May, Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (Cambridge University Press 2008). 
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relationship between individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility may cause 
apprehension with respect to carrying out the prosecution of this crime.  
There is an intrinsic link between the state act of aggression and the crime of aggression, and 
state responsibility for aggression and individual criminal responsibility for the crime of 
aggression, which upholds a relationship between the aggressor state and the perpetrator of the 
crime. To better understand this intrinsic link, there is need to return to the broader framework of 
public international law, as it is necessary to study the primary level of norms under international 
law that prohibit aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression, which in effect, shape the 
way that the concomitant norms interplay on the secondary level of responsibility.  
In this regard, there is a lack of clarification in present academic literature in relation to two 
issues. First, the legal definition of the crime of aggression is predicated upon the interplay 
between the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression on the 
primary level. Second, the concomitant norms interplay on the secondary level of responsibility 
so that individual criminal responsibility can only be found upon state responsibility. The 
problem is that the constitutive elements within the definition of the crime of aggression 
encompass two separate wrongful conducts by different actors, and it does not become 
immediately clear how international responsibility is attributed to the aggressor state and the 
individual accordingly.  
The central research question of this dissertation aims to analyse the conditions of 
responsibility relating to the crime of aggression to the State and the individual. Delineation of 
responsibility of these very different subjects provides an analytical perspective for engaging 
with the legal interests of the aggressed state in the context of the establishment and 
implementation of individual criminal responsibility against the individual who has committed 
the crime of aggression.  
This research is conducted from a positivist international law perspective, and thus relies on 
treaty law, customary international law and judicial decisions as the principal sources. In 
particular, the travaux préparatoires of the Kampala Amendments is examined extensively as a 
necessary step towards a better understanding of the sui generis nature of the jurisdictional regime of 
the Court over the crime of aggression and how these amendments to the Rome Statute affect the 
legal interests of States Parties to the original treaty.  
In this regard, this dissertation can be seen to encompass both conceptual and practical 
elements. The conceptual element of this dissertation is the delineation between the norms that 
prohibit aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression on the primary level, and the 
concomitant explanation of how the secondary norms should be interpreted with respect to state 
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responsibility and individual criminal responsibility in a situation of prosecution of the crime of 
aggression. The more practical elements of the present research encompass the contemplation of 
whether and to what extent the crime of aggression can be prosecuted at the ICC and domestic 
courts.   
This research intends to contribute to scholarship by studying the crime of aggression from a 
public international law perspective, with particular reference to the intrinsic link between the 
state act of aggression and the crime of aggression. By a public international law perspective, 
this dissertation will assert that individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression 
should not be understood as a phenomenon exclusive to international criminal law, but as part of 
the broader context of international responsibility for wrongful conduct. This study will give 
priority to three main issues.  
First, the better understanding of how the norms of international law on the primary level 
prohibit and criminalise aggression (the act of aggression and the crime of aggression), and how 
the breach thereof gives rise to legal consequences under the secondary level of international 
responsibility (state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility). This will put into 
perspective how the intrinsic link between the state act of aggression and the crime of aggression 
should be understood in relation to how the interplay between state responsibility and individual 
criminal responsibility should be interpreted during the prosecution of the crime of aggression.  
Second, the relevant actors should be identified, that is to say, the duty-bearers of the norms 
that criminalise aggression and the rights-holders of the enjoyment of the protection of these 
norms. It is submitted that the former are individuals, whilst the latter are states. It is further 
submitted that it is within the legal interests of the latter to enjoy the protection afforded by these 
norms; and in situations when the former has failed to comply with the duty to refrain from such 
conduct, that legal consequences by means of criminal sanctions are enforced.  
Third, there is need to examine how the norms that criminalise aggression are enforced 
under international law. Enforcement refers to ensuring that duty-bearers comply with their 
obligations to respect the norms that criminalise aggression; and that in the event of breach 
thereof, legal consequences can be enforced directly against the duty-bearer. The general 
argument is that, by attaching legal consequences to the breach of the norms that criminalise 
aggression, the duty-bearer will feel compelled to respect obligations to refrain from the relevant 
prohibited conduct. In a situation of breach of obligations, it is of course in the interests of the 
rights-holder that legal consequences are invoked against the duty-bearer. Therefore, the 
protection of the legal interests of the aggressed state as the victim of the crime of aggression 
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refers to ensuring that legal consequences are enforced against the perpetrator of the crime of 
aggression.   
In adopting the outlined approach of examining the crime of aggression, the study of this 
crime is advanced in both the fields of public international law and international criminal law.  In 
the context of public international law, this dissertation contributes to the ongoing study of 
international responsibility for wrongful conduct, particularly in the light of international crimes 
committed by individuals. By clarifying how the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms 
that criminalise aggression interplay on the primary level, it can be understood how the 
relationship between state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility should be 
interpreted with respect to the crime of aggression. With respect to international criminal law, 
this dissertation contributes to the ongoing study of prosecution of the crime of aggression at 
both the ICC and domestic courts. In particular, the hypothesis that the ICC should have de facto 
exclusive jurisdiction over the crime of aggression15 is challenged.16 Against the backdrop of 
international criminal law, the acknowledgment that the victim of the crime of aggression is the 
aggressed state is important, as this is indicative of the concept that the concept of a victim of an 
international crime may encompass both states and natural persons. Furthermore, an unusual 
asymmetry is brought to light, i.e. that the perpetrator of the crime is a natural person, whilst the 
victim is a state. The ramifications of this insight are examined in the context of the normative 
framework of victims’ rights and the regime of the ICC with respect to victim participation and 
reparations.  
There is also the question of whether natural persons who have suffered injury in a situation 
of aggression may be considered as victims of the crime of aggression. The assessment of injury 
to natural persons in a situation of aggression (as the result of the state act of aggression and the 
crime of aggression) involves examining the legal framework applicable in a situation of 
aggression, and delineating between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. From a broader public 
international law perspective, this illustrates how the three separate legal frameworks, 
international criminal law, jus ad bellum and jus in bello interplay in a situation of aggression.   
The findings of this research are also important from a practical perspective. First, the 
aggressed state may rightfully identify itself as the rights-holder of the enjoyment afforded from 
the protection of the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression. 
                                                
15 Article 8, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996 (“Draft Code of 
Crimes”); see also Commentaries on the Draft Code of Crimes, 27-28; see also Beth Van Schaack, ‘Par in 
Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression’ (2012) 10 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 133. 
16 This will be examined in Section 5.3 in Chapter V.  
 8 
The aggressed state may thus understand better its legal interests under international law in 
relation to legal consequences against the aggressor state for the act of aggression, and the 
alleged perpetrator(s) of the crime of aggression.  
Second, the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression is yet to be activated. States 
Parties to the Rome Statute (State Parties) have raised questions relating to the entry-into-force 
of the Kampala Amendments and the jurisdictional regime of the Court over the crime of 
aggression.17 This dissertation examines how the entry-into-force of the Kampala Amendments 
and the jurisdictional regime of the ICC over the crime of aggression should be interpreted, 
which is of interest to both academics and practitioners.   
Third, from a practitioner’s perspective, it may be useful to understand the legal positions of 
the aggressor state, aggressed state, the perpetrator of the crime of aggression, and natural 
persons in a situation of aggression. This way the legal position of each of these subjects can be 
taken into consideration when deciding upon the need to enforce legal consequences under the 
secondary rules of responsibility, with particular reference to individual criminal responsibility.  
This dissertation is conducted in three parts. Part I provides the background to the crime of 
aggression. The aim is to study the definition of the crime of aggression under international law, 
with particular reference to the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms that criminalise 
aggression, thereby placing obligations on states to refrain from an act of aggression and 
obligations on individuals to refrain from conduct relating to the crime of aggression. Part I 
consists of three chapters.  
Chapter I addresses the state act of aggression from the perspectives of both the aggressor 
state and the aggressed state in the light of the framework of collective security and the United 
Nations. This Chapter examines how international law places obligations on states to refrain 
from an act of aggression pursuant to the applicable legal framework, i.e. jus ad bellum. The 
scope and nature of these obligations will be studied, with particular reference to the duty-
bearers and rights-holders of the protection from the norms that prohibit aggression. This puts 
into perspective how responsibility can be attributed to the aggressor state under international 
law for the act of aggression.    
Chapter II examines crimes against peace pursuant to the Charter and judgment of the IMT, 
which mark the origins of the crime of aggression. Indeed the IMT signifies the turning point in 
international law when individuals were prosecuted and convicted for crimes against peace. It 
                                                
17 This is background information gathered from personal experience when I was accredited to the 
Liechtenstein delegation to attend the 11th Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court 2012 and spoke to various States Parties with respect to the 
ratification and implementation of the Kampala Amendments.  
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will be suggested that the norms that criminalise aggression did not exist prior to the formation 
of the Charter of the IMT or the judgment of the Tribunal. Yet, both the Charter and judgment of 
the IMT (“the Nuremberg principles”)18 have gradually gained customary international law 
status.19 This means that there are now norms under international law that impose obligations 
directly on individuals to refrain from conduct relating to a state act of aggression, and attach 
sanctions directly for the breach thereof, i.e. the criminalisation of aggression. The subsequent 
Nuremberg Trials pursuant to Control Council Law no.10 were directly bound by the judgment 
of the IMT and had further developed the Nuremberg principles. For these reasons, only the IMT 
and NMT will be examined in this Chapter in relation to understanding the origins of the norms 
that criminalise aggression. This Chapter aims to delineate the contours of the crime at 
Nuremberg (and thus customary international law), with particular reference to the state act 
element of the crime (the state act of aggression), and the elements of the crime pertaining to 
individual conduct (actus reus and mens rea). It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to include 
an analysis of the IMTFE.   
Chapter III examines the definition of the crime of aggression in the Kampala Amendments. 
Upon examining the legal nature of the Kampala Amendments, it is submitted inter alia that the 
definition of the crime under Article 8 bis(1) has not attained customary international law status. 
Therefore, the legal definition of the crime of aggression under customary international law is 
still the substantive definition of crime against peace pursuant to the Nuremberg principles. By 
comparing the definition of the crime of aggression in the Kampala Amendments with the 
definition of crimes against peace at Nuremberg, the legal definition of the crime of aggression 
can be studied in the context of whether, and how, the scope of the crime has developed in 
international law.  
Part II considers the more conceptual aspects of the present study. This involves examining 
the relationship between the aggressor state for committing an act of aggression and the 
perpetrator of the crime of aggression, to understand better how the norms that prohibit 
aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression interplay on the primary and secondary 
level, and how they should be interpreted with respect to the crime of aggression. As such, it can 
be better understood how the obligations placed on states to refrain from an act of aggression are 
interconnected with the obligations on individuals to refrain from conduct relating to the crime 
of aggression, and how this should be interpreted with respect to individual criminal 
                                                
18 GA Resolution 95(1) 1946. 
19 Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and the Judgment 
of the Tribunal (1950), Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, vol. II, para. 97.   
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responsibility for the latter. The aggressed state is identified as the rights-holder of the enjoyment 
of the protection from the norms that criminalise aggression, which has suffered from the failure 
of the relevant duty-holder to comply with obligations to refrain from conduct relating to the 
crime of aggression. Thus, it is submitted that enforcement of sanctions against the perpetrator(s) 
of the crime of aggression by means of criminal prosecution is in the direct legal interests of the 
aggressed state. Part II comprises two chapters.  
Chapter IV examines the relationship between the aggressor state and the perpetrator of the 
crime of aggression. It examines the intrinsic link between the act of aggression and the crime of 
aggression (primary level), whereby individual criminal responsibility for the crime of 
aggression is predicated upon state responsibility for the act of aggression (secondary level). 
This Chapter identifies the points of distinction between the norms that prohibit aggression and 
the norms that criminalise aggression to delineate how these norms interplay on the primary 
level. It then continues to elaborate the point of intersection between the norms that prohibit 
aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression to understand how the obligations on states 
to refrain from an act of aggression interplay with the obligations on individuals to refrain from 
conduct which relates to the act of aggression. The aim is to shed light on the relationship 
between state responsibility for aggression and individual criminal responsibility for the crime of 
aggression to explain how the former is sine qua non for the latter.  
Chapter V submits that the victim of the crime of aggression is the aggressed state because it 
is the rights-holder of the enjoyment of the protection afforded by the norms that criminalise 
aggression, who has suffered from the breach of obligations by the relevant duty-holder. As 
such, enforcement of sanctions (prosecution) against the perpetrator of the crime of aggression is 
in the direct legal interests of the aggressed state. That said, this submission appears to depart 
from the general concept of victims in international criminal law, which usually pertains to 
natural persons. Thus, it will be examined whether natural persons may also be considered as 
victim(s) of the crime of aggression. As the victim of the crime of aggression is the aggressed 
state, the question is how this can be reconciled with the normative framework of victims’ rights 
(which pertains to individuals). In particular, it will be addressed whether and to what extent the 
aggressed state may be a beneficiary to reparations for the crime of aggression from the 
perpetrator of the crime (individual civil responsibility). 
Part III examines the enforcement of the norms that criminalise aggression, with particular 
reference to the enforcement mechanisms under international law, the ICC and domestic courts. 
This Part will examine the question whether and to what extent international law protects the 
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legal interests of the aggressed state. In other words, whether and to what extent prosecution can 
take place at either the ICC level or in domestic courts. This Part has two chapters.  
Chapter VI examines prosecution of the crime of aggression at the ICC. The aim of this 
chapter is to understand to what extent the ICC as enforcement mechanism, is representative of 
the legal interests of the aggressed state (and the international community) to prosecute the crime 
of aggression. In order to do so, it is necessary to delineate the jurisdictional regime of the ICC 
over the crime of aggression (Articles 15 bis and 15 ter, Kampala Amendments) as this 
encompasses the contours of situations that may be prosecuted at the Court. As will be discussed, 
the jurisdictional regime over the crime of aggression at the Court is different from the 
jurisdictional regime over the other crimes in Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute: it is sui generis in 
nature. Another important and contentious issue that will be contemplated is the question of the 
consent of the aggressor state with respect to the jurisdictional regime of the ICC over the crime 
of aggression.   
Chapter VII examines prosecution of the crime of aggression in domestic courts. As a 
preliminary issue, this Chapter challenges and rejects the hypothesis that suggests that domestic 
courts are not competent fora for the prosecution of the crime of aggression, and that the ICC 
should have de facto exclusive jurisdiction. It will be submitted that domestic courts and the ICC 
may have concurrent jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as international law relies on both 
enforcement mechanisms to prosecute the perpetrator of the crime of aggression. This Chapter 
will examine the concerns that arise with respect to domestic prosecution for the crime of 
aggression and whether and to what extent they may be overcome.   
Before engaging with the topic of research, few conceptual clarifications are in order. First, 
the terms ‘crimes against peace’ and the ‘crime of aggression’ are synonymous and will be used 
interchangeably throughout this dissertation. Although there has been a change in terminology, 
this is limited only to nomenclature and has no effect on the substantive components of the 
crime. Second, the terms ‘state act of aggression’ and ‘state act element of the crime’ both refer 
to an act of aggression committed by the aggressor state. This can be juxtaposed with the 
‘elements of the crime pertaining to the conduct of the individual’, which refers to the behaviour 
of the individual. Third, it is commonly known that the term ‘war’ is rather anachronistic and has 
been replaced with the term ‘use of force.’ Yet, a ‘war of aggression’ is the state act element of 
crimes against peace pursuant to the Charter and judgment at the IMT (and thus customary 
international law). As such, a ‘war of aggression’ will be referred to in this dissertation in the 
context of the state act element for crimes against peace at the IMT, the NMT and the 
Nuremberg Principles under customary international law.  Fourth, the primary/secondary level 
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distinction refers to the norms on the primary level under international law that impose 
obligations on the relevant actor to refrain from an act of aggression (norms that prohibit 
aggression) or a crime of aggression (norms that criminalise aggression), and the norms on the 
secondary level that govern the responsibility of the relevant actors for the breach of obligations 
on the primary level.   
In this dissertation, it is submitted that the intrinsic link between the state act of aggression 
and the crime of aggression within the definition of the crime exists on two levels. On the 
primary level, the intrinsic link can be explained by identifying the point of intersection between 
the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression, as this 
demonstrates that both sets of norms run in parallel, and cannot exist separately from each other. 
On the secondary level, the intersection between state responsibility and individual criminal 
responsibility serves as an indicator that there has been a breach of both sets of norms on the 
primary level. The reason why state responsibility of the aggressor state is a necessary pre-
requisite of the crime of aggression is because it demonstrates that the individual(s) has acted in 
breach of the parallel set of obligations to refrain from conduct pertaining to the state act of 
aggression. As such, the individual is only responsible under international law for the breach of 
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An act of aggression is committed by the aggressor state against the aggressed 
state. Every act of aggression should be understood against the present framework of 
collective security pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), as one 
of the purposes of the UN is the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and the 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. By membership to 
the UN, the interests of a member state to resort to unilateral measures have been 
precluded because all enforcement measures relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security must be collective in nature. Concomitant to 
collective security is the legal framework pertaining to the use of force (jus ad 
bellum), which prohibits the use of force between states. Thus, an act of aggression 
represents a breach of the status quo of international peace and security by the 
aggressor state, as well as international law.  
The state act of aggression differs from a crime of aggression as the former is 
committed by a state while the latter by an individual. As will be discussed in the next 
two chapters, the state act of aggression is an essential component of the substantive 
definition of the crime of aggression, which is understood as the state act element of 
the crime.  Thus, it is important to understand the premise upon which the crime of 
aggression is predicated on.   
This chapter aims to study the obligations that international law confers on states 
to refrain from an act of aggression. The objective is to understand the scope and legal 
nature of these obligations, with particular reference to identifying the duty-bearer 
and rights-holder of the norms that prohibit aggression. This way, the obligations that 
the international legal framework places on states to refrain from an act of aggression, 
and the consequences of a breach thereof, can be understood. It should be clarified 
from the outset that the purpose of this chapter is not to provide an extensive, in-depth 
analysis of jus ad bellum in general, but rather to discuss the key elements, as far as 
necessary within the present context of this study of the state act of aggression.   
The chapter begins by examining the UN (section 1.2), with particular reference 
to the obligations placed on member states to refrain from an act of aggression, and 
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how the relevant organs of the UN may play a role in maintaining the status quo of 
international peace and security. The determination of an act of aggression and the 
ramifications thereof, will then be discussed. This is important to understand the role 
of the Security Council in determining an act of aggression for the purposes of 
prosecution of the crime of aggression at the ICC (Chapter VI).   
The Chapter continues to examine the legal framework that governs the use of 
force, jus ad bellum, in the light of how the prohibition of the use of force as 
encapsulated under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter confers obligations on states with 
respect to the use of force (section 1.3), and the applicability of the exception to this 
primary rule (section 1.4). By mapping out the framework of jus ad bellum, this helps 
to put into perspective how the rules under international law should be interpreted 
with respect to how states conduct themselves in relation to the use of force. The 
more contentious aspects of jus ad bellum, such as humanitarian intervention will also 
be examined (section 1.5.), followed by the legal nature of Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter (section 1.6).  
1.2. The United Nations   
 
The obligations on states to refrain from aggression, and the act of aggression 
itself, must be understood in the light of the framework of collective security within 
the UN.20 The prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and suppression of acts 
of aggression or other breaches of the peace are central to the objectives of collective 
security and the existence of the UN.21 After the horrors of World War II, the world 
was determined to establish an international multilateral institution that would 
maintain international peace and security, in the hopes that the future generations are 
protected from the scourge of war. This led to negotiations in 1944 and 1945 at 
Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, whereby, on June 26th 1945, the UN Charter was 
signed at San Francisco. The UN was born, an international organization with the 
primary purpose of maintaining international peace and security.22  
The essence of collective security can be seen in Article 1 of the UN Charter, 
which stipulates that the purposes of the UN are inter alia: 
                                                
20 Alexander Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (Oxford University Press 2011) 11. 
21 See Preamble and Articles 1, 24 and 39, UN Charter.  
22 Preamble to the UN Charter; see Leland M Goodrich, ‘From League of Nations to United 
Nations’ (1947) 1 International Organization 3. 
 16  
to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and 
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to 
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. 
 
According to this provision, the status quo is international peace and security. It can 
be inferred that states are under obligations to refrain from unilateral measures to 
maintain the status quo, as it is explicitly stated that measures of preventing and 
removal of threats to the peace, and the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace are “effective collective measures.” It is also inferred that states 
are now under obligations to refrain from unilateral actions when a wrong has been 
committed against them, as the provision confers obligations to resolve such matters 
under methods of international dispute settlement under international law as peaceful 
measures. This should be read together with Article 2(3) and Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. The former stipulates that ‘all Members shall settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, 
and justice, are not endangered’, whilst the latter pertains to the prohibition of the use 
of force.  
This departs from practice prior to the formation of the UN Charter, 23 where 
international law had allowed unilateral measures, e.g. by means of sanctions when a 
state resorts to war,24 reprisals or self-help.25  Here, it can be said that the framework 
of collective security is an improvement from the League of Nations, as the sanction 
mechanism of the latter appeared to be dependent upon the willingness of the member 
States to take action,26  as was in the nature of a decentralized legal order.27   
                                                
23  Claud H. Waldock, ‘The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in 
International Law’ (1952) 81 Recueil des Cours II 451, 460.        
24 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (2nd edn, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc 
1966) 25. 
25 Waldock (n 23) 460.  
26 Article 16 of the League Covenant states that ‘should any Member of the League resort to 
war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to 
have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby 
undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the 
prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-
breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse 
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The prohibition of states from unilateral measures either as sanctions against an 
aggressor state, or in response to wrongful activity, and the conferral of the interests 
of member states to the UN to preserve the status quo of international peace and 
security represent the shift from a decentralized system to a centralized system, i.e. 
from the League of Nations to the UN. By conferring their interests to the United 
Nations, it eliminates the autonomy for unilateral action when states believe the status 
quo is being challenged. According to Article 24 (1) of the UN Charter:   
 
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its 
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out 
its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.  
 
Thus, the Security Council is the UN organ that acts on behalf of all member states to 
the UN for the maintenance of international peace and security.28 It is important to 
note that Article 24 of the UN Charter refers to ‘primary’ responsibility, and not 
‘exclusive responsibility.’29 The powers of this organ are mainly found in Chapters VI 
and VII of the UN Charter, which provides the legal basis for the recommendations 
                                                                                                                                      
between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, 
whether a Member of the League or not’; See also Nico Krisch, ‘Introduction to Chapter VII 
Powers: The General Framework, Articles 39 to 43’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The 
United Nations Charter: A Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 1239. 
27 Kelsen has defined the principle of self-help as the primitive legal technique whereby ‘in 
early law the execution of the sanction was decentralized, that is, it was left to the individual 
whose interest was violated by the behavior of another individual which constituted the 
delict’, Kelsen, Principles of International Law (n 24) 7; He further submits that ‘the 
significant – and decisive - step in the development of collective security is achieved only 
when the principle of self-help is eliminated, and the principle of self-help is eliminated only 
when a legal order effectively reserves the execution of the sanction to a special organ, that is, 
when the force monopoly of the community is effectively centralized. The effectiveness of 
collective security then, is dependent upon the extent to which the force monopoly of the 
community is centralized, and the scope afforded to the principle of self-help is 
correspondingly restricted’, 36.    
28 Dan Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The 
Delegation by the UN Security Council of Its Chapter VII Powers (Oxford University Press 
1999) 6.  
29 See Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), 
Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C. J. Reports 1962, 151 (hereinafter “Certain Expenses 
of the United Nations”),163; Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, 136 (hereinafter 
“Legal consequences of the Construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”), 
para.26. 
 18  
and decisions made by the Security Council. Chapter VI provides the powers relating 
to peaceful settlement of disputes,30 whilst Chapter VII provides the powers of 
enforcement. 31 These powers are to be enjoyed by the Council insofar as they are 
conferred or implied in the UN Charter.32 Under Chapter VII, Article 39 of the UN 
Charter stipulates:  
 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
 
None of the terms ‘threat to the peace’, ‘breach of the peace’ or ‘act of aggression’, 
are defined in the UN Charter. Thus, it can be inferred that any determination is likely 
to be a political decision based on factual findings rather than a legal determination;33 
and is ultimately at the discretion of the Council.34 Upon a determination under 
Article 39, the Council may make recommendations or decide on the following 
measures under Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.  
Thus, this provision serves as the trigger mechanism for undertaking collective 
enforcement measures under the UN Charter. It is important to note the necessary pre-
requisite that the Council must first determine that there is either a ‘threat to the 
                                                
30 See Article 33, UN Charter. 
31 See Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (n 20) 26–27.            
32 Krisch (n 26) 1256.   
33 See Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (n 20) 150; see also Leland M Goodrich and Anne 
P Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security 
(Greenwood Press 1974) 362; Erika De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations 
Security Council (Hart Publishing 2004) 174–176. 
34 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has previously held, 
‘[t]he situations justifying resort to the powers provided for in Chapter VII are a threat to the 
peace’, a breach of the peace’ or an ‘act of aggression. While the ‘act of aggression’ is more 
amenable to a legal determination, the ‘threat to the peace’ is more of a political concept. But 
the determination that there exists such a threat is not a totally unfettered discretion, as it has 
to remain, at the very least, within the limits of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter’, 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, Case IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal Chamber, Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, 
para.29; see also De Wet (n 33) 134–138, in particular, she observes that the supporters of 
unlimited Security Council discretion under Article 39 ‘point to the fact that the the terms 
“threat to the peace”, “breach to the peace” or an “act of aggression” are not defined 
anywhere in the Charter’, ibid 135. 
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peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.’35 Here, the contrast between the UN 
and the League of Nations can be seen, as the latter had left member states to make 
such a determination, whilst the first three words of Article 39 of the UN Charter 
clearly establish that it is the role of the Security Council to determine any threats or 
breaches of the status quo and decide on collective enforcement measures. This is 
because member states of the UN have conferred upon the Security Council the 
authority to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression; upon which, it can determine collective enforcement actions.  
1.2.1 Determining an act of aggression  
 
In the broader context of the UN, an act of aggression represents a violation of 
international peace and security. As there is no definition of an act of aggression in 
the UN Charter, the determination of an act of aggression is not so straightforward. 
As will be examined later in Chapter VI, one of most controversial aspects of the 
negotiations leading up to the Kampala Amendments was the determination of the 
existence of an act of aggression. The drafters had to be careful that the definition and 
conditions that the Court may exercise jurisdiction were consistent with the UN 
Charter,36  which meant that they had to take into consideration the role of the 
Security Council with respect to determining an act of aggression. As such, opinion 
was divided upon whether the Security Council had the exclusive competence to 
determine an act of aggression, or whether other UN organs and/or the ICC may also 
have the competence to do so.37   
As submitted above, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security (Articles 1, 24, 39 of the UN 
Charter). Yet, by evidence of practice, the Security Council has appeared rather 
                                                
35 Krisch (n 26) 1335.         
36 See Niels Blokker, ‘The Crime of Aggression and the United Nations Security Council’ 
(2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 867, 867–894; Roger Clark, ‘Negotiating 
Provisions Defining the Crime of Aggression, Its Elements and the Conditions for the ICC 
Exercise of Jurisdiction Over It’ (2010) 20 European Journal of International Law 1103, 
1103–1115.  
37 This will be examined further in Chapter VII. 
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reluctant to determine acts of aggression.38 To date, there have been only five 
situations that have been determined as aggression: 
 
1) Acts committed by Southern Rhodesia against: Zambia,39 
Mozambique,40Angola, Mozambique and Zambia;41 
2) Acts committed by South Africa against: Angola,42 Botswana,43 Lesotho,44 
Seychelles;45 
3) Acts committed by mercenaries against Benin;46 
4) Attacks committed by Israel against Tunisia;47 
5) Acts committed by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait48 
 
However, it can be argued that there have certainly been more than five situations of 
aggression since 1945. For example, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 and the 
invasion of Iraq by the US in 2003 could also be considered as acts of aggression if 
assessed in accordance with the primary norms under jus ad bellum.   
Determinations of an act of aggression by the Security Council contain political 
ramifications such as the condemnation of the aggressor state, and the need for 
collective enforcement measures. As pointed out by Krisch, ‘the determination of an 
act of aggression by the Security Council is a political and not a judicial finding. It 
primarily opens the way for enforcement action and helps unite the international 
community against the aggressor.’49 The determination of an act of aggression under 
Article 39 of the UN Charter is thus concomitant with the responsibility to 
recommend enforcement collective measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to 
maintain or restore international peace and security as ‘such determination has been a 
                                                
38 See Christine Gray, ‘The Use and Abuse of the International Court of Justice: Cases 
Concerning the Use of Force after Nicaragua’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International 
Law 867, 898–899. 
39 SC Res. 326 (1973); SC Res. 455 (1979).   
40 SC Res. 386 (1976); SC Res. 441 (1977) ; SC Res. 424 (1978).  
41 SC Res. 445 (1979). 
42 SC Res. 387 (1976); SC Res. 546 (1984); SC Res. 571 (1985).  
43 SC Res. 568 (1985); SC Res. 572 (1985). 
44 SC Res. 527 (1982); SC Res. 580 (1985).  
45 SC Res. 496 (1981); SC Res. 507 (1982). 
46 SC Res. 405 (1977) . 
47 SC Res. 573 (1985); SC Res. 611(1988).   
48 SC Res. 667 (1990).  
49 Krisch (n 26) 1294.  
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method of collective coercion as well as a preliminary to collective measures of 
coercion.’50 In other words, if the Security Council determines a situation as an act of 
aggression, there are legitimate expectations from the international community as a 
whole, for the Council to recommend enforcement measures.   
Thus, the reluctance to determine the existence of aggression becomes somewhat 
more understandable, as the Council minimizes its potential of being in a position 
which gives rise to such expectations from the international community. There is also 
the political reality that all permanent members need to reach a consensus to authorize 
collective enforcement measures under Chapter VII in a situation of an act of 
aggression.51 By refraining from determining the existence of aggression, the Council 
may avoid being in a position where an act of aggression has been determined but it is 
not in the position to authorize enforcement measures.  
It is reasonable to question what would happen if the Security Council, as the 
central organ, fails to carry out its primary responsibility to restore and maintain 
international peace and security in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace or act of aggression. If Article 24 of the UN Charter confers the Security 
Council the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, 
then it can be implied that there is a subsidiary or secondary responsibility that falls 
upon another UN organ for the maintenance of international peace and security.52  
This question came to light when GA Resolution 377 A(V) was adopted in 1950, 
(“The Uniting for Peace Resolution”).53 Against the backdrop of blockage by the 
USSR of furnishing any form of assistance to the Republic of Korea against the 
aggression by North Korea,54 the US introduced an agenda item “United Action for 
Peace” whereby Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed that the Assembly 
                                                
50 Goodrich and Simons (n 33) 366.     
51 Article 27(3), UN Charter.  
52 Peters writes that ‘regarding the relationship between the Council and the Assembly, the 
term “primary” does not offer a precise guideline as to when and under what conditions 
exactly an act of the Assembly would unduly interfere with the competences of the Council 
and therefore be ultra vires. The exact delineation of competences is made not by the 
provision of Art.24 but by the more specific provisions of Arts 11, 12 and 39 and also by the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution,’ Anne Peters, ‘Article 24’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), 
The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 
769;Waldock (n 23) 505; Juraj Andrassy, ‘Uniting for Peace’ (1956) 500 American Journal of 
International Law 563, 564.  
53 See LH Woolsey, ‘The “Uniting for Peace” Resolution of the United Nations’ (1951) 45 
American Journal of International Law 129, 130.   
54 See G.A.O.R., 5th Sess., Annexes, vol.2, Item 68, U.N. Doc.A/1377(1950); See Peters (n 
52) 768–769.  
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“organize itself to discharge its responsibility [for collective security] promptly and 
decisively if the Security Council is prevented from acting.” 55 This Resolution 
intended to ‘improve the machinery of the United Nations for preserving peace’, by 
‘organizing the possibilities of collective action through the medium of the General 
Assembly in case the Security Council fails to exercise its responsibilities.’ 56 
Paragraph 1 of The Uniting for Peace Resolution:  
 
Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the 
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to 
be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General 
Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making 
appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in 
the case of a breach of the peace or an act of aggression the use of armed force 
when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.57 
 
The underlying basis for this paragraph is that the failure of the Council to exercise its 
primary responsibility must be due to an exercise of the veto power.58 The qualifiers 
of ‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ in the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution are consistent with Article 39 of the UN Charter, which serves not 
only to reinforce the primary responsibility of the Security Council, but also implies 
that it is necessary for the situation to be of a level that may invoke Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.  
                                                
55 G.A.O.R., 5th Sess., Annexes, vol.2, Item 68, U.N. Doc.A/1377 (1950); It is also known 
that one of the purposes of the Uniting for Peace resolution was ‘to eliminate any need for 
such improvisation as was necessary in Korea by laying a basis for a program in which 
members will make adequate forces available to the United Nations without undue delay’, 
U.S. Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations, Report by the 
President to the Congress for the Year 1960, Publication 4178 (1951) 100, as cited in 
Goodrich and Simons (n 33) 406.  
56 Andrassy (n 52) 463. 
57 Paragraph 1 further provides that the GA may meet in emergency special session within 
twenty-four hours of the request therefore, if it is not already in session at the time. The 
request for such emergency special session ‘shall be called if requested by the Security 
Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United 
Nations,’ which depicts the procedural steps within this mechanism.  
58 Myres S McDougal and Richard N Gardner, ‘The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation 
for Survival’ (1951) 60 Yale Law Journal 258, 289.  
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According to paragraph 1 of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the General 
Assembly may make ‘appropriate recommendations to Members for collective 
measures’ to maintain or restore international peace and security, which must be read 
in accordance with Article 11(2) UN Charter, which stipulates:  
 
The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance 
of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the 
United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a 
Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, 
and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard 
to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security 
Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be 
referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after 
discussion. 
 
There appear to be two aspects within this provision: i) the discussion of any 
questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security; ii) making a 
recommendation with regard to any such question.  With respect to former, there does 
not appear to be limits, which implies that the General Assembly is allowed to discuss 
a question even if the Security Council is carrying outs its functions with respect to 
it.59 However, there is a limitation on the latter, as can be seen in Article 12(1) of the 
UN Charter: 
 
While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation 
the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall 
not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless 
the Security Council so requests.  
 
Article 14 of the UN Charter states:  
 
                                                
59 Andrassy writes that ‘function’ is ‘a stage beginning when a matter is included in the 
agenda of the Council’but he cautions that ‘there are stages in the Council’s procedure where 
an item, though still on its agenda, is not actually considered’, Andrassy (n 52) 568–569.  
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Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may 
recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless 
of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly 
relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the 
provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of 
the United Nations. 
 
Thus it appears the Assembly can exercise its ‘dispute-settlement functions 
comprehensively and has the power of investigation to that effect’,60 provided that it 
does not encroach upon the functions of the Security Council. In the Advisory 
Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) observed that:  
 
As regards the practice of the United Nations, both the General Assembly and 
the Security Council initially interpreted and applied Article 12 to the effect 
that the Assembly could not make a recommendation on a question concerning 
the maintenance of international peace and security while the matter remained 
on the Council's agenda. […] The Court considers that the accepted practice of 
the General Assembly, as it has evolved, is consistent with Article 12, 
paragraph 1, of the Charter.61 
 
That said, as the Uniting for Peace Resolution is explicitly predicated upon the failure 
of the Security Council to exercise its primary responsibility, it is presumed that 
Article 12(1) of the UN Charter is not applicable in the present context.     
The next question is the competence of the General Assembly to make 
recommendations to Members for collective measures, which include the use of 
armed force.62 However, although such collective measures may include the use of 
armed force, they are not necessarily the same type of collective enforcement 
measures (Article 42, UN Charter) that the Security Council can make under Chapter 
                                                
60 Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (n 20) 46. 
61 Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, (n 
29) paras. 27-28. 
62 Thomas M Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks 
(Cambridge University Press 2002) 35; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of 
Force (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 260. 
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VII of the UN Charter. Unlike the Security Council, the General Assembly does not 
have any powers under the UN Charter to make legally binding recommendations to 
Member States, which undermines the hypothesis of the General Assembly having 
enforcement competences. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the Security 
Council derives its competence to authorize the use of military force by delegating its 
powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to Member States, whilst the General 
Assembly has no such powers under the UN Charter to delegate to Member States - 
an organ cannot delegate powers that it does not already possess. Also, as General 
Assembly resolutions have no legally binding effect, it is difficult to argue that a GA 
resolution can be relied upon as a legal source to confer powers to the General 
Assembly that are non-existent within the UN Charter. 63  
Upon closer examination of the text, the Uniting for Peace Resolution mentions 
that any appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, and the 
use of armed force if necessary, may be made in a situation of a ‘breach of peace or 
act of aggression.’ This implies that the use of force by the alleged aggressor state is 
already present. Therefore, the aggressed state is permitted under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter and customary international law to resort to self-defence. Likewise, as Article 
51 provides for collective self-defence, the General Assembly may call upon the 
obligations of other States. 64  In other words, if the General Assembly makes 
recommendations that involve the use of military force, this is not authorization of 
military force per se, but rather a reinforcement of the inherent right to individual or 
collective self-defence as enshrined in the UN Charter. 65 Furthermore, by excluding 
‘threat to the peace’, the Uniting for Peace Resolution reserves the competence to 
decide upon collective enforcement measures to preserve the status quo in the absence 
of an armed attack.  
Therefore, although the UN Charter states that primary responsibility falls upon 
the Security Council to maintain international peace and security, the competence to 
authorize military force under Chapter VII is exclusively for the Security Council. 
This is consistent with the opinion of the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion on Certain 
Expenses of the United Nations: 
                                                
63  Olivier Corten, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in 
Contemporary International Law (Hart 2010) 331. 
64 ibid 333. 
65  ibid 331; Yoram Dinstein, War Aggression and Self-Defence (5th edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2011) 541. 
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the kind of action referred to in Article II, paragraph 2, is coercive or 
enforcement action. […] This last sentence says that when "action" is 
necessary the General Assembly shall refer the question to the Security 
Council. The word "action" must mean such action as is solely within the 
province of the Security Council. It cannot refer to recommendations which 
the Security Council might make, as for instance under Article 38, because the 
General Assembly under Article II has a comparable power. The "action" 
which is solely within the province of the Security Council is that which is 
indicated by the title of Chapter VI1 of the Charter, namely "Action with 
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression".66   
 
Therefore the General Assembly may not authorize enforcement collective measures 
in the same way as the Security Council under Chapter VII, not even pursuant to the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution. Be that as it may, the General Assembly may determine 
the existence of acts of aggression. The General Assembly has previously determined 
six situations involving aggression: 
 
1) acts committed by China in Korea;67  
2) the occupation of Namibia by South Africa;68  
3) South Africa against other African States;69 
4)  acts committed by Portugal against territories under Portuguese 
administration;70  
5) acts committed by Israel in the Middle East;71 
6) acts by Serbia and Montenegro against Bosnia and Herzegovina.72   
 
                                                
66 Certain expenses of the United Nations (n 29), 164-165. 
67 GA Res. 498(V)(1951), see also GA Res. 500(V)(1951); GA Res. 712(VII)(1953); GA Res. 
2132 (XX)(1965).   
68 GA Res. 1899(XVIII)(1963); GA Res. S-9/2(1978). 
69  GA Res. 36/8(1981); GA Res. 36/172A(1981); GA Res. 38/92(1983); GA Res. 
39/72(1984); GA Res. 2508(XXIV)(1969); GA Res. 36/172C(1981); GA Res. 38/39C(1983); 
GA Res. 39/72G(1984).  
70  GA Res. 2795(XXVI)(1971); GA Res. 3061(XXVIII) (1973); GA Res. 
3133(XXVII)(1973). 
71 GA Res. 36/27(1981); GA Res. 37/18(1982); GA Res. 36/226A(1981); GA Res. ES-
9/1(1982); GA Res. 36/226A(1981). 
72 GA Res. 46/242(1982); GA Res. 47/12(1992). 
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The present analysis has shown that under Article 24 of the UN Charter, the 
responsibility conferred to the Security Council to determine an act of aggression is 
primary and not exclusive. Other UN organs may thus also play a role in determining 
the existence of an act of aggression. However, collective enforcement measures to 
suppress any acts of aggression and maintain or restore the status quo of international 
peace and security can only be made by the Security Council. 73 
1.3. The prohibition of an act of aggression under international law  
 
Concomitant to the framework of collective security within the UN Charter is the 
international legal framework that regulates the use of force, jus ad bellum. The 
primary rules confer obligations on States with respect to how they conduct their 
recourse to force. Yet, these rules are not precisely defined. Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter is highly subject to interpretation, whilst the interpretative framework with 
respect to the customary international law rules is incoherent.74 In a situation where 
there is need to consider the legality of the use of force, the situation will be assessed 
in accordance to the legal framework of jus ad bellum. This is not necessarily a 
straightforward task.  
1.3.1. The legal prohibition of the use of force: Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
 
The cornerstone of jus ad bellum is the prohibition on the use of force, as 
enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: 
 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
 
This is the rule under international law that confers obligations on member states to 
refrain from the threat or use of force. ‘All members’ implies that Article 2(4) is 
legally binding on every signatory state to the UN Charter. However, as it is generally 
                                                
73 Gray, ‘The Use and Abuse of the International Court of Justice: Cases Concerning the Use 
of Force after Nicaragua’ (n 38) 888–896. 
74 Corten (n 63) 4–27. 
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accepted that Article 2(4) has attained customary international law status, 75 it is also 
legally binding on non- signatory states. Therefore, Article 2(4) confers obligations on 
all states to refrain from unilateral force against other states.   
The question is whether Article 2(4) imposes a duty on individuals with respect 
to obligations to refrain from inter-state force. This is central to understanding the 
relationship between the act of aggression and the crime of aggression; with particular 
emphasis on the obligations that international law confers on states and individuals 
respectively.  As the UN Charter is a legal instrument binding on all member States of 
the United Nations, an argument can be made that it is only applicable to states as 
subjects of international law. Individuals, a fortiori, are not under any obligations to 
comply with Article 2(4), as confirmed by Dörr and Randelzhofer: 
 
Private individuals or groups do not fall under Art.2(4), nor under customary 
prohibition of the use of force.76 
 
Therefore, individuals are not duty-bearers with respect to compliance of Article 2(4). 
The inter-state nature of the obligations is further demonstrated by the use of the 
phrase ‘international relations,’ which suggests that the prohibition encompasses 
inter-state conflict, i.e. the use of force by one state against another state. This 
complements Article 2(3) of the UN Charter.   
The next component of Article 2(4) is the ‘use of force.’ Here, the shift in 
terminology from ‘war’77 can be seen. The normative framework under the League of 
Nations that restricted recourse to war did not appear to prohibit measures short of 
war, thus leaving it for member states to determine that their recourse to force was not 
necessarily prohibited as it did not constitute war. Article 1 of the General Treaty for 
                                                
75 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua  (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, 14 (hereinafter 
“Military and Paramility Activities in and against Nicaragua”) para 190; see also para.73; 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (n 
29) para.87; See also Claus Kress, ‘The International Court of Justice and the “Principle of 
Non-Use of Force”’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in 
International Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 567–568.  
76 Albrecht Randelzhofer and Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 2(4)’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), 
The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 
213.   
77 Corten (n 63) 51. 
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Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy  (“Kellogg-Briand Pact”) 
stipulates: 
 
the High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective 
peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their 
relations with one another. 
 
The concept of ‘recourse to war’ is broad and can be envisaged to encompass a broad 
range of forcible acts. States may carry out military actions and not declare them as 
war and argue that they are thus not in breach of international law;78 or states may 
carry out military actions which do not constitute a gravity severe enough to be 
considered as ‘war’ and similarly argue that they are not in breach of international law.  
Article 2(4) overcomes this by setting a broader prohibition, which would 
encompass measures ‘short of war’ in addition to ‘war.’ Thus, any use of force is 
prima facie a breach of Article 2(4). Furthermore, the prohibition under Article 2(4) 
extends beyond the use of force, and also encompasses a ‘threat to force.’ This infers 
prima facie that states are also under an obligation to refrain from the threat of the use 
of force against other states, in addition to the use of force.79   
It is generally accepted that ‘force’ refers to military force. 80 Thus, Article 2(4) 
should be understood as the prohibition of use or threat of military force by one State 
against another State.81 Under Article 2(4), states are under obligation to refrain from 
the use of military force against the ‘territorial integrity and political independence’ of 
                                                
78 For example, in 1931 and 1937, China and Japan engaged in hostilities with each other but 
denied that there was no state of war, and thus the situation did not fall under the Kellogg-
Briand Pact; see Randelzhofer and Dörr (n 76) 207. Nico Schrijver, ‘The Ban on the Use of 
Force in the UN Charter’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in 
International Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 468–469. 
79 In general, see Nikolas Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2009); Romana Sadurska, ‘Threats of Force’ (1988) 82 American Journal of 
International Law 239; Dino Kritsiotis, ‘Close Encounters of a Sovereign Kind’ (2009) 20 
European Journal of International Law 299; Marco Roscini, ‘Threats of Armed Force and 
Contemporary International Law’ (2007) 54 Netherlands International Law Review 229; 
Corten (n 63) 92–124. 
80 Corten (n 63) 50–52.  
81 Corten argues that ‘the applicability of article 2(4) presupposes a use of force by one State 
against another and not just a simple police operation by one State against individuals who 
allegedly broke its laws. If an aircraft unduly enters the airspace of a State that decides to 
shoot it down, the relationship opposes the State whose domestic legal order has been 
violated and the persons or persons responsible for that violation’, ibid 66.  
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other States. That said, the modes ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ 
are relatively vague, which naturally leaves room for interpretation by States with 
respect to their obligations to refrain from the use of force.82 
Article 2(4) includes the phrase ‘or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.’ Arguably, this could also provide room for 
interpretation by States that the use of force is not contrary to Article 2(4) as it is not 
inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. However, in my view, the use of the 
conjunction “or” should be read as broadening the scope of the prohibition of the use 
of force, and not to suggest that States may use force for purposes which are not 
contrary to the purposes of the UN. In other words, the phrase serves to extend the 
circumstances when the use of force is prohibited. Thus, in addition to refraining from 
the use of force against the territory integrity or political independence of any state, 
states are also under obligations to refrain from the use of force in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.  
For example, Article 2(4) does not appear to explicitly exclude reprisals as a form 
of self-help against a wrong state when an international wrong has been committed 
against the aggrieved state. An argument can be made that Article 2(4) does not 
necessarily restrict or preclude a state’s inherent right to forcible self-help. However, 
the general framework of collective security within the UN requires states to 
relinquish their right to unilateral measures such as forcible self-help. The phrase ‘or 
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations’ would 
arguably encompass obligations on states to refrain from the use of force as reprisals 
because such forms of self-help are contrary the framework of collective security.83  
This may be further affirmed by reading Article 2(3) together with Article 2(4).84  
Therefore, ‘or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
                                                
82  Myres S McDougal and Florentino P Feliciano, ‘Legal Regulation of Resort to 
International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defence in Policy Perspective’ (1959) 68 The 
Yale Law Journal 1057, 1101; Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Legal Limits to the Use of Force by 
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of International Law 1, 1.  
84 SC Res. 188(1964) has condemned ‘reprisals as incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations’;84 GA Res. 2625 (XXV)(1970) Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and cooperation among States (“Declaration 
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Nations’ can be interpreted as extending the prohibition of the use of force to 
encompass situations that are contrary to the framework of collective security. 
1.3.2. Article 2(4) and an act of aggression 
  
An act of aggression is not defined in the UN Charter. As such, there is no 
provision under the Charter that specifically prohibits an act of aggression. Articles 1 
and 39 infer that an act of aggression is contrary to the status quo of international 
peace and security. These articles suggest that states are under general obligations to 
refrain from committing an act of aggression. Yet, the only relevant provision 
conferring legal obligations on states with respect to recourse to force is Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter. By prohibiting recourse to unilateral force on the inter-state levels, 
the UN Charter effectively precludes a situation of aggression.  
Differences in thresholds pertaining to the use of force can be inferred from 
Articles 1 and 39 of the UN Charter, which describe ‘threats to the peace’, ‘acts of 
aggression’, or other ‘breaches of the peace’ as potential disruptions to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. As it is presumed that an act of 
aggression is more serious than a threat to the peace and/or breach of the peace, it is 
logical that only a serious violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter should be 
considered as an act of aggression. Thus, there is an implicit understanding that a 
certain threshold must be met in order for a violation of Article 2(4) UN Charter to be 
determined as an act of aggression.   
In 1974, the General Assembly adopted GA Resolution 3314 (XXIX), which 
contains a definition of aggression.85 This definition is not legally binding on member 
states. Nevertheless, it can be said to have highly normative value in determining 
whether a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter can be considered as an act of 
aggression.86 It will now be examined to what extent this definition is useful in 
providing an insight to what the required threshold is for a violation of Article 2(4) 
UN Charter to amount as an act of aggression. Article 1 of the annex to GA 
Resolution 3314(XXIX):  
 
                                                
85 For a comprehensive account of the drafting and negotiation history of GA Resolution 
3314(XXIX) 1974, see Benjamin B Ferencz, Defining International Aggression: The Search 
for World Peace, vol II (Oceana 1975). 
86 Dinstein, War Aggression and Self-Defence (n 65) 124. 
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Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this 
Definition. 
 
Although this provision appears to broadly mirror Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, 
there are several differences between both texts.  First, Article 1 of the annex to GA 
Resolution 3314(XXIX) excludes the ‘threat of force.’ Second, it specifies the need 
for the use of ‘armed force.’  Third, Article 1 of the annex to GA to Resolution 
3314(XXIX) has included the term ‘sovereignty’ to be read together with territorial 
integrity and the political independence of the intended victim state.  Fourth, the 
intended victim state is described as ‘another state’ rather than ‘any’ state.  Fifth, the 
scope of the prohibited conduct under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter includes ‘any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations’, whilst Article 1 
of the annex to GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) sets the scope for prohibited conduct to 
include ‘any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.’ Sixth, 
there is a phrase that connects Article 1 with the rest of the definition.  
The key aspects of Article 1 of the annex to GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) that 
demonstrate an act of aggression encompasses a higher gravity of the use of force 
than a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter are:  
• the elimination of the threat of force. 
• the requirement of ‘armed force’, which suggests that a higher level of the use 
of force is needed for a situation to be considered as an act of aggression. 
• the criteria of ‘any other manner inconsistent with the UN Charter’ suggests 
the need for legal assessment of the use of force under Article 2(4), Article 51 
and Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The ramifications are that such use of 
force is clearly unlawful.  
It is questionable whether the inclusion of ‘sovereignty’ with the phrase ‘territorial 
integrity and political independence’ has any added value with respect to the interests 
of the intended victim state or if it is merely rhetorical. Be that as it may, Article 1 of 
the annex to GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) when read against Article 2(4) UN Charter 
suggests that the intended use of force must be actual armed force that is clearly 
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unlawful, directed against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of the aggressed state.   
Article 1 of the annex to GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) must be read in conjunction 
with Article 2 of the annex to GA Resolution 3314 (XXIX):   
 
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall 
constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security 
Council, may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination 
that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light 
of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or 
their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.  
 
Armed force must be initiated by the aggressor state and must be in contravention to 
the UN Charter. As such, this provides ambit for an argument that any initiation of 
armed force, which is not in contravention to the UN Charter, may not be considered 
as aggression under Article 2 of the annex to GA Resolution 3314(XXIX).  
Article 2 of the annex to GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) suggests that whenever a 
state initiates the use of armed force, which is in contravention of the UN Charter 
against another State, this is prima facie an act of aggression. The Security Council, 
upon its discretion, can reverse the presumption that the armed force is an act of 
aggression. It is not clear who makes the presumption, whether it is a general 
presumption made by the aggressed state, international community or a specific organ 
within the UN. Regardless, the role of the Security Council in this provision is important.  
By conferring the Security Council with the discretion to refute a presumption 
that an armed force is an act of aggression, Article 2 of the Annex to GA Resolution 
3314(XXIX) upholds the primary role of the central organ to maintain international 
peace and security and determine an act of aggression (Articles 24 and 39 UN 
Charter). The discretion of the Council with respect to the situation extends not only 
to the assessing the gravity of the use of armed force, but also the gravity of the 
consequences of the armed force. Presumably, these consequences refer to the 
aftermath of the initiation of the use of force in the territory of the aggressed state. 
This is a rather broad discretion.   
The mention of ‘sufficient gravity’ as a determining factor with respect to the 
armed force and its consequences, when read together with Article 1 of the annex to 
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GA Resolution 3314(XXIX), can be used to support the argument that the armed 
force must be of a sufficiently serious violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter to 
be considered as an act of aggression. Article 2 of the annex to GA Resolution 
3314(XXIX) also demonstrates how determination of an act of aggression by the 
Security Council is normative, as the criteria of ‘other relevant circumstances’ 
including the lack of ‘sufficient gravity’ are not necessarily legal criteria.  
The next provision provides an enumerative list of acts that may qualify as an act 
of aggression. Article 3 of the annex to GA Resolution 3314 (XXIX) stipulates: 
 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in 
accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:  
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or 
attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part 
thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State 
or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine 
and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another 
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions 
provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory 
beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of 
another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression 
against a third State;  
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity 
as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. 
The enumerated list is to be read in conjunction with Article 2 of the annex to GA 
Resolution 3314(XXIX). This means that each of these acts may qualify for an act of 
aggression if they are initiated by the aggressor state and not refuted by the Security 
Council as being of insufficient gravity (or other relevant circumstances).  Upon a 
closer examination of the text of the enumerated acts, it can be observed that each act 
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is either performed by or on behalf of a state.87 This reaffirms the state-centric aspect 
of an act of aggression under GA Resolution 3314(XXIX). 
It can be questioned whether the enumerated list is exhaustive, i.e. opened or 
closed. The former would suggest that other acts that fall outside the list could also 
qualify as an act of aggression, whilst the latter would imply the contrary. The answer 
is in Article 4 of the annex to GA Resolution 3314(XXIX), which stipulates: 
 
The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may 
determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the 
Charter. 
 
Therefore, acts that fall outside the list in Article 3 of the annex to GA Resolution 
3314 (XXIX) may also be considered as an act of aggression. Article 4 of the annex to 
GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) specifically provides the Council with discretion to 
determine that an act outside the list may be an act of aggression. As can be seen, the 
definition within GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) has made specific reference to the 
discretion of the Security Council in several provisions. This demonstrates that the 
definition in GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) is for the purposes of guiding the Security 
Council to make a determination of an act of aggression under Article 39.    
Ultimately, the definition of aggression in GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) is 
normative, and does not carry the legal weight as envisaged by the representative of 
the USSR at the adoption of the Resolution, when he proclaimed that the definition 
“accomplished its main purpose of depriving a potential aggressor of the possibility of 
using juridical loopholes and pretexts to unleash aggression.”88 Nevertheless, GA 
Resolution 3314(XXIX) is a significant instrument in international law and plays a 
role as a guiding text in both legal and normative determinations of an act of aggression.89  
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III, the definition of an act of 
aggression for the purposes of the state act element of the crime in Article 8 bis of the 
Kampala Amendments has incorporated Articles 1 and 3 of the Annex to GA 
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Resolution 3314(XXIX). This implies that the determination of an act of aggression 
for the purposes of prosecuting the crime of aggression at the ICC will encompass 
examining a violation of Article 2(4) in the light of Articles 1 and 3 of the Annex to 
GA Resolution 3314(XXIX). 
1.3.3. A legal determination of an act of aggression  
 
It is interesting to note the practice of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with 
respect to determining an act of aggression.90 Although the Court has not yet made 
any determinations of an act of aggression, this does not mean that it does not have 
the competence to do so.91 In the Case concerning armed activities on the territory of 
the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda),92 the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) had filed an Application instituting proceedings against Uganda in 
respect of a dispute concerning “acts of armed aggression perpetrated by Uganda on 
the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in flagrant violation of the 
United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.”93  
Upon examining the facts,94 the Court held that ‘the evidence has shown that the 
UPDF (Ugandan forces) traversed vast areas of the DRC, violating the sovereignty of 
that Country. It engaged in military operations in a multitude of locations […]. These 
were grave violations of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter.’95 It concluded that 
‘Uganda has violated the sovereignty and also the territorial integrity of the DRC. 
[…] The unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a magnitude and 
                                                
90 See Separate Opinion of Judge Elaraby, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, 168 
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91 Blokker (n 36) 883; Gray, ‘The Use and Abuse of the International Court of Justice: Cases 
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Court of Justice, contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter. 
94 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (n 90) paras. 72-91. 
95 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (n 90) para. 153. 
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duration that the Court considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition on the 
use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.’96   
Therefore, the findings of the Court inter alia were that Uganda did not commit 
an act of aggression, but had violated the principle of the non-use of force and non-
intervention.97  In the Separate Opinions of Judge Elaraby and Judge Simma, the 
Court was criticised for not finding that an act of aggression was committed by 
Uganda. Judge Elaraby held in his Separate Opinion that the Court should have 
explicitly upheld DRC’s claim that ‘such unlawful use of force amounted to 
aggression’98 and felt it was ‘incumbent upon the Court to respond to the serious 
allegation put forward by the DRC that the activities of Uganda also constitute 
aggression,’99 and:   
 
Rarely if ever has the Court been asked to pronounce upon a situation where 
such grave violations of the prohibition of the use of force have been 
committed. This makes it all the more important for the Court to consider the 
question carefully and — in the light of its dicta in the Nicaragua case — to 
respond positively to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s allegation that 
Ugandan armed activities against and on its territory amount to aggression and 
constitute a breach of its obligations under international law. […].100  
 
Judge Simma observes that ‘Uganda invaded a part of the territory of the DRC of the 
size of Germany and kept it under its own control.’101 He continues:  
 
So, why not call a spade a spade? If there ever was a military activity before 
the Court that deserves to be qualified as an act of aggression, it is the 
Ugandan invasion of the DRC. Compared to its scale and impact, the military 
                                                
96 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (n 90) para. 165. 
97 For a criticism, see Blokker, ‘The Crime of Aggression and the United Nations Security 
Council’ (n 36) 884. 
98 Separate Opinion of Judge Elaraby, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (n 90) 
para. 1. 
99 Separate Opinon of Judge Elaraby, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (n 90) 
paras. 8-9. 
100 Separate Opinon of Judge Elaraby, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (n 90) 
paras.18, 20.  
101 Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (n 90) 
para. 2. 
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adventures the Court had to deal with in earlier cases, as in Corfu Channel, 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua or Oil Platforms, 
border on the insignificant.102 
 
This case demonstrates that even though the facts may present an act of aggression, 
this does not necessarily amount to a legal determination of the existence of such an 
act, as the Court was only satisfied that a grave violation of Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter was committed.    
1.4. Exceptions to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
 
The UN Charter provides two exceptions to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: i) 
self-defence (Article 51, UN Charter); ii) authorization by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII (Article 42, UN Charter).103 These exceptions allow a state to depart from 
its obligations to comply with Article 2(4), which means that they may resort to the 
use of force under these circumstances. In such situations, there is no breach of 
primary obligations on the part of the state in question, e.g. the alleged aggressor 
state, which means that there is no finding of an unlawful use of force – or act of 
aggression. Thus, it is in the interests of the alleged aggressor state to argue that the 
purported act of aggression falls within one of the exceptions to the prohibition of the 
use of force.   
1.4.1. Self-defence  
 
Self-defence is broadly understood as counter-force by (an) aggrieved state(s) 
against an attacking state(s), with the objective to repel and/or protect its territory 
from further attack. As any and all instances of the use of force must be assessed 
within the primary rules of jus ad bellum, self-defence should always be examined in 
the light of this legal framework. The primary rule under international law that 
prohibits the use of force allows a state to act in self-defence as an exception to the 
rule. Thus, in the present UN era, self-defence should be read in accordance with the 
                                                
102 ibid. 
103 Randelzhofer and Dörr argue that, ‘[A] State which wishes to invoke an exception to that 
rule in order to justify forcible actions in its international relations, will carry the burden to 
show that the invoked justification exists as a legal norm in abstracto and that its 
preconditions were fulfilled in a given case of armed force’, Randelzhofer and Dörr (n 76) 
217.  
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prohibition of the use of force and not in an abstract form, or as its own primary rule 
within jus ad bellum.  
The norms pertaining to self-defence are an exception to the primary rule that 
prohibits the use of force. Therefore, it is only logical that these norms are governed 
by this primary rule in the sense that the circumstances where a state can resort to 
self-defence are subject to the conditions within the rule itself for an exception to the 
rule. It is these conditions that depict when an exception can be made to the primary 
rule, allowing a state to resort to the use of force.   
As Article 2(4) encapsulates the primary rule that prohibits the use of force, the 
exception to this rule is reflected in Article 51: 
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.104 
 
The UN Charter acknowledges that states have the ‘inherent right’ of self-defence.  A 
connection can be made that self-defence is a form of self-help. Thus, the “inherent 
right” refers to the primitive right of states to resort to self-defence as a form of self-
help. As this right has always been present in international law, it is logical that it is 
retained as an exception to the primary rule that prohibits the use of force. This is 
reflected in Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the UN Charter.   
Yet, it is important that the “inherent right” to self-defence is not completely 
unfettered, and must be conducted in accordance with the norms under international 
law that govern the exception to the rule that prohibits the use of force. These norms 
delineate the circumstances when a state may resort to self-defence.  The sources that 
govern these norms are the UN Charter and customary international law. Similarly to 
Article 2(4), there is ambit for interpretation, as Article 51 can be read either 
                                                
104 See Franck (n 62) 45–52; Dinstein, War Aggression and Self-Defence (n 65) 187–239.  
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comprehensively or restrictively, and Randelzhofer and Nolte rightly point out that 
‘the content and scope of a customary right of self-defence are unclear.’105 This 
means that there is ambit of interpretation with respect to whether the use of force by 
the state in question is lawful self-defence.     
There appears to be a gap between Article 2(4) and Article 51, as there is a 
difference between the “use of force” and “armed attack.”106 The latter implies a 
larger scale attack than the former. Simply put, not every use of force may constitute 
an armed attack. This was recently held by the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission 
(EECC); that the border incidents between the two countries amounted to ‘relatively 
minor incidents’ and ‘were not of a magnitude to constitute an armed attack by either 
State against the other within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter.’107 
It can be inferred that not every violation of Article 2(4) would provide a legal 
basis for the aggrieved state to invoke the norms relating to self-defence: there is the 
criterion of a certain degree of gravity of the armed force.108  Yet, whether an armed 
force (which is of sufficient gravity) is a condition within the primary rule that 
prohibits the use of force for an exception to the rule to apply is one of the most 
contested areas of jus ad bellum. In other words, is an armed attack a condition, which 
is necessary for a state to exercise self-defence? 109 This has given rise to a divide in 
consensus in both practice and scholarship.110  
                                                
105 Albrecht Randelzhofer and Georg Nolte, ‘Article 51’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), 
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110 ibid 194–200; Abraham Sofaer, ‘On the Necessity of Pre-Emption’ [2003] European 
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The opposing views are predicated upon the interpretation of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. A broad reading of Article 51 would assert that the UN Charter does not 
preclude a state from recourse to self-defence in the absence of an armed attack as 
part of the “inherent right.”111 The crux of this argument reads the phrase “inherent 
right” to encompass a customary international law right that allows states to exercise 
anticipatory self-defence in the absence of an armed attack. Presumably, this right has 
existed prior to the formation of the UN Charter. Therefore, Article 51 provides that 
nothing in the UN Charter could preclude this inherent right to anticipatory self-
defence, not even the explicit requisite of an armed attack. 
In my view, this interpretation is incorrect for two reasons. First, it is questionable 
as to whether the “inherent right” mentioned within Article 51 encompasses the so-
called right to anticipatory self-defence under customary international law.112 Corten 
rightly points out: 
 
this argument relies on an assertion that is far from proven: the existence, at 
the time the Charter was drawn up, of a customary right of preventive self-
defence that supposedly then subsisted without ever being fundamentally 
called into question.113 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Christian Henderson, ‘The Bush Doctrine: From Theory to Practice’ (2004) 9 Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 3;Gray, ‘The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security 
Strategy of the USA’.   
111 For example, Sir Humphrey Waldock argues that ‘it would be a travesty of the purposes of 
the Charter [the preservation of international peace and security] to compel a defending state 
to allow its assailant to deliver the first, and perhaps fatal blow… to read Article 51 literally is 
to protect the aggressor’s right to the first strike’, Waldock (n 23) 498.  
112 The basis that is relied upon to argue that the right to anticipatory self-defence exists under 
customary international law can be traced back to the exchange between the USA and Great 
Britain in the 1830s, also known as the Caroline case. The Secretary of State of the United 
States, Daniel Webster, called upon the British to show that the ‘necessity of self-defence was 
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation … and 
that the British force, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter 
the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, 
justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly 
within it’, Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Henry Fox, British Minister 
in Washington (Apr.24, 1841), 29 British and Foreign State Papers 1840-1841, at 1138; for a 
criticism of the Caroline case as a source with respect to anticipatory self-defence, see Corten (n 
63) 409–410; Dinstein, War Aggression and Self-Defence (n 65) 197; Ian Brownlie, ‘The Use 
of Force in Self-Defence’ (1961) 37 British Yearbook of International Law 183, 265. 
113 Corten (n 63) 409. 
 42  
Second, to read Article 51 broadly would appear contrary to the object and 
purpose of the provision and the overall UN Charter. A broad interpretation would 
suggest a drafting incoherency as Article 51, which contains an explicit condition 
precedent of an armed attack for a member state to invoke the inherent right of self-
defence, would simultaneously allow this inherent right of self-defence to exist 
irrespective of the condition precedent. In this regard, the explicit mention of the 
condition of an armed attack is rather redundant. This interpretation, as argued by 
Dinstein, is “counter-textual, counter-factual and counter-logical.”114   
Be that as it may, the debate relating to anticipatory self-defence need not be 
examined here.115 Instead, attention is drawn to the prospect of a situation when a 
state has acted in a situation of anticipatory self-defence against another state. Here, 
there appear to be two findings; either the state has acted lawfully in anticipatory self-
defence in the absence of an armed attack by the other state, or the state has 
committed an unlawful recourse to force against the other state, the gravity of which 
may amount to an act of aggression. As can be seen, the interpretation of the 
applicability of the norms pertaining to self-defence, which allow an exception to the 
primary rule of the prohibition of the use of force, has significant implications with 
respect to whether the state in question has acted in breach of international 
obligations.  
This can be used as an example to demonstrate how the determination of an act of 
aggression is highly subject to the interpretation of the primary rule prohibiting the 
use of force – and the exceptions to this rule. The implications of this with respect to 
the crime of aggression are that it is unclear whether the state act of aggression may 
include anticipatory self-defence. In other words, it may be contended that there is no 
legal basis for prosecuting the perpetrator for the crime of aggression because the 
alleged aggressor state has not committed an act of aggression, but rather has acted in 
anticipatory self-defence. Ultimately, this will be at the discretion of the ICC to 
determine whether the use of anticipatory self-defence in question may amount to a 
state act of aggression for the purposes of prosecution of the crime of aggression.   
                                                
114 Dinstein, War Aggression and Self-Defence (n 65) 196. In particular, he argues that ‘the 
reliance on an extra-Charter customary right of self-defence is also counter-logical’, at 198. 
115 see Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary 
Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2010) 255–367. 
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1.4.2. Authorisation by the Security Council under Chapter VII  
 
As established in section 1.2, the Security Council has the primary responsibility 
(Article 24, UN Charter) to facilitate collective measures for the purposes of 
maintaining the status quo of collective security (Article 1, UN Charter) upon 
determination of the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression (Article 39, UN Charter). Its powers are inter alia derived from Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, which allow it to decide which form of collective measures 
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.  
Article 41 refers to peaceful measures, whilst Article 42 refers to ‘actions by air, 
sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security’. The latter encompasses forceful measures such as military action, which is 
carried out by Member States of the UN that Blokker has called the ‘coalition of the 
able and willing’.116 He observes that ‘these resolutions have become the primary 
instrument through which the Security Council has acted if the use of military force 
was considered necessary.’ 117  He points out that ‘this model of “delegated 
enforcement action” is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter as one of the 
instruments available to the Security Council’,118 but concludes nevertheless that ‘it is 
an implied power of the Security Council to adopt such resolutions.’119  
The legal basis for the “delegated enforcement action” is derived from the UN 
Charter. As all member states have conferred their interests and competence to the 
                                                
116 Niels Blokker, ‘Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security 
Council to Authorize the Use of Force by “Coalitions of the Able and Willing”’ (2000) 11 
European Journal of International Law 541. See also Niels Blokker, ‘Outsourcing the Use of 
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119  Ibid 567; Sarooshi further submits that ‘both the Charter system and principles of 
delegation reject carte blanche delegations and favour authorizations with respect the 
authority and responsibility of the SC in the UN Collective security system’, id.    
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central organ to have the power to decide and/or recommend collective enforcement 
measures to restore or maintain international peace and security, authorization of the 
use of force represents a delegation of these powers under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter to the participating member states to facilitate forcible enforcement 
measures.120     
Practice of the Security Council resolutions that authorize the use of force has 
been varied and diverse; 121 yet what is consistent is that such authorization is 
sufficiently clear and explicit: ‘all necessary means’122; ‘all necessary measures.’123 A 
sufficiently clear and explicit authorization of the use of force is also representative of 
unanimity between all permanent members of the Council with respect to forcible 
enforcement measures. In the spirit and framework of collective security, the Security 
Council does not recommend forcible enforcement measures for the purposes of 
punishing any State per se for breaching primary obligations, but rather to maintain or 
restore the status quo of international peace and security (Articles 1, 24, 39 , UN Charter).    
The conferral of powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is the reason why a 
clear and explicit authorization by the Security Council is needed for member states to 
use force.124 This serves as an exception to the prohibition on the use of force under 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter because states have been delegated powers under 
Chapter VII to exercise the use of force.125  It should be noted that the powers that the 
Security Council may delegate to member states under Chapter VII are the same 
powers as accorded to it under the UN Charter. Without this delegation of powers by 
the Security Council to the member states, Article 2(4) is applicable.    
1.5. The question of humanitarian intervention 
 
Grey areas in jus ad bellum relate to situations where the particular legality of the 
use of force is uncertain because the international community is divided with respect 
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to how the rules should be interpreted. In addition to anticipatory self-defence, 
another example is humanitarian intervention. This is when states, a group of states, 
or international organisations resort to the use of force against the territory of another 
state in order to protect that state’s nationals from deprivation of international 
recognised human rights; such protection neither having authorisation by the Security 
Council nor an invitation from the legitimate government of the target state.126 
Humanitarian intervention appears prima facie incompatible with Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter and the broader framework of collective security, and does not fall 
within one of the exceptions to the primary rule that prohibits the use of force. 
However, proponents in favour of the legality of this doctrine may put forward a 
restrictive interpretation of Article 2(4), whereby the scope of the prohibition of the 
use of force is narrow, and excludes humanitarian intervention. This interpretation is 
largely premised on the goals of humanitarian intervention, which is to enforce human 
rights. Such goals are prima facie consistent with the purposes of the UN. 
Furthermore, as argued by Reisman, such intervention ‘seeks neither territorial 
change nor a challenge to the political independence.’127 
 Corten however, is not convinced. He submits that it is ‘excessive to claim that 
an armed action conducted on the territory of a State without its consent would not be 
contrary to its territorial integrity or to its political independence, or performed in a 
manner incompatible with the UN’s purposes.’128 I concur, as my interpretation of the 
phrase “or, in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations” 
is intended to broaden the scope of the prohibition under Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter to include recourse to force contrary to the centralized system of collective 
security.  
It would appear that intervention by states in the absence of delegation of powers 
by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is inconsistent with the 
purposes of the UN, and the underlying framework of collective security. Corten 
                                                
126Verwey defines humanitarian intervention as, ‘the protection of fundamental human rights 
by a State or group of States, particularly the right to life of persons who are nationals of and 
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127  M. Reisman, ‘a humanitarian intervention to protect the ibos’ in R.B. Lilich, (ed)., 
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128 Corten (n 63) 499. 
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rightly points out that nothing in the actual text of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
indicates that it ‘authorises infringement of any of the UN’s purposes.’129 Yet, some 
may argue that humanitarian intervention is lawful under customary international law, 
thus constituting an extra-Charter exception to the prohibition of the use of force.130 
The question whether customary international law allows humanitarian intervention 
need not be answered here.131   
Humanitarian intervention has arisen as an area of contention with respect to the 
definition of the crime of aggression. As will be examined in further detail in Chapter 
III,132 the question of humanitarian intervention was raised in the negotiations at 
Kampala. The US, in particular, although a non-State party, was anxious that the 
definition of the crime of aggression should not encompass humanitarian 
intervention.133  Creegan has also expressed concern that the definition of the crime of 
aggression would encompass some situations of use of force, which although are 
prima facie unlawful, are nevertheless “good acts”, and do not appear to be 
protected.134 Her premise is that if humanitarian intervention is considered as an act of 
aggression under the definition of the crime of aggression in the Kampala 
Amendments, there is a possibility that individuals, who planned, prepared, initiated 
or executed the intervention, may be prosecuted at the ICC.135 Therefore, individuals 
who satisfy the leadership element pursuant to the definition of the crime do not 
appear to be protected from prosecution at the Court if the State they serve has committed a 
“good act” of aggression, which served the purposes of protecting human rights.  
Her position has underpinnings of just war theory.136 She writes in favour of 
defining the crime of aggression in a way so as to ‘proscribe only conquest, or 
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enumerate conquest with other aims of force that are considered reprehensible.’137 
According to her, ‘to defend, defer and prevent greater conflicts and greater violence, 
sometimes force, sometimes even aggressive force must be used.’138 In my view, any 
assessment of the justness of the cause of war, or the use of force, is incompatible 
with a positive approach to the international legal framework that governs the use of 
force. The legality of the use of force should be assessed with respect to the existing 
framework, and not the moral validity of its cause.  
Within the broader context of the use of force, Creegan has submitted that ‘the 
justness of a use of force should be politically judged by other states.’139 I strongly 
disagree. In my view, to allow states to politically judge the justness of a use of force 
appears to be remnant of a decentralized system of international law, where states are 
allowed to unilaterally decide upon the legitimacy of actions by other states, and 
exercise sanctions against these states.140 Indeed, the shift from a decentralized system 
to a centralized system of international law has endeavored to remove such unilateral 
powers from states, and to confer such powers to the Security Council as the central 
organ. Her view is thus problematic because it is remnant of a decentralized 
framework of international law, which is not compatible with the present international 
legal framework, the very foundations of collective security and the UN.    
In my view, humanitarian intervention is contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter in the light of its object and purpose. Any use of force in the absence of 
authorization by the Security Council under Article 42 of the UN Charter is 
representative of the use of force by states without Chapter VII delegated powers. 
This use of force is unlawful, regardless of the alleged justness of its cause, because it 
is a breach of the primary norms that prohibit the use of force. This raises the question 
of whether this breach is even important in the broader context of the gravity of the 
situation and the humanitarian situation at stake.  
As can be seen, it is difficult to discuss humanitarian intervention without 
considering the underlying moral implications, or addressing the underlying cause of 
the use of force. Indeed, the protection of human rights is arguably an obligation erga 
omnes. As such, even though the use of force for humanitarian purposes is prima 
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facie inconsistent with the rules of jus ad bellum, the cause of such intervention is 
upheld as the right and moral course of action. Such arguments depart from a positive 
approach to jus ad bellum, and rely on the “just cause” implications of the 
intervention to justify the use of force.141 The expression is that such uses of force 
may not necessarily be legal, but may be nevertheless legitimate.142  
My intention is not to discard the moral or humanitarian issues and 
considerations at stake, but to delineate the existing legal framework of jus ad bellum. 
Humanitarian intervention is considered here in the context of the latter. It is also 
considered in the context of the crime of aggression, as a concern by some states and 
scholars is that individuals may be prosecuted for humanitarian intervention.  
My view is that humanitarian intervention, like all other instances of the use of 
force or aggression, should be assessed in accordance with the existing framework of 
jus ad bellum, and not upon the justness of the cause of the use of force. This also 
applies in the context of determining whether humanitarian intervention may be 
considered as an act of aggression for the purposes of the crime of aggression at the 
ICC. The situation in question should be assessed in accordance with jus ad bellum 
and not whether it is a “good act” or “good policy.”  
1.6. The legal nature of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter  
 
The rule that prohibits the use of force pursuant to Article 2(4) confers a duty on 
states to comply with their obligations to refrain from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity and political independence of other states, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. The rights-holders of these norms 
are states, as they enjoy the compliance of the duty-bearer with obligations to refrain 
from the threat or use of force. Yet, the duty-bearers are also states, as obligations fall 
on them to refrain from the threat or use of force against the rights-holders. Thus, 
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every state is both the duty-bearer and rights-holder of the norm that prohibits the use 
of force.  
The legal nature of the prohibition of the use of force can be described as a 
peremptory norm – or a norm of jus cogens.143 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 1969 (“VCLT”) defines a peremptory norm as:  
 
a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.  
 
Although it is explicitly stated that this definition is only ‘for the purposes of the 
convention,’ it is nevertheless regarded as the definition of a peremptory norm under 
international law.144 In the Commentary to the VCLT, the ILC had stressed that ‘the 
law of the charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a 
conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of jus 
cogens.’145 The ICJ has subsequently cited this comment,146 and others, such as 
Schachter, have also pronounced that ‘article 2(4) is the exemplary case of a 
peremptory norm.’147 
                                                
143 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (n 75) para 190; Judge 
Elaraby held ‘the prohibition of the use of force … is universally recognized as a jus cogens 
principle, a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted’, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Elaraby, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, (n 29), 254; See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International 
Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 50–51; Corten (n 63) 200–201; James A Green, 
‘Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force’ (2011) 32 
Michigan Journal of International Law 215; Dinstein (n 69) 104–105; Ulf Linderfalk, ‘The 
Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s Box, Did You Ever Think About 
the Consequences?’ (2008) 18 European Journal of International Law 853.; Schrijver (n 78) 
484–486. 
144 It is worth noting that Article 53 governs a situation when a treaty conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law, and stipulates that the former is void in the 
light of the latter. The aforementioned derogation is not to be interpreted in abstract form, but 
in the context that states are not permitted to enter or conclude treaties that may have the 
effect of derogating from the peremptory norm (see Corten (n 63) 200–201.); see also Article 64 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 1969.  
145 Reports of the ILC to the GA, 21 UN GAOR Supp. No.09, pt. II, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 
(1966) reprinted in (1966) 2 YB Int’L Commn 172 at 247, UN  
Doc/A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1  
146 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (n 75), para. 190. 
147 Schachter (n 108) 129. 
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However, there have been doubts as to the validity of the qualification of the 
prohibition of the use of force as a peremptory norm. Green for example, questions 
whether the prohibition of the use of force is suitable, or indeed even capable, of 
being viewed as a jus cogens norm. His general position is that ‘the inherent 
uncertainty and flexibility of the prohibition would not seem to be compatible with 
the conception of peremptory norms as set out in the VCLT.’148  
The first problem he identifies is that if Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is a 
peremptory norm, it implies that the threat of force has also attained jus cogens status. 
He suggests that ‘the view that it is the prohibition of the use of force alone that is jus 
cogens – rather than Article 2(4) as a whole – would seem preferable as it excludes 
the problematic issue of the threat of force.’149 Yet, he acknowledges that the problem 
is that ‘the threat and use of force are inherently conjoined concepts as they currently 
exist in international law.’150 This leads him to submit that ‘the presence of the 
prohibition of the threat of force may mean that Art 2(4) cannot in its entirety form a 
jus cogens norm, but it does not prevent the prohibition of the use of force standing 
alone from meeting the criteria for a peremptory rule of international law.’151 
However, there is no need to separate the threat of force and the use of force with 
respect to the legal construct of the prohibition under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
The entirety of the provision is held to have jus cogens status.152 Corten, for example, 
writes that ‘the distinction between the prohibition of aggression and the prohibition 
of other less serious forms of the violation of the prohibition, while essential for 
determining the existence of self-defence within the meaning of the Charter, does not 
seem to me, however, to have to dictate a difference in status to the peremptory character 
of the rule.’153  
 Be that as it may, what Green finds ‘far more damaging’ is that ‘a jus cogens 
norm is one from which no derogation is permitted. Yet, in the case of the prohibition 
of the use of force, exceptions to the rule not only exist, but are built into the very 
nature of the UN system.’154 The derogations that he is referring to are the two 
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exceptions to Article 2(4) within the UN Charter: Article 51 and Article 42. He claims 
that ‘simply put, the prohibition of the use of force is a rule from which derogation is 
explicitly and uncontrovertibly permitted.’155  
He appears to have conflated the concepts of ‘exception’ and ‘derogation.’156 
Articles 51 and 42 of the UN Charter are not derogations from the prohibition of the 
use of force, but are in fact, exceptions to the rule. To derogate from a rule implies 
that the primary rule is applicable, but the relevant actor may detract from its 
obligations under the permitted circumstances. It represents taking a step back from 
the level that the rule applies on, which thus allows the relevant actor to depart from 
existing obligations. An exception, on the other hand, applies on the same level as the 
primary rule, and implies that the rule is not applicable to the relevant actor (subject 
to the conditions precedent within the exception). There is no breach of the primary 
rule if an act is committed within the compass of an exception to the rule.  
The prohibition of the use of force, as a primary rule, has exceptions, which are 
inherent within its legal construct.157 It is the structure of the rule itself, which 
contains exceptions to the rule. What is the logic behind this? The prohibition of the 
threat and use of force pursuant to Article 2(4) must always be read in the entirety of 
the UN Charter and the framework of collective security. As argued above, self-
defence is a form of self-help, which allows states to act in recourse to force in a 
situation requiring it to repel or halt an incoming attack. It is only logical that the 
prohibition of the use of force must allow an exception to the rule for states to 
conduct this form of self-help. This construct of the rule and its exception is reflected 
in Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the UN Charter.   
Article 42 of the UN Charter is representative of the delegation of the powers of 
the Security Council to member states to resort to force. This delegation of powers is 
consistent with the centralized system of collective security. If Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter is to be read in accordance with the framework of collective security within 
the UN Charter, it is only logical that the rule must contain an exception for situations 
when there is a delegation of powers by the Security Council to use force.  
In my view, the delegation of powers by the SC to the member state should not 
be viewed as a derogation of the rule, because it does not provide a basis where a state 
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may temporarily detract from obligations to refrain from the use of force, but instead 
it is derived from the same framework as the rule that prohibits the use of force. Both 
exist on the same level. For the delegation of powers under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter from the Security Council to member states for the use of force to co-exist 
with a prohibition of the use of force, it is only logical that the structure of the latter 
should encompass an exception for the former.  
If Article 2(4) is a peremptory norm, it is only logical that the prohibition of an 
act of aggression is also a peremptory norm. The next question is the significance of 
the peremptory norm status. Orakhelashvili writes that:  
 
the peremptory character of a rule derives from the substantive importance of 
the interest protected by that rule.[…] The purpose of jus cogens is to 
safeguard the predominant and overriding interests and values of the 
international community as a whole as distinct from the interests of individual 
states.158  
 
Indeed, the prohibition of aggression is within the predominant and overriding 
interests and values of the international community as a whole. Yet, Green cautions in 
overstating the importance of the peremptory status (or lack thereof) of a rule. 
Nevertheless, he submits that ‘a jus cogens norm potentially has an additional 
“compliance pull” to it. The widespread acceptance of the jus cogens concept means 
that states are more likely to take special note of peremptory norms and will 
potentially comply with them more often than with other rules.’159 
In my view, the significance of identifying a norm as jus cogens is not necessarily 
for the purposes of ensuring compliance on the primary level, but rather to examine 
the legal consequences under the secondary rules of state responsibility. In present 
context, an act of aggression represents a breach of a peremptory norm by the 
aggressor state. The status of the prohibition of aggression as a peremptory norm 
should be taken into consideration when assessing the responsibility of the aggressor 
state and the legal consequences.  
For example, under Article 26 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001 (ARSIWA), there are no circumstances that may 
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preclude the wrongfulness of any act of State which is not in conformity with an 
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. Thus, the 
aggressor state may not prima facie plead circumstances that may preclude 
wrongfulness with respect to an act of aggression.160 Furthermore, Chapter III of the 
ARSIWA, entitled “Serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of 
general international law”, sets out certain consequences relating to these breaches. 
This demonstrates that there are specific ramifications with respect to state 
responsibility if the prohibition of aggression is recognised as jus cogens.  
Related to the issue of jus cogens is the concept of obligation erga omnes. The 
ICJ held that ‘an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a 
State towards the international community as a whole’ and obligations of a bilateral 
reciprocal nature ‘arising vis-à-vis another State.’161 The Court continued:    
 
By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the 
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest 
in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, 
for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of 
aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning 
the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and 
racial discrimination.162   
 
Indeed, the prohibition of aggression is in the interests of collective security, and is 
one of the core purposes of the UN. As such, the outlawing of acts of aggression is 
very much in the interests of all states. Thus, an argument can be made that the duty 
on states to comply with obligations to refrain from an act of aggression is owed to 
the international community as a whole. This suggests that such obligations are owed 
to each and every state that forms a part of the international community of states as a whole.   
The question is whether obligations erga omnes extend only towards the 
prohibition of acts of aggression, or if such obligations also arise in the context of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Indeed, violations of Article 2(4) may occur on varied 
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scales. This could range from small instances of the use of force across borders, to 
military operations against non-state actors without the consent of the territorial state, 
to serious violations of Article 2(4) against the territory of the aggrieved state.  
An argument can be made that small border skirmishes are more representative of 
bilateral obligations between the wrongful state and the aggrieved state, rather than 
erga omnes. Be that as it may, the aggrieved state is a member of the international 
community of states as a whole. Thus, it may be the direct rights-holder of the 
obligation to refrain from the use of force on its territory, but this should not detract 
from the erga omnes nature of these obligations. Furthermore, if the prohibition of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is jus cogens, the obligations relating to this rule are 
ipso facto valid erga omnes.163 The obligations to refrain from the threat or use of 
force are owed to each and every state of the international community. This is 
consistent with maintaining the status quo of international peace and security.  
The importance of identifying such obligations as erga omnes is to understand 
the legal consequences under state responsibility, which arise from the breach of such 
obligations.164 As written by the ILC in the Commentary to ARSIWA, ‘there are 
certain consequences flowing from the basic concepts of peremptory norms of general 
international law and obligations to the international community as a whole within the 
field of state responsibility.’165With reference to the latter, ‘all States are entitled to 
invoke responsibility for breaches of obligations to the international community as a 
whole’166 pursuant to Article 48, ARSIWA. According to the ILC: 
 
Article 48 is based on the idea that in case of breaches of specific obligations 
protecting the collective interests of a group of States or the interests of the 
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international community as a whole, responsibility may be invoked by States 
which are not themselves injured in the sense of Article 42.167  
 
This suggests that states other than the aggressed state may invoke responsibility of 
the aggressor state, as the prohibition of an act of aggression was owed “to the 
international community as a whole.” Indeed, as noted by the ILC, ‘each State is 
entitled, as a member of the international community as a whole, to invoke the 
responsibility of another State for breaches of such obligations.168  
 
1.7. Conclusion  
 
An act of aggression is contrary to the purposes of the UN and represents a 
breach of the status quo of international peace and security. This is why the crime of 
aggression can be said to be a crime committed against the peace and security of 
mankind. It is a crime committed against the interests of each and every state that is 
part of the international community of states as a whole.  
This Chapter has identified the primary rule of international law that prohibits an 
act of aggression as Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. States are both the duty-bearers 
and rights-holders of the norms that prohibit aggression. The nature of this rule is jus 
cogens, which arguably gives rise to obligation erga omnes on the duty-bearers to 
refrain from an act of aggression. In addition to potential compliance pull on the 
primary level, the breach of this peremptory norm has specific consequences for the 
aggressor state under the secondary rules of responsibility.    
On the primary level, the legal construct of this rule allows exceptions to the rule: 
self-defence and authorization by the Security Council for the use of force under 
Chapter VII. If recourse to force conducted by a state falls within one of the 
exceptions to the primary rule, there has been no wrongful conduct. Thus, every 
alleged act of aggression must be assessed in the light of Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter and its two exceptions. This will also be the task at hand when determining 
whether a situation amounts to an act of aggression for the purposes of prosecuting the 
crime of aggression.   
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The point of this Chapter has been to delineate the scope and nature of the 
obligations that international law confers on states to refrain from an act of 
aggression. An understanding of these primary obligations is necessary in order to 
understand the legal positions of the aggressor state and the aggressed state in the 
context of a crime of aggression. This is important with respect to how the wrongful 
conduct is correctly attributed to the aggressor state and the perpetrator of the crime.  
Furthermore, by establishing that bilateral obligations are owed between the 
aggressor state and the aggressed state, it becomes clear that the latter has a legal 
interest to invoke consequences under the rules of state responsibility, regardless of 
legal consequences against the perpetrator of the crime of aggression.  This is 
important (as will be discussed in Part III), because the aggressed state may not 
always have access to enforcement against the perpetrator for the crime of aggression; 
as such, its legal interests in relation to the aggressor state should not be forgotten.  
This chapter has also brought to light that the determination of an act of 
aggression is multifaceted in the sense that:  
• a determination can be political or legal in nature  
• a determination can serve the purposes of identifying a breach in international 
peace and security 
• a determination can be made by the aggressed state for the purposes of self-
defence against the aggressor state  
• a determination can be made to identify wrongful conduct by the aggressor 
state for the purposes of state responsibility 
As will be discussed in the next two chapters, a determination of an act of aggression 
must be made for the purposes of fulfilling the state act element of the crime of 
aggression in the interests of prosecution. However, as demonstrated in this chapter, 
the determination of an act of aggression is not a straightforward or common task, and 
appears to be largely political, as evidenced by the fact that some of the cases of 
aggression qualified by the Security Council and General Assembly were not as 
serious (e.g. mercenaries against Benin) as other situations that were not qualified as 
such (e.g. the 1990 Iraq invasion against Kuwait). Thus, it can be presumed that the 
determination of an act of aggression for the purposes of the state act element for the 
crime of aggression will also be somewhat political in nature. 
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This chapter has focused on the state act of aggression. The next two chapters will 
examine the criminalisation of aggression, which is how international law places 
direct obligations on individuals to refrain from conduct that will cause the aggressor 
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Chapter II. Nuremberg and Crimes against Peace 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The IMT, which commenced in late November 1945, marked one of the most 
significant landmarks in history.169 The major war criminals of World War II stood 
trial and were prosecuted for their participation in a common plan or conspiracy to 
commit, or the commission of the crimes which were defined in Article 6 of the IMT 
Charter: crimes against peace; war crimes; and crimes against humanity.170 After the 
Nuremberg Trial, the subsequent NMT, which were established pursuant to Control 
Council Law No.10,171 and the Tokyo Trials at the IMTFE,172 had also indicted and 
convicted individuals for crimes against peace.  
Although the historical origins and efforts to criminalise aggression may have 
originated before the Nuremberg Trial, 173 this chapter argues that the norms 
criminalising aggression did not exist prior to the Trial. It was the subsequent 
affirmation of the IMT Charter and the judgment of the Nuremberg Trial, i.e. the 
Nuremberg principles,174 which gradually led to the crystallization of the norms that 
criminalise aggression under customary international law. As established in the 
previous chapter, individuals are not the duty-bearers or the rights-holders with 
respect to the norms that prohibit aggression under international law. States are the 
duty-bearers that must comply with primary obligations to refrain from an act of 
aggression and the rights-holders of the enjoyment of compliance of these obligations.  
The criminalisation of aggression means that norms under international law confer 
direct obligations on individuals to refrain from specific proscribed conduct relating 
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to the state act of aggression. The breach of these norms results in sanctions, which 
are executable directly against the individual for the breach of primary obligations. It 
is therefore the IMT, which was the starting point of the criminalisation of aggression.  
As already clarified in the introduction, there is an apparent change in terminology 
where international law now recognises the ‘crime of aggression’ in lieu of ‘crimes 
against peace’.175 However, this does not mean there have been any changes to the 
substantive constituents of the definition of the crime as any changes are purely 
nomenclature.176 Both of these terms will be used interchangeably in this chapter.  
 This Chapter will first look at the IMT (section 2.2), followed by the NMT 
(section 2.3). As the latter were directly bound by the judgment of the former,177 the 
case law is helpful in understanding the scope of the legal construct of crimes against 
peace pursuant to the Nuremberg Principles. When studying the IMT and NMT, there 
are primarily two main questions, which are relevant to understanding the contours of 
the crime of aggression under customary international law. First, what is the state act 
element that constitutes a crime against peace? In other words, which acts of 
aggression committed by Germany gave rise to individual criminal responsibility? 
Second, what are the elements of the crime pertaining to individual conduct that allow 
one to be liable for crimes against peace? In the light of these findings, this chapter 
will continue to examine how the Nuremberg principles gradually attain customary 
international law status (section 2.4), and the contours of the crime of aggression 
(section 2.4.3).  
2.2 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: The Nuremberg Trial  
 
At the Nuremberg Trial, the Indictment contained two counts for crimes against 
peace:  
                                                
175 Article 16, Draft Code of Crimes; Article 5(1), Rome Statute; The Kampala Amendments, 
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Count One included inter alia a ‘common plan or conspiracy to commit, or 
which involved the commission of, crimes against peace.’178  
Count Two alleged that all the defendants participated in the planning, 
preparation, initiation and waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars 
in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances.179 
 
Article 6(a) of the IMT Charter defined crimes against peace as: 
 
the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war 
in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances […].    
 
In my view, the definition should be demarcated into two separate substantive 
components:  
i) the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of […]  
ii) a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances.   
The first component refers to conduct of an individual, whilst the second component 
is the act of aggression committed by a state. The former is acknowledged as the 
elements of the crime pertaining to individual conduct, and the latter, the state act 
element of the crime. The approach of the Tribunal had been to first ascertain that 
Germany had committed wars of aggression, i.e. the state act element before assessing 
the conduct of each defendant, i.e. elements of the crime pertaining to individual 
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formulation of the plan to attack Poland: preparation and initiation of aggressive war (1939); 
expansion of the war into a general war of aggression: Planning and execution of attacks on 
Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia and Greece (1939-
1941); the invasion of the U.S.S.R territory in violation of the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 
1939; collaboration with Italy and Japan and the aggressive war against the United States 
(1939-1941); The common plan or conspiracy embraced the commission of crimes against 
peace, in that the defendants planned, prepared, initiated and waged wars of aggression, 
which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count1.asp. 
179 The wars referred to were as follows: against Poland (1939); against the United Kingdom 
and France (1939); against Denmark and Norway (1940); against Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg (1940); against Yugoslavia and Greece (1941); against the U.S.S.R (1941); 
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conduct. 180As the conduct of two different legal subjects were assessed, it can be 
inferred that there are two separate components within the definition of the crime that 
need to be assessed for a successful conviction of crimes against peace.  The order is 
to first establish the state act element, followed by considering the elements of 
individual conduct.  
2.2.1. The state act element of crimes against peace 
 
According to Article 6(a) IMT Charter, the state act element of crimes against 
peace is:  
• a war of aggression [or] 
• a war in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances  
As the conjunctive ‘or’ is used, the state act element of the crime can be established 
upon one of these two variants of war.   
A. War of aggression  
 
A ‘war of aggression’ is not defined in the IMT Charter. Thus, it is in the 
discretion of the Tribunal to determine a war of aggression. It should be noted that the 
Tribunal had differentiated between an act of aggression and a war of aggression.181 It 
found that Germany had committed acts of aggression against Austria and 
Czechoslovakia.182 As these acts did not amount to wars of aggression, no defendants 
were charged or convicted for crimes against peace in relation to Austria and 
Czechoslovakia. It is worth examining the factual basis why the acts committed by 
Germany were considered as acts of aggression and not wars of aggression, as this 
will delineate the constituents of the state act element of crimes against peace.  
The German attacks on Austria and Czechoslovakia were both referred to as ‘acts 
of aggression’ under Count One and named as ‘seizures’ in the IMT judgment.183 In 
examining the facts, it becomes apparent that there was no actual use of armed force 
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by Germany or armed resistance or counterforce by Austria184 or Czechoslovakia.185  
However, despite the lack of armed force, both countries were annexed by Germany. 
The internal political structures of both countries were changed and they were 
incorporated into Germany as a result of duress from the series of threats backed with 
the use of force. 186 The annexation of both countries amounted to acts of aggression 
because ‘the methods employed to achieve the object were those of an aggressor. The 
ultimate factor was the armed might of Germany ready to be used if any resistance 
was encountered.’187   
Therefore, it is the threat of the use of force that gives rise to the aggressive 
element, but the lack of military force that prevents such acts from being considered a 
war of aggression. Nevertheless, these acts were part of the ‘participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy’ under Article 6(a) which is why the acts committed 
against Austria and Czechoslovakia were considered under Count One of the 
Indictment and not Count Two. As a result, defendants could not be convicted for 
committing aggressive wars against Austria or Czechoslovakia (Count Two) but only 
for the common plan or conspiracy to commit aggressive acts (Count One);188 the 
element of which was fulfilled by the duress and threats of the use of force in order to 
achieve the political means desired by Germany.  
In contrast to the acts committed against Austria and Czechoslovakia, Germany 
initiated the use of force against the other countries in the indictment (Poland, UK, 
France, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, 
Greece, U.S.S.R.) and made a formal declaration of war against the U.S.189  
Poland was the first act of aggression identified by the IMT.190 Despite a 
German-Polish declaration of non-aggression, Hitler declared ‘there will be war’191 
                                                
184 ibid 192.  
185 ibid 194–197.  
186 It was held ‘this was premeditated and carefully planned, and was not undertaken until the 
moment was thought for it to be carried through as a definite part of the pre-ordained scheme 
and plan’, ibid 187.   
187 ibid 197. 
188  Göring (272-273); Hess (275-277); von Ribbentrop (278-279); Keitel (281-282), 
Rosenberg (286-287); Raeder (306-308); Jodl (314-315) and von Neurath (324-325),‘Judicial 
Decisions Involving Questions of International Law - International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences’ (n 4).  
189 ibid 192–214. 
190 ibid 197. 
191 On the 23 May, at a meeting where Göring, Raeder and Keitel were amongst those who 
were present, Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland and gave his reasons and 
 63  
and was determined for the destruction of Poland 192 as a necessity for Germany to 
enlarge her living space and secure her food supplies.193 Such invasions led to war 
with the objective of annexation and occupation of territory.  Fully aware of the 
existence of a pact of mutual assistance between Great Britain and Poland and an 
undertaking between France and Poland for mutual assistance, Hitler was determined 
to carry out his plans for annexation and occupation knowing that ‘this intention 
would lead to war with Great Britain and France as well’194 as there was the reality of 
counterforce by these two countries. He was of the opinion that if the isolation of 
Poland could not be achieved, Germany should attack Great Britain and France first, 
or should concentrate primarily on the war in the West, in order to defeat Great 
Britain and France quickly, or at least to destroy their effectiveness.195 The IMT held: 
 
[B]y the evidence that the war initiated by Germany against Poland on 1 
September 1939 was plainly an aggressive war, which was to develop in due 
course into a war which embraced almost the whole world, and resulted in the 
commission of countless crimes, both against the laws and customs of war, and 
against humanity.196 
 
The IMT stated ‘the aggressive war against Poland was but the beginning. The 
aggression of Nazi Germany spread quickly from country to country.’ 197  
The next two countries to suffer were Denmark and Norway. 198 This showed that a 
‘war of aggression’ could also encompass invasions with the objective of gaining 
military advantage of adversaries.199 The underlying reason for the invasions of 
Denmark and Norway appeared to be for preventing British encroachment on 
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Scandinavia and the Baltic, and for gaining bases in Norway in order to make 
effective attacks on England and France.200 Unlike the acts committed against Austria 
and Czechoslovakia, there did not appear to be a change of internal policy of the 
governments of Denmark or Norway. However, there was nonetheless, occupation of 
both countries as German possessions for further purpose of aggression against other 
countries, and a ‘breach of international treaties, agreements or assurances’ as there was 
a Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and Denmark, and a solemn assurance of 
peace to Norway.201 
The Defence had put forward an argument that Germany was compelled to attack 
Norway to forestall an Allied invasion, and thus her action was preventive.202 
However, the IMT rejected this as ‘it is clear that when the plans for an attack on 
Norway were being made, they were not made for the purposes of forestalling an 
imminent Allied landing, but, at the most, that they might prevent an Allied 
occupation at some future date”203 and that “Norway was occupied by Germany to 
afford her bases from which a more effective attack on England and France might be 
made, pursuant to plans prepared long in advance of the Allied plans which are not 
relied on to support the argument of self-defence.’204 
Thus, the IMT concluded that ‘in the light of all the available evidence, it is 
impossible to accept the contention that the invasions of Denmark and Norway were 
defensive, and in the opinion of the Tribunal they were acts of aggressive war.’205The 
breach of neutrality of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg was for purposes of 
obtaining air bases to gain military advantage over the United Kingdom and 
France.206 In May 1939, when Hitler foresaw the possibility at least of a war with 
England and France in consequence of the attack against Poland, he said “Dutch and 
Belgian air bases must be occupied … Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”207 
The IMT held that ‘the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg was entirely 
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without justification. It was carried out in pursuance of policies long considered and 
prepared, and was plainly an act of aggressive war. The resolve to invade was made 
without any consideration that the advancement of the aggressive policies of 
Germany.’208    
The IMT considered the wars of aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece 
together,209 where Hitler said to one of the defendants, von Ribbentrop that ‘the best 
thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This 
process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis 
covered the other while it was dealing with the uncertain neutral. Italy might well 
regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind.” 210 The attempt to persuade Italy to enter 
war on Germany’s side against Yugoslavia was unsuccessful. As for Greece, when 
asked for confirmation that the ‘whole of Greece will have to be occupied, even in the 
event of a peaceful settlement,’ Hitler replied “the complete occupation is a 
prerequisite of any settlement.”211 It can be assumed that the breach of neutrality of 
Yugoslavia fulfilled the agenda to liquidate one neutral after another, presumably for 
purposes of military advantage against the growing adversaries:  
It is clear from this narrative that aggressive war against Greece and Yugoslavia 
had long been in contemplation, certainly as early as August of 1939. The fact 
that Great Britain had come to the assistance of the Greeks, and might thereafter 
be in a position to inflict great damage upon German interests was made the 
occasion for the occupation of both countries.212   
 
Once again, despite a non-aggression pact, Germany invaded the U.S.S.R for 
purposes of political, military and economic exploitation for the enlargement of 
German territory to the east.213 The IMT held that ‘Germany had the design carefully 
thought out, to crush the U.S.S.R as a political and military power, so that Germany 
might expand to the east according to her own desire.’214   
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In the case of the U.S., Germany made a formal declaration of war in the light of 
the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan (1940).215  Germany agreed to 
support Japan for an attack against the U.S, despite the fact that under this Tripartite 
Pact, Italy and Germany were only to assist Japan if she was attacked. Four days after 
the attack launched by the Japanese in Pearl Harbour, Germany declared war on the 
U.S.216 The IMT held:   
 
Although it is true that Hitler and his colleagues originally did not consider 
that a war with the United States would be beneficial to their interest, it is 
apparent that in the course of 1941 that view was revised, and Japan was given 
every encouragement to adopt a policy which would almost certainly bring the 
United States into the war. And when Japan attacked the United States fleet in 
Pearl Harbor and thus made aggressive war against the United States, the Nazi 
Government caused Germany to enter that war at once on the side of Japan by 
declaring war themselves on the United States.217  
B. War in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances 
 
As the Tribunal had found that the defendants planned and waged aggressive 
wars against 12 nations, it was rendered ‘unnecessary to discuss the subject in further 
detail, or even to consider at any length the extent to which these aggressive wars 
were also “wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances.”’218  It 
was also considered unnecessary to ‘consider the other treaties referred to in the 
Appendix, or the repeated agreements and assurances of her peaceful intentions 
entered into by Germany.’219 Indeed, most of the wars of aggression were also in 
violation of bilateral agreements and assurances of peace between the particular 
aggressed state and Germany.  
Nevertheless, “wars in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances” is still part of the state act element of the crime of aggression under 
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Article 6 of the IMT Charter. The IMT had acknowledged that the following 
international treaties, agreements or assurances were of principal importance: the 
Hague Conventions, Versailles Treaty, Treaties of Mutual Guarantee, Arbitration and 
non-aggression between Germany and the other Powers, and the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact.220 At the time of the events on trial, these instruments were representative of the 
normative framework that governed the prohibition of the use of force under 
international law. The violation of these instruments resulting in war, is indicative of a 
breach of the prohibition of the use of force. Thus, this variant of war implies that a 
violation of the prohibition of the use of force may amount to crimes against peace.  
2.2.2. Observations   
 
The first and foremost underlying requirement appears to be that there must be an 
actual use of force, as evident by how the judgment dealt with the acts committed 
against Austria and Czechoslovakia. An annexation was not sufficient to be 
considered as a war of aggression without the use of force to achieve those means 
despite the threat of the use of force (which nevertheless qualified the methods 
employed to achieve such means as being aggressive in nature). The use of force may 
be accompanied with: the objective of annexation and occupation of territory, and 
perhaps annihilation (Poland); the objective of occupation for furthering purposes of 
aggression against other countries (Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Yugoslavia, Greece); the objective of gaining military advantage over other 
adversaries by preventing them from assisting a previously aggressed state (Denmark, 
Norway); the expansion of territory (USSR).  
The common underlying factor appears to be that a war of aggression will 
typically involve the initiation of the use of force by the aggressor state, leading to a 
partial or full occupation of the invaded territory. The exception was the war of 
aggression against the U.S. where there was a formal declaration of war, for the 
purposes of assisting in Japan’s war of aggression. 
However, upon a deeper analysis, I submit that a “war of aggression” is 
predicated upon two separate elements – an objective element and a subjective 
element. The former is the initiation of armed force by the aggressor state, i.e. 
Germany. The latter refers to the intention behind the armed force, the ‘aggressive 
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intention’ or animus aggressionis. In relation to the list above, each war of aggression 
comprises of the objective element of the use of force by Germany (with the 
exception of the US), accompanied with the animus aggressionis, e.g. gaining 
military advantage over other adversaries, or expansion of territory.  I argue that the 
animus aggressionis is a necessary part of a “war of aggression”, as the objective 
component is limited only to the violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact by virtue of 
recourse to war, which may amount only to a “war in violation of international 
treaties, assurances and agreements.” 
In 1951, Special Rapporteur Spiropolous in the Annex on the possibility and 
desirability of a definition of aggression of his Second Report on a Draft Code of 
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 221 explained the concept behind 
the animus aggressionis:  
 
In the absence of a positive definition of aggression provided for by an 
international instrument and applicable to the concrete, this case, international 
law, for the purpose of determining the “aggressor” in an armed conflict, is 
assumed to refer to the criteria contained in the “natural” notion of 
aggression.222 
 
The ‘natural’ notion according to him consists of both an objective and subjective 
criteria. The former is the first act of violence, whilst the latter is that the violence 
committed must be due to aggressive intention.223 The link between the objective and 
subjective can be seen here:  
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The mere fact that a State acted as first does not, per se, constitute 
“aggression” as long as its behavior was not due to: aggressive intention 
(Subjective element of the concept of aggression). That the animus 
aggressionis is a constitutive element of the concept of aggression needs no 
demonstration. It follows from the very essence of the notion of aggression as 
such.224    
 
Perhaps this is the reason the Tribunal found that Germany committed a war of 
aggression against the US despite the lack of armed force, i.e. its Declaration of War 
represented the animus aggresssionis – the intention to assist a third state in an 
aggressive war. Here, the animus aggressionis is the aggressive intention to commit 
war against another state(s).  Others have also considered the state act element for the 
crime of aggression to encompass the animus aggressionis, 225 e.g., Cassese argued 
‘the illegal use of force must be directed to the acquisition of the territory, the 
coercion of the victim state to change its government or its political regime, or else its 
domestic or foreign policy, or to the appropriation of assets belonging to the victim 
state’;226 while McDougall submits that the State act element of the crime must 
include: (i) war with the object of the occupation or conquest of the territory of 
another State or part thereof; (ii) war declared in support of a third party’s war of 
aggression; (iii) war with the object of disabling another State’s capacity to provide 
assistance to (a) third State(s) victim of a war of aggression initiated by the 
aggressor.227 
 
2.2.3. Elements of the crime pertaining to the conduct of the individual   
 
In accordance with Article 6(a) IMT Charter, the substantive component of the 
definition of the crime pertaining to the conduct of the individual is the ‘planning, 
preparation, initiation and waging’ […]. In my view, this can be interpreted as the 
material element of the crime – or actus reus of the crime, as it is representative of 
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perpetration by an individual in relation to the state act element of the crime, i.e. the 
wars of aggression or in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances. 
As all other crimes, there is also the mental element, i.e. mens rea that must be 
satisfied in addition to the actus reus.  In addition to the actus reus and mens rea of 
the crime, there is one additional issue that should be examined in relation to the 
elements of crime pertaining to the conduct of individuals. This additional element is 
the “leadership element” as this suggests that the perpetrator needs to have attained a 
sufficiently authoritative position within the hierarchy of state and/or the military and 
can realistically play a role in facilitating the state act of aggression.  
There is no explicit reference to a leadership element in the definition of the crime 
in Article 6(a) IMT Charter. However, the Kampala Amendments have incorporated 
an explicit leadership element in the substantive definition of the crime of aggression 
(Article 8 bis ). Understanding the approach of the IMT in ascertaining the scope of 
perpetrators that may be liable for crimes against peace is important to evaluate the 
extent to which the leadership element in the Kampala Amendments reflects the legal 
construct of the crime under customary international law. 
Thus, there are three main elements that need to be focused upon: i) the scope of 
perpetrators; ii) the actus reus; iii) the mens rea. The elements pertaining to the 
conduct of the individual for crimes against peace at Nuremberg will be analysed 
under these headings, in accordance with the findings of the Tribunal under Count 
One and Count Two.   
i. Count One: Conspiracy or Common plan 
 
From the evaluation presented by the IMT, it can be observed that planning and 
preparation relating to aggressive war had been carried out systematically. The IMT 
held that “planning and preparation are essential to the making of war.”228 Once again 
the tribunal reiterates “we shall therefore discuss both Counts together, as they are in 
substance the same. The defendants must have been charged under both Counts, and their 
guilt under each Count must be determined.”229 
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The IMT found eight defendants guilty under Counts one: Göring, Hess, von 
Ribbentrop, Keitel, Rosenberg, Raeder, Jodl and von Neurath.230 These defendants 
were also found guilty under Count Two. Six other defendants were charged only 
under Count One, and they were subsequently acquitted: Kaltenbrunner, Frank, 
Streicher, von Schirach,  Fritzsche and Bormann.231 Four defendants were indicted 
only under Counts One and Two: Schacht, Sauckel, von Papen and Speer, and all of 
them were acquitted under both counts.232   
The Prosecution had put forward that ‘any significant participation in the affairs 
of the Nazi Party or Government is evidence of a participation in a conspiracy that is 
in itself criminal.’ 233  However, the Tribunal adopted a narrower approach by 
examining whether a concrete plan to wage war existed, followed by the 
determination of the participants in the concrete plan. It was also held that ‘it is not 
necessary to decide whether a single master conspiracy between the defendants has 
been established by the evidence’234 and that ‘the evidence establishes the common 
planning to prepare and wage war by certain of the defendants. It is immaterial to 
consider whether a single conspiracy to that extent and over the time set out in the 
Indictment has been conclusively proved. Continued planning, with aggressive war as 
the objective, has been established beyond doubt.’235 Therefore, the Tribunal did not 
need to be satisfied that a single master conspiracy existed, but instead, there could be 
several conspiracies or common plans.  
The IMT also rejected the argument that such common plan cannot exist where 
there was a complete dictatorship as: 
  
A plan in the execution of which a number of persons participate is still a plan, 
even though conceived by only one of them; and those who execute the plan do 
not avoid responsibility by showing that they acted under the direction of the man 
who conceived it. Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself. He had to 
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have the cooperation of statesmen, military leaders, diplomats and businessmen. 
When they, with knowledge of his aims, gave him their cooperation, they made 
themselves parties to the plan he had initiated. They are not to be deemed 
innocent because Hitler made use of them, if they knew what they were doing. 
That they were assigned to their tasks by a dictator does not absolve them from 
responsibility for their acts. The relation of leader and follower does not preclude 
responsibility here anymore than it does in the comparable tyranny of organized 
domestic crime.236 
 
Thus, the Tribunal broadened the scope of perpetrators beyond the Head of State by 
the acknowledgement that ‘statesmen, military leaders, diplomats and business men’ 
could be held criminally responsible if they had knowledge of his aims, cooperated 
and became parties to the common plan.  
A. Scope of perpetrators 
 
In examining the eight defendants who were convicted under Count One, five 
held high governmental positions, whilst three held high military positions. In 
particular, Göring was the second most prominent man in the Nazi regime after Hitler, 
and had ‘tremendous influence’ with Hitler. He had a governmental position as 
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan and economic dictator, as well as a military 
position where he was Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe.237 Hess, the Deputy 
Führer, was Hitler’s closest personal confidant and ‘their relationship was such that 
Hess must have been informed of Hitler’s aggressive plans when they came into 
existence. And he took action to carry out these plans whenever action was 
necessary’238 as he was responsible for handling all Party matters. He also had the 
authority to make decisions in Hitler’s name on all questions of Party leadership. He 
was also Reichminister without Portfolio where he had the authority to approve all 
legislation before its enactment as law.239   
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Von Ribbentrop was Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, Ambassador to England 
and Reichminister for Foreign Affairs.240 Rosenberg was recognized as the Party’s 
ideologist, as he developed and spread Nazi doctrines in newspapers. His 
governmental positions included Reichsleiter and Reich minister for Eastern 
Occupied Territories.241 Von Neurath served as a professional diplomat, as the 
German Ambassador to Great Britain (1930 – 1932), Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
the von Papen Cabinet, and was made Reich Minister without Portfolio, President of 
the Secret Council Cabinet, and a member of the Reich Defence Council after he 
resigned and was Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia on 18th March 1939.242  
The other three defendants did not have political or governmental roles; instead 
they held high positions in the military. Keitel was the Chief of the High Command of 
the Armed Forces.243 Raeder was made Gross-Admiral and member of the Reich 
Defense Council. He built and directed the German navy in the 15 years he 
commanded it.244 Jodl was Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the 
Armed Forces and reported directly to Hitler on operational matters. In the strict 
military sense, he was the actual planner of the war and responsible in large measure 
for the strategy and conduct of operations.245 
Therefore, those who were convicted under Count One held high governmental 
or military positions. They had the authority to make decisions on behalf of the state.   
Not only did these defendants know Hitler on a personal basis, but also had a good 
relationship with him. From this, it can be presumed that they were in a position 
where Hitler would inform them about his plans.  This can be inferred by the acquittal 
of Schacht for Count One who ‘was clearly not one of the inner circle around Hitler 
which was most closely involved with this common plan. He was regarded by this 
group with undisguised hostility,’246 and the acquittal of Fritzsche who had never 
achieved ‘sufficient stature to attend the planning conferences which led to aggressive 
war’ and had never had a conversation with Hitler.247 
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It appears that the Tribunal did not hold these individuals responsible for the 
common plan or conspiracy to commit aggression based on their official titled 
position, but rather from their relationship with Hitler. This is because only those 
within Hitler’s ‘inner circle’ were in the position to know about his plans, discussed 
his plans which may or may not have influenced some of his decisions and carried out 
his plans.   
B. Conduct 
 
The IMT placed paramount significance on four secret, high level conferences 
held on 5 November 1937 and 23 May, 22 August and 23 November 1939 which 
were crucial in facilitating the common plan or conspiracy, as Hitler outlined his 
aggressive plans for the future. 248  One common factor between the eight defendants 
that were successfully convicted under Count One was that they attended one or more 
of these conferences where Hitler disclosed his decisions to his leaders or other 
important conferences in which other decisions were made relating to his plans for 
aggressive wars. Therefore, those who attended these conferences would have 
acquired the knowledge of Hitler’s intent to commit these acts and wars of 
aggression, making them a part of the common plan or conspiracy. 
This can be demonstrated by the following acquittals. Bormann was acquitted, as 
he ‘attended none of the important conferences when Hitler revealed piece by piece 
these plans for aggression.’249 Frick was acquitted because ‘the evidence does not 
show that he participated in any of the conferences at which Hitler outlined his 
aggressive intentions,’250 Streicher was acquitted as ‘there is no evidence to show that 
he was in ever within Hitler’s inner circle of advisers; nor during his career was he 
closely connected with the formulation of the policies which led to war. He was never 
present, for example, at any of the important conferences which Hitler explained his 
decisions to his leaders,’ therefore ‘the evidence fails to establish his connection with 
the conspiracy or common plan to wage aggressive war.’251 Donitz was also acquitted 
of Count one as ‘he was not present at the important conferences where plans for 
aggressive wars were announced, and there is no evidence that he was informed about 
                                                
248 ibid 188.  
249 ibid 329.  
250 ibid 291.  
251 ibid 294.  
 75  
the decisions reached there.’252 Kaltenbrunner and von Papen were acquitted because 
there was no evidence to connect them with plans to wage aggressive war on any 
other front.253 The grounds for the acquittal of Frank, von Shirach, Sauckel and Speer 
were vague.254 
C. Mental Element 
It can be inferred that all of the defendants who were convicted under Count One 
had knowledge of Hitler’s aggressive plans because they attended one or more of the 
four conferences, and had a relationship with Hitler which allowed them to be 
informed about his plans, or even participate in discussions in shaping or formulating 
them. For example, the Tribunal observed that ‘Hess was Hitler’s closest personal 
confidant. Their relationship was such that Hess must have been informed of Hitler’s 
aggressive plans when they came into existence. And he took action to carry out these 
plans whenever action was necessary.’255It is submitted that knowledge was the 
underlying mens rea for being a part of the common plan or conspiracy to wage 
aggressive war.  
ii. Count Two: planning, preparing, initiating or waging aggressive war   
The following defendants were acquitted on both Count One and Count Two: 
Schacht, Sauckel, von Papen and Speer.256 The following defendants were acquitted 
under Count One, but guilty of Count Two: Frick, Funk, Donitz and Seyss-Inquart.257 
These defendants appeared to be acquitted of Count One because they did not 
participate in any of the conferences at which Hitler outlined his aggressive 
intentions. However, the evidence showed that their actions still amounted to guilt 
under Count Two.   
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A. Scope of perpetrators 
  
The IMT Charter was silent on the scope of perpetrators for crimes against peace. 
Thus, the Tribunal did not have the mindset of an established scope of perpetrators 
when assessing individual criminal responsibility,258 but appeared to create one from 
assessing each individual as to whether they could be liable under Counts One and/or Two.  
First, the relationship of the individual and the Head of State, i.e. Hitler, was 
examined. The nature of this relationship was either professional or personal – or 
even somewhat interlinked. The next step was to consider the official position of the 
individual with respect to his position and role in the government or military. 
Emphasis should not be placed strictly upon the official title as such, but rather upon 
the scope of powers within the role pertaining to the official position.  
This was demonstrated in relation to Donitz, where the Tribunal acknowledged 
that although his official position entailed him doing tactical tasks, he actually had a 
leadership role in the army, as Hitler consulted him somewhat 120 times throughout 
the war.259 Therefore, the official title of position of the individual was not as 
important as the scope of their powers. Other factors that were taken into 
consideration included whether the individual had the authority to make official 
decisions on behalf of the government, sign laws or decrees, sign or initial directives 
and letters of memorandum. 
B.  Conduct 
 
It is not entirely clear what the difference was between each of the modes of 
perpetration, ‘planning, preparing, initiation or waging’ wars of aggression. The 
judgment did not really create an obvious distinction between the different modes of 
participation committed by the defendants under Count Two. However, it is important 
to note that “planning, preparing, initiation” were considered together, whilst 
“waging” considered on its own. It is also important to note that the defendant did not 
                                                
258 McDougall (n 7) 172.  
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necessarily have to commit all four modes of perpetration to be convicted under 
Count Two.   
It is rather difficult to differentiate between ‘planning’ as part of the ‘common 
plan’ and ‘planning’ as one of the modes of perpetration for an aggressive war.  Frick, 
Funk, Donitz and Seyss-Inquart who were acquitted under Count One were not held 
to be responsible for ‘planning’ under Count Two.260 As for those who were also 
convicted of planning as part of the conspiracy or common plan, they were found to 
have participated in the planning of certain aggressive wars under Count Two, e.g. 
Göring was found to be ‘the moving force for aggressive war, second only to Hitler. 
He was the planner and prime mover in the military and diplomatic preparation for 
war which Germany pursued.’261 The IMT therefore considered “planning” a war of 
aggression synonymous with the “common plan” to carry out an aggression.  
Acts which amounted to ‘planning’ under Count Two appear to include: 
diplomatic manoeuvers which included false assurances of peace (Göring,262 von 
Ribbentrop263); diplomatic pressure with the object of occupying the remainder of 
Czechoslovakia and inducing the Slovaks to proclaim their independence (von 
Ribbentrop264); diplomatic activity leading to attacks (von Ribbentrop265); signing 
directives and memoranda concerning aggressive plans (Keitel266, Jodl267); initialing 
documents containing aggressive plans (Keitel268, Jodl269); issuing a timetable for the 
invasion (Keitel270); originating the plan to attack Norway (Rosenberg271, Raeder272); 
preparing occupation plans (Rosenberg273); discussions with Hitler concerning plans 
or preparations for aggression (Raeder274). 
Although the defendants acquitted under Count One were not found liable for 
‘planning’, some of them were nevertheless held liable for preparation. Frick was held 
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liable for participating in the preparation for aggressive war by the numerous laws he 
drafted, signed and administered to abolish all opposition parties, thereby preparing 
the way for the Gestapo and their concentration camps to extinguish all individual 
opposition.275 Funk was held liable for participating in the economic preparation such 
as transferring into gold all foreign exchange resources available to Germany, 
economic preparation for certain aggressive wars, such as Poland, and plans for 
printing ruble notes in Germany before the attack on the Soviet Union to serve as 
occupation currency.276 Other acts which amounted to preparation included preparing 
the Yugoslavian and Greek campaigns (Göring277); signing the law establishing 
compulsory military service (Hess278); arranging conferences in December 1939 
between Hitler and the traitor Quisling which led to the preparation of the attack on 
Norway (Rosenberg 279 ); preparing plans for occupation by attending numerous 
conferences (Rosenberg, Keitel, Raeder, Göring, Funk, von Ribbentrop280); preparing 
several drafts of instructions concerning the setting up of the administration in the 
Occupied Eastern Territories (Rosenberg281).   
It is not clear what the Tribunal held ‘initiation’ to be. Perhaps the execution of a 
plan was considered as the initiation, e.g. executing the Yugoslavian and Greek 
campaigns (Göring 282); formulation and execution of occupation policies in the 
Occupied Eastern Territories (Rosenberg283). The only time ‘initiation’ was explicitly 
mentioned was in relation to Donitz, that he was held not guilty of planning, 
preparing or initiating aggressive war because he was a line officer carrying out 
strictly tactical duties and was not present at any of the important conferences, nor 
was there supporting evidence that he was informed about the decisions reached there.284  
Thus, as mentioned above, waging appears to be separate from planning, 
preparing and initiation because one can be convicted solely on waging (Donitz, 
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Seyss-Inquart.285) Acts which appear to amount to waging of aggressive war include: 
direct participation such as commanding the Luftwaffe in the attack on Poland and 
subsequent aggressive wars (Göring286); signing laws incorporating Austria into the 
German Reich (Hess, Frick287); signing decrees setting up the Government of the 
Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia (Hess288) signing laws incorporating other occupied 
territories into the Reich (Frick 289 ) establishment of German administration in 
occupied territories (Frick290) participation in administration of annexed/occupied 
territories (Hess, Rosenberg, Seyss-Inquart291) giving permission to attack Russian 
submarines before the invasion of the Soviet Union (Raeder292) commanding the U-
boats (Donitz293); being solely responsible for the submarine warfare that damaged 
and sank millions of tons of Allied and neutral ships (Donitz)294; directing army units 
to carry out economic directives for the exploitation of Russian territory, food and 
raw materials (Keitel295).      
Therefore, the level of participation of the individual should be considered when 
determining individual criminal responsibility. To summarize, the modes of 
participation can be broadly categorized into two different categories ‘planning, 
preparing and initiation’ and ‘waging’. Planning, preparing and initiation appear to be 
inter-related, whilst waging can be carried out separately. One does not necessarily 
have to participate in all four modes to be convicted. Therefore, upon closer 
examination, the scope of perpetrators for both categories may be slightly different. In 
relation to the former, there is a narrower scope of perpetrators, whilst the latter may 
perhaps be slightly broader.   
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C. Mental Element  
 
The IMT did not appear to pay too much attention to any particular mental 
element, apart from knowledge being the pre-requisite for conviction for crimes 
against peace. Knowledge appears to be the underlying mens rea. Thus, it can be 
inferred that there is no need to prove beyond reasonable doubt any aggressive 
intention – or animus aggressionis on the part of the defendants.  
Those who were convicted under Count One were held to be liable for planning 
specific acts or wars of aggression, whilst on the other hand, those who were 
acquitted were not held liable for planning under Count Two. It can therefore be 
deduced that the knowledge of Hitler’s plans for aggressive war was a pre-requisite 
for conviction of planning aggressive war under Count Two. ‘Preparing’ and 
‘initiating’ were the subsequent modes of participation after ‘planning’ and it can be 
assumed that there was knowledge of the plans for aggressive war. Thus, although the 
perpetrator may not necessarily have been involved in planning any specific 
aggressive wars, they still had knowledge of the aggressive plans (Frick, Funk296) and 
had carried out preparations for certain aggressive wars.  
A defendant could be convicted under Count Two for waging aggressive war 
even if he did not have knowledge of the aggressive plans. However, it was necessary 
that he had knowledge that the nature of war is aggressive. For example, because 
Hitler consulted Donitz somewhat 120 times during the course of the war, it was 
satisfied that he knew the war was of an aggressive nature.297 As for Seyss-Inquart, ‘he 
assumed responsibility for governing territory which had been occupied by aggressive 
wars and the administration of which was of vital importance in the aggressive war 
being waged by Germany.’298 This implies that he had knowledge that the war being 
waged was an aggressive war. Evidence of such knowledge may include participation 
in high-level government conferences or meetings where decisions are discussed. This 
is where the relationship between the individual and head of state should be 
considered, as it is likely that if one was in a close professional relationship with the 
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head of state, then there is a strong assumption that knowledge has been acquired of 
aggressive plans. 
It is not entirely clear whether knowledge needed to be from a factual or legal 
basis. Would the defendant need to have knowledge of the existing legal framework 
pertaining to how states should conduct recourse to force and deliberately planned, 
prepared, initiated or waged a war contrary to the laws on the use of force? Or would 
it suffice that the defendant was aware of the factual circumstances that the war being 
committed can be considered to be aggressive?  
At the time of the events, the prohibition of the use of force relied mainly on the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact and treaties and agreements of non-aggression between Germany 
and respective countries. To require legal knowledge that the war was aggressive in 
nature would entail knowledge of the provisions and obligations within the Kellogg-
Briand Pact and/or treaties and agreements of non-aggression between Germany and 
the respective intended victim States, and that the war being waged was in breach of 
such provisions and obligations.  
The requirement of factual knowledge can be satisfied if the defendant was aware 
that Germany had entered into such instruments with the intended victim States and 
that the plans to commit war were contrary to this. Here, knowledge could be said to 
be both legal and factual, as the defendant was simultaneously aware that: i) Germany 
entered into such an agreement with the intended victim State (factual knowledge); ii) 
such war would violate the legally binding agreement between both states parties 
(legal knowledge).  
However, other factors can also demonstrate factual knowledge that the wars 
committed were aggressive in nature. This may include inter alia knowledge that the 
state is initiating the use of force against another State, i.e. the first use of armed force 
against another State; that the war against the intended victim state was unprovoked; 
the magnitude of the scale of the war against the intended victim state; the plans for 
occupation, annihilation and annexation; the plans for gaining military advantage of 
adversaries; assisting in an aggressive war by a third State.      
It must be appreciated that in the light of the present UN framework of collective 
security, the rules of jus ad bellum are rather complex, thus it may now be more 
difficult than during the pre-UN Charter era to expect the defendant to have 
simultaneous legal and factual knowledge that the use of force will amount to an act 
of aggression.     
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2.2.4. Observations   
 
The analysis above has discussed three constituents of the elements pertaining to 
the conduct of the individual: the leadership element; the modes of perpetration (actus 
reus); the mental elements of the crime (mens rea). The IMT appears to be rather 
silent on the leadership element in both the IMT Charter and the judgment. Instead, 
each individual was assessed as to whether they could be liable under Counts One 
and/or Two by first examining the relationship of the individual and Hitler, followed 
by considering the official position of the individual.  The former could be either 
professional or personal, or interlinked, but the general assumption was that those 
within Hitler’s inner circle were in a position to effectively play a substantial role in 
one of the modes of perpetration that gave rise to the war(s) of aggression. With 
respect to the latter, the emphasis was not necessarily on the official position or title 
of the perpetrator but rather on the scope of underlying powers that the position 
entailed. The underlying determining factor that created the scope of perpetrators was 
that each individual had a close relationship with Hitler. Naturally, each one was in a 
position where Hitler would confide in them and tell them of his plans. Furthermore, 
as they also consulted with him, discussed and influenced his plans, they would have 
held an influential position in either the government or the military.  
With respect to the modes of perpetration, “planning, preparing, initiation” can be 
considered separately from “waging” [a war of aggression]. There appeared to be no 
particular distinctive feature that defined each mode of perpetration.  It should be 
noted that “common plan or conspiracy” (Count One) and “planning” (Count Two) 
were regarded as synonymous.  That said, those who were held liable for planning 
aggressive war needed to be in a highly influential position where they have 
knowledge of the government policies and plans for aggressive wars, and to be able to 
participate in this planning. It can be assumed that they would need to have authority 
to make decisions/laws/policies/sign or initial directives, memoranda and make 
decisions in the name of the state.  
At Nuremberg, those held liable included deputy Heads of State (Göring, Hess), 
ministers or heads of departments of foreign affairs (von Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, von 
Neurath), Command leaders in military (Keitel, Raeder, Jodl).  Those who potentially 
could be held liable for preparing and initiation would not need to have participated in 
the planning of aggressive war, but must nevertheless have obtained knowledge of the 
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aggressive plans. Thus, it can be inferred that the perpetrators that were held liable for 
planning are more limited than those that can be held for the other modes of 
perpetration because a narrower scope of perpetrators were convicted under Count 
One.   
The underlying mental element that must accompany the leadership element and 
the modes of perpetration is knowledge. Such knowledge need not necessarily be 
legal, but may encompass an awareness of the factual circumstances of the aggressive 
plans and/or that the war being waged displays the attributes of a war of aggressive 
nature.  
2.2.5. Individual criminal responsibility for crimes against peace: the question of the 
legal basis of the Nuremberg Trial 
 
The legal basis of Article 6(a) IMT Charter is questionable,299 as opined by 
Poltorak:  
 
either the verdict of the international tribunal, having condemned aggression 
and aggressors, has a solid legal basis or its basis is unlawful because in 
establishing the guilt of the accused for aggression it cannot cite any norms of 
international law.300 
 
In my view, it is questionable as to whether at the time of the formation of the IMT 
Charter and the Nuremberg Trial, norms under international law had criminalised 
aggression. The underlying issue is whether international law had placed obligations 
directly on individuals to refrain from the crime of aggression. This requires an 
examination of the international instruments that existed at the time of the events in 
order to understand the nature of the underlying norms and obligations in relation to the use 
of force, with particular reference to the rightful duty-bearer of these norms.   
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The source primarily relied upon by the Tribunal was the Kellogg-Briand Pact.  
Article 1 stipulates:  
 
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective 
peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their 
relations with one another. 
 
Article 2 states:  
 
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all 
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, 
which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means. 
 
As can be seen, the obligations under these Articles pertain to the High Contracting 
Parties that have signed the Pact. These states are the duty-bearers with respect to the 
obligations under the Pact. This suggests by default that individuals are inherently 
excluded from any obligations under this Pact. A further observation of the Pact 
indicates there are no apparent sanctions with respect to the breach of the obligations.  
Jackson acknowledges: 
 
Secretary Kellogg said that it was out of the question to impose any obligation 
respecting sanctions on the United States. The Senate proceedings make clear 
that its ratification was due only to the assurance that it provided no specific 
sanctions or commitment to enforce it. 
 
This treaty, however, was not wholly sterile despite the absence of an express 
legal duty of enforcement. It had legal consequences more substantial than its 
political ones. It created substantive law of national conduct for its signatories 
and there resulted a right to enforce it by the general sanctions of international 
law..301 
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The general sanctions of international law refer to the remedies of self-help, whereby 
one contracting party may resort to wrongful measures against another for the 
wrongful conduct.302 Such sanctions do not refer to criminal sanctions executable 
against individuals, as correctly pointed out by Merkhel:  
 
the Briand-Kellogg Pact did not establish a set of criminal sanctions for the 
case of its violation. For the case of a war-like aggression, its preamble merely 
drew the simultaneously weak and logical conclusion that an attacker could no 
longer invoke the other parties’ duty to keep the peace governed in the pact.303 
 
Poltorak, who is critical of those who do not view that the Pact gives rise to criminaity 
of aggression observes: 
 
the legal importance of the pact when applied to the problem of the 
criminalization of aggressive war can be reduced to zero on the basis that there 
is no categoricalness in the formulations, and in particular, the words 
‘illegality and criminality’ are missing.304  
 
However, it is not the lack of the words ‘illegality and criminality’ per se which is the 
reason why the Pact does not give rise to criminal responsibility. Rather it is the non-
applicability of the provisions to individuals and the lack of enforcement measures 
within the Pact that undermine any basis for individual criminal responsibility for 
aggression.305 Yet, a view persists that individuals are somehow duty-bearers of the 
obligations of the Pact and sanctions can be executed directly against them. Poltorak 
submits that:  
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one can often conclude that only the illegality of aggression can be deduced 
from the pact but not criminality which, of course, is not the case. (…) 
Modern war, with its ever-developing destructive technology threatens the life 
of all peoples. Under these conditions, there is no basis for creating a 
distinction between illegality and criminality for such an infringement of an 
agreement which leads to war.306  
 
His premise rejects any distinction between norms that prohibit aggression and norms 
that criminalise aggression. However, his supporting argument that the infringement 
of a common international treaty should not be compared with an infringement of an 
agreement, which is based on the protection of international law, is weak and bears 
little legal relevance. The point is that the duty-bearers of the obligations of this treaty 
are states, regardless of whether the agreement is based on the protection of 
international law.  
In my view, it is important to demarcate between norms that prohibit conduct and 
norms that criminalise conduct, as this is representative of the existing international 
legal framework and the correct conferral of obligations upon the relevant legal 
personalities.  It is precarious to argue that sanctions under international law are 
executable against individuals for the breach of this Pact, especially in the light of the 
fact that the Pact applied only towards signatory states and not towards individuals. 
Only the former were duty-bearers to comply with the provisions of the pact. 
Therefore, the IMT was wrong when it held:  
 
the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily 
involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law; and that 
those who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible 
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The Tribunal attempted to justify its approach by relying on customary international 
law:  
 
The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and 
practices of states which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from 
the general principles of justice applied by jurists and practised by military 
courts. This law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of 
a changing world. Indeed, in many cases treaties do no more than express and 
define for more accurate reference the principles of law already existing. The 
view which the Tribunal takes of the true interpretation of the Pact is 
supported by the international history which preceded it.308   
 
Poltorak has criticised the opponents of the Nuremberg principles, for recognizing 
only the Briand-Kellogg Pact as a source of international law (applied to the problem 
of aggression) hereby reducing its international legal importance to zero, and for 
firmly denying the importance of any other international legal acts in the period from 
1919-1939.309 He continues to examine the legal instruments that existed at the time, 
e.g. Article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the Protocol on the Peaceful Settlement of 
International disputes (declared that ‘aggressive war’ is an international crime), the 
Declaration of 21 American Republics on the Sixth Havana Conference (‘aggressive 
war is an international crime against the human species’, the General Convention on 
the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (condemnation of war as an instrument of 
national policy).310 His opinion is that these instruments suffice to provide a legal 
basis for an argument that existing customary international law conferred obligations 
directly on individuals to refrain from conduct pertaining to aggression – the crime of 
aggression. Glaser shares the same opinion, arguing that ‘the idea that such war would 
constitute an international crime had reappeared continually in international acts and 
in the doctrine of the law of nations. One could say without exaggeration, that it has 
been adopted by the universal conscience of civilised nations.’311 Thus, he finds no 
fault with the legal basis of the IMT Charter:  
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well before the outbreak of the Second World War, the consideration that a 
war of aggression constitutes a crime against the law of nations had developed 
in the conscience of peoples and in international relations to such an extent 
that one must recognize that an international custom had been formed in this 
regard, and in consequence that this consideration had already acquired the 
significance of a principle of international law.312 
 
The Tribunal itself held:  
 
All these expressions of opinion, and others that could be cited, so solemnly 
made, reinforce the construction which the Tribunal placed upon the Pact of 
Paris, that resort to a war of aggression is not merely illegal, but is criminal. 
The prohibition of aggressive war demanded by the conscience of the world, 
finds its expression in the series of pacts and treaties to which the Tribunal has 
just referred.313  
 
I disagree. The legal nature of the majority of the instruments that he referred to were 
soft-law with no legal binding effects as only agreements or conventions have legal 
binding effects on signatory parties, which in turn may gradually crystallise into 
customary international law. Thus, the IMT had erred in submitting:  
 
Although the Protocol (1924 Geneva Protocol) was never ratified, it was 
signed by the leading statesmen of the world, representing the vast majority of 
the civilized states and peoples, and may be regarded as strong evidence of the 
intention to brand aggressive war as an international crime.314 
 
Indeed, declarations and unratified protocols are considered as soft-law and are 
insufficient to provide a legal basis for criminalisation. Therefore, Poltorak is 
incorrect in submitting the existing instruments as proof that ‘the idea of establishing 
criminal responsibility for aggression has taken deep root in the legal awareness of 
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people and this has allowed the development of a process of creating an international 
legal norm for the criminal and legal prohibition of aggression. […] even before 1939, 
that is prior to the start of WWII, an international legal standard had formed in 
international law which put aggressive war beyond [sic] the law and declared it an 
international crime.315 
My view is that at the time of the Trial, there were no existing obligations on 
individuals to refrain from criminal conduct amounting to crimes against peace, as 
rightly said by Judge Röling:  
 
It is beyond doubt that before World War II, there had been no question of 
individual criminal responsibility for a violation of the Kellogg-Briand pact. 
Neither this treaty nor the resolutions of the League of Nations or the abortive 
treaties in which it was stated that aggression was an international crime had 
the effect of creating international criminal law.316   
 
At the Trial, the defence raised the issue of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena 
sine lege. It was submitted that ‘ex post facto punishment is abhorrent to the law of all 
civilized nations, that no sovereign power had made aggressive war a crime at the 
time that the alleged criminal acts were committed, that no statute had defined 
aggressive war, that no penalty had been fixed for its commission, and no court had 
been created to try and punish offenders.’317 To which, the Tribunal responded:  
  
it is to be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation 
of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust 
to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked 
neighboring states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such 
circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from 
it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to 
go unpunished. Occupying the positions they did in the Government of 
                                                
315 Poltorak (n 299) 451–453. 
316 Röling (n 173) 455, 459–460; for a different view see Glaser who argues that the Charter 
has ‘done nothing more than confirm a principle that had already been well established in 
public international law’, Glaser (n 299) 69.  
317 ‘Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law - International Military 
Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences’ (n 4) 217. 
 90  
Germany, the defendants or at least some of them must have known of the 
treaties signed by Germany, outlawing recourse to war for the settlement of 
international disputes, they must have known that they were acting in defiance 
of all international law when in complete deliberation they carried out their 
designs of invasion and aggression. On this view of the case alone, it would 
appear that the maxim has no application to the present facts.318 
 
There has been a divide in opinion as to whether nullum crimen sine lege was 
applicable at the Trial. Glaser and Poltorak for example, believe that the principle is 
not applicable in international law.319 Kelsen, on the other hand, argues that it is 
applicable.320 This debate need not be discussed here.321 It is worth mentioning 
however that the debate encompasses an interesting interplay between arguments 
from a natural law and positive law approach. 
Glaser for example submits that ‘the real source of the idea which forms the 
essene of the law – the idea of justice – is natural law: that law is made of eternal 
moral truths which are born with mankind, which each of us has in his conscience, 
and which are immutable.’322 Judge Röling, on the other hand, submits that ‘positive 
international law did not recognise the crime of aggressive war for which individuals 
could be punished.’323 
As the war had truly shocked the conscience of mankind, it brought forth the 
struggle between morality and legality with respect to punishing the perpetrators for 
aggressive war, as submitted by Jackson: ‘it is clear that by 1939 the world had come 
to regard aggressive war as so morally wrong and illegal that it should be treated as 
criminal if occasion arose.’324 Donnedieu de Vabres submits: 
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it is wrong to present as unjust the punishment inflicted on those who, in 
contempt for solemn commitments and treaties have, without prior warning, 
assaulted a neighbouring state. In such cases, the aggressor knows the odious 
character of his action. The conscience of the world, quite far from being 
offended if he is punished, would be shocked if he was not. […] the 
defendants knew that was of aggression were outlawed by most of the states of 
the world, including Germany itself; it was in full awareness of the situation 
that they violated international law when they deliberately followed their 
aggressive intentions with their plans for invasion. 325 
 
Merkhel, who generally appears to find the legitimacy of the Tribunal problematic, 
attempts to reconcile the two different positions by submitting:  
 
the punishment of the perpetrators was still the right to do; however, the 
construction foisted on it was wrong a more courageous and above all more 
honourable establishment would have openly acknowledged the breach of the 
prohibition of retroactive effect – and justified it, for there were conclusive 
arguments for it. 326 
 
Indeed, there is merit in the middle ground that despite the questionable legal basis of 
the Tribunal with respect to the crime of aggression, the prosecution of the 
perpetrators for the atrocities committed by Germany was nevertheless justifiable 
from a moral perspective. Be that as it may, the Charter and Judgment of the Trial at 
Nuremberg marks the cornerstone in international law whereby sanctions were enforced 
against individuals for their conduct in relation to aggression by the State they serve.  
Although it is questionable as to whether these individuals had acted in breach of 
conduct directly attributable to them under international law, the legal construct of the 
crime pursuant to Article 6(a) of the IMT Charter is now referred to as the substantive 
source of law that confers obligations on individuals to refrain from planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of the state act of aggression. Thus, emerging 
developments in international law have provided legitimacy to the legal premise 
applied by Nuremberg. This will be examined further below.  
                                                
325 Donnedieu de Vabres (n 319) 226–227. 
326 Merkhel (n 173) 568. 
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This section has endeavoured to signify that the IMT Charter and Nuremberg 
judgment represent the turning point in international law, which propagated the 
emergence of norms that criminalise aggression. Prior to the Nuremberg Trial, 
international law did not provide norms that criminalise aggression.  
2.3. The Tribunals established pursuant to Control Council Law No.10: The 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
 
After the Nuremberg Trial, the US established military tribunals as part of the 
occupation administration for the American zone in Germany pursuant to Control 
Council Law No.10,327 which was also known as the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, 
(“NMT”).328 12 trials were held from 1946 to 1949: four of which dealt with crimes 
against peace: United States of America v Carl Krauch et al (the “I.G. Farben 
case”);329 United States of America v Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen and 
Halbach, et al (the “Krupp case”);330 United States of America v Wilhelm von Leeb et 
al (The “High Command case”)331; United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsacker 
et al. (the “Ministries Case”).332    
                                                
327 Control Council Law No.10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against 
Peace and against Humanity; reprinted in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg 
Military Tribunals, United States Government Printing Office, 1951, Vol.III, p.XVIII 
(hereinafter “Control Council Law No.10”). 
328 See Kranzbuhler (n 299) 434. 
329 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council 
Law No.10, Nuernberg, October 1946- April 1949, United States Government Printing 
Office, 1952, vol. VIII, (hereinafter “The I.G. Farben Case”); available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-VIII.pdf; in the 
Indictment, 24 individuals who were high-level officials of I.G. Farben were charged under 
Count One with planning, preparation, initiating and waging wars of aggression and invasions 
of other countries; and Count five for participating and executing a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit such crimes against peace; Indictment available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Indictments.pdf  
330 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council 
Law No.10, Nurenberg, October 1946- April 1949, United States Government Printing 
Office, 1950, vol. IX, (hereinafter “the Krupp Case”); available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-IX.pdf; in the 
Indictment, 12 officials of the Krupp firm who held high-level positions in management or 
other high official positions in the business. They were charged under Count one for 
committing crimes against peace and Count four for participating in a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit such crimes.  
331 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council 
Law No.10, Nuernberg, October 1946- April 1949, United States Government Printing 
Office, 1950, Vol.XI, (hereinafter “The High Command Case”); available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-XI.pdf; in the 
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Control Council Law No.10 was the legal basis for which the NMT were carried 
out.333 According to Article X of Military Ordinance No.7: 
 
The determinations of the International Military Tribunal in the judgments In 
Case No. 1 that invasions, aggressive acts, aggressive wars, crimes, atrocities 
or inhumane acts were planned or occurred, shall be binding on the tribunals 
established hereunder and shall not be questioned except insofar as the 
participation therein or knowledge thereof by any particular person may be 
concerned. Statements of the International Military Tribunal in the judgment 
in Case No. 1 constitute proof of the facts stated, in the absence of substantial 
new evidence to the contrary.  
 
Thus, the NMT were legally bound by the Charter and judgment of the Nuremberg 
Trial. Article II(1)(a) of Control Council Law No.10 defined crimes against peace as:  
 
initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of 
international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation 
of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing 
(Emphasis added).  
 
Article II(2)(f) stipulates that any person without regard to nationality or the capacity 
in which he acted, is deemed to have committed crimes against peace ‘if he held a 
high political, civil or military (including General Staff) position in Germany or in 
                                                                                                                                      
Indictment, 14 officers who held high-level positions in the German military were charged 
under Count One for crimes against peace and Count four for conspiracy to commit such 
crimes.  
332 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council 
Law No.10, Nuernberg, October 1946- April 1949, United States Government Printing 
Office, [No publication date available] Volume XIV, (hereinafter “the Ministries Case”); 
available at: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-XIV.pdf; in 
the Indictment, 17 out of the 21 defendants were charged under Count two for planning, 
preparing, initiating and waging wars of aggression and invasions of other countries and 
under Count Two for participating in a common plan or conspiracy to commit such crimes.   
333 Control Council Law No.10, available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp.   
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one of its Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or held high position in the financial, 
industrial or economic life of any such country.’ 
As can be seen, the NMT adopted a broader scope of crimes against peace than 
the IMT because the definition of the crime in Article II(1)(a) Control Council Law 
no.10 included the ‘initiation of invasions of other countries.’ Furthermore, as 
emphasised, the definition in Control Control Law No.10 is non-exhaustive. Article II 
(2)(f) had put forward a scope of perpetrators that may be potentially prosecuted for 
crimes against peace, whilst the IMT Charter was non-explicit on this matter.   
In a similar approach to the IMT, the NMT Tribunals first determined the 
existence of the state act element, followed by examining the conduct of the 
individual. Yet, there are a couple of preliminary points, which should be made. From 
the outset, three differences between the NMT and the IMT can be observed. First, the 
Ministries tribunal had convicted two defendants for the invasions of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia.334 This was of course in contrast to the IMT, where no defendants 
were convicted under Count Two for crimes against peace with respect to these two 
states. Second, unlike the IMT, the NMT Tribunals provided definitions for invasions 
and wars of aggression.335 Third, unlike the IMT, the NMT also elaborated upon the 
scope of perpetrators who could be liable for crimes against peace.336 
2.3.1. The state act element of crimes against peace  
 
 
There are two immediate differences between the definition in the IMT Charter 
and Control Council Law No.10. First, the definition in the latter includes ‘invasions’ 
as crimes against peace. Second, Law No.10 contains the phrase ‘including but not 
limited to’ to expressly indicate a non-exhaustive nature. Both of these differences 
amount to a broader scope for crimes against peace than held at the IMT.  
The tribunals in Farben and Krupp accepted the determination of the IMT with 
regard to the invasions and wars of aggression and held that the alleged acts that the 
                                                
334 Ministries Case, (n 332) 867, 869. 
335 High Command Case, (n 331) 485; Ministries Case, (n 332) 330-331. 
336 see Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership Requirement in the Crime 
of Aggression’ (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 477, 480–488. 
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accused participated in were aggressive.337 The High Command and Ministries Case 
re-examined the findings of the IMT in relation to the nature of the acts committed.338 
The High Command Tribunal sought to define ‘war.’ It held:  
 
war is the exerting of violence by one State or politically organized body 
against another. In other words, it is the implementation of a political policy 
by means of violence.339 
 
It subsequently sought to define an invasion, holding that:   
 
[A]n invasion of one State by another is the implementation of the national 
policy of the invading state by force even though the invaded State, due to fear 
or a sense of the futility of resistance in the face of superior force, adopts a 
policy of non-resistance and thus prevents the occurrence of any actual 
combat.340  
 
It can be inferred that war (implementation of a political policy by means of violence) 
is an escalated form of hostilities in comparison to an invasion (implementation of the 
national policy of the invading state by force). The key point is that an invasion does 




                                                
337 I.G. Farben Case, (n 329) 1096-1097; Krupp Case (n 330) 157. 
338  High Command case (n 331) 485; In the Ministries Case, the Tribunal stated 
‘Notwithstanding the provisions in Article X of Ordinance No.7, that the determination of the 
International Military Tribunal that invasions, aggressive acts, aggressive wars, crimes, 
atrocities, and inhumane acts were planned or occurred, shall be binding on the Tribunals 
established thereunder and cannot be questioned except insofar as the participation therein 
and knowledge thereof of any particular person may be concerned, we have permitted the 
defense to offer evidence upon all these matters. In so doing we have not considered this 
article to be a limitation on the right of the Tribunal to consider any evidence which may lead 
to a just determination of the facts. If in this we have erred, it is an error which we do not 
regret, as we are firmly convinced that courts of justice must always remain open to the 
ascertainment of the truth and that every defendant must be accorded an opportunity to 
present the facts,’ (n 332) 317. 
339 High Command Case (n 331) 4. 
340 High Command Case (n 331) 485. 
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Whether a war be lawful, or aggressive and therefore unlawful under 
international law, is and can be determined only from a consideration of the 
factors that entered into its initation. In the intent and purpose for which it is 
planned, prepared, initiated and waged is to be found in lawfulness or 
unlawfulness.341  
 
This is indicative of the animus aggressionis, which was subsequently affirmed in the 
following dictum:  
 
As long as there is no aggressive intent there is no evil inherent in a nation 
making itself militarily strong.342 
 
 Thus, the state act element of crimes against peace consists of:  
• the exertion of violence by one State against another or the implementation of 
the national policy of the invading State by force 
• the animus aggressionis.  
The Ministries Tribunal viewed an invasion as ‘the use of force’343 with respect to its 
examination of the attacks against Austria and Czechoslovakia and held:  
 
the invasions were hostile and aggressive. An invasion of this character is 
clearly such an act of war as is tantamount to, and may be treated as, a 
declaration of war. It is not reasonable to assume that an act of war, in the 
nature of an invasion, whereby conquest and plunder are achieved without 
resistance, is to be given more favourable consideration than a similar 
invasion which may have met with some military resistance. The fact that the 
aggressor was here able to so overawe the invaded countries does not detract 
in the slightest from the enormity of the aggression in reality perpetrated. The 
                                                
341 Prior to this, the Tribunal observed that ‘the initiation of war or an invasion is a unilateral 
operation. When war is formally declared or the first shot is fired the initiation of that war has 
ended and from then on there is a waging of war between the two adversaries. Whether a war 
be lawful, or aggressive and therefore unlawful under international law, is and can be 
determined only from a consideration of the factors that entered into its initiation’, High 
Command Case (n 331) 486. 
342 High Command Case (n 331) 488. 
343 It relied on the definition of invasion from Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary as ‘act of 
invading, especially a warlike or hostile entrance into the posessions or domains of another; 
the incursion of an army for conquest or plunder’, Ministries Case (n 332) 331. 
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invader here employed an act of war. This act of war was an instrument of 
national policy.344  
 
By establishing that such attacks were aggressive invasions, and thus the state act 
element, the Ministries Tribunal was able to convict Lammers for his role in the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia;345 and Keppler for his role in the invasions of both 
Austria and Czechoslovakia.346    
2.3.2. Observations   
 
The NMT adhered to a broader interpretation of the state act element of crimes 
against peace than the IMT. Unlike the IMT, the High Command Tribunal had sought 
to define wars and invasions. From the definitions provided by the High Command 
Tribunal, the state act element of the crime can be inferred as ‘the exertion of violence 
by one State against another or the implementation of the national policy of the 
invading State by force’ 347  in conjunction with the animus aggressionis. The 
immediate difference from the IMT is that there was no need for an actual use of 
force for the act to fulfil the state act element of the crime. Thus, there was a lower 
threshold for the state act element at the NMT than the IMT.   
In the absence of actual use of force, it can be inferred that the animus 
aggressionis was the ultimate determining factor whether the act may be considered 
as an invasion or an aggressive war. Furthermore, the substantive content of an 
invasion appears to be reflective of the aggressive intentions identified by the IMT 
with respect to Austria and Czechoslovakia, which suggests that the common 
underlying factor is indeed the animus aggressionis.  
Thus, according to NMT case law, the absence of armed force by the alleged 
aggressor state does not detract from individual criminal responsibility for crimes 
against peace. The implementation of national policy by force will suffice, provided 
that the underlying criterion of the animus aggressionis is present.  
Three main points of comparison can be made between the NMT and the IMT 
with respect to the state act element of crimes against peace. First, the definition of 
                                                
344 Ministries Case (n 332) 331. 
345 Ministries Case (n 332) 867. 
346 Ministries Case (n 332) 869. 
347 High Command Case (n 331) 485. 
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the crime under Article II(1)(a) Control Council Law no.10 encompassed invasions as 
part of the state act element of crimes against peace. Immediately, this is broader than 
the definition under Article 6(a) IMT Charter. Second, the indictment at the IMT had 
excluded acts of aggression (Austria and Czechoslovakia) from Count Two of the 
indictment, which related to charges of crimes against peace. By contrast, the NMT 
did not exclude the acts committed against Austria and Czechoslovakia from the 
charges relating to crimes against peace. This implies that the IMT determined that 
aggressive wars were committed against twelve countries, whilst the NMT 
determined that aggressive invasions or wars were committed against fourteen 
countries. Third, the Ministries tribunal had convicted two defendants for crimes 
against peace for the invasions against Austria and Czechoslovakia. 348  This 
immediately departs from the judgment at Nuremberg.  
 
2.3.3. Elements of the crime pertaining to the conduct of the individual 
 
A. Scope of perpetrators  
 
Control Council Law no.10 did not contain a specific leadership element 
requirement.349 The first tribunal that attempted to delineate a scope of perpetrators 
was the Farben Tribunal. It suggested:  
 
to depart from the concept that only major war criminals-that is, those persons 
in the political, military, and industrial fields, for example, who were 
responsible for the formulation and execution of policies-may be held liable 
for waging wars of aggression, would lead far afield.350 
 
                                                
348 Ministries Case, (n 332) 867, 869. 
349 This was observed by the High Command Tribunal which stated, ‘no matter how absolute his 
authority, Hitler alone could not formulate a policy of aggressive war and alone implement that 
policy by preparing planning and waging such a war. Somewhere between the Dictator and the 
Supreme Commander of the Military Forces of the nation and the common soldier is the boundary 
between the criminal and the excusable participation in the waging of an aggressive war by an 
individual engaged in it. Control Council Law No.10 does not definitely draw such a line’, High 
Command Case (n 331) 486. 
350 I.G. Farben Case (n 329) 1124. 
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Here, it can be inferred that the scope of perpetrators must be persons in the political, 
military and industrial fields who were responsible for the “formulation and 
execution” of policies. To depart from this scope of perpetrators would ‘result in the 
possibility of mass punishments,’351 the Tribunal held that ‘some reasonable standard 
must, therefore, be bound by which to measure the degree of participation necessary 
to constitute a crime against peace in the waging of aggressive war.’352 It held: 
 
The defendants now before us were neither high public officials in the civil 
Government nor high military officers. Their participation was that of 
followers and leaders. If we lower the standard of participation to include 
them, it is difficult to find a logical place to draw the line between the guilty 
and the innocent among the great mass of German people. […] 
 
Strive as we may, we are unable to find, once we have passed below those 
who have led a country into a war of aggression, a rational mark dividing the 
guilty from the innocent. […] To find the defendants guilty of waging 
aggressive war would require us to move the mark without finding a firm 
place in which to reset it. We leave the mark where we find it, well satisfied 
that individuals who plan and lead a nation into and in an aggressive war 
should be held guilty of crimes against peace, but not those who merely follow 
the leaders.353 
 
As can be seen, this marked the emergence of the ‘leadership element.’ It can be 
inferred that this leadership element is representative of a position in the political, 
military or industrial fields, which confers the power to “formulate and execute” 
policies. The leadership element was further developed in the High Command 
Tribunal, where it was held: 
 
Wars are contests by force between political units, but the policy that brings 
about their initiation is made and the actual waging of them is done by 
individuals. What we have said thus far is equally as applicable to a just as to 
                                                
351 I.G. Farben Case (n 329) 1125. 
352 I.G. Farben Case (n 329) 1125-1126. 
353 I.G. Farben Case (n 329) 1126; see also High Command Case, (n 331) 486.  
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an unjust war, to the initiation of an aggressive and therefore, criminal war as 
to the waging of a defensive and, therefore, legitimate war against criminal 
aggression. The point we stress is that war activity is the implementation of a 
predetermined national policy.354 
 
If it is national policy which gives rise to a war, it is only logical that those who can 
be criminally responsible for war are the individuals that participate on the policy 
level: 
 
If the policy under which it is initiated is criminal in its intent and purpose, it 
is so because the individuals at the policy-making level had a criminal intent 
and purpose in determining the policy. If war is the means by which the 
criminal objective is to be attained, then the waging of war is but an 
implementation of the policy, and the criminality which attaches to the waging 
of an aggressive war should be confined to those who participated in it at the 
policy level.355  
 
The Tribunal continued, ‘it is self-evident that national policies are made by men. 
When men make a policy that is criminal under international law, they are criminally 
responsible for so doing. This is the logical and inescapable conclusion.’356Here, the 
Tribunal appears to suggest that the animus aggressionis is attributable to individuals 
at the policy-making level by placing emphasis on the ‘criminal intent and purpose’ 
and ‘criminal objective’ in relation to the waging of war – which is an implementation 
of the policy.  
As discussed earlier, the animus aggressionis is part of the state act element of 
the crime, but appears in the present context to also be a part of individual conduct as 
a mental element of the crime. From this, two points can be deduced. First, the animus 
aggressionis is key component to an aggressive invasion or war and is part of the 
substantive definition of the crime. Second, this animus aggressionis stems from 
individuals who are on the policy level.   
                                                
354 High Command Case (n 331) 485. 
355 High Command Case (n 331) 488. 
356 High Command Case (n 331) 490.  
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The Tribunal continues to qualify the scope of perpetrators in relation to crimes 
against peace:  
 
lf and as long as a member of the armed forces does not participate in the 
preparation, planning, initiating, or waging of aggressive war on a policy 
level, his war activities do not fall under the definition of crimes against peace. 
It is not a person's rank or status, but his power to shape or influence the 
policy of his state, which is the relevant issue for determining his criminality 
under the charge of crimes against peace. 
[…] 
International law condemns those who, due to their actual power to shape and 
influence the policy of their nation, prepare for, or lead their country into or in 
an aggressive war. But we do not find that, at the present stage of 
development, international law declares as criminals those below that level 
who, in the execution of this war policy, act as the instruments of the policy 
makers. Anybody who is on the policy level and participates in the war policy 
is liable to punishment. But those under them cannot be punished for the 
crimes of others.357 
 
From the High Command Case, it is inferred that the leadership element is predicated upon 
a position to “shape or influence” policy. As a result, all of the accused were acquitted for 
crimes against peace because they were not on the policy level:  
 
The acts of commanders and staff officers below the policy level, in planning 
campaigns, preparing means for carrying them out, moving against a country 
on orders and fighting a war after it has been instituted, do not constitute the 
planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of war or the initiation of 
invasion that international law denounces as criminal. 
[…] 
Under the record we find the defendants were not on the policy level, and are 
not guilty under count one of the indictment. With crimes charged to have 
been committed by them in the manner in which they behaved in the waging 
                                                
357 High Command Case (n 331) 491. 
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of war, we deal in other parts of this judgment.  It is important to note that this 
Tribunal held the leadership element as a necessary requirement for all modes 
of participation in crimes against peace, i.e. planning, preparing, initiation and 
waging.358  
 
The Ministries Tribunal appeared to adopt the “shape or influence” standard from the 
High Command Tribunal. 359  The Tribunal examined each defendant’s liability 
according to each separate invasion/war. A defendant’s guilt revolved greatly around 
his positions and activities (e.g. Koerner’s position as deputy to Goring.360) As a 
result, some defendants were ultimately held liable for certain invasions and 
aggressions: Keppler (Austria, Czechoslovakia361); Woermann (Poland, although he 
was eventually aquitted362); Lammers (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg, Russia363); Koerner (Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Russia364).   
Keppler was given full authority over the direction of the Nazi Party’s activities 
in Austria and became the direct representative of Hitler.365 Woermann was originally 
convicted for aggressive war against Poland, but a defence motion was subsequently 
granted to set aside this conviction, thus acquitting him.366 Nonetheless, his roles were 
the Ministerial Director and chief of the Political Division of the Foreign Office from 
                                                
358 ibid. 
359 The tribunal acknowledge that the perpetrators had to be ‘men holding positions of 
authority in the various departments of the Reich Government charged with the 
administration or execution of such programmes.’ Heller (n 171) 185.         
360 Ministries Case (n 332) 21-22. 
361  The Ministries Tribunal found ‘the defendant had knowledge of Hitler's plan for 
aggression against Czechoslovakia, knew that it was indefensible, and that he willingly 
participated in it. We find him guilty under count one in connection with the aggression 
against Czechoslovakia,’ Ministries Case (n 332) 389. 
362 The Ministries Tribunal found ‘on the evidence adduced with respect to the charges 
against Woermann in connection with the aggression against Poland, the Tribunal finds the 
defendant guilty under count one’, (n 332) 398; The Tribunal, with presiding Judge 
Christianson dissenting, set aside this conviction by an order of 12 December 1949. 
363  The Ministries Tribunal established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
Lammers 
was a criminal participant in the formulation, implementation and execution of the Reich's 
plans and preparations of aggression against those countries. It found the defendant Lammers 
guilty under count one, Ministries Case, (n 332) 416. 
364 The Ministries Tribunal found the defendant Koerner guilty under count one, Ministries 
Case (n 332) 435. 
365 Ministries Case (n 332) 386. 
366 The Tribunal, with presiding Judge Christianson dissenting, set aside this conviction by 
an order of 12 December 1949. 
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1938-1943 (Under State Secretary). Therefore, he carried out important duties ‘which 
often involved the exercise of a wide discretion and had a bearing on the plans and 
policies which were being considered or were in the process of execution.’367  
Lammers, occupied a position of ‘influence and authority through which he 
collaborated with and greatly helped Hitler and the Nazi hierarchy in their various 
plans of aggression and expansion.’368 There was evidence that he ‘held and exercised 
wide discretionary powers’369 and had ‘great importance and influence’370 in the 
higher Nazi circles in the distinctly policy making sphere, thus indicating his ‘great 
activity and contribution to the furtherance and implementation of the Nazi aggression 
against other countries generally.’371 Koerner was permanent deputy to Goring, and 
had a ‘wide scope of his authority and discretion in the positions he held, and which 
enabled him to shape and influence plans and preparations of aggression.’372  
On the other hand, von Weizsacker was acquitted from aggression against Poland 
because ‘he had no part in the plan for Polish aggression; he was not in the confidence 
of either Hitler or von Ribbentrop. While his position was one of prominence and he 
was one of the principal cogs in the machinery, which dealt with foreign policy, 
nevertheless, as a rule, he was an implementer and not an originator. He could oppose 
and object, but he could not override.’ 373 It can thus be inferred that in addition to 
being able to ‘shape or influence’ policy, the individual must have been a part of 
originating the aggressive policy.  
As the Ministries Tribunal had only convicted three defendants for specific 
invasions or wars of aggression, this implies that the role of an individual to ‘shape or 
influence’ state policy should be assessed on a case-by-case basis to see if in each 
particular situation they had either shaped or influenced the aggressive policy. There 
was no general assumption that they were able to ‘shape or influence’ state policy in 
every single invasion or war. Thus, it was not necessarily the official ranking or 
                                                
367 Ministries Case (n 332) 392. 
368 Ministries Case (n 332) 401. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Ministries Case (n 332) 406. 
371 Ibid. 
372 Ministries Case (n 332) 425. 
373 The Ministries Case (n 332) 357. 
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position of the individual at all, but the ability to shape or influence policy in each 
circumstance leading to aggressive invasion or war. 374 
B.  Mental Element 
 
Just like the IMT, the NMT adopted knowledge as the underlying mens rea of 
crimes against peace.375 The indictments for crimes against peace in all four tribunals 
had also included a common plan or conspiracy. The NMT appeared to use the same 
standard that was derived from the IMT judgment, where the defendant was either ‘in 
such close relationship with Hitler that he must have been informed of Hitler’s 
aggressive plans … or attended at least one of the four secret meetings at which Hitler 
disclosed his plans for aggressive war.”376The charges were summarily dismissed in 
both Farben and High Command, and dismissed by the Krupp and Ministries 
Tribunals.377  
Upon analysing Count Two relating to crimes against peace, the Farben Tribunal 
stated that ‘the question of knowledge’378 was the decisive factor of guilt or innocence 
of the defendants. It had cautioned earlier against viewing the conduct of the 
defendants in retrospect, as determination was meant to take into consideration ‘their 
state of mind and their motives from the situation as it appeared, or should have 
appeared, at the time.’379 
The Tribunal drew a distinction between common knowledge and personal 
knowledge.380 The former implied a common or general knowledge of Hitler’s plans 
and purpose to wage aggressive war throughout Germany, whilst the latter revolved 
                                                
374 Heller submits that there are four aspects of the “shape or influence” standard which are 
important to note: i) a defendant’s ability to shape or influence policy could not simply be 
inferred solely from his position in the Nazi hierarchy; ii) a defendant’s ability to “shape or 
influence” policy was not all-or nothing; iii) the tribunals were divided over whether a 
defendant had to actually influence Nazi policy in order to satisfy the leadership element; iv) 
although no industrialist was ever convicted of crimes against peace, the tribunals 
consistently emphasized that industrialists could satisfy the leadership requirement, Heller (n 
171) 186.            
375  ibid 194.      
376  The I.G. Farben Case (n 329) 1102; ibid 199.          
377 Heller argues that this conclusion is open to question in the light of the fact that both 
Koerner and Lammers were convicted for planning crimes against peace, ibid 200.  
378 I.G. Farben Case (n 329) 1113.  
379 I.G. Farben Case (n 329) 1108. 
380 I.G. Farben Case (n 329) 1102-1110. 
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around knowledge imputable to individual defendants.381 The former was held not to 
exist, as there was no such common knowledge in Germany,382 whilst the latter could 
not be imputed to the defendants as they were not military experts and could not 
reasonably have been expected to know about the extent of general rearmament plans 
or the armament strength of neighbouring nations.383  
Knowledge, or “actual knowledge” to be more precise, was the first criterion the 
High Commands Tribunal put forward for individual criminal responsibility for 
crimes against peace. It held: 
 
If a defendant did not know that the planning and preparation for invasions 
and wars in which he was involved were concrete plans and preparations for 
aggressive wars and for wars otherwise in violation of international laws and 
treaties, then he cannot be guilty of an offence. If, however, after the policy to 
initiate and wage aggressive wars was formulated, a defendant came into 
possession of knowledge that the invasions and wars to be waged were 
aggressive and unlawful, then he will be criminally responsible if he, being on 
the policy level, could have influenced such policy and failed to do so.384 
 
Two things can be pointed out. First, the requirement of knowledge that the wars were 
“aggressive and unlawful” implies that such knowledge must be both factual and 
legal. Second, guilt appears to be predicated upon knowledge. The Ministries 
Tribunal also adopted a high standard of knowledge: 
 
Our task is to determine which, if any, of the defendants, knowing there was 
an intent to so initiate and wage aggressive war, consciously participated in 
either plans, preparations, initiations of those wars, or so knowing, 
participated or aided in carrying them on. […] One can be guilty only where 
knowledge of aggression in fact exists, and it is not sufficient that he have 
suspicions that the war is aggressive.385 
 
                                                
381 I.G. Farben Case (n 329) 1102-1107. 
382 I.G. Farben Case (n 329) 1107. 
383 I.G. Farben Case (n 329) 1108-1110. 
384 High Command Case (n 331) 489. 
385 Ministries Case (n 332) 337. 
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The defendant needs to have actual knowledge that the wars were of an aggressive 
nature as ‘no man may be condemned for fighting in what he believes is the defence 
of his native land, even though his belief to be mistaken. Nor can he be expected to 
undertake an independent investigation to determine whether or not the cause for 
which he fights in the result of an aggressive act of his own Government.’386 The test 
is that ‘one can be guilty only when knowledge of aggression in fact exists, and it is 
not sufficient that he have suspicions that the war is aggressive.’387    
(i) The Industrialists 
 
The mens rea requirement of the knowledge resulted in the acquittal of the 
industrialists for crimes against peace.388 Heller writes that the mens rea requirement 
‘doomed the crimes against peace charges’for the Farben Tribunal. 389 The defendants 
in the Farben and Krupp Tribunals were high-level officials of industry, i.e. 
industrialists. The fact that they were charged with crimes against peace demonstrates 
that industrialists were not entirely excluded from the scope of perpetrators.  
Although both tribunals did not convict any of the industrialists for crimes 
against peace, this was not because they did not meet the requirement for the 
Leadership Element, but rather because they lacked knowledge. The Farben Tribunal 
concluded that ‘there was no such common knowledge in Germany that would apprise 
any of the defendants of the existence of Hitler’s plans or ultimate purpose.’390  
It also held that the defendants could not have personal knowledge of the 
magnitude of the rearmament efforts because they were not military experts.391 The 
Krupp Tribunal had found that the prosecution had failed to prove each defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt upon the two counts in the Indictment relating to 
crimes against peace, yet was careful to emphasize that its decision to acquit the 
                                                
386 Ibid. 
387 The Tribunal held that ‘any other test of guilt would involve a standard of conduct both 
impracticable and unjust’, Ministries Case (n 332) 337.   
388 Heller observes that the Ministries Tribunal held a higher standard of mens rea than the 
Farben and Krupp tribunals. The latter did not distinguish between rearmament and other 
preparations for crimes against peace, and applied the regular knowledge requirement. 
However, the former held that ‘rearmament was criminal only if a defendant both knew that 
his arms production would be used for aggressive purposes and intended them to be used in 
that way’, Heller (n 171) 196.              
389 ibid 197.   
390 I.G. Farben Case (n 329) 1113. 
391 Ibid. 
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defendants for crimes against peace should not be interpreted as industrialists being 
excluded from the scope of perpetrators:  
 
We do not hold that industrialists, as such, could not under any circumstances 
be found guilty upon such charges. 392 
C. Conduct: the Actus Reus  
 
The definition for crimes against peace in Article II(1), Control Council Law 
No.10 is the ‘planning, preparing, initiation or waging’ [of an aggressive war or a war 
in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances]; or the ‘initiation’ [of 
invasions of other countries]. The four modes of perpetration are identical to the 
definition of crimes against peace in the IMT Charter.   
From the analysis in the sections above, the NMT jurisprudence suggests that the 
first and foremost requisite element of individual conduct is actual knowledge that 
there are plans and intention for an (aggressive) war and that the nature of this war if 
waged, is aggressive. This could be seen in the Farben and Krupp tribunals where the 
defendants were acquitted based on lack of knowledge. The point is that the mens rea 
of knowledge must be satisfied before it can be considered whether the defendants 
facilitated any modes of perpetration.  
In addition to the requisite knowledge, the individual must be in a position to 
“shape or influence” policy (High Command, Ministries tribunals). As such, 
knowledge of the aggressive plans or aggression is a necessary pre-requisite to 
determine participation when one is in a position to “shape or influence” policy. 
Subsequent to acquiring such knowledge, an individual who fulfils the leadership 
element either participates in a substantial manner or omits to hinder or frustrate the 
aggressive plans.  
This was the view of the High Command Tribunal, as cited earlier, where a 
defendant, who satisfies the leadership element requirements, can be liable for crimes 
against peace if he knew about the plans for invasions and aggressive wars ‘could 
have influenced policy and failed to do so.’393  Thus, it can be inferred that if a 
                                                
392 The Krupp Case (n 330) 393; Heller observes that there was no explanation as to why 
industralists were held to a different mens rea than other types of defendants, Heller (n 171) 
196.       
393 High Command Case (n 331) 489; see also Ministries Case (n 332) 381-383. 
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defendant is on the policy level, participation in crimes against peace can either be: i) 
direct participation; ii) omission.  
(i) Direct participation: Planning, preparing, initiating, waging 
 
Like the IMT, the NMT considered “planning, preparing, and initiating” 
separately from “waging.”394 This could be seen in the Ministries Tribunal, where 
Ritter, Berger, and Schwerin von Krosigk were found to have participated in the 
‘waging’ of aggressive war, without taking part in or being informed of Hitler’s plans 
of aggression.395 Also, like the IMT, the Farben tribunal treated “common plan” and 
“planning” as synonymous.396 However, Heller observes that the Ministries Tribunal 
regarded both counts separately and adopted a broader definition of planning than 
either the IMT or the Farben Tribunal as the latter considered an individual to have 
planned a crime ‘only if he was involved in Hitler’s decision to launch an aggressive 
war or invasion against that country. The former, by contrast, expanded planning to 
include individual who were not involved in the decision to launch an aggressive 
attack, but formulated the policies to ensure that the attack succeeded – what the IMT 
and the Farben tribunal would have considered “preparing.”’397   
As the Ministries Tribunal was the only Tribunal that convicted defendants for 
crimes against peace, examining the judgment may shed some light to understand 
how it was satisfied that a defendant participated in a substantial way in one of the 
modes of perpetration. First and foremost, the Ministries Tribunal held ‘to say any 
action, no matter how slight, which in any way might further the execution of a plan 
for aggression, is sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt would be to apply a test too 
strict for practical purposes,’398 which suggests that participation in any of the modes 
of perpetration must be substantial.  
Keppler was convicted under Count One because of his knowledge of Hitler’s 
plans and the important role he played in carrying them out in relation to Austria and 
                                                
394 Heller (n 171) 189.            
395 Ritter (398-399); Berger (417); Schwerin von Krosigk (418), Ministries Case (n 332). 
396 See Heller (n 171) 189 .  
397 Heller writes that ‘the latter considered an individual to have planned a crime ‘only if he 
was involved in Hitler’s decision to launch an aggressive war or invasion against that country. 
The former, by contrast, expanded planning to include individual who were not involved in 
the decision to launch an aggressive attack, but formulated the policies to ensure that the 
attack succeeded – what the IMT and the Farben tribunal would have considered 
“preparing”’, Heller (n 171) 191.  
398 Ministries Case (n 332) 966. 
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Czechoslovakia. This included delivering an ultimatum to President Milkas in 
Austria,399 being present at the conference between Hacha and Hitler, as well as 
negotiating and concluding a treaty of friendship and defence with Slovakia (the 
separation of Slovakia from the Czechoslovakian State was an important and an 
integral part of Hitler’s plan of aggression).400 Thus, the acts he committed were: 
delivering an ultimatum, negotiating and concluding bilateral treaties.    
Lammers was called by Hitler and Goring to edit the Four Year Plan,  translated 
decrees and ordinances the wishes and plans of Hitler in connection with the Nazi 
programme pertaining to aggression against other countries; signing decrees with 
Hitler and Goring establishing the Ministerial Council for Reich Defence.401 He was 
not charged with the invasion of Austria because although he had knowledge of plans 
and preparations, there was no indication that he played ‘an active role in the 
formulation or implementation of such plans.’402 Rather, his acts were related to the 
administration of the seized territory as he signed a number of decrees concerning the 
reunion of Austria with the German Reich. However, it is not clear as to why the 
Tribunal did not find this to be an act of ‘waging’ aggressive invasion.  
He was nonetheless convicted for the ‘formulation, implementation and 
execution of the Reich’s plans and preparations of aggression against Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Russia.’403 His actions included 
attending the meeting of Hitler and Hacha and drafting and signing the decree 
establishing the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and signing the following 
decrees: incorporation of Poland into the Reich; concerning the Government of 
occupied Norway immediately after its invasion; central control of questions 
concerning Eastern European region and issuing and informing a limited number of 
high-level officials about a decree approved by Hitler concerning preparations for the 
occupation of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg; decree providing for 
central control of questions concerning the Eastern European region. Thus, the acts he 
committed were: attending high-levelled meetings, drafting and signing decrees.404  
                                                
399 Ministries Case (n 332) 132. 
400 Ministries Case (n 332) 134-136. 
401 Ministries Case (n 332) 406-416. 
402 Ministries Case (n 332) 406. 
403 Ministries Case (n 332) 415-416. 
404 Ministries Case (n 332) 406-416. 
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Koerner played a ‘leading role in the planning, coordination, and execution of an 
economic program to prepare the German Reich for the waging of aggressive war, 
and that he was further responsible for coordinating the economic exploitation of the 
occupied territories in furtherance of the waging of aggressive war.’405 He also 
directed the office of the Four Year Plan, which was held as an instrumentality for the 
planning and carrying on of aggression. He was held to have participated in the plans, 
preparations and execution of the Reich’s aggression against Russia because inter alia 
he was informed by Goering of the coming attack against the Soviet Union and he 
subsequently attended and advised the conferences which were convened to consider 
the scope and method of German exploitation of the eastern economies. 406 
Nevertheless, it is still difficult to identify a clear distinction between each mode of 
perpetration.  
(ii) Omission  
 
The High Command implied that an omission could amount to criminal liability 
if the individual was on the policy level and gained knowledge of the aggressive plans 
but failed to reversely influence the policy somehow.407 The Ministries Tribunal had 
made similar implications when determining the individual conduct of von 
Weizsacker in relation to a war of aggresson committed against the Soviet Union:  
 
We are not to be understood as holding that one who knows that a war of 
aggression has been initiated is to be relieved from criminal responsibility if 
he thereafter wages it, or if, with knowledge of its pendency, he does not 
exercise such powers and functions as he possesses to prevent its taking place. 
But we are firmly convinced that the failure to advise a prospective enemy of 
the coming aggression in order that he may make military preparations which 
would be fatal to those who in good faith respond to the call of military duty 
does not constitute a crime.408  
 
                                                
405 Ministries Case (n 332) 419. 
406 Ministries Case (n 332) 418-435. 
407 High Command Case (n 331) 488-489.  
408 Ministries Case, (n 332) 383. 
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From this, it can be inferred that inner disapproval is not sufficient, as the individual 
must somehow display an adverse reaction to the aggressive plans or policies. The 
acquittal of von Weizsacker may be insightful.  The Tribunal aimed ‘to ascertain what 
he did and whether he did all that lay in his power to frustrate a policy which 
outwardly he appeared to support.’409 It found that ‘instead of participating, planning, 
preparing or initiating the war against Poland, the defendant used every means in his 
power to prevent the catastrophe.’410 Such means included warning the other powers, 
trying to bring pressure on other powers to intervene, advising against the aggressive 
action.411  This part of the judgment is important:  
 
Although these efforts were futile, his lack of success is not the criterion. 
Personalities, hesitation, lack of vision and the tide of events over which he 
had no control swept away his efforts. But for this he is not at fault.412 
 
This indicates that the attempts to hinder or frustrate the plans do not need to have any 
real results. Whilst considering aggression against Russia, this statement of the 
judgment is useful:  
 
we are firmly convinced that the failure to advise a prospective enemy of the 
coming aggression in order that he may make military preparations which 
would be fatal to those who in good faith respond to the call of military duty 
does not constitute a crime.413 
 
This implies that the question of defendant’s involvement with foreign powers is not 
to be made a determining factor for a basis of guilt, because it may not be reasonable 
to expect an individual to warn a prospective enemy of an invasion. Therefore, 
disapproval can be expressed in an internal domestic matter, where the individual is 
measured only by whether he had voiced out or advised against the upcoming 
aggression. Whether or not the advice will be taken into consideration or followed is 
irrelevant.  
                                                
409 Ministries Case (n 332) 356. 
410 Ministries Case (n 332) 369. 
411 Ministries Case (n 332) 369. 
412 Ministries Case (n 332) 369. 
413 Ministries Case (n 332) 383. 
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It is somewhat surprising that the Tribunals held that omissions to adversely 
shape or influence aggressive policy to frustrate or hinder the aggressive plans would 
amount to criminal liability for crimes against peace. 414 As submitted above, at the 
time of these trials, there were no existing obligations under international law on 
individuals to refrain from conduct amount to crimes against peace. Individuals were 
thus under a duty to obey national law and could not reasonably be expected to know 
that international law was holding them to a standard whereby they had to not only 
refrain from conduct amounting to crimes against peace, but upon acquiring such 
knowledge had a duty to adversely influence policy, of which he/she had a role in 
shaping or influencing. Suffice it to say, international law did not impose any of such 
duties directly on the individual to hinder/frustrate aggressive policies of the state.   
2.3.4. Observations   
 
There appear to be three components, or elements of the crime, that must be 
satisfied in relation to the conduct of the individual: i) actual knowledge of the 
aggressive plans and that the nature of such invasion(s) or war(s) is aggressive; ii) the 
leadership element, i.e. being on the policy level; iii) a substantial participation or 
omission to frustrate/hinder the aggressive plans.  
These three components appear to be interlinked: knowledge is the first and 
foremost determining factor (Farben, Krupp). Upon the defendant’s actual knowledge 
of the aggressive plans, the Tribunals then examined whether the leadership element 
was satisfied. The Farben Tribunal held the leadership element as an individual in 
position to “formulate and execute” policies, whilst on the other hand, the High 
Command and Ministries Tribunal interpreted the leadership element as an individual 
in position to “shape or influence” policies. When satisfied that a defendant had 
fulfilled both of these elements, it was examined whether the defendant participated in 
one of the modes of perpetration. The leadership element applied in every mode of 
perpetration (High Command).  
The NMTs did not rule out the possibility of industrialists, and thus private 
economic actors from satisfying the leadership element. As the IMT did not explicitly 
establish or develop a leadership element, it is likely that when examining the scope 
of perpetrators under customary international law or existing case law –the NMT will 
                                                
414 See Kranzbuhler (n 299) 438.   
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be considered. Thus, it can be asserted that customary international law or existing 
case law does not necessarily exclude private economic actors from being able to 
“shape or influence” policy to give rise to individual criminal responsibility for 
crimes against peace.   
2.3.5. The Tribunals established pursuant to Control Council Law No.10 and 
customary international law  
 
Perhaps one of the factors that may have contributed to diminishing the judicial 
precedential value of the principles within the judgment of the NMT is the question of 
ex post facto law in relation to crimes against peace. The issues that were discussed 
above in relation to the question of ex post facto law for crimes against peace at the 
IMT also arise in the context of the NMT. They do not need to be repeated here. 
Instead, a related issue will be examined.   
In accordance with Article X of Military Ordinance No.7, the NMT were legally 
bound by the judgment and decisions of the IMT. The question is whether the NMT 
had acted ultra vires in departing from the determinations of the judgment of the IMT 
with respect to convictions for crimes against peace in relation to Austria and 
Czechoslovakia. Under Article X, the powers of judicial review of the NMT appear to 
be limited only to questioning insofar as the participation therein or knowledge 
thereof by any particular person may be concerned. It is thus questionable as to 
whether the NMT had the legal competence to judicially review the determinations of 
the IMT in relation to the acts committed by Germany.  
Overall, the NMT had played an undeniable role in further developing crimes 
against peace by ‘clarifying and further elaborating the principles of international law 
contained therein;’415 in particular, the leadership element and the potential liability of 
private economic actors. However, the extent to which the NMT case law may be 
relied upon as customary international law is uncertain. As Heller points out: 
 
Although international and domestic courts have consistently relied on the 
NMT judgments to determine the state of customary international law, they 
have exhibited considerable uncertainty about their authority. A number of 
courts have simply finessed the issue, stating that the judgments “contribute” 
                                                
415 Historical Developments relating to aggression, PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1, 45. 
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to customary international law without identifying the weight of their 
contribution. 416 
 
Nevertheless, the case law of the NMT gives rise to an interesting study and is helpful 
in understanding the corpus of crimes against peace, and may perhaps be ultimately 
considered as a ‘subsidiary means’ for determining the rules of international law.417   
2.4. The Nuremberg principles and customary international law   
 
The Nuremberg Trial marks the cornerstone upon which the present paradigm of 
international criminal law and international criminal justice has developed from. As 
dicussed in section 2.2.5, the legal basis of the IMT Charter and judgment is 
questionable, especially in the context of crimes against peace. Nevertheless, GA 
Resolution 95(1) 1946, affirmed the principles of international law recognized by the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal, i.e. the 
Nuremberg Principles.  
This is indicative of confirmation by the international community of the 
principles found in the IMT Charter and the Nuremberg judgment. However, this does 
not mean that the Nuremberg Principles have attained customary international law 
status. At the time of adoption by the General Assembly, the Resolution was only an 
affirmation of the Nuremberg principles. A further resolution, GA Resolution 177(II), 
was adopted, which entrusted the formulation of the principles of international law 
recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the 
Tribunal to the International Law Commission (“ILC”); whereby the Commission 
was directed inter alia to formulate the principles of international law recognized in 
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal.  
In the process, the Commission had questioned whether to examine the extent to 
which the principles contained in the Charter and judgment constituted principles of 
international law. It concluded:  
 
                                                
416 Heller also states ‘other courts have viewed the judgments as evidence of U.S. practice, no 
more important than the decisions of any national court. And still others have treated the 
judgments as the decisions of an international tribunal, entitling them to considerably more 
authority than national decisions’, Heller (n 171) 375.   
417 See Article 38(1)(d), Statute of the International Court of Justice.  
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since the Nuremberg principles had been affirmed by the General Assembly in 
resolution 95 (I) of 11 December 1946, the task of the Commission was not to 
express any appreciation of these principles as principles of international law 
but merely to formulate them. 418 
 
Therefore, the customary international law status of the envisaged Nuremberg 
principles was still not clear at this point in time. Nevertheless, the Commission 
continued with the task of formulating these principles, which was subsequently 
adopted during its second session in 1950.419 The Nuremberg principles as elaborated 
by the Commission were actually never formally adopted by the General Assembly. 
Instead, GA Resolution 488(V) (1950) had invited the “Governments of Member 
States to furnish their observations accordingly.”420   
In parallel to the work on formulating the Nuremberg Principles, the ILC was 
also directed to work on compiling a Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind. 421 The first draft of 1951, comprised of five Articles, of which 
the crimes defined in Article 2 were considered as crimes under international law, for 
which the responsibility individuals shall be punished.422 This included Article 2(1):  
 
[a]ny act of aggression, including the employment by the authorities of a State 
of armed force against another State for any purpose other than national or 
collective self-defence or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation by a 
competent organ of the United Nations.423  
 
                                                
418 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Formulation of 
the Nürnberg principles and preparation of a draft code of offences against the peace and 
security of mankind 1949 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1949 (1949), 282. 
419 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1951, Vol II, Second report by Mr. J. 
Spiropoulos, Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/44).  
420 See Observations of Governments of Member States relating to the formulation of the 
Nürnberg principles prepared by the International Law Commission, Extract from the 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1951 Vol. II., A/CN.4/45*, A/CN.4/45 & 
Corr.1, Add.1 & Corr.1 & Add.2. 
421 GA Resolution 177(II) 1950. 
422 Article 1, Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind 1951, Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, 1951, vol.II, 58-59.  
423 See Commentaries on the Draft code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1954, vol. II, 135. 
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There is a shift in terminology from ‘crimes against peace’ to ‘act of aggression.’ 
Despite the absence of a definition for the ‘act of aggression’,424  Article 2(1) 
nevertheless reflects the framework of jus ad bellum and principles of collective 
security pursuant to the UN Charter.  
In the later version of the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Mankind, 
which was adopted in 1996 (“Draft Code of Crimes”), Article 16 proscribes the crime 
of aggression. Here, another shift in terminology can be seen, i.e. from ‘crimes 
against peace’ to ‘crime of aggression.’ As clarified in the introduction, the difference 
in terminology has no substantive impact on the underlying constituents of the crime. 
As such, both terms are interchangeable.   
The legal status of the Draft Code of Crimes and the GA Resolutions were 
unclear. However, the positive opinions generally expressed by Governments with 
respect to the Nuremberg principles are nevertheless indicative of the political will of 
States to embrace the Nuremberg principles as a substantive source of law. Thus, 
positive opinions, affirmations and multilateral international instruments suggest the 
formation of customary international rules with respect to the Nuremberg principles.  
Yet, it is not entirely clear when the actual crystallisation of the Nuremberg 
principles as customary international law had occurred. My view is that it was a rather 
gradual process. Thus, it must be understood that the principles within the Nuremberg 
Charter, and the judgment of the Tribunal did not create any form of instant customary 
international law rules contrary to the opinion expressed by Sayapin:  
 
the Tribunal confirmed in its Judgment the validity of (then quite recent) 
treaty-based rules prohibiting an aggressive use of force by one State against 
another, and bestowed those international legal prohibitions addressed to 
States with individual criminal sanctions addressed to officials acting as 
organs of States. In that sense, the Nuremberg Tribunal testified to the 
formation of an “instant custom” on the subject.425 
 
Instead, the crystallisation process was gradual, as the Nuremberg principles were 
affirmed and gradually accepted by the international community through positive 
                                                
424 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1951, Vol II, Second report by Mr. J. 
Spiropoulos, Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/44), 262.   
425 Sayapin (n 12) 160.                  
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declarations and multilateral instruments. There are two particular aspects of the 
Nuremberg Principles which are relevant to this Chapter: i) individual criminal 
responsibility (Principle I); ii) crimes against peace (Principle VI(a)).   
2.4.1. Individual criminal responsibility for international crimes  
 
Principle I of the Nuremberg Principles reads ‘any person who commits an act 
which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to 
punishment.’ The premise of this principle can be traced back to Article 6 of the IMT 
Charter, which had bestowed individual responsibility for the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. At the time, the Defence had submitted:  
 
international law is concerned with the actions of sovereign States, and 
provides no punishment for individuals; and further, that where the act in 
question is an act of State, those who carry it out are not personally 
responsible, but are protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of the State.426 
 
The Tribunal rejected both of these submissions and held that ‘international law 
imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States.’427  The 
underlying rationale can be seen in the subsequent famous statement:   
 
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced.428  
 
This is arguably the most frequently cited dictum in the context of individual criminal 
responsibility for international crimes. It implies that prosecution, and the subsequent 
criminal punishment of individuals for international crimes is a type of enforcement 
to ensure that individuals comply with their obligations to refrain committing 
international crimes.  
                                                
426 ‘Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law - International Military 
Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences’ (n 4) 220.  
427 ibid.  
428 ibid 221.  
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That said, the argument raised by the Defence is not without merit, as conduct 
committed by individuals as part of the organ of the state should be attributed to the 
state, and not the individual. It is the rationale of the Tribunal, which is questionable 
as to whether international law had recognised individual as a personality of 
international law at the time of the events as they happened.  
Thus, it is debatable as to whether international law actually imposed duties and 
liabilities upon individuals in addition to states as proclaimed by the Tribunal. This 
debate need not be revisited here – the point is that it is rather uncertain as to whether 
international law had conferred obligations directly on individuals with respect to 
personal conduct and provided concomitant sanctions for the breach thereof.  
As such, the judgment can be interpreted as follows. By acknowledging that 
individuals commit international crimes, not only does the judgment initiate a shift in 
paradigm from the recognition of states as the only personality under international 
law to individuals also being personalities under international law, but it also indicates 
a dichotomy between the act of state and the act of an individual. Glaser submits that:  
 
The Charter has pierced through the principle, or even the idea, of state 
sovereignty. Two facts lead us to this conclusion: first of all, the Charter 
recognized individuals as subjects of international law – that is, as subjects of 
international rights and obligations; second, the Charter broke with the 
doctrine of immunity for what is called an act of state.’429   
 
Therefore, the Nuremberg Trial gave rise to the emergence of a new phenomenon: 
individual criminal responsibility for international crimes under international law.430    
2.4.2. Crimes against peace: the norms that criminalise aggression  
 
Principle VI (a) of the Nuremberg Principles reflects Article 6(a) of the IMT 
Charter.431 As discussed in 2.2.5, crimes against peace did not exist prior to the 
                                                
429 Glaser (n 299) 55.  
430 See Article 7, ICTY Statute; Article 6, ICTR Statute; Article 25, Rome Statute.     
431 For a comparative study on national legislation pertaining to the crime of aggression, see 
Astrid Reisinger Coracini, ‘National Legislation on Individual Responsibility for Conduct 
Amounting to Aggression’ in Roberto Bellelli (ed), International Criminal Justice: Law and 
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Nuremberg Trials. In other words, there was no individual criminal responsibility for 
aggression. Judge Röling affirms that:  
 
Until recently, traditional international law had regarded the jus ad bellum as one 
of the prerogatives of the sovereign state.432   
 
Therefore, the Nuremberg Trial is representative of the turning point in international 
law where sanctions may be executed directly against individuals for wrongful 
conduct under international law. The gradual crystallisation of the Nuremberg 
principles into customary international law suggests that the legal definition of crimes 
against peace within Article 6(a) IMT Charter now confers primary obligations 
directly on individuals to refrain from the proscribed conduct. The breach of these 
obligations entails direct legal consequences against the individual under the 
secondary rules of individual criminal responsibility, governed by international 
criminal law.  
The customary international law rule pertaining to the crime of aggression has 
not appeared to develop past the Nuremberg Principles. As will be examined in the 
next chapter, even though the Kampala Amendments now provide a definition of the 
crime of aggression in the Rome Statute, this definition is only for the purposes of 
prosecution at the ICC.  
2.4.3. Crimes against peace and customary international law  
 
The present scope of the crime of aggression under customary international law is 
predicated upon the legal definition of crimes against peace according to the 
Nuremberg Principles. As clarified in the introduction, the change in terminology 
does not necessarily affect the substantive components of the crime. The state act 
element of the crime and the elements of the crime pertaining to the conduct of 
individuals with respect to crimes against peace under customary international law 
will now be examined.  
 
 
                                                
432 Röling (n 173) 456. 
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A. The state act element of the crime   
 
Under customary international law, the state act element of the crime of 
aggression is a ‘war of aggression’ or a ‘war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances.’ Wilmshurst argues that:  
 
as far as international customary law is concerned, it is only a “war of 
aggression” which constitutes the crime of aggression in international law. 433 
 
However, as the definition of Article 6(a) IMT also encompasses a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, it is only logical that this variant is 
retained in the crystallisation of the legal construct of the crime into a rule of 
customary international law. Indeed, the reason why the latter was not considered in 
the judgment appeared to be for the purposes of procedural convenience, and not 
because it was irrelevant.434 Yet, she is not wrong that ‘the consequence of this is that 
there may be a violation by a State of an international law rule against the use of force 
which does not give rise to individual criminal culpability for the crime of 
aggression.’435 Perhaps her position can be clarified by submitting that the threshold 
for the state act element under customary international law is that the violation of the 
rule against the use of force must be of sufficient magnitude to amount to a ‘war.’ 
This way the second variant of the state act element need not be discarded. 
Pursuant to the Nuremberg judgment, the state act element of the crime can be 
understood as:  
• the initiation of the use of force, accompanied by animus aggressionis 
or 
• a violation of the prohibition of the use of force, which is of sufficient 
magnitude to be considered as war. 
How would these two variants of the state act element of the crime apply in the 
current paradigm of international law? Although international law has shifted away 
                                                
433 Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ‘Definition of the Crime of Aggression: State Responsibility or 
Individual Criminal Responsibility’ in Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi (eds), The 
International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression (Ashgate 2004) 95.  
434 ‘Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law - International Military 
Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences’ (n 4) 186. 
435 Wilmshurst (n 433) 95. 
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from the use of the word ‘war’ as terminology to describe the use of force, the 
substantive elements of a ‘war of aggression’ or a ‘war in violation of international 
treaties, agreements or assurances’ is nevertheless retained under customary 
international law.436  
The latter is relatively more straightforward. The international treaties, 
agreements or assurances referred to in the Nuremberg Trial are reflective of the 
normative framework that prohibits the use of force. As examined in Chapter I, the 
core international treaty that currently regulates the use of inter-state force is the UN 
Charter (Article 2(4)). Thus, this variant of the state act element of the crime can be 
understood as a ‘war’ in violation of the Article 2(4) UN Charter and other 
instruments under international law.437 It shall be presumed that the intended violation 
must be of sufficient magnitude that it may be normatively perceived as ‘war.’       
The former is slightly more complex, as it encompasses the animus aggressionis. 
Not only is this a subjective concept, but it is also a rather natural concept, which 
prima facie is incompatible with a positive approach to the jus ad bellum. As 
discussed in Chapter I, determining the legality of the use of force or the existence of 
an act of aggression is subject to the methodological interpretation of the existing 
rules of jus ad bellum. The relevance of the animus aggressionis will depend on the 
approach taken with respect to interpreting the legal rules within jus ad bellum. If a 
positive international law approach is taken, it is likely that the animus aggressionis 
will not be considered in the determining process, and the situation will be assessed 
objectively in accordance with the existing legal framework.  
This suggests that the animus aggressionis may no longer be necessarily relevant 
in the light of the present framework of jus ad bellum. In my view, there should 
indeed be caution in accepting that the legality of the use of force is dependent upon 
its intent and purpose. However, it should not be forgotten that at the time of the 
events, there was only a normative framework in place that prohibited the use of 
force. Thus, it is understandable that in the absence of a legal framework, the animus 
                                                
436 McDougall (n 7) 151.    
437e.g. GA Resolution 2625 (1970) The Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations; and GA Resolution 3314 (1974), The Definition of 
Aggression.  
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aggressionis may play a role in determining the legality of the use of force in 
question.  
Be that as it may, it should be noted that considering the animus aggressionis is 
for the purposes of establishing the state act element of the crime to prosecute an 
individual for crimes against peace, and not for determining the existence of an act of 
aggression committed by the alleged aggressor state for the purposes of invoking 
consequences under state responsibility. The latter can be done in an objective manner 
without the need to consider any mental element of the aggressor state.438    
B. The elements of the crime pertaining to individual conduct 
 
The elements of the crime pertaining to the conduct of the individual are: 
• the material elements of ‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging’ [a war of 
aggression];  
• the mental element of knowledge (and not necessarily intent).  
It is likely in a situation of prosecution either at the ICC or domestic courts, the 
approach of the IMT (and perhaps NMT) will be considered with respect to these 
elements of the crime pertaning to individual conduct.   
There is no explicit component within the definition of the crime that puts 
forward a scope of perpetrators that can be prosecuted. Nevertheless, from the 
Nuremberg judgment and the case law of the NMT, a scope of perpetrators may be 
formulated.439 Although the definition of the crime within the Kampala Amendments 
contains a specific leadership element, it can be assumed that the judges would 
nevertheless take the Nuremberg principles into account when interpreting the 
leadership element.’440  
                                                
438 See Article 2 ARSIWA 2001; See André Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence Between Individual 
Responsibility and State Responsibility In International Law’ (2003) 52 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 615, 633.  
439 McDougall writes that ‘obviously state acts of aggression can never be completed by a 
single individual. In all states, however, it is only a handful of individuals who have the 
ability to control the State’s political and military activities. As such, it is proper that only 
those same individuals are able to be charged with crimes of aggression. Sophisticated 
critiques of international criminal law more generally express concern that punishing an 
individual is wholly inadequate in the face of great tragedy, and that a focus on individuals 
may unfairly exonerate the collective. […] in such circumstances it seems particularly 
appropriate that individual leaders be punished for their decisions and actions, rather than any 
blame being placed on an entire people’, McDougall (n 7) 46–47.  
440 SWGCA Report 2007 (December) para.9.  
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On the national level of prosecution, states which have the crime of aggression in 
their criminal codes appear to be rather silent on the leadership element.441 Thus, it 
can also be assumed that the judges of the national courts would consider the 
Nuremberg principles when determining whether an individual is in a position to be a 
perpetrator for the crime of aggressive war.   
2.5. Conclusion  
 
Despite its many and varied flaws,442 it cannot be disputed that the Nuremberg 
Trial has bestowed a legacy to international law and a platform for individual criminal 
law to develop and flourish. Out of the sorrow and ashes of war marked the turning 
point where the Nuremberg Trial signified the promise that mass atrocities and 
violations of international law committed by individuals are no longer tolerated as 
they may be brought personally to trial and punished accordingly for their crimes. The 
phenomenon of individual criminal responsibility was applied to the wars of 
aggression committed by Germany against twelve nations, resulting in the conviction 
of the relevant perpetrators for crimes against peace.  
This chapter had illustrated how the legal basis of Article 6(a) IMT and the 
Nuremberg judgment with respect to crimes against peace was rather questionable 
because at the time of the events, the existing norms under international law had only 
prohibited – and not criminalised – aggression. States were the only rights-holders 
with respect to the norms that prohibit aggression. Thus, prosecution and conviction 
of individuals for crimes against peace at the Nuremberg Trial is indicative of 
executing sanctions (deprivation of liberty and life) directly against them for wrongful 
conduct, which was not attributable to them (at the time) under international law.   
Be that as it may, the subsequent affirmation of the IMT Charter and the 
Nuremberg judgment into the “Nuremberg Principles” represent the international 
community’s acceptance, and the gradual crystallisation of individual criminal 
responsibility and the crime of aggression into customary international law. Thus, at 
                                                
441  Reisinger Coracini, ‘National Legislation on Individual Responsibility for Conduct 
Amounting to Aggression’ (n 431) 553. 
442 Such criticisms include inter alia, the legal foundation of the IMT Charter and Tribunal, 
Kranzbuhler (n 299) 437; Merkhel (n 173) 565; George A Finch, ‘The Nuremberg Trial and 
International Law’ (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 20, 26;“Tu quoque” 
argument, Merkhel (n 173) 570–571; Poltorak (n 299) 446; Ex post facto law, Merkhel (n 
173) 567; Kelsen, ‘Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in 
International Law’ (n 299).  
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present there are norms under international law that criminalise aggression, by placing 
obligations directly on individuals to refrain from proscribed conduct relating to the crime 
of aggression, and attaching concomitant sanctions for the breach of these obligations.  
This chapter also delineated the contours of the crime of aggression under 
customary international law. This is highly valuable for several reasons. First, this 
will help place into perspective the obligations that customary international law 
confers on individuals with respect to the crime of aggression. Second, the 
relationship between the aggressor state and the perpetrator of the crime may be 
clarified in the light of the dichotomy between the state act element of the crime and 
the elements of the crime pertaining to individual conduct. These two points will be 
examined further in Chapter IV. Third, it can be assessed whether the definition of the 
crime of aggression in the Kampala Amendments for the purposes of prosecution at 
the ICC reflects or departs from the definition under customary international law. A 
direct comparison between the definition of the crime in the IMT Charter and the 
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Chapter III. The Crime of Aggression today:  
the Kampala Amendments 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Six and a half decades after the Nuremberg Trial, the Review Conference of the 
Rome Statute in Kampala adopted by consensus, Resolution RC/Res.6. This 
Resolution contains amendments to the Rome Statute, which provide a definition and 
jurisdictional regime for the crime of aggression (“Kampala Amendments”). The 
Kampala Amendments comprise of:  
• Definition of the crime of aggression (Article 8 bis) 
• Conditions for which the court can exercise jurisdiction (Article 15 bis and 15 ter) 
• Elements of the Crime 
• Understandings of the Crime. 
This Chapter focuses on the definition of the crime of aggression. The Elements of the 
Crime and the Understandings served as key tools to attain consensus for the 
definition of the crime of aggression.443 The conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction 
depict the jurisdictional regime of the ICC, which relates to the scope of prosecution 
that the Court may execute sanctions against individuals for the crime of aggression. 
This will be examined in Chapter VI.     
This Chapter begins by examining the journey from Rome to Kampala with 
respect to defining the crime of aggression (section 3.2), followed by introducing the 
Kampala Amendments (section 3.2.1). First, the state act element of the crime is 
examined (section 3.2.2.), followed by the elements of the crime pertaining to the 
conduct of the individual (“elements of individual conduct” [section 3.3]). As the 
Kampala Amendments have not attained customary international law status, the legal 
nature of the definition of the crime of aggression in Article 8 bis will be examined 
(section 3.4). Finally, a comparison will be made between the definition of the crime 
of aggression in the Kampala Amendments and crimes against peace in the IMT 
Charter and Nuremberg judgment (section 3.5). 
                                                
443 See Frances Anggadi, Greg French and James Potter, ‘Negotiating the Elements of the 
Crime of Aggression’ in Stefan Barriga and Claus Kress (eds), Crime of Aggression Library: 
the Travaux Préparatoires  of the Crime of Aggression (Cambridge University Press 2012); 
Claus Kress and others, ‘Negotiating the Understandings on the Crime of Aggression’, Crime 
of Aggression Library: the Travaux Préparatoires of the Crime of Aggression (Cambridge 
University Press 2012). 
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3.2. From Rome to Kampala 
 
Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute stipulates that the ICC has jurisdiction over (a) 
genocide; (b) crimes against humanity; (c) war crimes; (d) the crime of aggression 
(“core crimes”). However, unlike the other core crimes within Article 5(1), the crime 
of aggression remained undefined.444 States were undecided amongst themselves 
whether or not to include the crime of aggression in the Statute.445 The atmosphere 
pertaining to this issue was ‘too antagonistic for a substantive negotiation, whilst 
some delegations feared this controversy might derail the adoption of the Statute as a 
whole.’446 Thus, Article 5(2) represented a “codified impasse”447 derived from much 
uncertainty between the plenipotentiaries during the Rome Statute negotiations.448  It 
stipulates: 
 
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a 
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the 
crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise 
                                                
444 See Article 5, 1998 Prepcom Draft Statute, ‘Draft Statute for the International Criminal 
Court’, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, UN Doc.A/CONF.183/2/Add.1; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 248.        
445 See 1998 Rome Summary Records (18thJune) Committee of the Whole, Summary Record 
of the 6th Meeting, 18 June 1998, UN Doc.A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.6; excerpts reprinted in 
Barriga and Kress ibid 255–268; 1998 Rome Statute Summary Records (19th June) 
Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 6th Meeting, 18 June 1998, UN 
Doc.A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.6; excerpts  reprinted in Barriga and Kress ibid 269–271. 
446 Stefan Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ in Stefan 
Barriga and Claus Kress (eds), Crime of Aggression Library: the Travaux Préparatoires of 
the Crime of Aggression (Cambridge University Press 2012) 6.            
447 Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, ‘The Working Group on Aggression at the Preparatory 
Commission for the International Criminal Court’ (2001) 25 Fordham International Law 
Journal 589, 589.      
448 The Non-Aligned Movement expressed disappointment as ‘many of the difficulties that 
would allegedly result from [the crime of aggression] inclusion seemed merely to be pretexts 
for excluding that the “mother of crimes” –which has been recognized by the Nuremberg 
Tribunal some fifty years previously – from the Statute’, 1998 Rome Summary Records (13 
July, 10.00am), Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 34th Meeting, 13 July 1998, 
UN Doc.A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34, para.17; excerpts reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 305–
306.; Azerbaijan proposed that ‘there could be a transitional clause stating that, pending a 
definition thereof, the provisions on crimes of aggression and treaty crimes would not come 
into force’ 1998 Rome Summary Records (13 July, 3.00pm), Committee of the Whole, 
Summary Record of the 34th Meeting, 13 July 1998, UN Doc.A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.36, 
para.43; excerpts  reprinted in Barriga and Kress ibid 307; See also 1998 Proposal by NAM, 
‘Amendments Submitted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to the Bureau Proposal 
(A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59’, 14 July 1998, UN Doc.A/CONF.183/C.1/L.75; reprinted in Barriga 
and Kress ibid 315.     
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jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent 
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
The deliberate ambiguity in Articles 5(1) and 5(2) was a political move to ensure the 
sufficient votes necessary for adoption of the Statute. Resolution F of the Final Act 
adopted on the July 17th 1998, mandated the Preparatory Commission (hereinafter 
“PrepComm”) to: 
 
prepare proposals for a provision on aggression, including the definition and 
Elements of Crimes of aggression and conditions under which the 
International Criminal Court shall exercise its jurisdiction with regard to this 
crime.449 
 
Altogether, the negotiations post-Rome lasted from 1999 to 2010. Barriga, who 
played an instrumental part in the drafting process,450 has succinctly categorized the 
negotiation history into four phases: (i) 1999 – 2002, the PrepComm; ii) 2003-2009, 
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA); iii) Spring 2009-
2010, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute (ASP); iv) 31st May to 11th June 
2010,the Review Conference at Kampala.451 As the history has been well documented 
elsewhere, it need not be repeated here. 452 Relevant reference to the negotiation 
history will nevertheless be made when necessary. 
3.3. The Kampala Amendments: the crime of aggression 
 
Article 8 bis of the Kampala Amendments represents the first definition of the 
crime of aggression in a multilateral instrument. It is worth producing the provision in 




                                                
449 ‘Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court’, 17 July 1998, UN Doc.A/Conf.183/13; 
reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 330–331. 
450 Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1186.  
451Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 5.   
452See Barriga and Kress (n 6). 
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Crime of aggression:  
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its 
character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of armed force by a 
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the 
following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of 
aggression: 
 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or 
any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any 
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof; 
 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the 
use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; 
 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air 
fleets of another State; 
 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with 
the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the 
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the 
agreement; 
 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of 
another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a 
third State; 
 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to 
amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. 
 
 
According to Article 8 bis(1), the state act element is ‘an act of aggression which, by 
its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations.’ The elements of the crime pertaining to the conduct of the individual 
(“elements of individual conduct”) comprises of two separate components: 
• The planning, preparation, initiation or execution [by]  
• A person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a State.  
The first component refers to the different modes of perpetration that are related to the 
state act of aggression. The latter represents the leadership element of the crime. 
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There is also the additional element of mens rea. Overall, there are three elements of 
individual conduct for the crime of aggression: the modes of perpetration, the 
leadership element and the mens rea of the defendant.   
3.3.1. The state act element of the crime of aggression 
 
The state act element of the crime is undeniably an “act of aggression.”453 Yet not all 
recourse to force and/or acts of aggression can satisfy the underlying pre-requisite of 
the state act element of the definition of the crime because Article 8 bis(1) of the 
Kampala Amendments has set a significantly high threshold that the “act of 
aggression” by its “character, gravity and scale” constitutes a “manifest violation” of 
the UN Charter. The threshold for the use of force to be considered as the state act 
element of the  “crime of aggression” appears to be set higher than the threshold for 
an “act of aggression” under jus ad bellum.  
The definition of an “act of aggression” for the purposes of Article 8 bis(1) is 
contained in Article 8 bis(2) of the Kampala Amendments.  This means that the Court 
will first assess whether the use of armed force by the alleged aggressor state amounts 
to an “act of aggression” under Article 8 bis(2). If this is satisfied, the Court will 
proceed to examine whether the “act of aggression” has reached the threshold to be 
considered as the state act element of the “crime of aggression.”  
A preliminary point should be made prior to analysing the substantive aspects of 
this element. It is important to understand that the “crime of aggression” is not 
committed by the alleged aggressor state, but by the individual who was in a position 
to effectively exercise control over or direct the political/military action of that state 
and had ‘planned, prepared, initiated, and executed’ the act of aggression as defined 
under Article 8 bis(2).  
The definition within Article 8 bis(2) can be divided into two sections. The first 
section operates as a chapeau clause:454 
For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
                                                
453 Princeton Report (2006), para.14-15; para 23.   
454 Princeton Report (2006) para 10.  
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The latter section gives meaning to the chapeau clause by listing acts that may qualify 
as aggression:   
 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in 
accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 
14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression (...) 
 
As can be observed, the definition under Article 8 bis(2) is verbatim of Articles 1 and 
3 of the Annex to GA Resolution 3314 (albeit the slight but fundamental difference 
that Article 3 has been modified where ‘in accordance with the provisions of Article 
2’ has been replaced with ‘in accordance with UN GA Resolution 3314’). This has 
raised criticism, primarily because the legal nature of this Resolution is a non-binding 
multilateral instrument, which has the underlying purpose of serving as guidance to 
the Security Council in determining the existence of an act of aggression under 
Article 39 of the UN Charter.455  
The main concern associated with this is that non-binding provisions in the 
Annex to GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) have been replicated in a multilateral 
instrument for the purposes of giving rise to individual criminal responsibility.456 Not 
only is this contrary to the original drafting intentions behind the provisions of the 
Resolution, but as is well known, specificity and non-retroactivity are important in 
fulfilling the principle of legality in the context of criminal prosecution.457 Thus the 
issue is that the provisions in the Annex to GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) lack the 
specificity to constitute a basis for individual criminal responsibility. 458   
                                                
455 SWGCA Report 2007 (January) para. 22; SWGCA Report 2008 (June) para.32. 
456 SWGCA Report 2009 (February), para.17; SWGCA Report 2007 (December), para.23.  
457 SWGCA Report 2007 (January), para.22; Judge Theodore Meron has written that ‘the 
prohibition of retroactive penal measures is a fundamental principle of criminal justice and a 
customary, even peremptory, norm of international law that must be observed in all 
circumstances by national and international tribunals,’ Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law 
Comes of Age (Clarendon Press 1999) 224; Ward Ferdinandusse argues ‘the essence of the 
principle of legality, that an individual may not be prosecuted for conduct she could not know 
was punishable, requires the law to be so clear as to make its consequences forseeable’, Ward 
N Ferdinandusse, Direct Application of International Criminal Law in National Courts 
(Springer 2006) 238.   
458 See UN GA OR, 51 st sess., sup no.10 at 9, UN Doc A/51/10(1996); Documents of the 
47th Session [1995] 2 YB Intl Commn 1, 39, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1995/ Add.1 (part 1).    
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Although the incorporation of Articles 1 and 3 of the Annex to GA Resolution 
3314(XXIX) may not be ideal, 459  two points should be appreciated. First, the 
definition of an act of aggression in Article 8 bis(2) of the Kampala Amendments 
does not give rise to individual criminal liability because it is not the state act element 
of the crime per se; the latter is found in Article 8 bis(1). Instead, Article 8 bis(2) 
provides the definition of an “act of aggression” for the purposes of the “crime of 
aggression” in Article 8 bis(1). Thus, the act of aggression pursuant to Article 8 bis(2) 
is still subject to the threshold of “manifest violation” under Article 8 bis(1) in order 
to satisfy the state act element of the crime and give rise to individual criminal 
responsibility. Second, the political reality behind the negotiations should be taken 
into consideration that the drafters were aiming to achieve a consensus. The definition 
within GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) was relied upon because it was the consolidation 
of language agreed upon after some 20 years of negotiations, and not necessarily 
because of its substantive element.460 Strategically, this was the most logical decision 
because the SWGCA had incorporated the normative definition of aggression under 
international law.461   
 
 
                                                
459 Some delegations preferred to make no reference to resolution 3314(XXIX) at all, see 
Princeton Report (2007), para.41; Kress writes that ‘it would have been preferable to define 
the state component of the crime of aggression without reference to that document’, Claus 
Kress, ‘Time for Decision: Some Thoughts on the Immediate Future of the Crime of 
Aggression: A Reply to Andreas Paulus’ (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 
1129, 1136.  
460 Stefan Barriga, ‘Against the Odds: The Results of the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression’ in Stefan Barriga, Wolfgang Danspeckgruber and Christian Wenaweser 
(eds), The Princeton Process on the Crime of Aggression: Materials of the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression (2010) 9–10; SWGCA Report 2007 (December) para.14.  
461 See SWGCA Report 2007 (January) para 20-21; in the SWGCA Report 2008 (June), it 
was stated that ‘some delegations considered draft article 8 bis, paragraph 2, to constitute the 
best compromise, as it fulfilled several requirements: it was precise enough to respect the 
principle of legality; it covered only the most serious crimes; it was sufficiently open to cover 
future forms of aggression; and it was clearly understood that this definition only served the 
purpose of individual criminal responsibility under the Rome Statute. The Security Council 
and other organs thus remained free to continue to apply their own standards to the crime of 
aggression. The reference to resolution 3314(XXIX) was considered appropriate, as that 
resolution was a carefully negotiated instrument that reflected current customary international 
law,’ at para.31.; See Jan Klabbers, ‘Intervention, Armed Intervention, Armed Attack, Threat 
to Peace, Act of Aggression, and Threat or Use of Force: What’s the Difference’ in Marc 
Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2015) 498–499. 
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3.3.2. A closer inspection of Article 8 bis(2) and GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) 1974 
 
The explicit incorporation of Articles 1 and 3 of the Annex to GA Resolution 
3314(XXIX) into the definition of an act of aggression in Article 8 bis(2), prima facie 
implies an omission of Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 462 This gives rise to two questions. 
First, what are the ramifications of the omission of Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the 
Annex to GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) from the text of Article 8 bis(2)? Second, 
whether these omitted provisions may nevertheless be given effect in the context of 
Article 8 bis(2) which contains the phrase ‘in accordance with UN GA Resolution 
3314(XXIX).’463       
i. the omission of Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of GA Resolution 3314(XXIX)1974.  
 
Only Articles 2, 4 and 6 are of relevance to the present analysis. The 
incorporation of Articles 2 and 4 are particularly problematic because they refer to the 
role of the Security Council to make a determination of an act of aggression.464 Thus, 
from the ommission of references to Articles 2 and 4, it can be inferred that the 
Security Council is excluded from determining an act of aggression as part of the state 
act element of the crime for the purposes of prosecution at the ICC.465    
It should be clarified that this a separate matter from the role of the Security 
Council with respect to determining aggression as a condition for the exercise of 
jurisdiction under Article 15 bis Kampala Amendments, as the present matter refers to 
the substantive definition of the crime.  The difference is that the determination by the 
Security Council of an act of aggression pursuant to Article 15 bis is a procedural 
matter, while the determination by the Security Council of an act of aggression for the 
purposes of the state act element of the crime relates to the substantive element of the 
crime. To allow the Security Council to play a role in the latter raises concern not 
only with respect to the principle of legality, but also the rights of the accused under 
Article 67(1)(i) Rome Statute.466 Article 6 of the Annex to GA Resolution 3314 
stipulated: 
 
                                                
462 See Princeton Report (2007) paras. 38-43.   
463 Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1191. 
464 Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 27. 
465 ibid.  
466 See SWGCA Report 2007 (December), para.15. 
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Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or 
diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in 
which the use of force is lawful. 
 
The potential gap caused by excluding Article 6 was discussed during the 
negotiations.467 Some delegates suggested that a reference to “unlawful” should be 
inserted before the phrase ‘use of armed force’ in draft article 8 bis, paragraph 2,468 as 
this was ‘intended to make clear that not all uses of armed force constituted 
aggression, in particular, in case of self-defence.’  
This stemmed primarily from the concern that by excluding Article 6 in the 
definition in Article 8 bis(2), all uses of armed force by a State against another State, 
even in situations of self-defence and approval by the Security Council, are prima 
facie acts of aggression. 469 On the other hand, others objected to this suggestion, 
stressing that the wording of General Assembly Resolution 3314(XXIX) should not 
be changed.’470 It is apparent that the latter view prevailed.  
Although an ordinary reading of the text of Article 8 bis(2) could suggest that an 
act of aggression may also encompass situations of the use of force which are lawful, 
this is not logical in the context of Article 8 bis and in the light of its object and 
purpose. The most simple object and purpose of defining aggression is to characterize 
the circumstances that result in the breach of primary norms to refrain from the use of 
force against other states.  
Thus, to suggest that the definition of an act of aggression may encompass 
situations of force that are consistent with jus ad bellum and the UN framework of 
collective security appears to be contrary to the object and purpose of ascertaining the 
situations where unlawful recourse to force may be considered as aggression.471 More 
                                                
467  SWGCA Report 2009 (February), para.15; SWGCA Report 2008 (June), para.77; 
SWGCA 2007 Report (December), para.17; see Michael J Glennon, ‘The Blank-Prose Crime 
of Aggression’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal of International Law 71, 89.  
468 SWGCA Report 2009 (February), para.15. 
469 See Glennon (n 467) 88–89. 
470 SWGCA Report 2008 (June), para.33; McDougall is of the view that ‘given the passion 
with which States defend their reserved right to use force it is surprising that they have 
adopted a definition of an act of aggression that deals with permissible uses of force so 
opaquely’, McDougall (n 7) 101.   
471 Kress and von Holtzendorff argue that ‘the recognition of such an odd concept can be 
avoided by way of a harmonious interpretation of Articles 1, 3 and 6 of the annex of 
Resolution 3314, as is required by Article 8 of that same annex. The absence of a ground 
precluding the wrongfulness of the use of armed force constitutes an implicit negative 
 134  
importantly, in the overall context of Article 8 bis, defining an act of aggression under 
Article 8 bis(2) is to give meaning to “an act of aggression” in Article 8 bis(1) for the 
purposes of defining the state act element of the “crime of aggression.” Article 8 
bis(2) cannot be read separately from Article 8 bis (1) as both of these provisions 
form Article 8 bis, the definition of the crime of aggression.472 
 The act of aggression as defined in Article 8 bis(2) is still subject to an additional 
threshold within Article 8 bis(1), which would serve to exclude lawful instances of 
the use of force. Thus, the threshold of a “manifest violation” of the UN Charter under 
Article 8 bis(1) overcomes any drafting inadequacies in Article 8 bis(2) with respect 
to lawful situations of the use of force.  
ii. Is GA Resolution 3314(XXIX)1974 to be incorporated in its entirety? 
 
Some of the participants in the negotiations had expressed the view that a 
provision on the state act of aggression must refer to GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) in 
its entirety, stressing that the resolution was a package and that all its provisions were 
interrelated, as evidenced by Article 8.473 The question is whether the phrase ‘in 
accordance with’ in Article 8 bis(2) can be read to incorporate GA Resolution 
3314(XXIX) in its entirety into the definition of an act of aggression.474 This suggests 
that the aforementioned omitted provisions will nevertheless be incorporated into the 
definition in Article 8 bis(2) because the definition of an act of aggression in GA 
Resolution 3314(XXIX) must be read in its entirety. Yet, reading GA Resolution 3314 
(XXIX) in its entirety would give effect to the discretion of the Security Council 
under Articles 2 and 4 with respect to the determination of the state act element of the 
crime. To exclude the role of the Security Council from determining an act of 
                                                                                                                                      
element of the concept of ‘act of aggression’ as defined in the annex to Resolution 3314. As 
this construction of the term is ‘in accordance with United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974’, it should also be adopted under draft Article 
8 bis,’ Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1192. 
472 ibid. 
473 Princeton Report (2006), para 33 mentions a “generic reference” to GA Resolution 
3314(XXIX): such a reference would be consistent with the need to preserve the integrity of 
the resolution, respect the interconnected nature of its provisions (article 8) and, in particular, 
cover also articles 1 and 4, which were relevant in this context. This approach would further, 
avoid time-consuming discussion surrounding the selection of specific acts, Princeton Report 
(2007), para.39; SWGCA Report 2007 (December), para.15; see Barriga, ‘Negotiating the 
Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 27; McDougall (n 7) 99.  
474 McDougall (n 7) 97. 
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aggression for the purposes of establishing the state act element of the crime would 
exclude Articles 2 and 4 of GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) from being applicable. Thus, 
the only logical approach is to read Article 8 bis(2) without incorporating GA 
Resolution 3314(XXIX) as a whole so as to exclude the Security Council from 
playing a role in determining the state act element of the crime.   
Notably, the Security Council has a specific role to play in determining an act of 
aggression as an external mechanism prior to the initiation of an investigation of the 
crime of aggression (Article 15 bis (6)). The Security Council may also refer a 
situation of aggression to the ICC (Article 13(b)), or defer proceedings relating to a 
crime of aggression (Article 16). It is worth clarifying that these are procedural 
actions and do not affect the substantive element of the state act element of the crime 
of aggression pursuant to Article 8 bis. Be that as it may, such procedural actions in 
relation to the prosecution of the crime of aggression at the ICC is indicative of a 
relationship between the Security Council and the Court, and an unforeseen role for 
the Security Council to play in relation to determining an act of aggression at the time 
when GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) was adopted in 1974.   
Lastly, an argument can be made that if it was intended for other provisions of 
GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) to be incorporated into Article 8 bis(2), the relevant 
provisions could have also been included in the draft together with Articles 1 and 3. 
As such, it is submitted that Article 8 bis(2) should be read without the incorporation 
of GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) as a whole. Support for this argument can be found in 
the February Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
(2009), where it had been observed that ‘the point was made that the reference to 
General Assembly Resolution 3314 did not import the content of that resolution as a 
whole.’475 Thus, only Articles 1 and 3 of GA Resolution 3314 are to be given effect in 
Article 8 bis (2). The phrase ‘in accordance with’ acts as a reference to the source 
from which the definition is obtained, i.e. GA Resolution 3314 and should not serve 
as a point of reference for incorporation.476    
 
 
                                                
475 SWGCA Report 2009 (February), para.17.  
476 Princeton Report (2007), para.41. 
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iii. The enumerated list: open or closed?  
 
In the negotiations leading to Kampala, the SWGCA held extensive discussions 
over the question whether the definition should be specific or generic in nature.477 The 
former refers to a definition that includes a concrete list of acts of aggression,478 
whilst the latter focused upon more general acts such as ‘armed attack’479 or ‘use of 
armed force.’480 It appears that in subsequent discussions, the majority appeared to 
favour the specific approach based on GA Resolution 3314(XXIX).481 By mirroring 
the acts defined under Article 3, it is possible that this was a strategic move to appease 
the states that wanted a specific definition of list of acts.482 Article 3 GA Resolution 
3314(XXIX) was adopted in its entirety as the participants were reluctant to revisit the 
illustrative list of acts.483   
The SWGCA also considered the question of whether the enumerated list within 
Article 8 bis(2) is open or closed.484 Those in favour of a closed list were focused 
upon the importance of the principle of legality, expressing the view that ‘the 
ambiguity of the nature of the list was in itself problematic under the principle of 
                                                
477 See Barriga and Kress (n 448) 24; Princeton Report (2005), para.75; Princeton Report 
(2006), para.7. 
478 See Princeton Report (2006), para.7; Barriga informs us that ‘Arab and AM countries, in 
particular, favored a definition based on GA Resolution 3314, especially since it contained 
strong references to the right of self-determination and the ‘right to struggle to that end and to 
seek and receive support,’ and that it appealed to the permanent members of the Security 
Council as ‘it stressed the autonomy of the Security Council in determining the existence of 
an act of aggression’, in Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ 
(n 446) 24–25. 
479 ‘Proposal Submitted by Germany: Definition of the Crime of Aggression’, 30 July 1999 
(“Proposal by Germany”) UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.13; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 
6) 340. 
480  ‘Proposal Submitted by Greece and Portugal’, 7 December 1999, UN 
Doc.PCNICC/1999/WGCA/DP.1; ‘Proposal Submitted by Greece and Portugal’, 28 
November 2000, UN Doc.PCNICC/2000/WGCA/DP.5; reprinted in Barriga and Kress, ibid 
343, 375.    
481 Princeton Report (2006), paras.7-13; SWGCA Report 2006 (November), para.8; SWGCA 
Report 2007 (January), paras.14-15.  
482 Princeton Report (2007), para.46: Support was expressed for the list of acts contained in 
the non-paper, taken from article 3 of resolution 3314(XXIX). It was stated that the list 
represents current customary international law, though some took the view that was only true 
for subparagraph (g). It was stated that most of the acts contained in the list were reflected in 
the practice of the Security Council, while for some acts there was no Council practice.  
483 SWGCA Report 2007 (December), para.19. 
484 SWGCA Report 2008 (June), para 34-35; SWGCA Report 2007 (December), para 18-21; 
SWGCA Report 2007 (June), 47-53; Princeton Report (2007), para.47. 
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legality.’485 Whilst, on the other hand, those in favour of the open or semi-open list 
‘indicated that there was a need to provide room for future developments of 
international law and to ensure that perpetrators would not enjoy impunity.’486 
Apparently, the matter was never definitely resolved.487 However, it was ‘emphasized 
that the generic and specific approaches could easily be combined by including a 
general chapeau and a non-exhaustive list of specific acts.’488 
As mentioned above, Article 8 bis(2) contains the chapeau clause, whilst the list 
demonstrates examples of acts which may qualify as aggression under the chapeau 
clause. The use of the term ‘qualify’ implies that the listed acts have been determined 
to meet the chapeau definition, but this does not mean that the list is necessarily exhaustive.  
My interpretation is that the list under Article 8 bis(2) is open to the extent that the 
acts which fall outside the enumerated list can be considered aggression provided they 
meet the definition of an act of aggression within the chapeau clause, i.e. ‘the use of 
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of 
the United Nations.’489 
As there is the possibility that acts which potentially fall outside the list may be 
considered as an act of aggression under Article 8 bis(2), this may raise concern with 
respect to the principle of legality. Kress suggests that the threshold under the 
chapeau clause would serve as the limiting factor to curtail the potential acts which 
fall outside the enumerated list, and that this is sufficiently specific to fulfil the 
principle of legality for the purposes of international criminal law.490  
From the list, it may be argued that some of the illustrative acts may not meet the 
threshold in the chapeau clause or may not be sufficiently grave to be considered a 
“serious crime of international concern” as set out under the general ambit of the 
Rome Statute.491 For example, (f) refers to ‘the action of a State in allowing its 
territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that State 
                                                
485  Princeton Report (2007), para.50; SWGCA Report (January), 2007 para.20; See Kai 
Ambos, ‘The Crime of Aggression after Kampala’ (2010) 53 German Yearbook of 
International Law 463, 487.  
486 Princeton Report (2007), para.51. 
487 McDougall (n 7) 103.  
488 Princeton Report (2006), para.10.  
489 Princeton Report (2007), para 48; SWGCA Report 2008 (June), para.34; McDougall (n 7) 
103; See Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1191. 
490 Kress (n 459) 1137; See also Princeton Report (2006), paras.11-12. 
491 SWGCA Report 2007 (December), para 23. 
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for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State’. It is questionable as to 
whether this is sufficient enough for judges to consider that this amounts to an “act of 
aggression” which is a use of armed force which is “inconsistent with the UN 
Charter” under the chapeau clause or a “crime of serious international concern”?  As 
there is no apparent reason why this act was incorporated into the enumerative list, it 
can be inferred that this was the result of the general reluctance of the participants to 
open the Pandora’s Box of re-examining each act under the list individually.  Once 
again, this is why the threshold clause in both the chapeau and Article 8 bis(1) is so 
important.492   
3.3.3. An act of aggression that by its character, gravity and scale constitutes a 
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations 
 
Article 8 bis(1) contains a threshold that the act of aggression by its “character, 
gravity and scale” must constitute a “manifest violation of the UN Charter.” The need 
for a threshold had already originated in the July 2002 Coordinator’s Paper 
(“character, gravity and scale, constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the 
UN.”) The 2006 Princeton Report shows that some participants stressed there was no 
need for an additional qualifier as an act of aggression under Article 1 of GA 
Resolution 3314(XXIX) was serious enough,493 others however, were in favour of this 
threshold as it “excluded borderline cases.”494 In general, there appeared to be a 
preference for the term “manifest” in lieu of “flagrant.”495   
A threshold implies that some acts of aggression are more serious than others and 
should give rise to individual criminal responsibility, and this ‘would not only exclude 
minor border skirmishes and other small-scale incidents but also acts whose illegal 
character was debatable rather than manifest.’496 Thus, the threshold is intended to 
preserve the criteria under Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute that the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC should be limited to those that were considered “the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.”497  
                                                
492 SWGCA Report 2008 (June), para 24.  
493 Princeton Report (2006), para.18. 
494 Princeton Report (2006), paras.18-20.  
495 Princeton Report (2006), para.20; see Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime 
of Aggression’ (n 446) footnote 146. 
496 SWGCA Report 2007 (January), para. 16; SWGCA Report 2008 (June), para.24; SWGCA 
Report 2009, para.13. 
497 SWGCA Report 2007 (January), para.17; SWGCA Report 2007 (December), para.23. 
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The threshold also appears to serve another purpose, which is to rectify any 
drafting inadequacies within Article 8 bis(2) Kampala Amendments, especially in the 
light of the potential gap caused by the omission of Articles 2, 4 and 6 of the Annex to 
GA Resolution 3314(XXIX). This would help to overcome concern that the definition 
in Article 8 bis(2) may not necessarily differentiate between a breach of Article 2(4) 
and an act of aggression; nor clearly exclude situations of use of force which fall 
within exceptions to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.   
That said, there is no reference to a “manifest violation” in either the UN Charter 
or GA Resolution 3314: this threshold is a new construct. This meaning is not entirely 
clear and is subject to the discretion to the judges. This is where ambiguity arises. 
What does “manifest violation” mean? According to the simple dictionary definition, 
“manifest” is “to show something clearly, through signs or actions;”498 “able to be 
seen: clearly shown or visible.”499 This suggests that a “manifest violation” is the 
clear, visible, and obvious breach of the laws of the use of force as enshrined within 
the UN Charter.  
Upon referring to the Elements of the Crime of Aggression, in the Introduction, it 
is written that the term “manifest” is an objective qualification.500 The fifth Element 
of the Crime is verbatim with Article 8 bis(1) which states that:   
 
The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constituted a 
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
If the Elements of the Crime are meant to be instructive, then ‘character, gravity and 
scale’ should be taken into consideration to identify a “manifest violation.” It can be 
inferred:  
• the character of an act of aggression is a “manifest violation” 
• the gravity of an act of aggression is a “manifest violation” 
• the scale of an act of aggression is a “manifest violation”  
 
The terms “character, gravity and scale” therefore assist the court in determining that 
the act of aggression represents a “manifest violation” of the UN Charter.501 Yet, none 
                                                
498 Cambridge Online Dictionary 
499 Merriem-Webster Dictionary Online 
500 Paragraph 3, Introduction, Elements of the Crime of Aggression, Resolution RS/Res.6.  
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of these terms are defined, which suggests that there is discretion for interpretation by 
the judges.  
The more important question is whether all three factors have to be present. At 
first glance, the use of the conjunctive ‘and’ implies that all three factors must be 
present – to what extent is this true? 502 Understanding 7 states:  
 
in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a manifest violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations, the three components of character, gravity 
and scale must be sufficient to justify a “manifest” determination. No one 
component can be significant enough to satisfy the manifest standard by itself. 
 
The first sentence suggests that each of the three components must be independently 
sufficient to be considered as a ‘manifest’ determination, 503  whilst the second 
sentence infers that two of the three components are sufficient to assist the Court to 
determine that the use of force was a “manifest” violation. However, the latter does 
not necessarily convey that two components are sufficient for a finding of a ‘manifest 
violation’ of the UN Charter. Instead, it suggests that in the absence of one of the 
components, the Court is not precluded from finding that an act of aggression 
pursuant to Article 8 bis (2) has amounted to a ‘manifest violation’ of the UN Charter.  
Therefore, the correct approach is that an act of aggression pursuant to Article 8 
bis (2) should be assessed in the light of all three components. In a situation when one 
of the components is absent, this should not preclude the Court from finding that the 
act of aggression has amounted to a ‘manifest violation’ of the UN Charter in the light 
of the two components that are present.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
501 See McDougall (n 7) 130.  
502 Robert Heinsch, ‘The Crime of Aggression After Kampala: Success or Burden for the 
Future’ (2010) 2 Goettingen Journal of International law 713, 729.   
503 Claus Kress, who was the focal point for the negotiations relating to the Understandings, 
explains that, ‘the idea behind this sentence was to exclude the determination of manifest 
illegality in a case where one component is most prominently present, but the other two not at 
all. It was thought that use of the word ‘and’ in the formulation of the threshold requirement 
in draft art 8 bis (1) excluded a determination of manifest illegality in such a case and that the 
understanding should properly reflect this fact’, see Kress and others (n 443) 96.    
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3.3.4. Grey areas of jus ad bellum: the question of humanitarian intervention   
 
As already mentioned in section 1.5, humanitarian intervention was discussed 
during the negotiations in Kampala.  The Head of the US delegation intervened at the 
Review Conference on 4 June 2010: 
 
The current definition in Article 8 bis does not fully acknowledge, as President 
Obama did in his recent Nobel acceptance speech, that certain uses of force 
remain both lawful and necessary. If Article 8 bis were to be adopted as a 
definition, understandings would need to make clear that those who undertake 
efforts to prevent war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, the very 
crimes that the Rome Statute is designed to deter – do not commit ‘manifest’ 
violations of the U.N. Charter within the meaning of Article 8 is. Regardless 
of how states may view the legality of such efforts, those who plan them are 
not committing the ‘crime of aggression’ and should not run the risk of 
prosecution.504 
 
The US Delegation then proceeded to prepare a set of proposed draft Understandings 
(“US Non-Paper 2010”), which covered the issue of humanitarian intervention in its 
proposed third Understanding:  
 
It is understood that, for the purpose of the Statute, an act cannot be 
considered to be a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter unless it 
would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter of 
accordance with normal practice and in good faith, and thus an act undertaken 
in connection with an effort to prevent the commission of one of the core 
crimes contained in Articles 6, 7 or 8 of the Statute would not constitute an act 
of aggression. 
 
                                                
504  See ibid 95; The US delegation proceeded to introduce a set of proposed draft 
Understandings that addressed this issue, see 2010 non-paper by the United States; reprinted 
in Barriga and Kress, id 751; see ‘Understandings Regarding the Amendments to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression’, 11 June 2010, in 
Review Conference Official Records, RC/10/Add.1, 2010 (with particular reference to 
Understandings 3 and 4), reprinted in Barriga and Kress, id, 805.   
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As can be seen in the final Understandings to the Kampala Amendments, this had 
been rejected. However, Kress et al observe:  
 
the great majority rejected Understandings 3 and 4. […] there was the 
widespread concern that it would be inappropriate to deal with key issues of 
current international security law in the haste of the final hours of diplomatic 
negotiations. Therefore the widespread rejection of Draft Understandings 3 
and 4 of the US must not be interpreted as widespread rejection of their 
content.505  
 
As such, it can be reasonably presumed that the US was not the only nation present at 
the Review Conference that had concern with respect to the potential qualification of 
humanitarian intervention and other grey areas of jus ad bellum as the state act 
element of the crime of aggression under Article 8 bis(1).  Thus, some States Parties 
may still be concerned that the definition of the act of aggression (Article 8 bis(2)) 
and the crime of aggression (Article 8 bis(1)) may encompass humanitarian 
intervention. This suggests that individuals who satisfy the leadership element under 
Article 8 bis(1) are not protected from prosecution at the Court for humanitarian 
intervention as a crime of aggression, even though the alleged act of aggression was a 
“good act” or benign aggression which served the purposes of protecting human 
rights. Creegan goes even further by arguing:  
 
[I]n the context of humanitarian intervention, the crime of aggression and the 
other crimes of the Rome Statute are put into violent contrast: humanitarian 
intervention is a tool to prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity – yet it is indictable elsewhere in the Rome Statute. Again, this 
contrast underscores the fundamental wrongness of war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity in any context, as the true highest crimes of the 
international system, while aggression remains a way to both precipitate and 
alleviate these wrongs.506    
   
                                                
505 ibid. 
506 Creegan (n 133) 70; She also writes that ‘the two groups of offences, human rights crimes 
and the polticial crime of aggression simply cannot be compared’, 81. 
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In my view, to create a distinction between a good aggression and bad aggression is 
not entirely consistent with a positivist approach to jus ad bellum. An act of 
aggression is an act of aggression regardless of whether it is a “good” aggression or a 
“bad” aggression.  
The underlying criterion is that the aggressor state has acted in violation of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, regardless of the nature or justness of this act. To take 
into consideration the justness of the act of aggression to determine if it is a good 
aggression or a bad aggression is precarious as the determination is entirely political 
and subject to the agenda of the interpreter.   
Any assessment of the justness of the cause of war, or the use of force, is 
incompatible with a positive approach to the international legal framework that 
governs the use of force. The legality of the use of force should be assessed with 
respect to the existing framework, and not the moral validity or justness of its cause. 
The same objective standards should be applied in determining whether a situation 
amounts to an act of aggression (Article 8 bis(2)) and/or whether an act of aggression 
amounts to a crime of aggression (Article 8 bis(1)), irrespective of the cause of the 
underlying use of force.    
It is therefore possible that humanitarian intervention may be considered as an 
“act of aggression” under Article 8 bis(2). But, to satisfy the state act element of the 
crime, it must amount to a “manifest violation” of the UN Charter under Article 8 
bis(1).Thus, it can be argued that the threshold excludes cases of insufficient gravity 
and the grey areas of jus ad bellum by virtue of the three qualifiers of ‘character, 
gravity and scale.’507 This way, only the clear and obvious acts of aggression attract 
individual criminal responsibility for the purposes of prosecution at the ICC.  
The threshold in Article 8 bis(1) may potentially act as a safeguard to prevent 
judges from prosecuting individuals for the planning, preparation, initiation and 
execution of acts of aggression, whereby the international community is divided with 
respect to the legality of the underlying use of force.508 Be that as it may, it is not for 
the ICC, or the framework of international criminal law to clarify the grey areas 
within the jus ad bellum.509 The purpose of determining the act of aggression is only 
to establish the state act element of the crime. 
                                                
507 SWGCA Report 2008 (June), para.24. 
508 McDougall (n 7) 159. 
509 ibid. 
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3.4. The crime of aggression and the act of aggression: the tale of two thresholds 
 
The state act element of the crime of aggression entails a significantly higher 
threshold (“manifest violation” of the UN Charter) than an act of aggression under jus 
ad bellum (presumably a “serious violation” of the UN Charter).510 Thus, not all acts 
of aggression may give rise to individual criminal responsibility, but only those, 
which by their character, gravity and scale constitute a “manifest violation” of the UN 
Charter.511 
The significantly higher threshold under Article 8 bis (1) in comparison to the 
existing threshold required by jus ad bellum for an act of aggression has given rise to 
two broad concerns. First, some have expressed concern that such inconsistencies 
have the ramification of diluting/eclipsing the current definition of aggression under 
jus ad bellum.512 Second, some fear that such a high threshold will indirectly condone 
the use of force or acts of aggression.513 In my view, both concerns are unfounded.   
3.4.1. Myth One: diluting/eclipsing jus ad bellum   
  
O’Connell and Niyazmatov have argued that ‘public international law experts are 
right to be concerned about the rise of two competing definitions of aggression in 
public international law. They especially need to be concerned about the newer ICC 
definition eclipsing the jus ad bellum definition.’514 They submit that ‘the immediate 
concern is the potential to dilute the jus ad bellum.’515 They explain:  
 
                                                
510  SWGCA Report 2009 (June), paras.26-28; Mary Ellen O’Connell and Mirakmal 
Niyazmatov, ‘What Is Aggression? Comparing the Jus Ad Bellum and the ICC Statute’ 
(2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 189, 119. 
511 Princeton Report (2006), paras 18-19. 
512 O’Connell and Niyazmatov (n 510) 200. 
513 Daniel D Ntanda Nsereko, ‘Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court’ [2002] Nordic Journal of International Law 497, 501–504; Andreas Paulus, 
‘Second Thoughts on the Crime of Aggression’ (2009) 20 European Journal of International 
Law 1117, 1124. 
514 O’Connell and Niyazmatov (n 510) 200.; Sean Murphy also argues in a similar vein that 
‘adoption of the definitions on “act” and “crime” of aggression may have collateral 
implications outside of the criminal context, especially on rules relating to the jus ad bellum’, 
Sean D Murphy, ‘The Crime of Aggression at the International Criminal Court’ in Marc 
Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2015) 556–557.  
515 O’Connell and Niyazmatov (n 510) 201.   
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Article 8 bis (1) requires that the conduct by its ‘character, scope and gravity’ 
constitutes a ‘manifest’ violation of the UN Charter to constitute aggression. 
Yet, the GA has already made a determination than the examples in Article 3 
of its Definition are serious violations of the Charter. In other words, Article 3 
acts are ‘manifest’ violations. International law experts will need to emphasize 
this point so that government leaders do not come to think that leaving troops 
on the territory of another state, as Uganda did in Congo, or other conduct is 
not a violation of the UN Charter because it is not a ‘manifest’ violation for 
the ICC Statute.516  
 
They appear to equate a serious violation of the UN Charter pursuant to GA 
Resolution 3314(XXIX) with a manifest violation of the UN Charter in Article 8 bis 
(1). They suggest that every act of aggression should rightfully qualify as the state act 
element of the crime. However, this would appear contrary to the object and purpose 
of the threshold of a “manifest violation” in Article 8 bis (1) as it is clearly intended 
that not every act of aggression may amount to the state act element of the crime of 
aggression.  
In further criticism, the second part of their submission that government leaders 
may act in the belief that their conduct is not a violation of the UN Charter because it 
is not a “manifest” violation for the ICC Statute is rather groundless. Regardless of the 
applicability of the Kampala Amendments and the Rome Statute, States have primary 
obligations under the UN Charter with respect to their conduct of recourse to force. 
These obligations fall upon Government leaders, within their official capacity as 
organs of the State. 517  Thus, regardless of the legal effect of the Kampala 
Amendments or Rome Statute, government leaders have a duty to comply with their 
primary obligations under jus ad bellum to refrain from violating the UN Charter.  
Paulus had argued in a similar vein that: 
 
What happens to the remaining ‘ordinary’ violations of the prohibition on the 
use of force? Are they less meaningful because they are not criminalized? The 
true impact of the definition as adopted by the Working Group may well lie in 
                                                
516 ibid 200. 
517 Article 3, ARSIWA 2001. 
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the derogation from the existing comprehensive prohibition on the use of force 
rather than its clarification.518  
 
I disagree with his premise. Irrespective of whether an act of aggression may amount 
to a crime of aggression for the purposes of the Rome Statute, states are prohibited 
from ‘ordinary’ and all violations of the prohibition of the use of force. The 
prohibition of the use of force is a peremptory norm, which aside from compliance 
pull, gives rise to a special set of consequences under the secondary rules of state 
responsibility.519  This means that ‘ordinary’ violations of the prohibition of the use of 
force are by no means less meaningful as there are consequences for the aggressor 
state under the secondary rules of state responsibility.  
O’Connell and Niyazmatov conclude that ‘the crime of aggression has been 
included in the ICC Statute, but is based on a different definition than that found in 
the jus ad bellum. This is regrettable.’520 However, there is a different definition for 
the crime of aggression than an act of aggression, this does not necessarily have a 
detrimental effect on the obligations of states with respect to jus ad bellum. 
Regardless of whether the act of aggression meets the threshold to be considered as 
the state act element of the crime of aggression, jus ad bellum is applicable. 
 Therefore, it is submitted that violations of jus ad bellum that are not 
criminalized should not be viewed as “less meaningful” nor should the entire legal 
framework be viewed as “diluted or eclipsed” or “derogated from.” It is not disputed 
that two thresholds for the act of aggression under international law may have the 
potential to cause confusion. The point is that despite any potential concern, the 
threshold for the state act element for the crime of aggression does not necessarily 
“dilute” or “eclipse” the definition under jus ad bellum because it pertains to the 
prosecution of an individual and not for invoking legal consequences against the 
aggressor state.     
3.4.2. Myth Two: condoning the use of force which gives rise to “lesser violations” of 
the UN Charter  
 
Another concern which arises in relation to the threshold under Article 8 bis (1) is 
that acts of aggression which fall short of the threshold become implicitly condoned 
                                                
518 Paulus (n 513) 1124. 
519 Article 26, and Chapter III, ARSIWA 2001  
520 O’Connell and Niyazmatov (n 510) 207.  
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as they do not give rise to individual criminal responsibility. In other words, states 
believe there is a green light to commit acts of aggression, which fall beneath a 
“manifest violation” of the UN Charter because there are no consequences of criminal 
punishment. 521  Nserenko, writing before the Review Conference submitted:  
 
to exempt small-scale armed attacks on other states’ sovereignty, territorial 
and political independence from the reach of international criminal law will be 
to encourage leaders of powerful states to launch repeated short, sharp armed 
attacks on less powerful states with impunity. Weak states must be protected 
from such bullying by powerful ones.522   
 
This is rather pessimistic and rather unwarranted. Leaving aside his conceptual 
distinction between powerful and less powerful states, ‘short, sharp, armed attacks’ 
are still prohibited under Article 2(4), which means that every state has obligations to 
refrain from such conduct, regardless of whether the leader may face the criminal 
prosecution. Both ‘weak’ and ‘powerful’ states are rights-holders of the enjoyment of 
the norms that prohibit aggression. Paulus had also expressed similar concern that: 
 
in the absence of prosecution by the Court, states can easily view such 
abstention as an unjustified bill of clean health. Thus, in the end, 
criminalisation may lead to the unintended consequence of rendering the use 
of force easier rather than sanctioning it more effectively.523  
 
As I had argued above, regardless of criminalisation of aggression, the rule of the 
prohibition of the use of force under jus ad bellum will confer primary obligations on 
states. The high threshold under Article 8 bis(1) is directly relevant to individual 
criminal responsibility. Once again, it must be clarified that this qualifier applies in 
isolation, strictly in the context of when individuals may be prosecuted and should not 
be interpreted as affecting the legal framework of jus ad bellum.  
Regardless of whether the state act of aggression can satisfy the criteria to be 
considered as the state act element of the crime of aggression and thus prosecutable, it 
                                                
521 See McDougall (n 7) 133.  
522 Nsereko (n 513) 103. 
523 Paulus (n 513) 1124; for a reply, see Kress (n 459) 1135.  
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is still prohibited conduct and a violation of jus ad bellum. Thus, all acts of aggression 
are prohibited under international law, regardless of whether or not the relevant 
individuals who are part of the state organ may face criminal prosecution. It should 
not be presumed that the high threshold required in order for an act of aggression to 
be considered as a crime of aggression would condone – or encourage state officials 
to commit violations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which fall short of a manifest 
violation of the UN Charter. 
3.5. Elements of Individual Conduct  
 
The elements of individual conduct in Article 8 bis(1) comprise two components: 
• Planning, preparation, initiation or execution (“perpetration phase”)   
• Position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of a State (“leadership element”). 
The former describes the material element or actus reus of the crime, while the latter 
is the necessary pre-requisite which enables the perpetrator to be in a position to 
conduct the relevant actus reus. The necessity of the latter can be seen by the 
incorporation of the use of the word ‘by’ to connect both the perpetration phrase and 
the leadership element.  Suffice it to say, like all crimes – the actus reus must be 
accompanied with the mental elements (mens rea). Therefore, there are three elements 
altogether which give rise to the elements of individual conduct of the crime of 
aggression: actus reus, leadership element and the mens rea. 
3.5.1. Leadership element 
  
The leadership element was a relatively uncontentious issue in the negotiations 
leading up to the Kampala Amendments.524 The basic assumption is that one has to be 
in a high position within the hierarchy of a state to be considered as a perpetrator of 
the crime of aggression. Under Article 8 bis(1) the individual must be in a position to 
exercise control over or direct the political or military action of a State (“control or 
                                                
524 The leadership element was already contained in the Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.193/2/Add.1; in the Coordinator’s 1999 
Consolidated Text of Proposals on the Crime of Aggression, PCNICC/1999/WGCA/RT.1(9 
Dec.1999); Princeton Report (2006), para.88; ‘Proposal for Alternative Language on Variant 
(a) Prepared by the Chairman for the Informal Consultations’, in Princeton Report (January) 
2007, Annex (Appendix); reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 577.   
 149  
direct”). This is a substantive component of the definition, and should not be 
interpreted as merely jurisdictional in nature.525  
The negotiation history supports this claim. The 2007 Proposal by the Chairman 
on Variant (a) (January), annexed to the 2007 SWGCA Report (January), was 
criticised by some delegations that ‘the new formulation seemed to link the leadership 
element to the scope of jurisdiction of the Court, and no longer to the definition of the 
crime of aggression itself.’526 Some participants had ‘stressed the importance of 
retaining the leadership clause in the definition itself, since it constituted an integral 
part thereof.’ 527  In response, the 2007 Chairman’s Non-Paper on Defining the 
Individual’s Conduct included the leadership clause as part of the definition of the 
crime. It can be inferred that it was intended that the leadership element should be a 
substantive component of the definition of the crime.528  
The importance of the leadership element is further reinforced by the following 
addition to Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute:529      
  
In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of this article shall apply 
only to persons in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of a State. 
 
The leadership element is imposed on all modes of perpetration, implying that all 
secondary perpetrators must also fulfil the “control or direct” criteria.530 The footnote 
in the second Element of the Crime of Aggression states that ‘more than one person 
may be in a position that meets these criteria.’ Thus, subject to these conditions, there 
can be more than one perpetrator of the crime.  
The leadership element can be understood in two parts: i) the role of the 
perpetrator in the context of the hierarchy of the State political/military structure that 
enables him/her to carry out the requisite conduct; ii) the requisite conduct of the 
                                                
525 Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 23; see also 
2007 Proposal by the Chairman on Variant (a) (January); 2007 SWGCA Report (January), 
para.11.   
526 SWGCA Report 2007 (January), para.11.   
527 Princeton Report (2007), para.9. 
528 SWGCA Report 2007 (December), para.6.  
529 Princeton Report (2007), para.11.  
530 See Barriga and Kress (n 6) 23; SWGCA Report 2009, para 25: it was noted that this 
provision was crucial to the structure of the definition of aggression its current form.  
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perpetrator to control or direct the political/military action of the State. The 
requirement that the person must be ‘in a position’, implies that the perpetrator must 
formally attain a position where he/she has the capacity to carry out the requisite 
conduct, i.e. an official leadership position. This would involve examining the official 
title of the defendant and the relevant powers and duties affiliated with such position. 
However, the inclusion of the word “effectively” suggests that the perpetrator 
must possess the actual ability to exercise sufficient authority to carry out the requisite 
conduct, in addition to a formal leadership position. Thus, ‘in a position effectively’ 
suggests a de facto leadership position, where the person is able to carry out the 
requisite conduct of ‘controlling/directing’ the political or military action of a state, 
who is not a mere figurehead who lacks the capacity to carry out those functions.  
The simple definition of “control” is “to order, limit or rule something, or 
someone’s actions or behaviour”;531  “the power to influence or direct people’s 
behaviour or the course of events.”532 The simple definition of “direct” is “to give 
authoritative instructions to; command; order or ordain”;533 “to cause (someone or 
something) to turn, move, or point in a particular way”;534 “to control the operations 
of; manage or govern.”535 Put in context, this suggests that the perpetrator must have 
the power or authority to have a direct effect on the ‘political or military’ action of the 
aggressor state by having a decisive say or command, or order, limit, rule, govern, 
regulate, supervise the political or military action of the relevant state which is aimed 
at achieving the objectives which lead to the act of aggression which by its character, 
gravity and scale constitutes a manifest violation of the UN Charter.   
The next question that needs to be addressed is the scope of the persons with 
respect to the leadership element.536 Should “control or direct” adhere to a strict 
interpretation or does it provide ambit for nuance?  The former suggests that the 
defendant must be a de facto leader who must have effective control and/or direction, 
whilst the latter suggests that the defendant may not necessarily have to be a political 
                                                
531 Cambridge online dictionary  
532 Oxford online dictionary 
533 Dictionary.com 
534 Merriam-Webster online 
535 Oxford online dictionary 
536 McDougall interprets the scope of perpetrators as ‘de facto “leaders” who are in position 
to have a decisive say over, govern, instruct or command the deeds of the political or military 
establishments of a State aimed at achieving particular objectives’ and that business and 
religious leaders are excluded,’ McDougall (n 7) 203.   
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or military leader but one who nevertheless attains de facto effective control and/or 
direction over the political/military action of the relevant state.  
This may arguably include leaders of non-state parties (e.g. private economic 
actors) or religious leaders.  This issue was touched upon in the negotiation history, 537 
as it had been raised that ‘the content of the leadership clause merited greater 
consideration, and that the Nuremberg precedent (indictments under the IMT and 
Control Council Law No.10) referred to persons outside formal government circles 
who could “shape or influence” the State’s action [...].538   
Some delegations had considered the ‘language to be sufficiently broad as to 
permit the prosecution of more than a single leader, including persons outside formal 
government circles’539 and it was subsequently expressed that ‘the language of this 
provision was sufficiently broad to include persons with effective control over the 
political or military action of a State but who are not formally part of the relevant 
government, such as industrialists.’540  
Heller argues that ‘the SWGCA rejects the “shape or influence” standard because 
it believes that the IMT and NMT applied the more restrictive “control or direct” 
requirement.’541 However, McDougall disagrees and argues that the participants of 
the negotiations were aware of the broader scope of perpetrators applied by the NMT, 
and ‘made a conscious choice to narrow the scope of perpetrators captured.’542 This 
was perhaps also the most logical decision, as Barriga reflects that ‘given that the 
wording of the clause already enjoyed widespread support, […] there was limited 
interest in exploring alternative formulations. There was also concern that this 
formula would open the doors too far, especially in relation to democracies where a 
                                                
537 See SWGCA Report 2007 (January) para 13; Princeton Report (2007), para.12;  ‘Elements 
of the Crime of Aggression – Proposal Submitted by Samoa’, 21 June 2002, UN 
Doc.PCNICC/2002/WGCA/DP.2; ‘Proposed text on the Definition of the Crime and Act of 
Aggression – Proposal Submitted by the Delegation of Colombia’, 1 July 2002, UN Doc. 
PCNICC/2002/WGCA/DP.3; ‘Elements of Crimes’, 9 September 2002, in ASP Official 
Records, ICC-ASP/1/3, Part II, 108; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 418.   
538 Princeton Report (2007), para.12. 
539 SWGCA Report 2007 (December), para.9. 
540 SWGCA Report (2009), para. 25. 
541 Heller (n 336) 479. 
542 McDougall (n 7) 183. 
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very large circle of persons could be said to ‘shape or influence’ the State’s action.’543 
Thus, it is intended that the scope of perpetrators should be narrow.  
Heller criticises the leadership element in the Kampala Amendments as 
representing ‘a significant retreat from the Nuremberg principles – not their 
codification.’544 He expressed concern that:  
 
Adopting the ‘control or direct’ requirement also entails rejecting the principle 
– central to both the IMT and NMT – that non-governmental actors can 
commit the crime of aggression, because no private economic actor and very 
few complicit third-state officials could ever be in a position to control or 
direct an aggressive state’s political or military action.545 
 
However, including non-state actors in the scope of perpetrators may be rather 
problematic, especially in the broader context of non-state actors and/or private 
economic actors (businesses and/or multinational corporations) having a locus standi 
at the ICC. Also, it would have been unrealistic to expect a consensus if the definition 
of the crime allowed for the potential prosecution of non-state actors. The 
implications of the leadership element will propagate the Court to concentrate upon 
the endeavour of prosecuting the few who are truly responsible for making decisions 
relating to the use of force. This may perhaps be more effective in achieving the 
deterrent objectives. 546  
Be that as it may, there does appear to be ambit for discussion that the scope of 
perpetrators under Article 8 bis (1) is sufficiently broad so as to encompass a key 
leadership role attained by a religious leader or industralist. The decision as to 
whether an individual may fall within the leadership element is ultimately for the 
discretion of the Court.    
 
                                                
543 Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 22.; ‘Proposal 
for a Definition of the Crime of Aggression Submitted by the Delegation of Germany’, 19 
February 1997, UN Doc.A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/DP.3; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 
223–225; see Princeton Report (2007) para.12; 1997.   
544 Heller (n 336) 497.  
545 ibid 488–489.  
546 McDougall (n 7) 46–47. 
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3.5.2. Actus reus: planning, preparing, initiation or execution  
 
In the negotiations leading up to Kampala, the participants were divided between 
two drafting approaches with respect to the forms of individual participation within 
the definition of the crime. The starting point is the July 2002 Coordinator’s Paper: 
 
a person commits a “crime of aggression” when, being in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action 
of a state, that person intentionally and knowingly orders or participates 
actively in the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of 
aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a flagrant 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.547 
 
As it was considered difficult to reconcile this with the secondary forms of 
participation within Article 25(3),548 it was initially suggested that: 
 
The provisions of articles 25, paragraphs 3, 28 and 33 of the Statute do not 
apply to the crime of aggression.549  
 
This has been described as the “monist” approach because the definition contains a 
description of different forms of participation, whilst excluding application of the 
various modes of participation enlisted within Article 25(3).  
As the negotiations carried on towards the 2005 Princeton Meeting, there was a 
shift towards a preference for adopting an approach which was more consistent with 
the other crimes in the Rome Statute, where the formulation was: the conduct of the 
principal perpetrator, in addition to the other forms of participation contained in 
                                                
547 It is also interesting to note that ‘the requirement in the July 2002 Coordinator’s Paper for 
the perpetrator to be ‘in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political 
or military action of a State’ also made its way unchanged into article 8 bis of the resolution 
adopted in Kampala’, Barriga and Kress (n 6) 10.   
548 Princeton Report (2004), para.37; Princeton Report (2005), para.19. 
549  ‘Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator’, 11 July 2002, UN 
Doc.PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT.1/Rev.2, in Report of the Preparatory Commission for the 
International Criminal Court, UN Doc. PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, Part II, 3, para.3. 
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Article 25(3). 550 This was called the “differentiated approach” as it intended to 
include the modes of participation in Article 25(3).551 
Some had found that the difference between the two options was very minimal as 
they were largely predicated upon the same rationales. Although, many delegations 
indicated in the light of the above that they were flexible, they nevertheless expressed 
a preference for one of the two variants. 552 As can be seen, the “differentiated 
approach” ultimately prevailed553 and the definition of the crime of aggression is 
drafted in a similar manner to the other core crimes, where there is the conduct of the 
principal perpetrator, in conjunction with the other forms of participation found in 
Article 25(3).554  
However, to be able to adopt the “differentiated approach,” the challenge for the 
participants was to decide upon the series of conduct verbs to describe how the 
principal perpetrator committed the crime of aggression:555 
 
in the case of the crime of aggression the underlying collective act is not 
broken down in a list of possible individual types of conducts, as is the case 
with the crime of genocide (killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm etc) 
and the crime against humanity (murder, extermination, etc); that means that it 
is the collective act as such that constitutes the point of reference for any 
definition of what the individual principal perpetrator actually does.556 
 
It was argued that the term “participates” should be excluded from the definition in 
order to avoid the forms of participation under Article 25(3) Rome Statute.557 Possible 
words that were suggested included “organize and direct”, “direct” and “order” as 
                                                
550 Princeton Report (2005), paras.20-25; Princeton Report (2006), para.84. 
551 Barriga informs that ‘the conceptual challenge of the differentiated approach, however, 
was to find a single conduct verb for the definition that properly describes what the principal 
perpetrator actually does’, Barriga and Kress (n 6) 21.  
552 See SWGCA Report (January) 2007, para.9. 
553 Princeton Report (2006), para.84; SWGCA Report 2007 (January), para.6: the main 
advantage of this approach was that the existing provisions of the Statute would be applicable 
to the greatest extent possible.  
554  See ‘Discussion Paper Proposed by the Chairman’, 16 January 2007, ICC-
ASP/5/SWGCA/2; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 101.  
555 Princeton Report (2006), para.85; see also Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the 
Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 20–22.     
556  SWGCA Report 2005 (June), Appendix III, Discussion Paper I, Section III(1)(a), 
Discussion Paper on the Crime of Aggression and Article 25, paragraph 3 of the Statute. 
557 Princeton Report (2006), para.87. 
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alternative conduct words.558 The discussion included whether to keep the phrase 
“planning, preparing, initiation and execution’ which was already contained in the 
2002 PrepCom Paper.  
In the course of the negotiation process, some had wished to delete this phrase as 
the elements of this notion were contained in the forms of participation under Article 
25(3) Rome Statute and thus ‘the inclusion of these terms in the conduct element 
might blur the distinction between primary and other perpetrators.’559Those who 
wished for the phrase to be retained noted that it ‘reflected the typical features of 
aggression as a leadership crime, and its retention in the text would highlight the 
criminalized conduct and thus increase the deterrent effect of the provision.’560 It was 
then suggested that the terms in this phrase should be used as conduct verbs. 561  
In 2007, the Chairman of the SWGCA suggested that paragraph 3 bis should be 
added to Article 25:  
 
With respect to the crime of aggression, the provisions of the present article 
shall only apply to persons being in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State.562 
 
This ensured the leadership requirement applies to both primary and secondary 
perpetrators.563 Barriga writes:  
 
This approach squared the circle in many ways: it allowed for retaining the 
Nuremberg precedent in the definition, it allowed for fully applying article 
25(3) to the crime of aggression, and it brought the cumbersome search for an 
innovative conduct verb to an end.564 
                                                
558 Princeton Report (2006), para.89. 
559 SWGCA Report (2006), para.92. 
560 SWGCA Report (2006), para.92. 
561 SWGCA Report (2006), para.92. 
562 ‘Proposal for Alternative Language on Variant (a) Prepared by the Chairman for the 
Informal Consultations’, in 2007 Princeton Report (January), Annex (Appendix); reprinted in 
Barriga and Kress (n 6) 104.  
563 ibid 
564Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 21; Princeton 
Report (2007), para.8: The point was made that with respect to the conduct verb, the 
Chairman’s alternative language followed the Nuremberg precedent. The proposal would thus 
cover all forms of conduct and would be qualified by the leadership element. The proposal 
would furthermore replicate the structure used for the other crimes under the Statute, which 
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Criticism had been raised with respect to the addition of the verbs ‘planned’ 
‘prepared’ ‘initiated’ or ‘executed’ to the modes of liability covered in Art 25(3);565 
and that ‘multiplication of modes of liability will create unnecessary confusion in the 
current structure of the Statute.’566 However, excluding the perpetration phrase would 
have resulted in the lack of a direct nexus between the conduct of the individual and 
the state act of aggression. Also, this would have departed from the legal construct of 
the crime of aggression with respect to the Nuremberg Trial.  
3.5.3. Mens Rea 
 
As the Kampala Amendments do not refer to any special intent requirement,567 it 
is assumed that Article 30 of the Rome Statute applies. This was mentioned in the 
2009 Chairman’s Non-Paper on the Elements of the Crime:   
 
where no reference is made in the Elements to a particular mental element for 
any particular material element listed, the relevant mental element set out in 
article 30 – intention, or knowledge, or both – applies. Usually, intention 
applies to a conduct or consequence element, and knowledge applies to a 
circumstance or consequence element.’568 
 
Thus, it is useful to examine the Elements of the crime of aggression to decipher 
whether they are a ‘conduct or consequence’ element (intention) or a ‘circumstance or 
consequence element (knowledge)’. Elements 1 and 2 describe the conduct of the 
individual, Elements 3 and 4 on the other hand refer to the state act element, whilst 
Elements 5 and 6 relate to the threshold requirement.  
                                                                                                                                      
would satisfy the principle that the drafting of the provisions on aggression should follow the 
structure of the other crimes, wherever possible.   
565 SWGCA 2006 (June), para.92.  
566 Dov Jacobs, ‘The Sheep in the Box: The Definition of the Crime of Aggression at the 
International Criminal Court’ in Christoph Burchard, Otto Triffterer and Joachim Vogel (eds), 
The review conference and the future of the ICC (Kluwer law International 2010) 142.  
567 This is in contrast with genocide, as there is a special intent requirement, i.e. dolus 
specialis which requires the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such, Article 6 Rome Statute; see Payam Akhavan, Reducing Genocide to 
Law: Definition, Meaning and the Ultimate Crime (Cambridge University Press 2012) 44–49.  
568 ‘Non-Paper by the Chairman on the Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction’ in 2009 
Princeton Report, annex III, para.10; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 677. 
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Element 1 contains the perpetration phrase, which is a conduct element and not a 
circumstance or consequence element, which means that ‘intention’ must be present. 
In other words the perpetrator must have intended to plan, prepare, initiate or execute 
the act of aggression.  Knowledge is not necessarily applicable here. 569  
Element 2 confirms that the perpetrator was in a position effectively to 
“control/direct” the political/military action of the State which committed the act of 
aggression.  This is a circumstance element, which means that ‘the perpetrator must 
have known (that is, been aware) that he or she was in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of the State which 
committed an act of aggression.’570 
Elements 3 and 4 refer to the act of aggression under Article 8 bis (2) and are 
circumstance elements which mean that knowledge is applicable. In particular, 
Element 4 states that: 
 
the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that 
such a use of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations (emphasis added). 
 
It is important to understand that ‘there is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator 
has made a legal evaluation as to whether the use of armed force was inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations.’571 
In the 2009 Chairman’s Non-Paper on the Elements of Crimes, it is explained 
that the mental element of “knowledge of fact” means that ‘the perpetrator is not 
required to have knowledge of the legal doctrine and rules used to evaluate whether a 
State use of force is inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, but is only 
required to have awareness of the factual circumstances establishing this 
inconsistency.’572 To satisfy the “factual circumstances” element:  
 
it would not be sufficient merely to show that the perpetrator knew of the facts 
indicating that the State used armed force. It would also be necessary to show 
that the perpetrator knew of facts establishing the inconsistency of the use of 
                                                
569 Ibid, para.12. 
570 Ibid, para.14. 
571 Ibid, para.2. 
572 Ibid, para.6. 
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force with the Charter of the United Nations. Examples of relevant facts here 
could include: the fact that the use of force was directed against another State, 
the existence or absence of a Security Council resolution, the content of a 
Security Council resolution, the existence or absence of a prior or imminent 
attack by another State.573 
 
Heller points out that the jurisprudence at the NMT differs in terms of mens rea, as 
these tribunals held that ‘participating in an act of aggression was criminal only if the 
defendant knew that the act was illegal under international law.’574 Although this was 
indeed acknowledged by the Chairman, he expressed concern that: 
 
a mental element requiring that the perpetrator positively knew that the State’s 
acts were inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations (effectively 
requiring knowledge of law) may have unintended consequences. For 
example, it may encourage a potential perpetrator to be wilfully blind as to the 
legality of State acts even if that advice is subsequently shown to have been 
incorrect. Also, mental elements requiring knowledge of the law are regularly 
avoided in domestic legal systems as they are often difficult to prove to the 
required standard.575  
 
Elements 5 and 6 relate to the threshold of the “manifest’ violation of the UN Charter. 
The introduction to the Elements of the Crime clarifies that ‘the term “manifest” is an 
objective qualification’ 576  and that ‘there is no requirement to prove that the 
perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to the “manifest” nature of the violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations.’577   
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576 Elements of the Crime, Resolution RC/Res.6, para.3; In the Chairman Non-Paper on 
Elements of the Crime (2009), it is clarified that ‘Paragraph 3 clarifies that the use of the term 
“manifest” in proposed Elements 5 and 6 is an objective qualification. In other words, the 
Court’s determination whether the particular violation of the Charter of the United Nations is 
objectively a “manifest” violation is decisive, rather than whether the perpetrator considered 
it to be a manifest violation, at para.7, Appendix II; reprinted in Barriga and Kress, ibid 680.   
577 Elements of the Crime, Resolution RC/Res.6, at para.4. 
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Once again, in Element 6, there is the requirement of knowledge of “factual 
circumstances.” This should be read in conjunction with Element 4 because ‘there 
may be instances where an accused is aware of facts establishing that a State use of 
force is an act of aggression, but not aware of other facts establishing that this act of 
aggression constitutes, by its character, gravity and scale, a manifest violation of the 
Charter of the UN.’578 In other words, the perpetrator may fulfil the mental elements 
of the act of aggression under Article 8 bis (2) but not the mental elements required of 
a “manifest” violation of the UN Charter to be liable for the crime of aggression.  
It appears that the perpetration phrase is the only component of the definition of 
the crime of aggression where the mental element required is the intention of the 
perpetrator. The other components, i.e. the leadership element and state act element 
require the mental element of factual knowledge. To satisfy the mental elements 
required for a successful conviction for the crime of aggression means that the 
individual must first acquire factual knowledge that the intended use of force is 
“inconsistent with the UN Charter”; and the acts which such use of force entails will 
constitute a “manifest” violation of the UN Charter. Upon such knowledge, the 
defendant must intend to plan, prepare, initiate or execute such acts. 
The threshold for the mental elements appears to be relatively low, especially in 
comparison with the high threshold required to satisfy the leadership element and the 
state act element. However, it can be logically assumed that if the perpetrator fulfils 
the leadership element, he/she has an inherent knowledge of being in such a position 
and of his/her scope of powers to exercise control over or to direct the 
political/military action of a State.  
Having attained such a high-level governmental position, it is likely that the 
person will be able to acquire the necessary knowledge of the factual circumstances 
that the intended use of force is inconsistent with the UN Charter.  However, 
knowledge that such intended use of force will constitute a “manifest violation” of the 
UN Charter may be more difficult to satisfy. Perhaps the latter will be the most 
difficult mental element to satisfy.   
 
                                                
578 ‘Non-Paper by the Chairman on the Elements of Crimes’, in 2009 Princeton Report, annex 
II, para.25; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 684. 
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3.6. The legal nature of the Kampala Amendments  
 
Article 8 bis (1) and Understanding 4 affirm that the definition of the crime of 
aggression is only for the purposes of this Statute. Thus, the definition in Article 8 bis 
(1) does not prima facie have customary international law status, nor is it a 
universally binding definition. What then is the legal nature of the Kampala 
Amendments? Do the Kampala Amendments confer substantive obligations to refrain 
from the conduct proscribed in Article 8 bis? If so, who are the duty-bearers of these 
obligations, and who are the rights-holders of the enjoyment of the proscribed 
conduct?   
The legal nature of the Rome Statute should first be considered.579 Milanovic has 
argued that there are two possible ways of reading the Rome Statute:  
 
First, like the statutes of other international criminal tribunals the Rome 
Statute could be seen as being purely jurisdictional in nature. Its provisions 
defining international crimes would be addressed to the Court itself, setting 
out the scope of its subject-matter jurisdiction, but they would not be 
addressed to individuals directly. Rather, the source of substantive norms of 
criminal law, which are directly addressed to individuals would be elsewhere, 
in customary international law.580  
 
The answer is not at all straightforward, as he points out ‘it is impossible to resolve 
this fundamental ambiguity about the legal nature of the Rome Statute by reference to 
the text alone or to its drafting history.’581  
The first step is to examine the relationship between the State Party and the ICC. 
When a State Party ratifies the Rome Statute, it accepts the jurisdictional competence 
of the Court over the crimes in Article 5(1), whereby the ICC may enforce sanctions 
against the perpetrators of these crimes provided they are nationals or had committed 
the crime on the territory. The classical jurisdictional nexus of nationality or territorial 
                                                
579 See Marko Milanovic, ‘Is the Rome Statute Binding on Individuals? (And Why We 
Should Care)’ (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 25, 26; see also Marko 
Milanovic, ‘Aggression and Legality: Custom in Kampala’ (2012) 10 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 165, 171. 
580 Milanovic, ‘Aggression and Legality: Custom in Kampala’ (n 579) 171. 
581 ibid 172. 
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principle is reflected in Article 12 of the Rome Statute. Thus, the acceptance of 
jurisdictional competence by the ratification of the Kampala Amendments signifies 
the delegation of enforcement powers against a crime (nationality principle and 
territorial principle) from the State Party to the ICC.  
Yet, enforcement powers are concomitant with the powers to prescribe. In other 
words, for punishment to be executed against these crimes, there must first be a legal 
source that confers substantive obligations on individuals to refrain from the 
proscribed conduct relevant to each crime. Thus, if the ICC may enforce sanctions 
against the crimes that it proscribes, it is only logical that the Rome Statute carries 
some substantive legal effect that creates obligations on individuals to refrain from 
the criminalized conduct.582  
However, the Rome Statute does not place obligations on States Parties to 
proscribe the crimes under Article 5(1) into their domestic criminal legislation. 
Whether States Parties proceed to codify these crimes into their domestic legislation 
is dependent upon their domestic ratification process. Some States Parties do not 
require a separate implementation process with respect to ratification, which means 
that the Rome Statute acts directly as a substantive legal source, while other States 
Parties need to implement the core crimes (Article 5(1) Rome Statute) into their 
domestic legislation as part of the domestic ratification process. As such, the legal 
source that confers obligations on the relevant individuals is domestic legislation.  
Any substantive effect with respect to obligations to refrain from proscribed 
conduct of the crimes appears to be predicated upon the ratification of the Rome 
Statute.583 As the State Party clearly consents to the jurisdictional competence of the 
ICC over the crimes in Article 5(1), it is presumed that Articles 6, 7 and 8 confer 
obligations on individuals that have a national or territorial jurisdictional link to the 
State Party. Such obligations may be directly applicable; or incorporated into 
domestic legislation (and then applicable).   
In the context of the Kampala Amendments, the same discussion applies, i.e. 
whether Article 8 bis is jurisdictional or substantive in nature. If the answer is the 
former, then no substantive legal obligations are conferred on any legal personality. 
                                                
582 Milanovic, ‘Is the Rome Statute Binding on Individuals? (And Why We Should Care)’(n 
576) 29–30,32,38,45,51–52.  
583 Milanovic, ‘Aggression and Legality: Custom in Kampala’ (n 579) 175. His premise is that 
‘the rule on the Statute’s substantive scope of application should trace the Statute’s 
jurisdictional regime, but do so while avoiding ex post facto application’, at 177. 
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Thus, the definition in Article 8 bis describes the subject matter of the crime of 
aggression in the Rome Statute.  
The legal obligations stem from another legal source, i.e. customary international 
law; whilst Articles 15 bis and 15 ter create the jurisdictional regime whereby 
sanctions can be executed against the individual for the breach of obligations to 
refrain from conduct relating to the crime of aggression. Thus, if Article 8 bis does 
not confer any substantive legal obligations, there is no need to contemplate the 
relevant duty-bearers or rights-holders. The opposing argument is that Article 8 bis 
does create substantive obligations when a State Party has ratified the Kampala 
Amendments. Once again, such obligations may be directly applicable or 
incorporated into domestic legislation. In my view, it is only logical that the Kampala 
Amendments assimilate the legal nature of the Rome Statute.  
Thus, it is presumed that in situations where the Court has jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression, the Rome Statute confers substantive obligations on the 
individuals to refrain from the proscribed conduct under Article 8 bis (on the basis of 
a nationality or territorial nexus to the ratifying State Party). However, it should be 
noted that the jurisdictional regime of the Court over the crime of aggression is sui 
generis and different from the other crimes. This sui generis jurisdictional regime will 
be examined in more detail later in Chapter VI. At present, it will suffice to submit 
that the delegation of domestic competence to prosecute the crime of aggression 
under the nationality or territorial principle is predicated upon the ratification of the 
State Party to the Kampala Amendments.584 
The next question is whether the duty-bearer of these obligations is the State 
Party or individuals that have a jurisdictional nexus with the State Party under the 
nationality or territorial principle. As the ICC has jurisdiction over natural persons 
(Article 25(1) Rome Statute) and serves as an enforcement mechanism against 
international crimes by punishing individuals by means of criminal sanctions, it is 
only logical that the duty-bearer of any substantive obligations in relation to the 
Kampala Amendments are individuals.  
Yet, what about the State Party? This question is relevant because Article 8 bis(2) 
refers to state conduct. Does Article 8 bis(2) confer obligations on States Parties that 
ratify the Kampala Amendments in relation to how they conduct their use of force?  
                                                
584 ibid 175–183. 
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In my view, it is rather difficult to argue in the affirmative. In the light of the object 
and purpose of Article 8 bis and the overall Kampala Amendments, the definition of 
the “act of aggression” provides a definition for the state act element of the crime, 
from which the elements of individual conduct can subsequently be evaluated.  
Thus, it can be inferred that the inclusion of the definition of the “act of 
aggression” is to clarify the state act element, and not to impose legally binding 
obligations on States Parties as subjects of international law with respect to recourse 
to force. Indeed, if Article 8 bis(1) and bis(2) had intended to impose such obligations 
on States Parties, it is unlikely that a consensus would have been achieved.  
The next step is to delineate the underlying norms that formulate the substantive 
obligations upon individuals pursuant to a nationality or territorial link of the ratifying 
State Party. The definition under Article 8 bis(1) stipulates the ‘planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution,’ by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over 
or to direct the political or military action of a State of [an act of aggression which, 
by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations].  
The conduct within the brackets, i.e. the state act element of the crime, is carried 
out by the alleged aggressor state and need not be discussed here. How should the 
substantive obligations on individuals be depicted? The leadership element, as 
emphasized in italics above, suggests that these obligations fall specifically on 
individuals who satisfy this criterion.  
Thus, in the course of duties performed in official capacity with regard to this 
criterion, the relevant individuals have obligations to refrain from planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution of any political or military action of a State, which 
would amount to an act of aggression.   
In other words, the duties, responsibilities or activities of the individual who is in 
a position to effectively exercise control over or direct the political/military action of 
a state must not encompass the planning, preparation, initiation, or execution by 
means of any actions which result in the state committing an act of aggression which 
by its character, gravity and scale constitutes a manifest violation of the UN Charter. 
It should be noted that there are no direct obligations on individuals to refrain from an 
act of aggression, as such obligations can only be conferred onto states. The duty, 
which falls on individuals is to comply with obligations to refrain from all of the 
modes of perpetration connected to the state act of aggression.  
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Article 8 bis(1) has criticised as being too vague. 585  Prior to the Review 
Conference, Glennon has submitted that:  
 
the proposed definition would constitute a crime in blank prose (…). The high 
level of specificity needed to impose individual criminal liability―as opposed 
merely to guide state conduct―has therefore proven unattainable.586 
 
His premise is based on the principle of legality;587 where he submits that ‘the 
definition, suffering from overbreadth and vagueness, does not provide sufficient 
notice to potential defendants as to what conduct is permitted and what is 
proscribed,’588 and is ‘irretrievably vague.’589  
Two points can be made in relation to this. First, the definition of the other crimes 
also provide ambit for interpretation. As such, the criticism of vagueness is not 
entirely unique to the crime of aggression.590 It is the ICC that will ultimately deal 
with any interpretation relating to the definition of the crime of aggression. Second, 
the question is how much specificity is required in light of the fact that it is not the 
state that is prosecuted for an act of aggression, but the individual for participating in 
one or more of the modes of perpetration. An argument can be made that it is 
sufficient that individuals are aware that international criminal law confers a duty on 
them to comply with obligations to refrain from the planning, preparation, initiation 
or execution stages of an act of aggression committed by a state.  
In general, the legal determination of an act of aggression is not a straightforward 
endeavor. The contours of the primary norms that prohibit the use of force are not 
entirely clear, and neither is the threshold for an act of aggression. Yet, the very 
existence of the crime of aggression is predicated upon the ascertainment of breach of 
primary norms relating to the prohibition of the use of force.  
As the breach of primary norms is inherently unspecified under international law 
as to what constitutes a state act of aggression, the criticism that the state act element 
of the crime of aggression is too vague or imprecise runs deeper than Article 8 bis (1). 
                                                
585 Glennon (n 467) 101–102. 
586 ibid 72. 
587 ibid 85. 
588 ibid 88. 
589 ibid 102. 
590 Milanovic, ‘Aggression and Legality: Custom in Kampala’ (n 579) 170. 
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It involves questioning the fundamental construct of the definition of the crime of 
aggression, 591  as the obligations on individuals to refrain from the modes of 
perpetration are intrinsically connected with the obligations on states to refrain from 
an act of aggression.   
Although the legal construct of the crime of aggression may be rather complex, to 
question its very existence is rather unhelpful to the present analysis. As per Lord 
Bingham in R v Jones, ‘the core elements of the crime of aggression have been 
understood, at least since 1945, with sufficient clarity to permit the lawful trial (and, 
on conviction, punishment) of those accused of this most serious crime. It is 
unhistorical to suppose that the elements of the crime were clear in 1945 but have 
since become in any way obscure.’592 
Thus, the Kampala Amendments, although far from being perfect and entirely 
precise, are nevertheless representative of a positive step towards formulating a 
substantive definition of the state act element of the crime of aggression; as nicely put 
by Milanovic, ‘while these problems are real, they are not necessarily fatal to the 
Kampala definition.’593 Furthermore, in the absence of any substantive legal effects 
on State Parties, it can be argued that the specificity of the state act element was 
intended to satisfy the interests of the principle of legality, and concomitant due 
process rights of the defendant.594    
3.7. The Kampala Amendments and the IMT Charter: a comparison  
  
The legal construct of crimes against peace at Nuremberg is representative of the 
substantive definition of the crime under customary international law. Thus, the 
Kampala Amendments should be examined in the light of customary international law 
with respect to whether and to what extent the definition of aggression has 
encapsulated or departed from the substantive norms of the crime.595  
 
 
                                                
591 See Glennon (n 467) 102. 
592 R v Jones, UKHL [2006], para 19.  
593 Milanovic, ‘Aggression and Legality: Custom in Kampala’ (n 579) 170. 
594 For a contrary view, see Glennon (n 467) 101. 
595 See Milanovic, ‘Aggression and Legality: Custom in Kampala’ (n 579) 171. 
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3.7.1. Overview  
  
The table below shows the comparison between the crime of aggression in the 
Kampala Amendments and crimes against peace at Nuremberg. This enables 
deductions to be made as to what extent the Kampala Amendments reflects or departs 
from the customary international law scope of the crime of aggression.   
 
Table 1: Comparison between Kampala Amendments and Nuremberg 
 
 Kampala Amendments Nuremberg 
State act element  Act of aggression which by 
its character, scale and 
gravity constitutes a 
“manifest violation” of the 
UN Charter 
War of aggression or war in 
violation of international 
treaties, agreements or 
assurances 
 
Elements of individual 
conduct 
• Position to effectively 
control or direct the 
political or military action 
of the relevant State  
• Planning, preparing, 
initiation, or execution [of 
an act of aggression] 
Planning, preparing, 
 initiation or waging [a war of 
aggression or war in violation 
of …] 
Mental element  • Intention - Planning, 
preparing, initiation or 
execution. 
• Knowledge – position to 
effectively control or 
direct the political or 






• Factual Knowledge - the 
use of armed force by a 
State against the 
sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political 
independence of another 
State, or in any other 
manner is inconsistent 




• Knowledge of Hitler’s 
aggressive plans – 
‘planning, preparing, 
initiation’ 
• Knowledge that the nature 




    
                                                
596 It is unclear as to whether this encompasses legal knowledge or factual knowledge. I have 
assumed that both legal and factual knowledge apply simultaneously and/or interchangeably 
to satisfy the requirement of “knowledge.”  
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• Factual knowledge – the 
act of aggression, by its 
character, gravity and 
scale, constituted a 
manifest violation of the 
UN Charter.  
  
3.7.2.  The state act element of the crime  
 
The question is whether an act of aggression by its character, gravity, scale, which 
constitutes a manifest violation of the UN Charter (Kampala Amendments) is of equal 
gravity to a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements and assurances.597 In the previous chapter, it was submitted that a “war of 
aggression” for the purposes of the Nuremberg Trial (and thus customary 
international law) encompasses the following:  
• the use of military force (“war”)  
• war with the objective of annexation, occupation of territory or annihilation of 
the intended victim state 
• occupation with the objective for further purposes of aggression against other 
countries  
• war for the purposes of gaining military advantage over other adversaries by 
preventing them from assisting a previously aggressed state 
• war for the purposes of expansion of territory 
• formal declaration of war in support of a third state’s war of aggression 
It is difficult to directly assess whether the threshold of “manifest violation” of the 
UN Charter under Article 8 bis (1) will encompass the acts listed above. The 
centralized system of collective security enshrined within the UN Charter had only 
been established during the time of the Trial. Prior to the formation of the UN 
Charter, only a normative framework existed with respect to the prohibition of the use 
of force. Thus, the Tribunal had to assess the acts committed by Germany under a 
different framework than the one applicable to the ICC. It is difficult to envisage a 
threshold for the Tribunal with respect to the state act element, which will amount to a 
“manifest violation” of the UN Charter. As such, it is difficult to assess whether the 
                                                
597  Princeton Report (2006), para.24 (note that opinions differed on what customary 
international law required). 
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12 wars committed by Germany will satisfy the threshold within Article 8 bis(1). 
Presumably Germany’s war of aggression and occupation of Poland would satisfy this 
criterion, but not the war of aggression declared on the USA. Yet, it is difficult to be 
certain that the threshold under Article 8 bis(1) represents a narrower scope of the 
state act element than customary international law. 598  For example, it can be argued 
that the normative value of a ‘war’ encompasses a greater magnitude of armed force 
than a ‘manifest violation’ of the UN Charter. In this regard, the state act element 
under Article 8 bis(1) is broader. McDougall submits:  
 
Articles 1 and 3 of the 3314 Definition, which are replicated in Article 8 bis 
(2), capture an extremely broad range of conduct. The effect of the additional 
threshold in draft Article 8 bis (1) is not entirely clear; nevertheless it seems 
highly unlikely that in requiring a certain level of seriousness and evident 
illegality it sets the bar as high as importing a de facto requirement that a ‘war’ 
has taken place. The intention of the majority of the SWGCA was certainly for 
a much broader range of acts to be captured by the definition.599 
 
She concludes that:  
 
Article 8 bis criminalises a significantly broader range of conduct than the 
customary definition of the State act element of the crime.600  
 
Another point to consider is that the state act element of a “war of aggression” under 
customary international law must include the initiation of military force and the 
animus aggressionis. In the 1999 Proposal by Germany for the definition of the crime 
of aggression, the state act element of the crime was put forward as: 
 
an armed attack directed by a State against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State when this armed attack was undertaken in 
manifest contravention of the Charter of the United Nations with the object or 
                                                
598 Id. 
599 McDougall (n 7) 154. 
600 ibid. 
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result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of 
such other State or part thereof by armed forces of the attacking State.601 
 
The ‘object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory 
of another State or part thereof’ could perhaps be seen as the animus aggressionis. 
However, most participants were against this for reasons such as ‘the fact that the 
object extended into the jus in bello, whereas the crime of aggression fell within the 
jus ad bellum; the difficulties in making an exhaustive enumeration of the objects or 
results; the fact that articles 3 and 5 of GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) only included 
military occupation or annexation as examples of aggression; the Security Council did 
not refer to the object or result in its decisions relating to aggression.’602 Ultimately, 
Article 8 bis (1) does not include any explicit reference to objectives of the act of 
aggression – or the animus aggressionis.   
However, this does not mean that the drafters of the Kampala Amendments 
should be faulted for excluding the animus aggressionis. First of all, it is a concept of 
natural law, which suggests that the animus aggressionis is ‘based on “sentiment” 
(impression) and not on legal constructions.603 Such natural notions appear seemingly 
irreconcilable with a positive approach to the jus ad bellum.  
Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that at the time of the events that preceded 
the Nuremberg Trial, the primary instrument that prohibited the use of force was the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact. Thus, every violation of this instrument prima facie gave rise to 
war. As such, war needed to be accompanied with the animus aggressionis to be 
regarded as a war of aggression for the purposes of individual criminal responsibility. 
In the light of the current jus ad bellum, as there is now a legal framework that 
prohibits the use of force, it is possible to establish the state act element of the crime 
on objective considerations. 
That said, the IMT Charter had not included an explicit reference to the animus 
aggressionis, and yet the Tribunal considered the animus aggressionis when 
determining the state act element of the crime. Thus, it is possible that judges at the 
                                                
601 ‘Proposal Submitted by Germany: Definition of the Crime of Aggression’, 30 July 1999, 
UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.13; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 340.   
602 Princeton Report (2006), para. 26. 
603 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1951, Vol II, Second report by Mr. J. 
Spiropoulos, Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/44), at para.151.  
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ICC may nevertheless consider the animus aggressionis, particularly if they adopt a 
non-positive interpretation to jus ad bellum. 
Overall, the Kampala Amendments appear to have a more specific definition of 
the state act element of the crime of aggression than the IMT Charter. By reason of 
the two-tier process involved in determining the state act element of the crime under 
Article 8 bis, it is only logical that a narrow scope of acts committed by the aggressor 
state may satisfy the requirements of the overall test. The inference is that a narrower 
scope of situations of aggression may be prosecuted at the ICC than at the IMT, or 
domestic courts. Thus, in my view, the threshold for the state act element of the crime 
of aggression is narrower in the Kampala Amendments than customary international law.     
3.7.3. Elements of individual conduct  
 
The first difference is that the definition of crimes against peace in the IMT 
Charter does not have any explicit reference to a leadership element, whilst the 
definition in the Kampala Amendments has a specific leadership element. The IMT 
did not work with any set scope of perpetrators, but assessed the relationship between 
the defendant and Hitler to ascertain whether this was professional or personal, 
followed by the official position and role in the government or military. At the NMT, 
despite inconsistencies between the Tribunals, the prevailing opinion appeared to be 
that the perpetrator must be able to “shape or influence” policy.604   
Therefore, the Kampala Amendments appear to have put forward a narrower 
definition (“control or direct”), which has become one of substantive components 
within the definition of the crime. As a result, the scope of perpetrators that can be 
prosecuted at the ICC is presumably narrower than that at the IMT and NMT.  The 
perpetration phrase is nearly verbatim with the exception of the use of the term 
‘execution’ in lieu of ‘waging’ in the Kampala Amendments; it can be presumed that 
this does not have any substantive implications. That said, it should be noted that the 
modes of perpetration in Article 8 bis (1) are connected to the leadership element in 
the definition, i.e. that the perpetrator can only participate in the conduct within the 
perpetration phrase if he/she is in a position to effectively direct or control the 
military/political action of the relevant State.    
                                                
604 Princeton Report (2007), para.12. 
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There also appear to be more detailed requirements for the mental elements in the 
Kampala Amendments than was required at Nuremberg. The former is consistent with 
the Rome Statute which contains a specific provision for mental elements (Article 30) 
and a set of Elements of the Crime. It is established that the required knowledge can 
be factual knowledge and does not necessarily have to be legal knowledge.  
At the IMT, it was not clear as to whether the knowledge required at Nuremberg 
was predicated upon a legal or a factual basis. It is inferred that both are applicable, 
either interchangeably or simultaneously, i.e. a defendant may have both factual and 
legal knowledge. It is worth pointing out that the pre WWII framework pertaining to 
the use of force as applied by the IMT was much simpler than the ius ad bellum of the 
present UN era, which made the requirement of such legal knowledge easier to 
acquire than it would today.  
3.8. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter, which has focused on the substantive definition of the crime of 
aggression, should not be read in isolation from Chapter VI, which focuses on the 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression. 
The reason why the substantive definition of the crime in the Kampala Amendments 
was examined prior to, and in isolation from the jurisdictional regime of the ICC over 
the crime of aggression, is because the former is relevant to the study of the legal 
definition of the crime, which falls into this Part of the dissertation (Part I: 
Background), while the latter is relevant to understanding when a situation of 
aggression may be prosecuted as a crime of aggression (Part III: Enforcement).   
This Chapter has studied the substantive constituents of the definition of the 
crime of aggression in the Kampala Amendments. There appears to be two tiers for an 
alleged situation of aggression to satisfy the definition of the crime of aggression. 
First, it must be satisfied under Article 8 bis(2) that a state has used armed force 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Upon 
being satisfied that Article 8 bis(2) has been met, the next step is to determine that this 
act of aggression is by its ‘character, gravity and scale’, a ‘manifest violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations’ pursuant to Article 8 bis(1).  Once the state act element 
of the crime is established under Article 8 bis(1), the defendant will be assessed 
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whether he/she is in a position to exercise control over or direct the political or 
military action of the State (and must be aware that he/she is in such a position) and 
had planned, prepared, initiated or executed the act of aggression.  
This Chapter has analysed how the legal definition of the crime of aggression has 
developed since the Nuremberg Trial. The definition and scope of the crime in the 
Kampala Amendments appear to be different from the Nuremberg definition in some 
respects, namely that the latter is significantly more detailed and specific with regard 
to the state act element and gives rise to a narrower scope of perpetrators that may be 
potentially prosecuted as a result of the leadership element. This can be used to infer 
that the Kampala Amendments do not appear to reflect customary international law. 
That said, the Kampala Amendments do not depart entirely from customary 
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Chapter IV.  The relationship between the aggressor 
state and the perpetrator of the crime of aggression 
  
4.1. Introduction  
 
The crime of aggression is unique because it encompasses an act of aggression as 
a substantive part of its legal definition. Not only is an act of aggression an essential 
component of the definition, but it is also the very premise upon which this crime is 
predicated. This is indicative of a relationship between the aggressor state and the 
perpetrator of the crime of aggression in the sense that responsibility under 
international law for the latter can only be found in the light of the former. Therefore, 
the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression are 
intrinsically linked on both primary and secondary levels.  
Yet, what does this really mean? How does a situation of aggression give rise to a 
crime of aggression? How does the responsibility of the aggressor state give rise to 
individual criminal responsibility for the perpetrator of the crime of aggression?   
To shed light on these questions, this chapter will examine the definition of the crime 
of aggression under international law to delineate between the norms that prohibit 
aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression (section 4.2). 
By identifying the points of distinctions between the norms that prohibit 
aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression, it becomes possible to 
understand how these norms interplay on the primary level (section 4.2.1). To 
correctly identify the point of intersection between the norms that prohibit aggression 
and the norms that criminalise aggression will show how the obligations on states to 
refrain from an act of aggression interplay with the obligations on individuals to 
refrain from conduct which relates to the act of aggression (section 4.2.2). By 
understanding the framework of primary norms that prohibit aggression and the 
norms that criminalise aggression, it is then possible to understand the relationship 
between state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility with respect to the 
crime of aggression; in particular, the apparent paradox whereby former is a sine qua 
non for the latter (section 4.3). 
The point of clarifying the applicable legal framework on both primary and 
secondary levels is directly relevant to the objective of this dissertation to determine 
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how responsibility is attributed under international law to the aggressor state and the 
perpetrator of the crime with respect to the crime of aggression.   
States are not tangible entities and are unable to conduct themselves in the form 
of physical beings.605 Thus, individuals who form part of the state organ essentially 
perform the acts, which are then construed as an act committed by a state.606 
Aggression, although committed by the aggressor state against the aggressed state, is 
an act that was technically orchestrated by individual(s) who form part of the state 
organ. As these individual(s) had acted in the official capacity of the state, the act of 
aggression is committed by the aggressor state. As such, aggression is seen as a 
collective act that is committed by the entity of the state as a whole, and is attributed 
to the state.  
However, as examined in Chapters II and III, aggression has become criminalized 
under international law and individuals can now be held criminally responsible for the 
crime of aggression. As the use of force by the aggressed state is technically the result 
of the actions of individual(s), this raises the question of how this conduct should be 
attributed to individuals. There is also the question of how the conduct is also 
attributable to the aggressor state, as there are now two actors that can be held 
responsible under international law. Hence, it is important to examine the legal 
construct of the crime of aggression to understand how the norms that prohibit 
aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression come into play on both the 
primary and secondary levels (section 4.3.1).  
In addition to examining the intersection between state responsibility and 
individual criminal responsibility with respect to the crime of aggression, this Chapter 
will also examine three other issues that arise. First, the animus aggressionis, which 
represents the aggressive intent behind the act of aggression, will be examined 
(section 4.3.2). More specifically, whether the animus aggressionis can be attributed 
to the aggressor state or to the individuals who planned, prepared, initiated or waged, 
the state act of aggression. This has implications with respect to the mental element of 
the crime of aggression. Second, the defendant may plead rather unconventional 
defences under international criminal law, which is due to the relationship between 
state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility, namely that the act of 
aggression was committed either in self-defence or under a circumstances precluding 
                                                
605 Kelsen, Principles of International Law (n 24) 182.  
606 ibid 194.  
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wrongfulness (section 4.3.3). An interesting issue that will be examined is whether 
prosecution of the crime of aggression can be considered as satisfaction for the 
aggressed state (section 4.3.4).       
4.2.  The legal definition of the crime of aggression  
  
Under Article 6(a) of the IMT Charter, crimes against peace is the:  
 
planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances.  
 
Article 8 bis (1) Kampala Amendments has defined the crime of aggression as:  
 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action 
of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
From studying both definitions, it can be deduced that the legal definition of the crime 
of aggression consists of three separate components: i) the state act element of the 
crime; ii) the material element of the crime (actus reus); iii) the mental element of the 
crime (mens rea). The state act element of the crime refers to the act of aggression 
committed by the aggressor state, whilst the actus reus and the mens rea are elements 
of the crime pertaining to the conduct of the alleged perpetrator. It is important to note 
that the legal construct of the crime encompasses conduct from two different legal 
personalities: the aggressor state and an individual.  
The state act element is the “war of aggression” or “an act of aggression which, 
by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations.” Broadly understood, it refers to the wrongful recourse to force 
committed by the aggressor state. The key point is that it is an act committed by a 
state. Therefore, this is a separate element from the material element of the crime, 
which is committed by an individual.  
However, as the act of aggression is the actual physical manifestation of the 
crime of aggression, it is easy to presume that it is the material element, i.e. the actus 
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reus of the crime. This can be further supported by the fact that it is necessary to 
determine an act of aggression prior to assessing the conduct of the individual. From 
this premise, the criminality of conduct of the individual is assessed in accordance 
with the alleged participation in carrying out the material element of the crime. This 
interpretation suggests that the actual aggression itself is the material element of the 
crime, and the perpetrator is guilty if it is found that he/she participated in the 
planning, preparation, initiation or waging/execution of the material element of the 
crime. The state act of aggression is the material element of the crime, and criminality 
of the conduct of the individual is subsequently assessed in relation to his/her 
participation in the material element of the crime. Thus, the material element of the 
crime comprises of:   
• planning an act of aggression 
• preparation of an act of aggression 
• initiation of an act of aggression 
• waging/execution of an act of aggression  
The act of aggression becomes attributable to the individual by virtue of his/her 
participation in one of the modes of perpetration. Prima facie, this is consistent with 
the underlying rationale of international criminal law, which confers individual 
criminal responsibility for acts committed in sovereign capacity of the state.  
However, my view is that this interpretation is incorrect. An act of aggression, which 
is the violation of norms under jus ad bellum can only be committed by a state. Unlike 
other international crimes, such as genocide, whereby the conduct may be attributable 
to individuals, an act of aggression can only be attributed to a state, as individuals are 
not duty-bearers to respect the norms that prohibit the use of force.   
To argue that the act of aggression is the material element of the crime is 
problematic for two reasons. First, it attributes responsibility under secondary norms 
to a legal personality who has not acted in breach of relevant primary norms. It is the 
aggressor state, not an individual, which has acted in breach of international law. 
Second, by labeling an act of state as the material element of a crime suggests that the 
crime of aggression is a state crime, as opposed to a crime committed by an 
individual. This is contrary to the rules of state responsibility and individual criminal 
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responsibility, as the former excludes the concept of state crimes,607 and the latter 
attributes responsibility directly on individuals. The act of aggression can therefore, 
only be attributed to the aggressor state and must remain as a separate component of 
the crime from the elements pertaining to the conduct of the individual.  
In my view, the material elements of the crime refer to:  
• planning 
• preparation 
• initiation  
• waging/execution  
This must be read in conjunction with the state act element of the crime: 
• planning [an act of aggression] 
• preparation [an act of aggression] 
• initiation [an act of aggression] 
• waging/execution [an act of aggression]  
The correct reading therefore, is that the state act element must first be satisfied, i.e. 
that the state has committed an act of aggression, and then it can be determined 
whether the individual had participated in the planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging of the act of aggression committed by the aggressor state. As discussed in 
Chapter II, this was the approach of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and as will be discussed 
in Chapter VI, the intended approach of the Review Conference as seen in Article 15 
bis and 15 ter of the Kampala Amendments.    
As the material elements of a crime refer to the conduct of the individual, and not 
the conduct of a state, it is only logical that a distinction must be made between the 
four modes of perpetration and the act of aggression. The former is considered as the 
material elements of the crime, which is to be attributed to the individual and the 
latter is the state act element, which can only be attributable to the aggressor state.   
                                                
607 See Giorgio Gaja, ‘Should All References to International Crimes Disappear from the ILC 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility?’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 
365; Rosenne Shabtai, ‘State Responsibility and International Crimes: Further Reflections on 
Article 19 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility’ (1997) 30 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 145; James Crawford, ‘Revising the Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 435; Georges Abi-
Saab, ‘The Uses of Article 19’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 339; Andrea 
Gattini, ‘Smoking/No Smoking: Some Remarks on the Current Place of Fault in the ILC 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 397; 
Alain Pellet, ‘Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!’ (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law 425. 
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Therefore, individual criminal responsibility is predicated on the state 
responsibility of the aggressor state. This had been expressed in the Commentaries on 
the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996 
(“Commentaries on the Draft Code of Crimes”): 
 
[T]he responsibility of an individual for participation in this crime is 
established by his participation in a sufficiently serious violation of the 
prohibition of certain conduct by States contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, of 
the Charter of the United Nations. The aggression attributed to a State is a sine 
qua non for the responsibility of an individual for his participation in the crime 
of aggression. An individual cannot incur responsibility for this crime in the 
absence of aggression committed by a State. Thus, a court cannot determine 
the question of individual criminal responsibility for this crime without 
considering as a preliminary matter the question of aggression by a State.608   
 
The responsibilities described in this statement refer to the secondary norms that arise 
as a result of breach of primary norms. The overlap between these secondary norms is 
the result of the legal construct within the definition of the crime. There can be no 
crime by an individual if there is no act of aggression committed by the aggressor 
state. This sets the crime of aggression apart from the other crimes, as the underlying 
purpose of international criminal law is to impute accountability and responsibility on 
individuals for acts that may otherwise be attributed to the state; and yet, the legal 
construct of aggression upholds a relationship between the aggressor state and the 
perpetrator of the crime.  
The next component is the mental element of the crime of aggression. It is 
important to note that this refers to the mens rea of the defendant, and not the mental 
element of the aggressor state. If the material element of the crime consists of four 
modes of perpetration, the mens rea of the defendant must therefore be directly 
relevant to the intention of the defendant to participate in one of these modes of 
perpetration, e.g. the defendant had intended to participate in the planning an act of 
aggression.   
  
                                                
608 Commentaries on the Draft Code of Crimes, para.14. 
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4.3. An act of aggression and a crime of aggression: the norms that prohibit 
aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression  
 
An act of aggression and a crime of aggression can be understood as two 
different wrongful actions under international law, committed by two different legal 
personalities. The former can only be committed by a state, while only individual(s) 
may commit the latter. Yet, as submitted above, the latter can only be founded upon 
establishment of the former; and individual criminal responsibility can only be 
predicated upon state responsibility. To understand why this is so, the norms that 
prohibit aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression should be examined.  
First, it is important to identify the points of distinction between the act of 
aggression and the crime of aggression (section 4.2.). The next step is to identify the 
point of intersection between the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms that 
criminalise aggression (section 4.2.2). By identifying this intersection, it brings to 
light how these norms are connected on the primary level, and form the legal 
definition of the crime of aggression. By understanding how these norms interplay on 
the primary level, it then becomes possible to understand how the norms on the 
secondary level should be interpreted with respect to individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of aggression.    
4.3.1 Points of distinction 
 
There are two legal frameworks that apply to the phenomenon of aggression: jus 
ad bellum and international criminal law. These two legal frameworks apply on 
distinct and separate levels, and govern the conduct of different subjects of 
international law.  Jus ad bellum only applies to states, whilst international criminal 
law applies directly upon individuals. The existence of these two distinct legal 
frameworks is why and how international law confers different obligations on states 
and individuals to refrain from the act of aggression and crime of aggression 
respectively.  Caution must be warned against presuming that the rule of international 
law that prohibits the act of aggression automatically gives rise to individual criminal 
responsibility. For example, the ILC wrote in the Commentaries on the Draft Code of 
Crimes:  
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the violation by a State of the rule of international law prohibiting aggression 
gives rise to the criminal responsibility of the individuals who played a decisive 
role in planning, preparing, initiating or waging aggression.609 
 
The latter sentence appears to be rather broad-brush as it suggests that the criminal 
responsibility of the individuals who played a decisive role in planning, preparing, 
initiating or waging aggression is predicated upon the violation of the rule of 
international law prohibiting inter-state aggression. It can be inferred that the same 
rule of international law gives rise to both forms of responsibility.  
There are in fact two rules, which are applicable in the present context: the rule of 
jus ad bellum that prohibits inter-state aggression, and rules under international 
criminal law that give rise to the criminal responsibility of the individuals who played 
a decisive role in planning, preparing, initiating or waging, of aggression committed 
by the aggressor state. The rule of jus ad bellum prohibiting aggression does not 
automatically give rise to individual criminal responsibility. These two separate rules 
demonstrate that international law provides norms prohibiting the use of force on the 
inter-state level, and norms that place obligations on individuals to refrain from 
prohibited conduct amounting to the crime of aggression. In other words, there can 
only be a crime of aggression if there is an act of aggression, and not the other way 
round.  
A situation of aggression violates the norms contained within both of these 
frameworks under international law. This is why a situation of aggression can be 
attributable to both the state and the individual as an act of aggression and a crime of 
aggression. Both have failed to perform their duties to comply with their respective 
obligations under international law.  
Three inter-related points of distinction can be seen: i) there are two different acts 
under international law: an act of aggression; and crime of aggression; ii) there are 
two different subjects of international law: the state; and the individual; iii) there are 
two different frameworks of international law that interplay in the prohibition of a 
situation of aggression: jus ad bellum (act of aggression); and international criminal 
law (crime of aggression).   
                                                
609 Commentaries on the Draft Code of Crimes, 43.  
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4.3.2. The point of intersection  
 
The point of intersection between the crime of aggression and act of aggression 
refers to the point where the norms that prohibit the act of aggression interconnect 
with the norms that criminalise aggression. In other words, it is the point where the 
obligations to refrain from an act of aggression conferred onto a state are 
interconnected with the obligations conferred on individuals to refrain from one of the 
relevant modes of perpetration. Thus, by identifying the point of intersection, it 
becomes clear how the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms criminalise 
aggression are connected on the primary level.  In my view, the point of intersection 
between the aggressor state and the individual is that the act of aggression was 
facilitated by the conduct of the individual in his/her participation in one of the modes 
of perpetration, as part of his/her official capacity as part of the organ of a state. But 
for the individual, the aggressor state would not have committed an act of aggression. 
However, if the aggressor state has not committed an act of aggression, the individual 
could not have participated in one of the modes of perpetration intended to facilitate 
aggression. Indeed, this intersection reaffirms that the crime of aggression and the act 
of aggression are clearly intrinsically linked.610    
i. Obligations to refrain from the act of aggression  
  
States are not tangible beings, which essentially means that obligations to refrain 
from inter-state aggression really fall upon individuals who are ‘indirectly and 
collectively, in their capacity as organs or members of the state, subjects of the 
obligations, responsibilities and rights presented as obligations, responsibilities and 
rights of the state.’ 611 The selection of these individuals is not governed by 
international law, but instead by the national law of the state. Hence, any conduct 
committed by these individuals in their capacity as organs of the state will be imputed 
                                                
610 Commentaries on the Draft Code of Crimes, 43; see Constantine Antonopoulos, ‘Whatever 
Happened to Crimes against Peace?’ (2001) 6 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 33, 36. 
611 Kelsen, Principles of International Law (n 24) 194–195; see Commentaries on ARSIWA, 
where it is written that the reference to a “State organ’ covers all the individual or collective 
entities which make up the organization of the State and act on its behalf, at 40. 
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to the state. The breach of any of such obligations by individuals in their capacity as 
organs of the state will be considered as conduct, or acts of the state.612   
Therefore, although international law confers obligations upon states, these 
obligations are really imposed upon individuals in their capacity as organs of the 
state, and not in their individual capacities as natural persons.613 An act committed by 
individuals in the official capacity as a state organ implies that such acts were 
committed in a collective capacity, and not an individual one. This is why the breach 
of obligations conferred onto states as legal subjects gives rise to collective 
responsibility, in the sense that the state as a whole, is responsible.  
In the context of an act of aggression, obligations are conferred onto individuals 
who act in the official capacity of a state, to refrain from making any political or 
military decisions, which will lead the state to act in violation of the prohibition of the 
use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The nature and scope of the 
obligations placed on states to refrain from aggression against other states under jus 
ad bellum was examined in detail in Chapter I and need not be repeated here.   
The point is that obligations conferred onto states to refrain from an act of 
aggression are technically conferred on individuals who act in official capacity of the 
state. By virtue of their role as part of the state organ, the acts performed by 
individuals that are committed in official capacity are attributed to the state. An 
argument can be made that the underlying rationale of international criminal law is 
that individuals who perform tasks in their official capacities of the state, may no 
longer hide behind the shield of the state if these acts result in international crimes.614 
Therefore, the individuals who were responsible in their state capacity for facilitating 
the act of aggression should also be made personally responsible.  
There is, however, one issue that arises. This is that individuals are not the duty-
bearers of the obligations to refrain from an act of aggression. As argued in Chapter I, 
the prohibition of the use of force, and Article 2(4) does to not apply to individuals. 
Therefore, this is different from other international crimes such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, where individuals are the duty-bearers of the 
                                                
612 In the Commentaries on ARSIWA, it is written that ‘the general rule is that the only 
conduct attributed to the State at the international level is that of its organs of government, or 
of others who have acted under the direction, instigation or control of those organs, i.e. as 
agents of the State’, 38; Nollkaemper (n 438) 616; See Sayapin (n 12) 103. 
613 Article 4, ARSIWA 2001; Kelsen, Principles of International Law (n 24) 196.     
614 ‘Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law - International Military 
Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences’ (n 4) 221. 
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obligations to refrain from the proscribed conduct. To attribute the act of aggression 
directly to the individual results in imputing norms of secondary responsibility for 
conduct, which he/she has not acted in breach of.  
The point of intersection, thus, refers to conduct which can be attributable to 
individuals in relation to their facilitation of the act of aggression in their official 
position as part of a state organ. This is specific conduct, which is identifiable as part 
of the duties of the individual in his/her role as part of the state organ. It is this 
conduct that international criminal law places obligations on individuals to refrain 
from. This means that in the course of their official duties, individuals must refrain 
from such conduct in relation to the military and political policies and/or actions of 
the state they serve. If an individual has acted in breach of obligations to refrain from 
this conduct, causing the state to commit an act of aggression, a crime of aggression 
can be found. As submitted above, the breach of this conduct is the material element 
of the crime, whilst the act of aggression committed by the aggressor state is the state 
act element of the crime.   
ii. Obligations to refrain from the crime of aggression  
 
The planning, preparation, initiation or waging/execution of aggression can only 
be carried out in connection with the state committing aggression. These four modes 
of perpetration cannot exist independently without the state act of aggression. The 
point of intersection is that the act of aggression was facilitated by the conduct of the 
perpetrator through one of these modes of perpetration. Therefore, the obligations to 
refrain from “planning, preparation, initiation and waging/execution” can only take 
effect in parallel with the obligations on the state to refrain from the act of aggression. 
When the state has breached its obligations to refrain from the act of aggression, the 
responsible individual has also breached obligations to refrain from planning, 
preparing, initiating or waging, the act of aggression by the state. These modes of 
perpetration serve to determine the conduct of an individual in relation to the 
aggressor state committing aggression.  
iii. The question of the leadership element   
 
It is generally accepted that the crime of aggression is a leadership crime, as only 
someone who has attained such capacity within a state can realistically “plan, prepare, 
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initiate or wage/execute” the state act of aggression.615 Indeed, as mentioned above, 
the material elements of planning, preparation, initiation and execution refer to 
specific conduct, which can be identified as the duties of an individual in his/her role 
as part of the state organ. The question is whether customary international law places 
obligations on all individuals to refrain from the crime of aggression, or only upon 
those individuals who fall within the leadership element. 
Although the definition in the Kampala Amendments explicitly provides that the 
perpetrator must be in a position to “control or direct” the political or military action 
of a State, as discussed in Chapter III, this is not necessarily reflective of customary 
international law as the standard for the leadership element is considerably narrower 
than applied by the IMT or NMT (to “shape or influence” the policy of a State).   
Thus, the leadership element in the Kampala Amendments need not be considered 
here.  
As examined in Chapter II, neither the IMT nor NMT convicted a defendant for 
crimes against peace on the pure basis of their official position(s). It should be further 
recalled that neither Statute contained any explicit references to a leadership element.    
The IMT did not have a pre-determined scope of perpetrators, but instead examined 
whether the defendant had a professional or personal relationship with Hitler to 
determine whether he was in a realistic position to participate in one of the modes of 
perpetration. The NMT did not make any decisions based on the official position of 
the individual, but instead contemplated his ability to shape or influence policy in 
each circumstance giving rise to Germany’s aggression.  
It can be inferred that the tribunals used the leadership element to determine 
whether the individual could have “planned, prepared, initiated or waged” a war of 
aggression for the purposes of limiting the culpability of the German population for 
the crime. As cannot be disputed, a war of aggression is a collective act committed by 
the state. The leadership element therefore limits the culpability by directing the 
responsibility onto the individuals who are in position to “plan, prepare, initiate or 
wage” a war of aggression as opposed to the population as a whole. Such individuals 
would realistically be in Hitler’s “inner-circle” or in a position to “shape or influence” 
the policy of a state. Thus, the process of applying the leadership element was not to 
determine whether customary international law had placed obligations on the 
                                                
615 Sayapin (n 12) 222. 
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individual to refrain from the crime of aggression, but rather to make a realistic 
culpable link between the individual, the modes of perpetration, and the act of state.  
As touched upon in Chapter II, it is difficult to argue that the crime of aggression 
existed under customary international law at the time of the IMT and NMT trials, thus 
the process of applying the leadership element should not be interpreted as 
determining whether customary international law had placed an obligation on the 
individual to refrain from the crime of aggression. Instead, the leadership element was 
contemplated in order to make a realistic culpable link between the individual, the 
modes of perpetration, and the act of state.  
Therefore, it is submitted that the leadership element should not be interpreted to 
mean that only individuals who fall within this scope of perpetrators have the duty to 
perform obligations under customary international law to refrain from the crime of 
aggression. Customary international law imposes obligations on all individuals to 
refrain from planning, preparing, initiating and waging [a war of aggression]. How the 
leadership element comes into play, is that the Court uses a threshold to assess 
whether the perpetrator could realistically be culpable for the crime of aggression.  
It can be further recalled that the NMT did not entirely rule out that private 
economic actors, i.e. industrialists may be criminally responsible for crimes against 
peace. Thus, an argument can be made that private economic actors are not excluded 
from criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression under present customary 
international law.616 This reinforces the submission that customary international law 
applies obligations on all individuals to refrain from the crime of aggression, as 
private economic actors and non-state actors617 consist of individuals.  
                                                
616 See Florian Jessberger, ‘On the Origins of Individual Criminal Responsibility under 
International Law for Business Activity: IG Farben on Trial’ [2010] Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 783. 
617 It is worth noting that in contemporary warfare, there may be situations where non-state 
actors may commit aggression against states, perhaps in a nature which falls outside of 
Article 3(g) GA Resolution 3314(XXIX) 1974. As the present legal definition of the crime of 
aggression under international law is state-centric, it is likely that an act of aggression 
committed by a non-state actor (which may not be attributed to a state) would not satisfy the 
state act element of the crime of aggression under customary international law or the Kampala 
Amendments. The implications are that such acts of aggression committed by non-state actors 
may not be qualified as crime(s) of aggression. At present, only aggression committed by a 
state can give rise to criminally responsibility for the individual. The question of aggression 
committed by non-state actors, although an interesting one, exceeds the scope of this 
dissertation.  
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This is why an interpretation that customary international law imposes 
obligations on all individuals to refrain from the crime of aggression is preferable.618  
More importantly, this is consistent with the doctrine of individual criminal 
responsibility: customary international law imposes obligations on all individuals to 
refrain from the crime of aggression, irrespective of his/her official position in the 
government/military of the state. The latter, governed by domestic law, is ultimately 
irrelevant, as obligations apply directly on the individual; the breach of which entails 
criminal punishment.     
4.4. The norms that apply on the secondary level  
 
A situation of aggression breaches norms contained within two frameworks of 
international law: the aggressor state has breached the rules of international law 
prohibiting unlawful recourse to force 619  and the individual(s) responsible has 
breached obligations under international law to refrain from causing a state to act in 
the prohibited manner. This is why aggression can be attributable to both the state and 
the individual pursuant to the secondary norms of responsibility, i.e. there is dual 
attribution.620   
As two different actors have acted contrary to the obligations placed on them by 
international law, each set of secondary norms must apply, and should not be 
interpreted to cancel each other out. In other words, state responsibility for aggression 
does not mean that the individual is no longer responsible for the crime of aggression 
and need not be prosecuted. Likewise, the finding of individual criminal responsibility 
of the perpetrator for the crime of aggression does not mean that the aggressor state is 
precluded from the traditional consequences under the secondary rules of state 
responsibility.621 In addition to prosecution of the crime of aggression, the aggressed 
state may bring the matter to an international forum or other traditional form of 
dispute settlement for the purposes of invoking legal consequences pursuant to 
responsibility of the aggressor state.  
                                                
618 See Antonio Cassese, ‘On Some Problematic Aspects of the Crime of Aggression’ (2007) 
20 Leiden Journal of International Law 841, 846; Sayapin (n 12) 224–225. 
619 Article 1, ARSIWA (2001).  
620 Wilmshurst (n 433) 93; Beatrice I Bonafé, The Relationship Between State and Individual 
Responsibility for International Crimes (Martnius Nijfhoff 2009) 44; Nollkaemper (n 438) 
617.  
621 Article 58, ARSIWA 2001; Article 4, Draft Code of Crimes; Bonafé (n 620) 44, see also 
115 and 190. 
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The purposes and objectives of state responsibility have evolved throughout 
history,622 an examination of which exceeds the compass of this dissertation. At 
present, it is generally accepted that the secondary rules of state responsibility are 
considered to be inter alia restorative and/or reparative in nature, whilst also serving a 
legality function of ensuring that the wrongdoing party complies with international 
obligations.623 More importantly, it is generally accepted that this set of secondary 
rules is not meant to be punitive in nature.624 This can be seen in Article 34 of the 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“ARSIWA”), 
as the damages are essentially non-punitive in nature: restitution, compensation and 
satisfaction. 
The immediate difference appears prima facie that state responsibility does not 
encompass a punitive element, whilst the fundamental objective of individual criminal 
responsibility is centered upon punishing individuals for committing international 
crimes.625  The general idea is that the aggressor state cannot be punished under 
international law for the act of aggression,626 but on the other hand, the perpetrator of 
the crime of aggression can be punished in the form of criminal sanctions.   
4.4.1. The crime of aggression: the intersection between state responsibility and 
individual criminal responsibility   
 
The relationship between state responsibility and individual criminal 
responsibility in the context of the crime of aggression is especially interesting 
                                                
622 See James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge University Press 
2013) 3–42. 
623 For an examination into how reference to crimes of state was ultimately omitted, see 
Crawford, ibid 390–394. 
624 In the Commentary on the ARSIWA, it was written that it was initially thought that the 
breach of peremptory norms of international law could be reflected in a category of 
“international crimes of State” which were in contrast with all other caes of internationally 
wrongful acts (“international delicts”), and that there had been ‘no development of penal 
consequences for States of breaches of these fundamental norms,’ at 111.  In earlier drafts of 
the ARSIWA, Article 19(2) read ‘an internationally wrongful act which results from the 
breach by a State of an obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of 
the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a 
whole constitutes an international crime.’ The concept of state crimes and Article 19 was 
eventually dropped from the present Draft Articles. The present articles thus do not recognize 
the existence of any distinction between State “crimes” and “delicts”’, at 111. 
625 Nollkaemper (n 438) 636; Bonafé (n 620) 224–225. 
626 It was held by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY that ‘under present international law it is 
clear that States, by definition, cannot be the subject of criminal sanctions akin to those 
provided for in national criminal systems’, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, International Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, Case IT-95-14-AR 108 bis, ILR, vol.110, 688 at 698. 
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because the former can exist independently from the latter, whilst the latter is entirely 
predicated upon the former. 627 On the primary level, as discussed above, the norms 
that prohibit an act of aggression that run in parallel with the norms that prohibit the 
planning, preparation, initiation and waging thereof, are the norms that prohibit the 
use of force pursuant to Article 2(4). Thus, the violation of norms that prohibit 
aggression simultaneously give rise to a breach of the norms that prohibit the 
planning, preparation, initiation and waging thereof.  As there is a simultaneous 
breach of the parallel norms that prohibit aggression and the norms that criminalise 
aggression, this can be understood as the intersection between state responsibility and 
individual criminal responsibility with respect to the crime of aggression. In this 
regard, it appears that this intersection is largely a matter for determining that there 
has been a breach of primary obligations, and not necessarily for the purposes of 
ascertaining the legal consequences under the secondary rules of responsibility.  
To clarify, the intersection where state responsibility for an act of aggression 
gives rise to individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression is 
representative of a breach of the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms that 
criminalise aggression by the aggressor state and the perpetrator of the crime of 
aggression. Therefore, the determination of the act of aggression in the present 
context is not for the purposes of invoking legal consequences against the aggressor 
state, but to ascertain that the defendant had acted in breach of primary norms to 
refrain from the proscribed conduct. The establishment of responsibility of the 
aggressor state is necessary to indicate that the individual has acted in breach of the 
parallel set of obligations to refrain from the modes of perpetration. 
4.4.2. The animus aggressionis: the individual or the state? 
 
The animus aggressionis can be understood as the natural concept that 
encompasses the aggressive intent. The question is how this should be qualified: is 
this the mental element of the aggressor state or the individual? 628 Although the 
question of fault in state responsibility falls outside the scope of this dissertation,629 
the general position appears to be that fault is not necessary to establish the 
                                                
627 Commentaries on the Draft Code of Crimes, 43; See Antonopoulos (n 610) 36; Bonafé (n 
620) 108. 
628 Bonafé (n 620) 138; Nollkaemper (n 438) 633–634. 
629 See Crawford (n 622) 38, 49, 60–61; Bonafé (n 620) 120; Gattini (n 607). 
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responsibility of states.630 Indeed, the ARSIWA do not make any explicit reference to 
fault.631 The criteria for establishing state responsibility appears to be objective, as 
‘once the breach of an obligation owed under a primary rule of international law is 
established, this is prima facie sufficient to engage the secondary consequences of 
responsibility.’632   
In reality, the act of aggression was conducted by an individual(s) acting on 
behalf of the aggressor state in his/her official capacity within an organ of the state.633 
The idea or intention for the state to act in aggression thus originates from an 
individual as a natural person, and not the state as a tangible entity. However, the 
question is whether the aggressive psychological element should be attributed to the 
aggressor state as part of the state act of aggression, or to the individual as mens rea 
for the crime. Sayapin has identified the animus aggressionis as the mental element of 
the crime of aggression, which ‘emerges before any objective action is embarked 
upon and accompanies the entirety of developments related to the commission of the 
crime.’634 He submits:  
 
the formation of an animus aggressionis in the minds of a group of individual 
civilian and/or military leaders of a State is the very first step in the process of 
planning the crime of aggression. The animus aggressionis is in place at the 
moment when one leader first thinks of using force against another State, 
without that this planned use of force is manifestly consistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.635   
 
To argue that the absence of an animus aggressionis in the minds of individuals 
involved in the planning of the use of military force would render the intended use of 
                                                
630 Crawford (n 622) 60–61. 
631 See Ibid 60. 
632 ibid 61; see Commentary on ARSIWA, at 36; Nollkaemper (n 438) 633. 
633 Sayapin writes that ‘the animus aggressionis emerges before any objective action is 
embarked upon and accompanies the entirety of developments related to the commission of 
the crime. In effect, the formation of an animus aggressionis in the minds of a group of 
individual civilian and/or military leaders of a state is the very first step in the process of 
planning the crime of aggression. The animus aggressionis is in place at the moment when 
one such leader first thinks of using force against another state, without that this planned use 
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force manifestly consistent with the purposes of the United Nations is rather 
simplistic. The legality of the use of force in the light of whether it is consistent with 
the purposes of the UN is not dependent upon the intention or the purpose with which 
the use of force was carried out, but instead whether the force is within the confines of 
permissible use of force under the legal framework of jus ad bellum.636Yet, Sayapin is 
not incorrect in stating that the formation of an animus aggressionis is in the minds of 
a group of individuals, as states are abstract entitites and are unable to formulate 
thoughts and intentions in a mental capacity. However, the question is whether it is 
correct to attribute the animus aggressionis to individuals or if it should be attributed 
to states.  
As examined in Chapter II, under customary international law, the state act 
element of the crime, a “war of aggression” comprises of: i) the initiation of armed 
force by the aggressor state; and the ii) the animus aggressionis. The latter is a 
substantive part of the state act element of the crime. In my view, this provides 
sufficient legal basis to argue that it is the state policy ipso facto that encompasses the 
underlying animus aggressionis. Hence, the animus aggressionis should be 
considered as the aggressive intention of the state, and not the individual.  
It should be clarified that this does not amount to “fault” in the light of the 
secondary rules of state responsibility,637 as the animus aggressionis falls within the 
compass of the primary rules of international law. In this regard, the primary norms 
that prohibit the act of aggression encompass an additional element to refrain from 
having any animus aggressionis towards other states. This suggests that aggressive 
objectives such as occupation or annihilation of territory are attributable to the state as 
part of the state act element, and not as mens rea of the individual.    
The question is whether this aggressive intention is necessary to evaluate that a 
state has committed an act of aggression. As discussed in Chapter I, this is highly 
subject to the methodological interpretation of jus ad bellum. The animus 
aggressionis may not hold any significance with respect to ascertaining the legality of 
the use of force from a positive approach, whilst on the other hand; a non-positive 
approach may value the animus aggressionis in determining whether the use of force 
by the alleged aggressor state was inherently aggressive in nature.   
                                                
636 See Article 3, ARSIWA 2001.  
637 Bonafé (n 620) 122. 
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Be that as it may, any consideration of the animus aggressionis is pursuant to the 
primary norms prohibiting an act of aggression. Responsibility of the aggressor state 
for an act of aggression under the secondary rules can be conducted in an objective 
manner without having to take into consideration any mental element or intention of 
the state. The significance of not attributing the animus aggressionis to the individual 
is that this mental element does not need to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for 
the purposes of ascertaining individual criminal responsibility. In other words, the 
mens rea of the individual does not necessarily have to encompass an aggressive 
intent per se for the state act element of the crime. This is consistent with the 
judgment at the IMT where it appeared that the knowledge of Hitler’s aggressive 
plans had sufficed as criteria for the mental element. This is also consistent with the 
Kampala Amendments, as there is no explicit mention of a special intent requirement 
to commit aggression.638   
Presumably, mens rea can be satisfied if it can be proven beyond reasonable 
doubt that the individual had knowledge of the aggressive plans of the state, or 
perhaps even the animus aggressionis. It does not appear to be necessary that this 
knowledge requires any legal evaluation of the use of force, but can be predicated 
upon a factual basis.639 This was stated in the second paragraph of the Introduction of 
the Elements of the Crime in the Kampala Amendments:  
 
There is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator has made a legal 
evaluation as to whether the use of armed force was inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
 
The factual basis is reaffirmed in the following Elements of the Crime: 
 
Element 4:  
The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that 
such a use of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
 
                                                
638 See Paragraph 2 of the General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes, RC-Res.6.  
639 ‘Non-Paper by the Chairman on the Elements of Crimes’, in 2009 Princeton Report, annex 
II, para.6 (Appendix II), ibid.   
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Element 6: 
The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established such a 
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
The mens rea of the individual refers to the intention to participate in one or more of 
the modes of perpetration, and factual knowledge that the use of armed force is 
inconsistent with the Charter of the UN. The threshold for the mens rea of the 
individual with respect to the state act element appears to be relatively low. However, 
this is logical, as the individual has attained a high-ranking position in the state organ, 
thus the mens rea can be inferred from the state act element of the crime, as it is 
highly plausible that he/she had knowledge of the aggressive state policy. There is no 
need to prove that the individual personally had animus aggressionis once it is 
established that there is an act of aggression.  
In my view, the animus aggressionis cannot be attributed to individuals, because 
the act of aggression itself is attributed to the state. It is therefore only logical that if 
the act of aggression is attributed to the state, its underlying animus aggressionis must 
also be attributed to the state.   
4.4.3 Self-defence and circumstances precluding wrongfulness: unconventional 
defences under international criminal law  
 
A point that arises from the unique relationship between state responsibility and 
individual criminal responsibility is that the defendant may plead rather 
unconventional defences for the crime of aggression. These defences are self-defence 
and circumstances that may preclude wrongfulness. Indeed, a plea that the alleged 
aggression was really an act of self-defence may be used as a defence by both the 
alleged aggressor state and the accused.640 On the level of primary norms, if recourse 
to force was conducted in self-defence, there is no wrongful conduct of unlawful use 
of force. This is affirmed in Article 21 of ARSIWA: 
 
The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a 
lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
 
                                                
640 Bonafé (n 620) 156. 
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A successful plea by the aggressor state would imply that there is no breach of 
primary obligations, and thus no responsibility for aggression. A defendant 
prosecuted for the crime of aggression may also plead that the aggressor state had 
acted in self-defence. If so, this would preclude the establishment of the state act 
element, therefore individual criminal responsibility cannot be assessed. It should be 
noted that this defence does not relate to personal conduct, but rather the conduct of 
the aggressor state.  
Another unconventional form of defence that may be pleaded by the individual is 
that the alleged act of aggression is not unlawful recourse to force as it was conducted 
under circumstances that preclude its wrongfulness. 641  These circumstances are 
governed in Chapter V of ARSIWA.642 According to the ILC, ‘they do not annul or 
terminate the obligation; rather they provide a justification or excuse for non-
performance while the circumstance in question subsists.’643 Thus, the defendant may 
plead that there is no act of aggression committed by the aggressor state because the 
use of force was conducted under a circumstance that may preclude wrongfulness. 
That said, Article 26 of ARSIWA does not preclude the wrongfulness of any state for 
an act, which is contrary to jus cogens. Thus, it appears prima facie that 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness to justify an act of aggression are 
inadmissible in principle.644 This is of course subject to dispute under international 
law, as some may argue that the use of force may be justified under the theory of 
countermeasures, distress and necessity.645 This debate need not be examined here. In 
the light of the possibility of circumstances precluding wrongfulness being invoked to 
justify a use of force, the present analysis has contemplated this as a defence that may 
be pleaded by the defendant. The general idea is that it is in the interests of the 
defendant to dismiss the state act element of the crime.  
The difference between self-defence and circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
is that the former applies on the level of primary norms, whilst the latter applies to the 
secondary rules of responsibility. The former means that there is no breach of primary 
obligations by the aggressor state, and thus no parallel breach of primary obligations 
                                                
641 Chapter V, ARSIWA; ibid 158. 
642 The six circumstances are: consent (Article 20, ARSIWA), self-defence (Article 21, 
ARSIWA), countermeasures (Article 22, ARSIWA), force majure (Article 23, ARSIWA), 
distress (Article 24, ARSIWA) and necessity (Article 25, ARSIWA).  
643 Commentaries on ARSIWA, at 71. 
644 Corten (n 63) 199–200. 
645 ibid 198. 
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by the individual. The latter on the other hand, means that there may have been a 
breach of primary obligations by both aggressor state and individual, but there are 
circumstances that may preclude the aggressor state from responsibility under the 
secondary rules. The question is whether the responsibility of the individual for 
breach of primary obligations will be precluded because the aggressor state is not 
found responsible for aggression under the secondary rules.   
There are two ways of interpreting this. First, the two sets of secondary rules of 
responsibility are linked with respect to the legal consequences. In other words, the 
finding of individual criminal responsibility is entirely predicated upon the finding of 
state responsibility. If so, then the criminal forum may have to assess whether there 
are any circumstances that may preclude the wrongfulness of the aggressor state, 
which would ultimately lead to the acquittal of the defendant due to the lack of state 
act element of the crime.  
The problem with this approach is that when the aggressor state breached 
obligations on the primary level, the individual had breached parallel obligations to 
refrain from the planning, preparing, initiation and waging of the act of aggression. 
Regardless of whether the aggressor state is found ultimately responsible under 
secondary rules, the individual had nevertheless breached obligations under 
international law. To acquit the individual on the basis that the aggressor state is not 
found responsible for the breach of obligations because of circumstances that preclude 
wrongfulness suggests that the legal consequences of both rules of responsibility are 
interlinked and must be found in the parallel.  
The other way of approaching this question is to appreciate that there is a 
dichotomy between the two sets of secondary rules with respect to the legal 
consequences. If it is found that there has been a breach of primary obligations by the 
aggressor state, and thus, a breach of primary obligations by the individual, 
circumstances that may preclude wrongfulness may affect the findings under the rules 
of state responsibility, but not individual criminal responsibility. In other words, if the 
court is satisfied that the aggressor state had committed an act of aggression, and that 
the individual had planned, prepared, initiated or waged this act, circumstances 
precluding the wrongfulness of the act of aggression should not affect the individual 
criminal responsibility because primary obligations have nevertheless been breached 
by the individual. The individual may not be acquitted for the crime of aggression as 
the Court may find prima facie that the breach of primary obligations by the state is 
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sufficient to satisfy the state act element of the crime, regardless of the legal 
consequences under state responsibility for the aggressor state.  
In my view, a preference is expressed for the second interpretation. If it can be 
satisfied that an individual has breached a duty to comply with obligations under the 
norms that criminalise the modes of perpetration relating to an act of aggression, the 
aggressed state has a legal interest to invoke legal consequences against the 
perpetrator for a breach of duty owed to it. So long as it is satisfied that there has been 
a breach of the relevant primary norms by an individual, legal consequences may be 
invoked under the secondary norms of individual criminal responsibility.  
4.4.4. Prosecuting the crime of aggression: the question of satisfaction 
  
An important question is whether prosecution of state leaders or other high-
ranking government/military officials of the aggressor state for the crime of 
aggression can be considered as a form of satisfaction for the aggressed state.646 
Under Article 31(1), ARSIWA, the responsible State is under an obligation to make 
full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. Satisfaction, 
is one of the legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act by a state, as set 
out in Article 34, ARSIWA: 
 
Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take 
the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in 
combination […]  
 
The provision governing satisfaction is Article 37, ARSIWA, which stipulates in sub-
paragraph 1:  
 
The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under obligation to 
give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made 
good by restitution or compensation. 
 
                                                
646 Article 34 and 37, ARSIWA 2002. 
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It is indeed possible that restitution or compensation may not provide full reparation 
for the ‘non-material injury’ caused by an act of aggression.647 In the Commentary to 
the draft ARSIWA, the ILC writes that:  
 
Material and moral damage resulting from an internationally wrongful act will 
normally be financially assessable and hence covered by the remedy of 
compensation. Satisfaction, on the other hand, is the remedy for those injuries, 
not financially assessable, which amount to an affront to the State. These 
injuries are frequently of a symbolic character, arising from the very fact of 
the breach of the obligation, irrespective of its material consequences of the 
State concerned.648  
 
The question is whether prosecution of the crime of aggression may amount to a form 
of satisfaction for the aggressed state.  Article 37(2), ARSIWA stipulates: 
  
Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression 
of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality. 
 
It should be noted that this list is not exhaustive,649 which can be used to infer that 
prosecution can indeed be considered as a form of satisfaction. It should be clarified 
that ‘satisfaction is not intended to be punitive in character, nor does it include 
punitive damages.’650 The remedy of satisfaction does not intend for the aggressed 
state to punish the aggressor state. Instead, the punishment of individuals who were a 
part of the organ of the state for the crime of aggression can be seen as a form of 
appeasement for the moral damage caused towards the aggressed state. As there are 
                                                
647  In the Commentaries on ARSIWA, the ILC had specifically listed violations of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity’ as examples where the internationally wrongful act of a 
State causes non-material injury to another State, at 106. 
648 ibid.   
649 The Commentary elaborates that ‘the appropriate form of satisfaction will depend on the 
circumstances and cannot be prescribed in advance. Many possibilities exist […] Paragraph 2 
does not attempt to list all the possibilities, but neither is it intended to exclude them all. 
Moreover, the order of the modalities of satisfaction in paragraph 2 is not intended to reflect 
any hierarchy or preference. Paragraph 2 simply gives examples which are not listed in order 
of appropriateness or seriousness. The appropriate mode, if any, will be determined having 
regard to the circumstances of each case’, Commentaries on the ARSIWA, at 106; see also 
99.    
650 Commentaries on ARSIWA, 107. 
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no clear rules on satisfaction, this remedy should be considered on a case-by-case 
basis. Two circumstances may be contemplated: i) prosecution by the aggressor state 
of its own state officials for the crime of aggression; ii) prosecution at the ICC for the 
crime of aggression.  
i. Prosecution by the aggressor state of its own state officials for the crime of 
aggression 
 
The aggressor state has jurisdiction under the nationality principle to prosecute its 
own state officials for the crime of aggression in a domestic court. The punishment of 
nationals who are responsible for the relevant misconduct could serve as a form of 
satisfaction for the aggressed state. It has been argued that ‘a judgment against an 
individual perpetrator can be considered as a (partial) remedy against the state.’651 
Therefore, in situations where the aggressor state has conducted proceedings against 
its own nationals for the crime of aggression, this may be representative of the legal 
remedy of satisfaction for the aggressed state.  
Such proceedings may be initiated by the aggressor state, or perhaps ordered by 
the competent forum of dispute settlement that is dealing with the state responsibility 
of the aggressor state as a form of satisfaction.652 As prosecution is the means of 
exercising sanctions directly against individuals for the breach of duty to perform 
primary obligations and does not amount to any direct enforcement action against a 
state, forums might be more ready to grant this as a form of satisfaction.653   
ii. Prosecution at the ICC for the crime of aggression  
 
There are two aspects to this. First, whether a judgment at the ICC can be 
considered as a judicial declaration of wrongfulness as a form of satisfaction.654 As 
prosecution involves first determining the state act element of the crime, there are two 
levels upon which a judicial declaration of wrongfulness could take place: i. the 
determination of an act of aggression; and ii. the conviction and subsequent 
punishment of the individual. Thus, even if there is no successful conviction of the 
                                                
651 Nollkaemper (n 438) 638. 
652 ibid. 
653 ibid. 
654 Crawford (n 622) 529–530. 
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defendant for the crime of aggression, the determination of the act of aggression could 
still be considered as a judicial declaration of wrongfulness, e.g. the Corfu Channel 
case, where the ICJ declared:  
 
the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty. 
This declaration is in accordance with the request made by Albania through 
her Counsel, and is in itself appropriate satisfaction. 655 
 
The determination of aggression in proceedings at the ICC is representative of a 
finding by an international court that the aggressor state had committed a wrongful act 
against the aggressed state. However, this may not be immediately associated with the 
remedy of satisfaction for the aggressed state, as it is a part of the definition of the 
crime of aggression. It may be viewed and understood as the preliminary step prior to 
assessing the conduct of the defendant. Nevertheless, the question is whether the 
positive determination of an act of aggression could serve as satisfaction for the 
aggressed state.656  
The next question is whether prosecution at the ICC can be considered as a form 
of satisfaction. As the ICC is the embodiment of the international community, 
prosecution is representative of the interests of the international community in 
punishing the nationals from the aggressor state who have committed wrongful 
activities against the aggressed state. This may arguably amount to a form of 
satisfaction for the aggressed state against the aggressor state.   
Either way, prosecution at the ICC is representative of the possibility, in the 
interests of the aggressed state, of the legal remedy of satisfaction under international 
law.  
4.5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has clarified how the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms 
that criminalise aggression interplay on the primary level, and how the breach thereof 
should be interpreted with respect to the secondary level of responsibility. This is in 
the direct legal interests of the aggressed state, as the victim of the crime of 
                                                
655 Corfu Channel Case, (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania), 
Judgment of April 9th, 1949, [hereinafter “Corfu Channel Case”] 4, 35. 
656 Commentaries on ARSIWA, 107. 
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aggression.  The intrinsic link within the definition of the crime whereby the crime of 
aggression is predicated on an act of aggression can be explained by examining the 
point of intersection between the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms that 
criminalise aggression. The act of aggression committed by the aggressor state was 
facilitated by the conduct of the individual in his/her participation in one of the modes 
of perpetration, as part of his/her official capacity as part of the organ of the state. By 
identifying this intersection, it can be understood that the crime of aggression is 
predicated on the act of aggression because the norms that prohibit the modes of 
perpetration, planning, preparation, initiation or waging, run in parallel with the 
norms that prohibit an act of aggression. Each set of norms cannot exist independently 
of each other.  
The intrinsic link where individual criminal responsibility is predicated upon 
state responsibility can be clarified by understanding that the intersection where the 
latter gives rise to the former is for the purposes of identifying that there has been a 
breach on the primary level of the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms that 
criminalise aggression. Thus, state responsibility of the aggressor state is indicative 
that the defendant has acted in breach of the parallel set of obligations to refrain from 
the modes of perpetration. By doing so, the legal position of the three parties involved 
in a situation of aggression, the aggressor state, the aggressed state and the perpetrator 
of a crime can be brought to light, with particular reference to a crime of aggression. 
The legal positions of these three parties can be summarized as follows. 
The aggressor state has acted in breach of the norms that prohibit an act of 
aggression. If the breach has reached a sufficient threshold, it may satisfy the state act 
element of the crime of aggression. This means that there has also been a breach of 
the parallel norms that confer obligations on individuals to refrain from the planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging/execution of the proscribed act of aggression. Thus, 
upon establishing the state act element of the crime, it can be assessed whether the 
defendant has acted in breach of the relevant norms, which gives rise to the material 
element of the crime. There is of course, also the need to establish the mental element 
with respect to the ‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging’ modes of perpetration, 
for a successful conviction of the crime of aggression.    
In criminal proceedings, determining the existence of an act of aggression by the 
aggressor state is not for the purposes of considering or invoking legal consequences 
under the secondary rules of state responsibility. Instead, this determination serves the 
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purpose of identifying that there has been a breach on the primary level by the 
defendant of the relevant norms.  
Subject to this determination, the conduct of the defendant will be assessed with 
respect to whether he/she had participated in the material elements of the crime, and 
has the relevant mental element. The individual is responsible only for his/her 
involvement in planning, preparation, initiation or waging, the act of aggression. The 
latter is attributed to the aggressor state because it is the correct duty-bearer with 
respect to the norms that prohibit an act of aggression.    
The attribution of conduct to the relevant duty-bearer is thus demarcated into the 
‘act of aggression’ and ‘planning, preparation, initiation and waging.’ The 
significance of this demarcation is to retain a dualist structure of responsibility, 
whereby the aggressed state has a legal interest to invoke legal consequences against 
the aggressor state under the secondary rules of state responsibility, and a legal 
interest for legal consequences against the perpetrator of the crime of aggression 
under the secondary rules of individual criminal responsibility.   
During prosecution, the parallel and simultaneous existence of state responsibility 
and individual criminal responsibility for aggression is accepted and acknowledged 
for the purposes of ascertaining the state act element within the definition of the 
crime. However, a dichotomy is still respected in the light of the conditions and legal 
consequences of the secondary rules of responsibility, as the purpose of prosecution is 
to punish the perpetrator and not to invoke responsibility of the aggressor state. 
Here, the question arises as to whether prosecution of the perpetrators for the 
crime of aggression may amount to a form of the legal remedy of satisfaction for the 
aggressed state. This way, there are legal consequences against both the aggressor 
state and the perpetrator of the crime for their breaches of primary obligations. 
Regardless of the outcome of prosecution, the aggressed state may choose to bring the 
matter to another form of international dispute settlement for the purposes of invoking 
responsibility of the aggressor state. In such forum, there is a possibility that an order 
may be made for the aggressor state to prosecute the responsible individuals for the 
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Chapter V. The victim of the crime of aggression 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
As the ordinary meaning of a victim can be rather broad, this Chapter approaches 
the concept of a victim from a more technical perspective, whereby the victim is the 
rights-holder of the enjoyment of the protection from the norm prohibiting the act in 
question that has suffered harm or injury (“damages”) from the breach of duty of the 
duty-bearer to comply with this norm. The victim of the crime of aggression therefore 
is the rights-holder of the enjoyment of the protection afforded by the norms that 
criminalise aggression that has suffered from the breach of duty by the relevant duty-
holder (the perpetrator of the crime of aggression) to refrain from the prohibited 
conduct. 
 The premise of this Chapter is that the aggressed state is the victim of the crime 
of aggression because it is the rights-holder of the enjoyment of the protection 
afforded by these norms (section 5.2.1). Be that as it may, human suffering, injury, 
death and destruction of natural persons within the territory of the aggressed state 
should not be undermined or neglected. In this regard, they are victims of a situation 
of aggression in the light of the inevitable destruction, hardship, physical and 
emotional suffering that war brings with it. Thus, it is easy to presume that these 
natural persons who suffer from the crime of aggression are the victims of the crime. 
This presumption will be examined in the form of a hypothesis that natural persons 
are the victims of the crime of aggression. 
This Chapter will begin by challenging this hypothesis with the intention of 
showing that it is not sustainable (section 5.2.). The first ground for rejecting the 
hypothesis is that natural persons are not the rights-holders of the norms that 
criminalise aggression (section 5.2.1). The second ground is that there is need to 
establish actual harm caused to the natural person in a situation of aggression. Yet, 
actual harmed caused by the crime of aggression is the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the aggressed state (section 5.2.2). This will be proven by examining the 
legal framework applicable in a situation of aggression, i.e. jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello. This legal analysis will show how actual harm caused to natural persons in a 
situation of aggression should be assessed under jus in bello and not jus ad bellum. 
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Thus, injury to natural persons in a situation of aggression may be qualified as 
violations of jus in bello and thus potentially war crimes (if it is satisfied that the 
constitutive elements of the crime are present). In other words, natural persons who 
are injured in a situation of aggression are not victims of a crime of aggression, but 
instead may be victims of war crimes (section 5.2.3) That said, I am prepared to 
acknowledge that although natural persons are not the rights-holders of the norms that 
criminalise aggression, they may arguably be beneficiaries of the implementation of 
the norm by the duty-bearer (section 5.2.5). As such, they may be considered as the 
indirect victims of the crime of aggression. Although conceptually this may be 
logical, from a practical perspective, the problem is with establishing actual harm, as 
there is a wide scope of situations that may amount to harm.   
As the focus of this Chapter is on the (direct) victim of the crime of aggression, 
this Chapter continues to examine the legal interests of the aggressed state (section 
5.3). As the victims of the other core international crimes are natural persons, 
international criminal law has appeared to adopt a victim-centric approach,657 as can 
be seen from the emerging normative framework of victims’ rights.658 The first 
question is how the crime of aggression should be considered within the normative 
framework of victims’ rights (section 5.3.1). The implications of this are whether the 
aggressed state, as a victim of an international crime, may receive reparations for the 
crime of aggression from the perpetrator (section 5.3.2.).  
The Chapter then continues to examine prosecution of the crime of aggression in 
both domestic courts and the ICC (section 5.3.3.). The latter is particularly interesting 
because at the ICC, the victims of the core crimes, and thus the crime of aggression, 
are natural persons.659 This means that natural persons may participate in the Court’s 
proceedings (Article 68(3) Rome Statute) and receive reparations (Article 75 Rome 
Statute). The implications of reparations at the ICC for the crime of aggression are 
that individuals, who are non-rights holders, are receiving reparations for the breach 
of duty that was not owed to them. The legal and practical implications will be 
discussed. (section 5.3.3.iv). 
 
                                                
657 In general, see M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victims’ Rights’ (2006) 
6 Human Rights Law Review 203. 
658 Friedrich Rosenfeld, ‘Individual Civil Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression’ (2012) 
10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 249, 250. 
659 Article 85, Rules of Evidence and Procedure, International Criminal Court.  
 204  
5.2. Can natural persons be victim(s) of the crime of aggression? 
 
This section will challenge the hypothesis that natural persons are the victims of 
the crime of aggression. The first step is to identify the rights-holder of the enjoyment 
of the protection afforded by the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms that 
criminalise aggression. This involves re-examining the obligations that international 
law places on states and individuals as the relevant duty-bearers to refrain from a 
situation of aggression (act of aggression and crime of aggression). The second step is 
to consider the need to ascertain the actual harm caused to the intended rights-holder, 
i.e. the victim of the crime of aggression as a result of the failure of the duty-bearer to 
comply with the duty to refrain from the prohibited conduct. This should be assessed 
in the light of the legal framework applicable in a situation of aggression. This 
enables the third step, which is to assess how injury to natural persons that have 
suffered as a result of a situation of aggression should be qualified. There is also the 
concomitant issue of injury to natural persons who are part of collateral damage.   
5.2.1. Re-examining the obligations to refrain from an act of aggression and a crime 
of aggression  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the respective obligations conferred on 
states and individuals to refrain from the act of aggression and crime of aggression are 
intrinsically linked and run in parallel to each other. The obligations placed on 
individuals to refrain from the four modes of perpetration (planning, preparation, 
initiation and waging) cannot exist independently to the obligations on the state to 
refrain from the act of aggression. In other words, international criminal law applies 
in parallel with jus ad bellum by placing obligations on individuals to refrain from 
conduct in their position as part of the state organ that will facilitate the state to act in 
aggression. 
It is important to consider the nature of the obligations pertaining to the 
prohibition of inter-state force. These obligations fall upon states, and are owed to 
each and every state that is part of the international community of states as a whole. It 
should be concentrated upon that the nature of these obligations applies only to the 
legal personality of states under international law.  
As obligations conferred on the individual with respect to the crime of aggression 
are predicated upon the obligations conferred on the state to refrain from an act of 
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aggression, both sets of obligations are owed to the same right-holders. In a situation 
of aggression, the act of aggression and the crime of aggression stem from the same 
unlawful use of force by the aggressor state, which means that both wrongful conduct 
cause harm of a singular nature to the rights-holder. In this context, the rights-holder 
can be identified as the aggressed state, as it is this legal personality that is owed the 
obligations to refrain from the act of aggression and obligations to refrain from the 
crime of aggression. As the breach of these obligations cause direct harm to the 
aggressed state as the rights-holder, it can be classified as the victim of both the act of 
aggression and the crime of aggression.    
Immediately this departs fundamentally from the other crimes, as the victims of 
these crimes are natural persons. Yet, to argue that both state(s) and individual(s) are 
victims of the crime of aggression suggests that the perpetrator has breached a duty to 
comply with obligations owed to both state and individuals. This implies that 
obligations international law confers on individuals to refrain from the modes of 
perpetration are owed to individuals, in addition to every state that is a member of the 
international community of states.  As such, an argument can be made that obligations 
imposed on individuals to refrain from “planning, preparing, initiation and waging” 
aggression are owed to “the international community” and not the “international 
community of states as a whole.” This appears consistent with the premise of 
international criminal law, whereby individuals are under obligations to refrain from 
crimes that are against the interests of the international community, which can be 
understood to encompass natural persons, in addition to states. Thus, by virtue of the 
crime of aggression being an international crime, the obligations that fall on 
individuals to refrain from the prohibited conduct, by default, is owed to the 
international community.660 This is because the norms that criminalize acts under 
international law, i.e. international crimes, impose direct obligations on individuals to 
refrain from such conduct; such obligations are owed to the international community. 
Therefore, individuals, in addition to states, may also be considered as right-holders. 
The contrary argument is that the obligations imposed on individuals with respect 
to the crime of aggression are owed to the international community of states as a 
whole – and not the international community. The effect of this is that these 
obligations are not owed towards individuals; thus there is a narrower scope of 
                                                
660 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga Omnes’ 
(1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 63, 68. 
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obligations placed on individuals to refrain from the prohibited conduct with respect 
to the crime of aggression than the other crimes. The rights-holders are only States. 
My preference is for the second view because the obligations that fall on 
individuals to refrain from the crime of aggression under customary international law 
cannot exist independently from obligations that fall on states to refrain from the act 
of aggression. To argue that obligations to refrain from the modes of perpetration are 
owed to individuals, in addition to states as subjects of international law, would 
arguably extend the obligations on individuals to refrain from the modes of 
perpetration further than the obligation placed on states to refrain from aggression. If 
so, then these obligations cannot exist in parallel, as one set of obligations is wider 
than the other.  
It may be questioned why it is important to preserve this parallel-construct of 
obligations to refrain from the act of aggression and the crime of aggression as it 
would appear to limit the scope and nature of obligations on individuals to refrain 
from the latter. Indeed, in the interests of the international community, such 
formalism in adherence to legal doctrine may appear anachronistic, or even contrary 
to the purposes of international criminal justice. Yet, it is important that adherence to 
the parallel-construct of the act of aggression and crime of aggression should be 
upheld because the legal construct of the definition of the crime pursuant to 
customary international law is that the latter is predicated upon the former. To argue 
that obligations conferred onto individuals with respect to the crime of aggression 
extend beyond the obligations conferred onto states for the act of aggression would 
depart from the substantive definition of the crime under customary international law 
as it shifts the parallel construct that the definition is predicated.    
5.2.2. The legal framework applicable in a situation of aggression 
 
When examining a situation of aggression, it should be understood that a military 
operation conducted by the aggressor state takes place on two tiers: i) the use of force 
on the inter-state level between the aggressor state and aggressed state(s); ii) the 
actual hostilities, i.e. armed conflict that takes place. The legal framework with 
respect to the former is jus ad bellum, which regulates how states resort to the use of 
force on the inter-state level, whilst the legal framework pertaining to the latter is jus 
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in bello, which governs the hostilities.661 It is expected that states when engaging in 
warfare should comply with both jus ad bellum and jus in bello as these are two 
different legal frameworks that apply to separate stages of the military operation. In 
other words, states are expected to comply with the rules of jus ad bellum in the way 
that they conduct their recourse to force, and to also comply with the rules of jus in 
bello during the hostilities that follow from the use of force. Both legal frameworks 
are therefore concurrent as they apply simultaneously. It is worth mentioning that the 
latter is also directly applicable to individuals, in the sense that individuals who take 
direct part in hostilities have obligations to comply with the rules of jus in bello. It 
should be clarified that for jus in bello to be applicable, a certain threshold needs to be 
met that there is in fact an armed conflict. As this legal framework does not apply 
during times of peace, the threshold serves to ensure that there is an armed conflict for 
its applicability.  
The application of jus ad bellum and jus in bello are separate and independent 
from each other, which is known as the separation dissertation.662 This means that the 
legality of one legal framework does not affect the application of the other. This is 
especially important in a situation of aggression. Regardless of the fact that the 
aggressor state has acted in violation of jus ad bellum, jus in bello will still be 
applicable to the hostilities between the aggressor state and aggressed state. This 
means that notwithstanding the legality of the use of force that initiated the hostilities, 
both parties whether right or wrong, are entitled to the same rights and protection 
under the framework jus in bello, and are under a duty to perform the obligations 
imposed on them with respect to how to conduct hostilities.663  
This symmetrical application of jus in bello between both parties to the conflict is 
known as the principle of equality between belligerents.664 Therefore, regardless of 
                                                
661  See Jasmine Moussa, ‘Can Jus Ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? Reaffirming the 
Separation of the Two Bodies of Law’ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 963. 
662 See Keiichiro Okimoto, The Distinction and Relationship between Jus Ad Bellum and Jus 
in Bello (Hart 2011) 12–36. 
663 For the moral implications of the separation dissertation, see Jeff McMahan, ‘Morality, 
Law and the Relation Between Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello’ (2006) 100 Proceedings of 
the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 112. 
664 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 3; for the moral implications with respect to the equality 
of belligerents principle, see Donald M Ferencz, ‘Aggression in Legal Limbo: A Gap in the 
Law That Needs Closing’ (2013) 12 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 507, 
513; Michael Mandel, ‘Aggressors’ Rights: The Doctrine of “Equality Between Belligerents” 
and the Legacy of Nuremberg’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 629, 650. 
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the status of a state under jus ad bellum, the same rules of jus in bello apply equally. 
Koutroulis submits that the equality of belligerents principle entails the following: 
 
primo, the belligerent party that violated jus ad bellum does not have fewer rights 
or more obligations than the one that did not violate jus ad bellum; secundo, 
conversely, the belligerent party that did not violate jus ad bellum does not have 
more rights or fewer obligations than the one that did.665  
 
The significance of this is the natural persons, i.e. soldiers and civilians from both 
aggressor and aggressed state are entitled to the equal rights and subject to the same 
obligations under jus in bello.  
Under jus in bello, there are two types of armed conflicts: i) international armed 
conflict (IAC); ii) non-international armed conflict (NIAC).666 This was reaffirmed by 
the ICTY, which held:   
 
an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International 
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and 
extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace 
is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is 
achieved.”667   
 
From this, it can be deduced that an IAC is the resort to armed force between states, 
and a NIAC is the resort to protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. The 
threshold for the former appears to be lower (armed force) than the latter (armed 
violence). This implies that it is easier to be satisfied that there is an IAC than a 
                                                
665 Vaios Koutroulis, ‘And Yet It Exists: In Defence of the “Equality of Belligerents” 
Principle’ [2013] Leiden Journal of International Law 1, 20. 
666 See Dapo Akande, ‘Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts’ in 
Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
667  Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka "Dule" (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction), IT-94-1, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), 2 October 1995, para.70. 
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NIAC. As aggression involves the initiation of the use of force by the aggressor state 
against the aggressed state, the threshold for an IAC is met. In this type of conflict, 
the legitimate aim of each party is to weaken the military position of the enemy.668 
The significance of the classification of conflicts is to identify whether the applicable 
principle of distinction is consistent with the rules of jus in bello that apply in an IAC 
or an NIAC.669 The principle of distinction is the cardinal rule of jus in bello that 
places an obligation on those participating in hostilities to distinguish between the 
natural persons who may be a legitimate ‘military objective’ or a ‘protected 
person.’670 Only the former may be targeted.  
The underlying concept of the principle of distinction is that attacks are only 
permitted against the combatants who are part of the armed forces of the parties to the 
conflict and military objects (Article 43 Additional Protocol I). Civilians, civilian 
objects and the rest of the civilian population must be protected in the course of 
hostilities.  This can be seen in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I (AP I):  
 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between 
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against 
military objectives.671  
 
                                                
668  Meagan S Wong, ‘Targeted Killings and the International Legal Framework: With 
Particular Reference to the US Operation against Osama Bin Laden’ (2012) 11 Chinese 
Journal of International Law 127, 147. 
669 Nils Melzer, Targeted Killings in International Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 300–
301. 
670 Melzer writes that ‘In order to exclude any ambiguity in this respect, these two categories 
of persons must be mutually exclusive, as well as absolutely complementary. In other words 
in the context of hostilities, every person must either be a legitimate ‘military objective’ or a 
‘protected person’ – tertium non datur.’ ibid 300; Wong (n 668) 147–149.  
671 In the Commentary on the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
8 June 1977, it was written that ‘The basic rule of protection and distinction is confirmed in 
this article. It is the foundation on which the codification of the laws and customs of war 
rests: the civilian population and civilian objects must be respected and protected in armed 
conflict, and for this purpose they must be distinguished from combatants and military 
objectives’ at 598; see Melzer (n 669) 301. 
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Only military objectives may be attacked, whilst attacks against protected persons are 
prohibited regardless of potential military advantage of such attacks.672‘Military 
objectives’ does not appear to be defined in the Geneva Conventions 1949, but was 
defined in Article 52(2) AP I:  
 
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are 
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military 
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage.673 
 
It can be inferred that this provision refers to objects in the sense of physical and 
tangible objects, and not necessarily natural persons. Melzer elaborates that ‘a more 
comprehensive overview of persons constituting legitimate military objectives can be 
obtained by identifying those categories of persons which IHL does not protect 
against direct attack.’674  
Nevertheless, even if the natural person does not fall within the category of a 
protection person, it is still important to comply with other principles of jus in bello in 
the course of targeting, e.g. the principles of proportionality and military necessity, 
the prohibition of indiscriminate attack and the prohibition or restriction of certain 
means and methods of warfare.675 In other words, military objectives from the 
aggressed state may be lawfully targeted if the principle of distinction is applied 
correctly and consistently with proportionality and other rules within jus in bello. 
Stemming from the present analysis, the following inter-related points should be 
concentrated upon.  
First, although there is undeniably a causal link between the act of aggression and 
the injury to the natural person, there are two legal frameworks that come into play 
                                                
672  The ICJ held in the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, that ‘states must never 
make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are 
incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets,’ Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (hereinafter “Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons”), I.C.J. Reports 1996, 226 at 257; Dinstein, The Conduct of 
Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (n 664) 33–35.   
673 For a criticism of the definition in Article 52(2), see Dinstein ibid 90–91. 
674 Melzer (n 669) 302. 
675 ibid 303. 
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which impose different primary obligations on the relevant actors. This is important 
because there are different legal consequences under the secondary rules of 
responsibility for violations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The aggressor state has 
breached its duty to refrain from the use of force against the aggressed state. 
Regardless of this violation of jus ad bellum on the part of the aggressor state, the 
aggressed state is nevertheless under a duty to comply with its obligations under jus 
ad bellum to conduct counterforce lawfully and/or to act upon authorization by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII. Upon the initiation of the use of force by the 
aggressor state against the aggressed state, the threshold has been crossed for the rules 
of jus in bello pertaining to an IAC to be applicable to the hostilities for both parties 
to the conflict. This means that armed forces from both the aggressor and aggressed 
state may lawfully target military objectives from either side under the principles of 
distinction, necessity and proportionality. 
Second, regardless of the legality of the use of force, be it aggression or lawful 
self-defence, the same rules of jus in bello apply between both parties to the conflict.  
This means that soldiers, i.e. combatants from both the aggressor state and the 
aggressed state are entitled to lawfully target combatants from the other side in 
accordance with the principles of distinction, necessity, proportionality and other 
existing norms of jus in bello.  
Third, any fatalities or injuries of natural persons in a situation of aggression may 
not necessarily be unlawful conduct, because the individual could have been killed in 
accordance with jus in bello. For example, if the natural person was a combatant who 
was targeted lawfully. Indeed, the preservation of equality between belligerents and 
the equal applicability of jus in bello in a situation of aggression, has raised 
dissatisfaction, which appears to be centered upon a moral basis.676     
Fourth, any harm or injury to natural persons must be assessed in the light of jus 
in bello, and not jus ad bellum. This involves examining which primary norms have 
been breached, so that the correct secondary norms of responsibility may be invoked. 
Potential violations of jus in bello may give rise to individual criminal responsibility 
for war crimes if there was an existing rule of customary international law that has 
criminalised the specific norm of jus in bello that had been breached. As such, 
                                                
676 See Ferencz (n 664); Mandel (n 664); Handbook on the Ratification and Implementation of 
the Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute of the ICC: Crimes of Aggression and War 
Crimes (2013) 4. 
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sanctions can be exercised directly against the individual for the breach of duty to 
comply with obligations to respect the specific norm that had been criminalised.  
5.2.3. Natural persons that have suffered as a result of a situation of aggression 
 
In the course of hostilities subsequent to an act (and crime) of aggression, there is 
a possibility that natural persons who are nationals from both the aggressor state and 
the aggressed state may be injured or killed. Such natural persons can be either 
civilians or soldiers. The lawfulness of the act of injuring or killing an individual will 
depend on the legal status of the person under jus in bello pursuant to the principle of 
distinction, in conjunction with other factors such as necessity and proportionality. 
The person who is carrying out the targeting is under a duty to make a distinction 
between persons who are legitimate targets and persons that are to be protected from 
attack.  
Under jus in bello, there are two broad categories of persons: combatants and 
civilians. Article 43(2) AP I states that members of the armed forces of a party to a 
conflict are combatants, and have the right to participate directly in hostilities.677 
However, not all combatants are legitimate targets for attack. Under Article 41(1) AP 
I, if the combatant has been rendered hors de combat, he/she should not be made the 
object of attack.678 Pursuant to Article 48(1) AP 1, parties to the conflict are 
prohibited from attacks against civilians and civilian objects. Article 50(1) AP I 
defines a civilian as: 
 
any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to 
in Article 4 (A) (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 
                                                
677 Article 4(2) Geneva Convention III lists four conditions for the classification as a part of 
the armed forces of a State: i) being under responsible command; ii) wearing a fixed 
distinctive sign; iii) carrying arms openly; iv) conducting their operations in accordance with 
the laws and customs of war; It is interesting to note that Article 43(1) Additional Protocol I 
(AP I) only lists two criteria to be considered as part of the armed forces of a State: i) 
organized armed forces, groups and units, which are; ii) under a command responsible to the 
relevant party to the conflict.  
678 Article 41(2) AP I states that a person is ‘hors de combat’ if: (a) he is in power of an 
adverse Party; (b) he clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or (c) he has been rendered 
unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable 
of defending himself, provided in any of these cases that he abstains from hostile acts and 
does not attempt to escape 
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of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person 
shall be considered to be a civilian.  
 
Melzer writes that ‘the negative definition of civilians as all persons who are not 
members of the armed forces has become part of customary law’679 and that ‘ the only 
exception to this basic dichotomy are participants in a levée en masse, who both 
conventional and customary international humanitarian law recognize as combatants, 
but who qualify neither as members of the armed forces nor as civilians.'680 
Indeed, there may be situations where civilians directly participate in hostilities. 
Although they retain their legal status as civilians, they lose their protection against 
direct attack for the period that they are directly participating in hostilities (Article 
51(3) API).681 Therefore, the legal status of a person under jus in bello is not 
necessarily the exclusive determining factor that depicts whether or not they become a 
legitimate target, as the conduct of the person is also important, i.e. whether they are a 
hors de combat or a civilian taking direct part in hostilities.   
In the case of injury or fatality to a natural person on the territory of either the 
aggressor state or the aggressed state, the first step is to consider whether the person 
was a combatant or a civilian. If the person was the former, the next step is to 
consider whether he/she was a person hors de combat. In the case of the latter, the 
question is whether the person was taking a direct part in hostilities, or behaving in a 
‘hostile’ act and had temporarily lost his/her protection under jus in bello. These steps 
are to be taken in consideration of existing treaty and customary rules of jus in bello 
that apply in an IAC.  
The targeting of a person hors de combat or a civilian may indeed give rise to a 
violation of jus in bello. However, the principle of distinction is not a sufficient 
ground to assess the legality of the specific targeting. The fatality must also be 
assessed in accordance with the other principles of jus in bello, i.e. military necessity 
                                                
679 Melzer (n 669) 310.     
680 ibid. 
681 ibid; The International Committee of the Red Cross Guidance on the notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities (“ICRC Guidance”) states ‘for the purposes of the principle of 
distinction in international armed conflict, all persons who are neither members of the armed 
forces of a party to the conflict nor participating in a leve´e en masse are civilians and, 
therefore, entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities’; see also Wong (n 668) 147–149. 
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and proportionality.682 The latter is measured with respect to expected collateral 
damage from the attack. According to Dinstein, collateral damage is either: (a) 
incidental losses or injury to civilians; (b) destruction of or damage to civilian objects; 
or (c) combination of both. 683  Thus, injuries and fatalities of civilians may 
nevertheless be permitted as collateral damage under jus in bello, provided such 
damage must be proportionate with respect to military necessity.  
It is submitted that any injury to natural persons on the territory of both the 
aggressed state and aggressor state should be assessed under jus in bello (and not jus 
ad bellum). As already mentioned, there are certain primary norms within jus in bello 
that give rise to individual criminal responsibility, in the sense that the breach of such 
obligations give rise to sanctions that can be executed directly against the individual 
for the breach thereof pursuant to the secondary norms regulated by international 
criminal law.  
Such conduct constitutes war crimes, because there are specific obligations under 
international criminal law that run in parallel with obligations under jus in bello, 
which place duties on combatants to refrain from specific prohibited acts when 
conducting hostilities. In other words, there can be individual criminal responsibility 
for a serious violation of jus in bello as a war crime if there is a concomitant rule 
governed by international criminal law which provides individual criminal 
responsibility for the act committed.     
If injuries and fatalities of civilians take place on a large scale where it affects the 
civilian population, this raises the factual question of whether this was the result of 
direct attack(s) against a civilian population, or if these atrocities are part of the 
collateral damage. The latter does not technically amount to any violation of jus in 
bello. The former, on the other hand, is prohibited under Article 51(2) API, and has 
been criminalized as a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(i) of the Rome Statute.684 As 
discussed earlier, direct attacks against the civilian population can also amount to a 
crime against humanity if it can be proven that such attacks were part of a systematic 
and planned attack against the civilian population.   
                                                
682 Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (n 
664) 128–130. 
683 ibid 128. 
684 ibid 125. 
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There is the possibility that such attacks may be the result of indiscriminate 
attacks, where the person facilitating the targeting did not apply the principle of 
distinction. As such, damage and injury are caused to both civilian and military 
objectives without any distinction, which may lead to mass killings of the civilian 
population.685 This is prohibited under Article 51(5)(b) AP I as ‘an attack which may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and military advantage anticipated,’ and has also been criminalized as a war 
crime under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) Rome Statute.   
In the light of the above, it is submitted that natural persons in the territory of 
aggressed state who are injured or killed as a result of hostilities in a situation of 
aggression (act of aggression and crime of aggression) may in fact be victims of 
violations of jus in bello and war crime(s) if it can be satisfied that the necessary 
elements of the crime are present.686  
5.2.4. Injury to natural persons who are part of collateral damage 
 
There is one aspect, which is worth examining in further detail. As mentioned 
above, collateral damage, subject to military necessity, is permissible under jus in 
bello. This leaves the question of natural persons that are killed or injured as part of 
collateral damage, which does not constitute a violation of jus in bello. How should 
the injury of these persons be assessed; and what are their legal interests?  
These natural persons were owed obligations under the primary norms of jus in 
bello by the duty-bearer to comply inter alia with the principles of distinction, 
necessity and proportionality.  However, there is no violation of the primary norms 
under jus in bello because the duty-bearer was exempted from these primary 
obligations because of military necessity. As there are no violations of the primary 
norm, there can be no responsibility under the secondary norms of state responsibility 
or individual criminal responsibility. Thus, natural persons who are injured or killed 
                                                
685 Dinstein explains that ‘the indiscriminate character of an attack is not a by-product of ‘body 
count’ (i.e. ensuring number of civilian fatalities). The key to a finding that a certain attack has 
been indiscriminate is the nonchalant state of mind of the attacker’ ibid 127. 
686 See Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, ‘Reparation Claims by Individuals for State Breaches of 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights: An Overview’ (2003) 1 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 339. 
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as part of collateral damage may not be considered as victims of jus in bello or war 
crimes.  
It should be noted that injury or killing of natural persons as part of collateral 
damage can be committed by both sides of the conflict, i.e. both the aggressor state 
and the aggressed state. Collateral damage is indeed one of the realities of the use of 
force and can be envisaged to encompass damage to the infrastructure and 
environment of the receiving state, in addition to natural persons.  Returning to the 
premise that collateral damage is an aspect of the use of force, it can perhaps be 
assessed in accordance with jus ad bellum, as such damage can be viewed as part of 
the use of military force against the receiving state, which may be either the aggressor 
state or the aggressed state.  
The shift from focusing on collateral damage under the lens of jus in bello to jus 
ad bellum, means that individuals are no longer considered as direct rights-holder, and 
the state becomes the immediate rights-holder of the enjoyment of the protection from 
the norms that govern the use of force. As the rights-holder, the receiving state is 
entitled to invoke the responsibility of the opposing state for damage caused to 
civilians and infrastructure in its territory as a result of the use of force.  
It is of course difficult in practice to distinguish between damages caused by 
violations of the jus ad bellum and by violations of the jus in bello. In practice, both 
violations occur simultaneously. The approach of the UN Compensation Commission 
(UNCC) which was established by Security Council Resolution 687(1991) processed 
claims and paid compensation to a variety of personalities, i.e. individuals, 
corporations, governments and international organisations who had suffered from the 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi forces. The Commission did not appear to 
make any distinction between violations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, but rather 
compensation for the ‘direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the 
depletion of natural sources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and 
corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.’687   
The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC), on the other hand, made a 
distinction between violations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.688 Of particular 
                                                
687 SC Res. 687(1991), para.16. 
688 See Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC): Partial Award - Jus ad bellum, para.5; 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC): Final Award - Ethiopia's Damages Claims 
 217  
relevance is the fact that EECC had awarded reparations to Ethiopia inter alia for 
civilian deaths and injuries related to Eritrea’s breach of jus ad bellum,689 injuries 
caused by landmines because of Eritrea’s jus ad bellum violation.690  
From these awards, two brief points can be observed. First, even if injuries and 
deaths to civilians are lawful as permissible military damage under jus in bello, 
responsibility for these injuries and deaths may be invoked if the damage occurred 
during the period which the wrongful state has acted in violation of jus ad bellum.  
Second, any damage to civilians as a result of violations of jus ad bellum, irrespective 
of legality under jus in bello, is contrary to the interests of the injured state. As such, 
this provides the state as a rights-holder with the legal interest to invoke legal 
consequences against the wrongful state under the secondary norms of state 
responsibility for such damage to civilians. One way to read this is that natural 
persons, who are nationals of the state, are representative of that state’s interests. The 
same could be said for non-nationals who are within the territorial state and thus 
subject to its domestic laws. Injury or damages to a state’s nationals or non-nationals 
within its territory is representative of an infringement of its interests. That this injury 
is caused by a violation of the primary norm owed to the territorial state with respect 
to the enjoyment of the prohibition of the use of force provides this state with a legal 
interest to invoke responsibility for the breach thereof.   
Another way to read this is that as the norms relating to jus ad bellum are 
inapplicable to individuals, the state becomes the indirect rights-holder in the event of 
damages to individuals within its territory caused by a violation of the primary norms. 
As such, the state may have an indirect interest in invoking responsibility for the 
breach of primary norms of jus ad bellum that led to such damages against individuals 
in its territory.  
Regardless of which of the two readings is adopted, the common point is that 
natural persons do not have a direct legal interest with respect to violations of jus ad 
bellum. Their interests can only be represented by the territorial state with respect to 
invoking responsibility of the wrongful state for the violation of jus ad bellum. It is 
for the discretion of territorial state on how to distribute any awards it may receive 
                                                                                                                                      
between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea (hereinafter 
“Final Award, Ethiopia’s Damages Claims”)[17 August 2009], para. 311.  
689 Final award, Ethiopia’s Damages Claims, ibid para. 349. 
690 Final award, Ethiopia’s Damages Claims, ibid paras. 388-391, and 393. 
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from methods of international dispute settlement with the individuals within its 
territory.  
In the present context of a situation of aggression, the natural persons on the 
territory of the aggressed state who are injured or killed from collateral damage 
caused by the aggressor state may not have a legal interest to invoke state or 
individual criminal responsibility of the combatants of the aggressor state, or the 
aggressor state for violations of jus in bello or war crimes, respectively; as such 
damage may be permissible under this legal framework if military necessity has been 
satisfied. Nor do they have legal interest to invoke the responsibility of the aggressor 
state for the initial and any subsequent breaches of jus ad bellum that gave rise to the 
collateral damage, as they are not rights-holders of the enjoyment of primary norms 
under this legal framework. It is the aggressed state that has the legal interest to 
invoke the responsibility of the aggressor state for the collateral damage, with 
particular reference to the injury and deaths caused to civilians. 
5.2.5. Indirect victims of the crime of aggression  
 
Although natural persons are not rights-holders of the norms that criminalise 
aggression, they may nevertheless be beneficiaries of the implementation of the norm 
because they also enjoy the protection afforded by the norm that criminalises 
aggression. Thus, it can be argued that natural persons are indirect victims of the 
crime of aggression. Although this is logical on a conceptual level, it can be predicted 
that practical difficulties that arise would include establishing that harm was caused to 
the natural person as a result of the crime of aggression as the scope of damages 
appear to be wide, e.g. death, physical injury, psychological and emotional distress, 
personal economic loss, etc.  
As the present dissertation focuses on the direct victim of the crime of 
aggression, i.e. the aggressed state, the discussion on indirect victims need not be 




 219  
5.3. The victim of the crime of aggression: the legal interests of the aggressed 
state  
 
 It has been established that the aggressed state is the victim of the crime of 
aggression; this section will now consider its legal interests with respect to legal 
consequences against the perpetrator of the crime of aggression. It is important to note 
that the aggressed state has a direct legal interest against the perpetrator of the crime 
of aggression, in addition to a direct legal interest against the aggressed state.    
5.3.1. The victims’ rights paradigm 
 
The emerging paradigm of victims’ rights propagates a victim-centric, i.e. 
individual-centric approach in international criminal law.691  However, unlike the 
other international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes), it is 
clear that the victim of the crime of aggression is a state. How then should the crime 
of aggression be considered within the normative framework of victims’ rights?692      
Perhaps, the crime of aggression should prima facie be excluded from this 
normative framework because of its state-centric attributes. To focus on the victim of 
the crime of aggression would appear contrary to the grain of the emerging paradigm 
that shifts the focus onto individuals. This suggests that the normative framework 
focuses only on the international crimes that are premised on violations of 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Therefore, 
structural changes need not be made to the normative framework of victims’ rights, 
and it may continue to develop forward in its current direction.  
Alternatively, the focus will fall upon the indirect victims of the crime of 
aggression, who are natural persons that have suffered as a result of the violation of 
jus ad bellum by the aggressor state. Yet, this is not entirely straightforward, as 
pointed out above and also by Grzebyk that it is ‘difficult to determine the victims of 
aggression, and consequently it is almost impossible to view the aggression from the 
victims’ perspective, as is the trend in international criminal law’.693 Furthermore, as 
argued above, there is the need to assess the legal status of the natural person who 
                                                
691 In general, see Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victims’ Rights’ (n 657). 
692 Rosenfeld (n 658) 250.  
693 Grzebyk (n 11) 264.   
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may be injured in a situation of aggression in accordance with the applicable legal 
framework. 
Another possibility is that the normative framework of victims’ rights may evolve 
to acknowledge that the definition of a victim may also include a state. Although this 
appears prima facie incompatible with the focus on individuals, this is not necessarily 
an insurmountable limiting factor. International criminal law as a young discipline is 
developing. Expanding the legal personality of a victim to encompass a state is a 
natural progression post-Kampala.   
Regardless of which approach is adopted, the more pragmatic question is, how 
would the aggressed state benefit from the normative framework pertaining to 
victims? Aside from the monetary or compensatory purposes of this normative 
framework, the other symbolic concepts appear to be of relatively little value to the 
aggressed state. For example, the aggressed state having a locus standi to participate 
in proceedings in conjunction with the perpetrator of the crime of aggression does not 
carry the same symbolic significance as a natural person who is the victim of 
genocide or crimes against humanity having a locus standi to participate in 
proceedings against the perpetrator.694 Likewise, the value, significance or relevance 
of the right to the truth, and recovery and reintegration into society, which is of 
paramount importance to victims of the other crimes, is not applicable to the 
aggressed state.  
Therefore, the question of the victims’ rights of the aggressed state is limited to 
reparations under international law for the violations of the obligations owed to it 
under the primary norms by the relevant duty-bearers, i.e. the aggressor state and the 
perpetrator of the crime of aggression. In my view, the question of whether the victim 
of the crime of aggression is compatible with the normative framework of victims’ 
rights is rhetoric. The underlying element that can be distilled is whether as the rights-
holder – or victim of an international crime – a logical argument can be made that the 
aggressed state, like the victims of the other international crimes, is also entitled to 
rights under international law as a beneficiary with respect to remedies for the 
violation of international obligations owed to it.  
It is worth clarifying that although the reparations with respect to state violations 
of international law and the reparations with respect to international crimes both 
                                                
694 Article 68, Rome Statute.  
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extend in their respective forms beyond monetary value, the form of reparation that 
shall be referred to in the present study is compensation. For the purposes of the 
forthcoming analysis, reparation shall be understood as monetary compensation.  
 
5.3.2. The question of reparations for breaches of jus ad bellum and the crime of 
aggression 
 
States have always been viewed as the rights-holders of international obligations 
and the beneficiaries of reparations in the light of violations of international law. 
Thus, the aggressed state has always been recognised as the beneficiary of reparations 
for state breaches of jus ad bellum. Yet, there is still ambit for interesting discussion. 
The question is whether the aggressed state is entitled to reparation from the 
perpetrator of the crime of aggression. In other words, can the aggressed state, in 
addition to reparations for a state act of aggression also receive reparations for the 
crime of aggression? It is worth placing emphasis that reparations with respect to the 
crime of aggression are not to be made by the aggressor state, but the perpetrator as 
the true duty-bearer. Therefore, it is an individual that must pay compensation to the 
aggressor state for the harm he/she has caused for failing to comply with the duty to 
refrain from conduct relating to the crime of aggression. The concept where an 
individual must pay compensation or damages to an injured party for wrong that 
he/she has committed is not an entirely novel concept. For example, Zegveld writes 
that:  
The individual perpetrator is not only criminally responsible for the crimes he 
has committed towards the international community, but also liable for the 
harm he has caused towards the victims being the object of the protection of 
the criminal norms.695 
 
As the aggressed state is entitled to reparations for an act of aggression, irrespective 
of whether it may also receive reparations for the crime of aggression, this may lead 
one to argue that it does not really matter whether the aggressed state may also be 
entitled to reparations for the crime of aggression, as reparations may be sought under 
state responsibility. Yet alternatively, one may argue that it is indeed in the best 
                                                
695  Liesbeth Zegveld, ‘Victims’ Reparations Claims and International Criminal Courts: 
Incompatible Values’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 79, 85. 
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interests of the aggressed state to be able to seek reparations for both the act of 
aggression and the crime of aggression. This way, if the aggressed state is 
unsuccessful in obtaining reparations for the act of aggression, there is still a chance 
for it to obtain reparations for the crime of aggression.  
Regardless, there is basis to argue that the aggressed state as the victim of the 
crime of aggression has a legal interest in reparations by the perpetrator of the crime 
of aggression. This may appear to be rather conceptual. Nevertheless, the question of 
individual civil responsibility in addition to individual criminal responsibility of the 
perpetrator of the crime of aggression is relevant in understanding the full scope of 
the legal interests of the aggressed state and the perpetrator of the crime.696  
In my view, the aggressed state has a legal interest in the individual civil 
responsibility of the perpetrator, in addition to individual criminal responsibility. The 
next step is to examine to what extent individual civil responsibility of the perpetrator 
of the crime of aggression is enforceable. It is important to understand that any 
individual civil responsibility for the crime of aggression is first predicated upon a 
conviction pursuant to individual criminal responsibility. At present, the intended 
forums that may award reparations are domestic courts and the ICC. Yet, it should be 
remembered that the primary function of these forums is to enforce (criminal) 
sanctions directly against the perpetrator of the crime of aggression, and not to 
enforce individual civil responsibility against the defendant. As such, the latter will be 
examined in the context of the former, in relation to the legal interests of the 
aggressed state.   
5.3.3. Prosecution of the crime of aggression  
 
If the aggressed state is the rights-holder, it can be argued that it has a direct legal 
interest in the enforcement of sanctions against the perpetrator for the crime of 
aggression as a crime has been committed directly against it. It has been suggested 
that the aggressed state also has an interest in reparations as a legal consequence of 
individual civil responsibility of the perpetrator of the crime of aggression. The 
question is to what extent these legal interests of the aggressed state are protected by 
the present enforcement mechanisms against the crime of aggression.  
                                                
696 Rosenfeld (n 658). 
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i. Prosecution of the crime of aggression in domestic courts  
 
In domestic courts, prosecution is carried out by the sovereign (crown) or the 
Government against the defendant. In contrast with prosecution at the ICC (as will be 
examined below), prosecution of the crime of aggression in the domestic court of an 
aggressed state is directly representative of its interests. By virtue of domestic 
prosecution, the aggressed state may enforce criminal sanctions directly against the 
duty-bearer for his or her failure to comply with the duty owed to the aggressed state 
to comply with the norms that criminalise aggression.  
Here, a difference can be identified between the crime of aggression and the other 
crimes. Domestic prosecution of the other crimes, e.g. war crimes, genocide or crimes 
against humanity is conducted by the sovereign (crown) or the government against the 
perpetrator on behalf of the interests of the victims who are natural persons. Although 
this may not give rise to any real practical ramifications, the difference is symbolic. 
The crime of aggression is a crime committed by an individual directly against the 
aggressed state. As the state itself is the victim, the sovereign (crown) or government 
is not facilitating proceedings on behalf of individual(s) in the interests of society for 
breach of the domestic penal code, or the international community for breach of 
international norms, but rather for prosecuting a crime committed directly against it.  
Aside from the aggressed state that may initiate proceedings under the territorial 
principle of jurisdiction, the aggressor state may also prosecute a perpetrator under the 
nationality principle of jurisdiction. Both the aggressor state and aggressed state have 
a legal interest to enforce sanctions against the perpetrator of the crime of aggression 
by virtue of the nationality or territorial principle of jurisdiction. If the aggressor state 
has initiated proceedings, it is still nevertheless in the interests of the aggressed state 
that sanctions are executed against the perpetrator of the crime of aggression. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, there is also the possibility that prosecution of the 
crime of aggression in the domestic courts of the aggressor state may amount to 
satisfaction for the aggressed state.697  
With respect to individual civil responsibility, upon a successful conviction, the 
domestic court may order the defendant to pay compensation to the aggressed state. 
Presumably, this would be in a situation where the aggressed state has initiated 
                                                
697 See Articles 34 and 37, ARSIWA 2001.    
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proceedings. The practical shortcomings are that the perpetrator may not have 
sufficient funds or assets to make any compensation to the aggressed state. Indeed, it 
should be emphasized that the source of compensation should be from the personal 
assets and funds of the perpetrator, and not from the aggressor state. For this reason, 
individual civil responsibility may not be practically feasible – or enforceable.  
ii. Prosecution of the crime of aggression at the International Criminal Court  
 
At the ICC, prosecution is representative of the interests of the international 
community.698 It can be said that the legal interests of the aggressed state are 
represented by virtue of its membership in the international community. Even if the 
aggressed state itself refers the situation to the ICC (Article 14 Rome Statute), it 
delegates its direct interests of invoking individual criminal responsibility of the 
perpetrator to the interests of the international community as a whole. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that the interests of the aggressed state are undermined by 
ratifying the Rome Statute, the aggressed state has consented to the delegation of its 
interests. As discussed earlier in Chapter III, the competence of the ICC to prosecute 
international crimes is delegated from the domestic competence of States Parties. 
Thus, the ICC does not undermine the legal interests of the aggressed state even 
though prosecution takes place in the interests of the international community.  
In relation to reparations to the victims of the core crimes within Article 5(1) 
Rome Statute, the ICC has its own regime pertaining to victim’s rights. This will now 
be examined as a preliminary issue, followed by examining the more specific question 
of reparations for the victim(s) of the crime of aggression.  
iii. Preliminary Issue: the regime at the International Criminal Court pertaining to 
victims  
 
The ICC has established a regime pertaining to victims, which serves as an 
innovative platform for the advancement of victims’ rights in international law. Under 
this regime, victims are given locus standi to participate in proceedings (Article 68(3) 
Rome Statute) and may even be awarded reparations (Article 75 Rome Statute). The 
                                                
698 Dapo Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of 
Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’ (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 618, 
626.   
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concept behind victims’ participation is that a platform is provided for victims to 
present their side of the story in the same proceedings as the perpetrators who have 
committed crimes against them. It can be envisaged that this would provide an insight 
to the social reality and personal story of the victim.699 The idea is that they are able 
to be a part of the process that enforces sanctions against the perpetrators who have 
committed crimes against them.700  
As must be appreciated, this is one of the most progressive steps taken in 
international criminal justice, as the ICC is the first international criminal court that 
has provided such a platform for victims,701 and has aptly been described as a ‘shift 
away from a retributive justice system to a more restorative, justice-oriented 
model.’702 The Court has an infrastructure, which facilitates the regime pertaining to 
victims. There is a Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) within the Registry, along 
with a Victims Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS) and Office of the Public 
counsel for Victims (OPCV). As a subsidiary of the Assembly of States Parties, there 
is also a Trust Fund for Victims (TFV), which is a preparatory mechanism established 
in Article 79 of the Rome Statute: 
 
1. A Trust Fund shall be established by decision of the Assembly of States 
Parties for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction fo the 
Court, and of the families of such victims.  
 
2. The Court may order money and other property collected through hfines or 
forfeiture to be transferred, by order of the Court, to the Trust Fund. 
 
3. The Trust Fund shall be managed according to criteria to be determined by 
the Assembly of States Parties.703 
                                                
699 Christine van den Wyngaert, ‘Victims before International Criminal Courts: Some Views 
and Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge’ (2011) 44 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 475, 487. 
700 See Salvatore Zappala, ‘The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused’ [2010] 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 137. 
701See Zegveld (n 695); van den Wyngaert (n 699). 
702 van den Wyngaert (n 699) 476; see also Conor McCarthy, ‘Reparations under the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and Reparative Justice Theory’ (2009) 3 The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 250, 253. 
703 See Rules 98 (1-4) specifies reparations awarded by the Court against a convicted person; 
Rule 98(5) Trust Fund’s assistance mandate with regard to the use of “other resources” for the 
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According to definition of victims set in Rule 85 of the Rules and Procedure and 
Evidence (RPE) of the ICC:  
 
  (a) “Victims” means natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
 
(b) Victims may include organizations or institutions that have sustained direct 
harm to any of their property which is dedicated to religion, education, art 
or science or charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals 
and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes. 
 
In the broader framework of public international law, this is also a significant 
development, as the regime at the ICC pertaining to victims is an example of the 
participation of individuals in their own capacity at an international court and the 
recognition of individuals as rights-holders and beneficiaries.   
Pursuant to Article 75(2) of the Rome Statute, the Court may make an order 
directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect 
of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. Where appropriate, 
the Court may order that the award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund 
provided for in Article 79 of the Rome Statute. It appears that reparations may take 
two forms: from the convicted perpetrator, or the TFV.704 Reparations from the 
former indicate that the individual has breached his/her duty owed towards the 
victim(s) to comply with the norms that criminalise the convicted act, and is now 
facing legal consequences under secondary norms of responsibility. This is 
representative of reparations and damages in the light of the relationship between the 
perpetrator and the victim as the duty-bearer and rights-holder under international 
law. The latter, on the other hand, is not predicated upon a bilateral relationship 
                                                                                                                                      
benefit of victims, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Court; See also 
Resolution ICC-ASP/4/Res.3, Regulation of the Trust Fund for Victims; See also 
Commentaries to the Rome Statute, text 79; available at: 
http://www.casematrixnetwork.org/cmn-knowledge-hub/icc-commentary-clicc/commentary-
rome-statute/commentary-rome-statute-part-7/#c3903.  
704 van den Wyngaert (n 699) 480.  
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stemming from rights and duties, but is representative of the international community 
providing a form of financial support to the victims of international crimes.  
It is worth examining the TFV in more detail.705 An important difference between 
a reparation order made against the defendant and a reparation order through the Trust 
Fund is that resources under the latter may be made for the benefit of victims of 
crimes that have yet to be prosecuted.706 The latter may also provide for assistance to 
victims and families through humanitarian programmes that undertake activities to 
provide physical rehabilitation, psychological rehabilitation, and/or material support 
to victims in situations where the Court has jurisdiction.707 Indeed, the TFV appears to 
serve broader purposes relating to victims’ rights than reparation for international 
crimes. The mandate of the Fund is: i) to implement Court-Ordered reparations and 
(ii) to provide physical, psychological, and material support to victims and their 
families.708 The second part of the mandate addresses the social reality of the 
victims,709 and appears to exist independently to the reparative function under the first 
part of the mandate, which is connected to finding of guilt of the perpetrator.  
Both forms of reparations demonstrate that the ICC is an additional avenue for 
reparations to victims of the crimes, in addition to reparation for state violations of 
international humanitarian law or international human rights law.710 Indeed, this 
means that in theory, the victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC may be 
entitled to two forms of reparations: i) against the perpetrator of the crime; ii) against 
the state that is in violation of international humanitarian law or international human 
rights law. Both reparations arise in the context of different secondary norms of 
responsibility.  
It should be noted that reparations under the ICC are irrespective to the secondary 
norms that arise from breach by states of primary norms that prohibit conduct. In 
other word, reparations at the ICC relate solely to international crimes, and not 
violations of international law that lack criminal sanctions.  
                                                
705 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Justifying Compensation by the International Criminal Court’s Victims 
Trust Fund: Lessons from Domestic Compensation Schemes’ (2011) 36 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 123. 




710 See Liesbeth Zegveld, ‘Remedies for Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law’ (2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross 497; van den Wyngaert (n 699); 
Zegveld (n 695). 
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iv. Reparations with respect to the crime of aggression at the International Criminal 
Court  
 
The victim of the crime of aggression is the aggressed state and not natural 
persons pursuant to Rule 85(b) Rules of Procedure and Evidence to the Rome Statute. 
However, as argued above, individuals are the beneficiaries of the implementation of 
the norms that criminalise aggression. This way, although they are not rights-holders 
per se, it is presumed that States Parties have conferred the status of beneficiaries onto 
individuals with respect to the crime of aggression. This presumption is supported by 
the absence of any agreements or further amendments that stipulate a separate 
victims’ regime for the crime of aggression.  By having the status as a beneficiary, a 
legal interest is created, which allows the natural person to have the locus standi to 
participate in proceedings and to receive reparations. What are the implications of this 
from a legal and practical perspective?  
a. The legal implications for the aggressed state  
 
As the ICC does not include the aggressed state in its regime pertaining to 
victims, the rights-holder of the protection from the norms that criminalise aggression 
is excluded from participating in proceedings against the perpetrator, and from being 
awarded reparations. Instead, natural persons, who are not rights-holders, are the 
beneficiaries of the rights and remedies from the regime pertaining to victims at the 
ICC.  
That said, the exclusion of the aggressed state from the regime pertaining to 
victims at the ICC is understandable. The legal mandate of the ICC covers 
individuals, which is representative of an international forum that recognises 
individuals as a legal personality and confers them the locus standi to appear in court 
– whether as a defendant or a victim participant. Pursuant to Article 25(1) of the 
Rome Statute the Court has jurisdiction over natural persons. By allowing individuals 
to participate in the proceedings against other individuals and to receive reparations 
from individuals, the regime pertaining to victims is reflective of the underlying 
premise that individuals owe duties to each other to refrain from international crimes.  
To allow the aggressed state to have locus standi as a victim participant in the 
proceedings and/or to receive reparations for violations of jus ad bellum would run 
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the risk of the ICC becoming an alternate or surrogate forum for international dispute 
settlement. This is especially so if the reparations are made from the Victims Trust 
Fund, as this fund can be considered as a reparatory mechanism that is part of the 
ICC. The risk is that the ICC may be manipulated as the alternate forum where the 
aggressed state can receive reparations for aggression if other forms of dispute 
settlement are unsuccessful. Not only is this precarious from a political perspective, 
but it also departs from the purpose of the ICC as an enforcement mechanism under 
international law to invoke individual criminal responsibility for international crimes. 
For this reason, my view is that the regime pertaining to victims at the ICC 
should not be modified with respect to the crime of aggression. Although the 
aggressed state is the direct victim of the crime of aggression, the ICC is not the 
correct forum for it to have a locus standi to participate in proceedings or to award 
reparations through either a reparation order against the defendant or the Victims 
Trust Fund. Be that as it may, it can be argued that it is nevertheless in the interests of 
the aggressed state for its nationals to be considered as victims for the purposes of the 
regime at the ICC, and to receive reparations for the crime of aggression from either 
the perpetrator or the Victims Trust Fund. Thus, individuals are the direct 
beneficiaries, and the aggressed state is the indirect beneficiary.  
If the aggressed state wishes to receive reparations for the crime of aggression, 
perhaps domestic prosecution should be considered. Even so, as discussed above, the 
individual civil responsibility of the perpetrator cannot be guaranteed under domestic 
prosecution. There is a very strong possibility that the only avenue for the aggressed 
state to receive reparations for a situation of aggression is under the secondary norms 
of state responsibility.  
Be that as it may, it should not be forgotten that the legal consequences under the 
secondary norms of international criminal law that arise from a breach of the norms 
that criminalise aggression are the sanctions of a criminal nature against the 
perpetrator. Prosecution in itself is representative of the legal interests of the 
aggressed state, regardless of whether there may be reparations, in addition to the 
conviction of the defendant.  
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b. The legal implications for individuals 
 
To understand the significance of the recognition of individuals as beneficiaries 
of the implementation of the norms that prohibit aggression and the norms that 
criminalise aggression, the first question is whether injured individuals have a right of 
reparation directly conferred by international law for violations of jus ad bellum. As 
submitted above, individuals are not rights-holder of the norms that prohibit or 
criminalise aggression. Rosenfeld confirms:  
 
In the field of state responsibility, an individual right to reparation for violations of 
the ius ad bellum is still widely rejected among scholars. […] In the absence of 
primary individual rights, individuals would not be in a position to assert secondary 
rights to reparation, either.711 
 
The ICC is therefore representative of the first international forum that may 
potentially award reparations to individuals for violations of jus ad bellum.712 Such 
reparations may be ordered directly against the perpetrator, or may be ordered from 
the Victims Trust Fund. This means that the reparations do not come from the 
aggressor state, but from the perpetrator of the crime of aggression or a multilateral 
fund, which is considered as a reparative mechanism under the ICC.  
The next question is how individuals who are not primary rights-holders may 
nevertheless have tertiary rights that allow them to be beneficiaries of reparations. 
The legal basis for this is the Rome Statute, whereby all States Parties to the Rome 
Statute have conferred these tertiary rights to natural persons, and have consented to 
the application of the regime pertaining to victims. As the Kampala Amendments do 
not address the regime pertaining to victims, it can be presumed that the existing 
regime will apply. The implications of this are that these tertiary rights to reparations 
                                                
711 Although it may be argued that the UNCC awarded reparations for individuals for 
violations of international law (including jus ad bellum and jus in bello) committed by Iraq, 
its composition as a claims commission was a subsidiary of the Security Council (Resolution 
687 (1991) para 18) for the specific purposes of compensation for losses, damage and injury 
resulting directly from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. It is questionable as to 
whether this can be used as an example of an international forum that could grant reparations 
to individuals for state violations of jus ad bellum. For example, Rosenfeld questions whether 
the UNCC may be regarded as state practice to base a customary right of individuals to 
reparation for violations of jus ad bellum; Rosenfeld (n 658) 262. 
712 ibid. 
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are only applicable at the ICC. As individuals are not true rights-holders under 
international law, as a general rule, they may not be able to request for reparations for 
violations of jus ad bellum in other forums.  
c. The practical implications  
 
Article 75 of the Rome Statute, which governs reparations, is rather vague: 
 
The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, 
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, 
in its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its own motion in 
exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, 
loss or injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which 
it is acting.  
 
Such ‘constructive ambiguity’ provides the Court with a large ambit of discretion to 
determine how reparations are made. 713 Considering that the ICC is the first 
international forum that will allow reparations to individuals for the violations of jus 
ad bellum, there is considerable pressure on judges to develop an approach and 
standards for awarding reparations. Suffice it to say, different standards will apply to 
reparations in this context, than the objective criteria under the secondary norms of 
state responsibility.  
However, it is outside the scope of the present study and perhaps too premature at 
this point in time to discuss how reparations should be made with respect to the crime 
of aggression. Instead, this section will focus on some concerns that may arise with 
respect to the practical implications of applying the regime pertaining to victims to the 
victims of the crime of aggression. Without prejudice to the applicability of the 
regime applicable to victims of the other crimes within Article 5(1) of the Rome 
Statute, there are indeed particular concerns with arise with respect to the victims of 
the crime of aggression.  
First, there is the practical difficulty of determining whether an individual may be 
considered as a victim under Rule 85 RPE for the purposes of the applicable regime.  
                                                
713 van den Wyngaert (n 699) 486; McCarthy (n 702) 255–256. 
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For example, with respect to sub-paragraph (a), how would the threshold for “harm” 
be satisfied? Indeed, the potential scope for “harm” would be extensive in the context 
of aggression, as it could encompass inter alia emotional distress or mental anguish, 
minor or major injuries, fatalities, damage to personal property, economic loss. Thus, 
it may be difficult to draw a line to determine whether or not harm is sufficiently 
serious for the natural person to be considered a victim of the crime.  
Second, there is also the need to consider the legal framework applicable in a 
situation of aggression. The Court would have to be careful that the determination of a 
“natural person” does not conflate jus ad bellum with jus in bello. For example, injury 
to a natural person should be assessed in the light of the status of the individual under 
jus in bello as to whether he/she is a civilian or combatant, and whether this amounted 
to any violation of international law. If so, then the next question is whether such 
violation could be considered as a war crime. It is important in situations when the 
injury or harm caused to the individual does not constitute a violation of jus in bello, 
or a war crime, that he/she should not be classified as a victim of the crime of 
aggression as a matter of convenience.  
With respect to the entities covered under Rule 85, “direct harm” to property, 
which is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes, 
historic monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes 
are prima facie representative of violations of jus in bello and not jus ad bellum. In 
particular, the damage of this “direct harm” appears to be a breach of obligations to 
refrain from attacks against cultural property under jus in bello.714 Nevertheless, 
violations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello often occur simultaneously, and the “direct 
harm” to the entity which is described may be classified as a violation of jus ad 
bellum if it is found to be a part of permissible collateral damage under jus in bello.  
Caution must be taken to ensure that there is no conflation between jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello, and the entity in question should be classified correctly as a victim of a 
war crime or a victim of the crime of aggression.  
Third, by providing a potential avenue for reparations for violations of jus ad 
bellum, this creates a possibility for political manipulation by states as there is the 
possibility that the aggressed state would view the ICC as an alternative forum for 
reparations than the ones under traditional dispute settlement, which would then 
                                                
714  Rule 38, Customary International Humanitarian law, available at:  
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule38.  
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initiate an interest for the aggressed state to refer the situation to the Court. The 
incentive for initiation of prosecution is then based on the prospect of reparations than 
the legal interest to establish the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator. 
This would dilute the symbolic significance of the ICC as an enforcement mechanism 
against international crimes, as the underlying political agenda is the quest for 
reparations for the crime of aggression.  
In my view, for these three reasons, the regime pertaining to victims should 
exclude the crime of aggression. That said, this is a matter of policy for the Court to 
deal with upon the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction of the crime of aggression.   
5.4. Conclusion  
 
This Chapter has delineated the concept of a victim as the rights-holder of the 
enjoyment of the protection of the norms that criminalise aggression that has suffered 
injury or harm from the failure of the duty-bearer to comply with the duty to refrain 
from the prohibited conduct. As states are the rights-holders, the victim of the crime 
of aggression is the aggressed state. Following from this premise, the hypothesis that 
natural persons are also the victims of the crime of aggression has been rejected on 
two grounds. First, natural persons are not the rights-holders of the enjoyment of the 
protection of the norms that criminalise aggression. Therefore, they cannot be 
considered as victims of the crime. Second, the actual damage caused by the crime of 
aggression, which is the state act of aggression (jus ad bellum), is committed against 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the aggressed state and not against natural 
persons. Thus, it is difficult to conceptualise natural persons as victims of the crime of 
aggression, as any harm or injury caused must be assessed under jus in bello.  
It is submitted that in a situation of aggression (state act of aggression and crime 
of aggression), individuals may be considered as victims of violations of jus in bello 
and war crimes if it is satisfied that all constituent elements of the crime are present – 
and not victims of the crime of aggression. As there are currently available fora for 
the prosecution of war crimes and it is generally accepted that victims are entitled to 
reparations, it may perhaps be in the better interests of natural persons who are 
harmed or injured in a situation of aggression to initiate proceedings as a victim of 
war crimes and not the crime of aggression.  
 234  
That said, an issue that was addressed was the question of death or injury to 
natural persons in a situation of collateral damage, which is permissible under jus in 
bello. As there has been no wrongful conduct on the primary level of norms, there is 
no responsibility on the secondary level. Thus, natural persons who are injured or 
killed as part of collateral damage may not be considered as victims of jus in bello or 
war crimes. In such a situation, the collateral damage should be assessed under jus ad 
bellum, which means that the aggressed state has a legal interest to invoke the 
responsibility of the aggressor state for damages (death or injury to natural persons) 
caused as a result of failure to comply with a duty to refrain from an act of aggression.   
Although the hypothesis that natural persons are victims of the crime of 
aggression is rejected, it is acknowledged that they may be considered as indirect 
victims of the crime of aggression, as they are nevertheless beneficiaries of the 
enjoyment of protection from the implementation by the duty-bearers of the norms 
that criminalise aggression.  
As the victim of the crime of aggression, the aggressed state has a legal interest 
that legal consequences are invoked against the perpetrator(s) of the crime of 
aggression in the form of criminal sanctions. It is also argued that the aggressed state 
has a legal interest in reparations for the crime of aggression, which is to be paid for 
by the perpetrator (and not the aggressed state). Therefore, the aggressed state has a 
legal interest in reparations for both the state act of aggression and the crime of 
aggression.  
It is predicted that the only forum that may potentially protect the legal interests of 
the aggressed state with respect to reparations for the crime of aggression are its 
domestic courts. Upon successful conviction of the defendant for the crime of 
aggression, the Court may make an order for reparations (from personal assets). The 
practical problems are that the defendant may not have sufficient funds to pay 
reparations to the aggressed state. On the other hand, the ICC does not appear to be 
directly representative of the aggressed state’s legal interest with respect to 
reparations. At the ICC, natural persons are recognised as potential legal beneficiaries 
to receive reparations for the crime of aggression. As natural persons have a 
jurisdictional nexus to the aggressed state by either the nationality or territorial link, it 
can be said that reparations are nevertheless in the (indirect) interests of aggressed 
state.  
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Be that as it may, regardless of reparations by the perpetrator or Victims Trust 
Fund for the crime of aggression, prosecution of the crime of aggression should be 
regarded as the first interests of the aggressed state as this is representative of the 
invocation of legal consequences against the perpetrator of the crime of aggression for 
failure to comply with primary obligations under international law.  
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Chapter VI. Prosecution of the crime of aggression at 




Chapter III had examined the definition of the crime of aggression in the 
Kampala Amendments (Article 8 bis). This Chapter will focus on the entry-into-force 
of the Kampala Amendments and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction of the 
ICC over the crime of aggression (Articles 15 bis and 15 ter). The contours of this 
jurisdictional regime depict the scope of situations of aggression that may be 
prosecuted as the ICC as the crime of aggression.  
Thus far, it has been established that prosecution of the crime of aggression at the 
ICC is in the interests of the international community, and also in the direct legal 
interests of the aggressed state. Yet, the effectiveness of the Court as an enforcement 
mechanism is predicated upon the contours of its jurisdictional regime (Article 15 bis 
and Article 15 ter) as it is unable to carry out proceedings in situations that fall 
outside of this regime. This means that the ICC is able to protect the legal interests of 
the aggressed state only to the extent that the situation of aggression falls within the 
jurisdictional regime of the Court over the crime of aggression.  
The aim of this Chapter is to ascertain the jurisdictional regime of the ICC over 
the crime of aggression, which determines when a situation of aggression can be 
prosecuted at the Court as a crime of aggression. As will be shown, the jurisdictional 
regime over the crime of aggression is not entirely consistent with the existing 
jurisdictional regime that the Court has with respect to the other core crimes under 
Article 5(1) Rome Statute. It is sui generis in nature. To understand how and why this sui 
generis regime was adopted, it is necessary to examine to the negotiation history behind 
the Kampala Amendments in relation to the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction.  
The Chapter begins by examining the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression (section 6.2), followed by revisiting the negotiation history 
starting from Article 5(2) Rome Statute (sections 6.3 and 6.4) to the Review 
Conference at Kampala (section 6.5). As a result of the Kampala Compromise 
(section 6.6), the jurisdictional regime over the crime of aggression (section 6.6.2) is 
divided into state referrals and proprio motu investigations (Article 15 bis) and 
Security Council referrals (Article 15 ter). In relation to the former, there is the 
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concomitant question of state consent (aggressor state). This issue pertains to whether 
the consent of the aggressor state is necessary for a situation of aggression to be 
prosecuted at the ICC. This Chapter submits that the jurisdictional regime at the ICC 
requires the consent of the aggressor state in situations of state referrals and proprio 
motu investigations (Article 15 bis), and will examine how this consent should be 
expressed and the ramifications of this with respect to the jurisdictional regime over 
the crime of aggression. The Chapter continues to examine the jurisdiction regime 
pursuant to Security Council referrals (Article 15 ter), followed by contemplating the 
effects of the Kampala Amendments on future States Parties (section 6.6.3). 
 The final section in this Chapter (section 6.7) considers the ICC as an 
enforcement mechanism, with particular reference to the legal interests of the 
aggressed state.     
6.2. The beginning of all prosecutions: activating the crime of aggression at the 
International Criminal Court  
 
The crime of aggression currently lies dormant at the Court.  Although the Rome 
Statute has encompassed the crime of aggression as one of the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole (Article 5(1)), its jurisdiction was 
delayed until a provision would be adopted stipulating the definition and conditions 
for the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime. At Kampala, it was decided by 
consensus that the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction was to be even further 
delayed. This political strategy played a significant role in helping to achieve 
consensus.715 Therefore, the delayed activation of the Court’s jurisdiction was a 
substantial part of the compromise and should be appreciated as a component of the 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction.716  
                                                
715 The President of the Review Conference, Ambassador Christian Wenaweser reflects Post-
Kampala, ‘I considered in Kampala, and still do today, that the issue of the formula for 
delayed activation – while important – was of significantly less relevance than some of the 
compromises that had been forged beforehand, in particular the opt-out framework for states 
parties, the wholesale exemption for non-states parties and the competence given to the Pre-
Trial Division to authorize an investigation in the absence of a determination by the Security 
Council’, Christian Wenaweser, ‘Reaching the Kampala Compromise on Aggression: The 
Chair’s Perspective’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 883, 887; Niels Blokker 
and Claus Kress, ‘A Consensus Agreement on the Crime of Aggression: Impressions from 
Kampala’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 889, 891. 
716 Wenaweser (n 715) 886; Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1207. 
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The Kampala Amendments provide two requirements for the activation of the 
Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. One requirement is that there must 
be at least 30 ratifications of the Kampala Amendments as seen in Articles 15 bis (2) 
and 15 ter (2): 
 
The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression 
committed one year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by 
thirty States Parties. 
 
The second requirement involves a majority of two thirds of States Parties to make a 
decision to activate the Court’s jurisdiction after 1 January 2017. This can be seen in 
Article 15 bis (3) and Article 15 ter (3):  
 
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in 
accordance with this article, subject to a decision to be taken after 1 January 
2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is required for the adoption of 
an amendment to the Statute.    
 
Understandings One and Three state that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction ‘only 
with respect to crimes of aggression committed after a decision in accordance with 
article 15 bis, paragraph 3, is taken, and one year after the ratification or acceptance 
of the amendments by thirty States Parties, whichever is later’ (italics added). The 
phrase “whichever is later” implies that the minimum requirement of 30 ratifications 
and the activation decision are cumulative conditions.717      
 
6.3. The conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction: revisiting the negotiation 
history 
6.3.1. Article 5(2) Rome Statute: a “codified impasse”   
 
As Article 120 of the Rome Statute does not allow for reservations, an argument 
can be made that every State Party has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC over the 
                                                
717 Astrid Reisinger Coracini, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction 
Over the Crime of Aggression - at Last ... in Reach ... Over Some’ [2010] Goettingen Journal 
of International law 745, 771. 
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core crimes pursuant to Article 5(1) Rome Statute, including the crime of aggression. 
Thus, the crime of aggression appears to be a rather curious crime that is present and 
already operational since the adoption and entry-into-force of the Rome Statute, but 
yet remains to be defined and intended to be subject to its own jurisdictional regime: a 
crime which has been described as “half in and half out.”718 The starting point to 
understanding this curious crime, is to return to Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute, 
which can be broken down into the following components: 
• the Amendments are to be adopted in accordance with Articles 121 
(Amendments to the Rome Statute) and 123 (Review of the Statute) 
• the definition of the crime and the conditions under which the Court can 
exercise jurisdiction are to be adopted by the ASP/Review Conference  
• the definition of the crime and the conditions under which the Court can 
exercise jurisdiction are to be consistent with the UN Charter 
The negotiations from Rome to Kampala thus had to encompass: i) deciding upon the 
correct entry into force mechanism under Article 121; ii) defining the crime in a 
manner that was consistent with the UN Charter; iii) ascertaining the conditions under 
which the Court can exercise jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the UN Charter. 
6.3.2. Trigger mechanisms  
 
From early stages of the negotiation process, it appears to have been accepted 
that the existing trigger mechanisms under Article 13 (state referrals; Security Council 
referrals; proprio motu investigations)719 should also be applicable to the crime of 
aggression. This could already be seen in the 1999 Coordinator’s Paper,720 whereby 
Option 1 for the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction read:  
                                                
718 Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 8.  
719 Kirsch and Robinson inform that ‘the term ‘trigger mechanism’ emerged during the 
development of the ICC Statute to refer to the procedural mechanisms by which the ICC 
jurisdiction over a particular situation might be activated. As the concept developed, it 
became clear that it referred not simply to the commencement of specific investigations of a 
particular case or individual, but rather to the ability to direct the Court’s attention to events 
in a particular time and place, possibly involving numerous criminal acts, with a view to 
initiating an exercise of jurisdiction over those events,’ Phillippe Kirsch and Darryl Robinson, 
‘Referral by States Parties in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 
2002) 619. 
720 ‘Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator: Consolidated Text of Proposals on the 
Crime of Aggression’, 9 December 1999, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGCA/RT.1 (as corrected 
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The Court shall exercise its jurisdiction with regard to the crime of aggression 
in accordance with the provisions of article 13 of the Statute.  
 
This was later affirmed in the 2007 Chairman’s Non-Paper on the Exercise of 
Jurisdiction.721 The significance is that the Security Council was not considered to be 
the exclusive trigger mechanism because proceedings may also be initiated by States 
and the Prosecutor.722  
6.3.3. The role of the Security Council 
 
Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute had specified that the provision relating to the 
crime of aggression ‘shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of 
the United Nations.’ As examined in Chapter I, pursuant to Article 24 of the UN 
Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, which includes determining an act of aggression 
under Article 39 of the UN Charter. Thus, Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute 
encompasses the question of the role of the Security Council with respect to the 
definition of the crime of aggression and the conditions under which the Court can 
exercise jurisdiction.   
This envisaged role was arguably the most significant and contentious question in 
the negotiations.723 Already in the much earlier 1994 Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court produced by the ILC (“Draft Statute for an International Criminal 
Court”), Article 23(2) provided that: 
 
A complaint of or directly related to an act of aggression may not be brought 
under this Statute unless the Security Council has first determined that a State 
has committed the act of aggression which is the subject of the complaint.724 
                                                                                                                                      
on 13 December 1999, UN oc.  PCNICC/1999/WGCA/R.1/Corr.1); reprinted in Barriga and 
Kress (n 6) 344.  
721 Article 15 bis (1), Non-Paper Submitted by the Chairman on the Exercise of Jurisdiction’, 
in 2007 Princeton Report, Annex (Appendix) III; reprinted in ibid 553.   
722 Princeton Report (2006), para.61.  
723 See Blokker, ‘The Crime of Aggression and the United Nations Security Council’ (n 36). 
724 At the time, criticism was raised within the ILC that ‘it would introduce into the statute a 
substantial inequality between State members of the Security Council and those that were not 
members, especially between the Permanent Members of the Security Council and other 
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In the Commentaries on the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, it was 
written:   
 
the difficulties of definition and application, combined with the Council’s 
special responsibilities under Chapter VII of the Charter, mean that special 
provision should be made to ensure that prosecutions are brought for 
aggression only if the Council first determines that the State in question has 
committed aggression in circumstances involving the crime of aggression 
which is the subject of the charge.725 
 
This clearly implies a type of exclusivity in competence for the Security Council to 
determine an act of aggression. Some delegations, such as the Russian Federation 
were in support of such an exclusive role of the Security Council: 
 
[…] subject to a prior determination by the United Nations Security Council 
of an act of aggression by the State concerned, the crime of aggression means 




                                                                                                                                      
States.’ Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 
May to 22 July 1994, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth session, 
Supplement No.10, UN Doc.A/49/10.43, at 87. 
725 Commentary to Art.20 of the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission, 1994, vol. II, Part II, 39; The Commentary had also 
additionally included that ‘any criminal responsibility for an act or crime of aggression 
necessarily presupposes that a State has been held to have committed aggression, and such a 
finding would be for the Security Council acting in accordance with Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations to make. The consequential issues of whether an individual 
could be indicted, for example, because that individual acted on behalf of the State in such a 
capacity as to have played a part in the planning and waging of the aggression, would be for 
the court to decide’, 44. 
726 See ‘Proposal by Cameroon’, 2 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.39; reprinted in 
Barriga and Kress (n 6) 274; ‘Proposal Submitted by the Russian Federation: Definition of the 
Crime of Aggression’, 29 July 1999, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.12; reprinted in Barriga and 
Kress, ibid 339; ‘Proposal Submitted by Germany: the Crime of Aggression – a Further 
Informal Discussion Paper’, 13 November 2000, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGCA/DP4; 
reprinted in Barriga and Kress, ibid 340. 
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However, this was not necessarily the general opinion. Fernandez de Gurmendi who 
was the Co-ordinator of the Working Group on Aggression of the PrepCom in the 
period 2000-2002 reports that most of the proposals made in the Working Group 
appeared to accept that ‘a determination of an act of aggression is a precondition for 
the Court to exercise its functions over the crime of aggression’ and that ‘the Security 
Council has the right to be the organ that acts in the first place.’727 This suggests that 
the Security Council has the ‘primary’ role and not the exclusive role to determine an 
act of aggression.  
Despite the apparent general consensus that a pre-determination of aggression by 
the Security Council is ideal as a requirement for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction, 
there has always been a divide in opinion with regards to whether the power and 
competence to determine aggression should be exclusive to the Security Council. 
Wilmshurst argues with respect to the pre-determination of aggression that: 
 
the Court will not be able to act in relation to the crime of aggression unless 
and until the Council has first determined that aggression has been committed 
by the State concerned (this was indeed the tenor of the statement made by the 
United Kingdom and the United States on the adoption of the Statute at the 
Conference).728 
 
However, there appeared to be rather limited support outside of the permanent 
members.729 At the SWGCA, the vast majority of the contentions which arose within 
the negotiations were significantly predicated upon the need for a prior external 
determination of the state act of aggression which had to be consistent with the UN 
Charter.730 
As it was decided that all three mechanisms under Article 13 were applicable to 
the crime of aggression,731 the role of the Security Council was especially significant 
                                                
727 Fernandez de Gurmendi (n 447) 603. 
728  Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ‘The International Criminal Court: The Role of the Security 
Council’, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A challenge to impunity 
(2001) 41. 
729 Blokker, ‘The Crime of Aggression and the United Nations Security Council’ (n 36).  
730 Wenaweser (n 715) 884; see also Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1195. 
731 ‘Proposals for a Provision on Aggression Elaborated by the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression’, in 2009 SWGCA Report, Annex (Appendix) I (2009 SWGCA 
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with respect to state referrals and proprio motu investigations. Such external 
determination was understood as the pre-condition for jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression (“jurisdictional filter”) and furthered the on-going debate encompassing 
whether the Security Council had primary or exclusive responsibility to determine an 
act of aggression. The inability to reach a consensus on the jurisdictional filter can be 
seen in Article 15 bis of the SWGCA Proposal 2009 which had marked the 
conclusion of the work of the Group. It is worth reproducing the relevant section in 
full:      
  
Article 15 bis Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
 
2. Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, he or she shall first ascertain whether the 
Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the State 
concerned. The Prosecutor shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the 
situation before the Court, including any relevant information and documents. 
 
3. Where the Security Council has made such a determination, the Prosecutor may 
proceed with the investigation in respect to the crime of aggression.  
 
4. (Alternative 1) In the absence of such a determination, the Prosecutor may not proceed 
with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression.  
 
Option 1 – end the paragraph here. 
 
Option 2 – add: unless the Security Council has, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, requested the Prosecutor to proceed with the 
investigation in respect of a crime of aggression. 
 
4. (Alternative 2) Where no such determination is made within [6] months after the date 
of notification, the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of 
aggression. 
 
Option 1 – end the paragraph here. 
 
Option 2 – add: provided that the Pre-Trial Chamber has authorized the commencement 
of the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression in accordance with the procedure 
contained in article 15; 
Option 3 – add: provided that the General Assembly has determined that an act of 
aggression has been committed by the State referred to in article 8 bis; 
Option 4 – add: provided that the International Court of Justice has determined that an act 
of aggression has been committed by the State referred to in article 8 bis. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                      
Proposals); reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 663; SWGCA Report 2008 (November), 
paras. 8-10.   
 
 245  
As can be observed, Article 15 bis (4) (Alternative 1) promotes the exclusivity 
hypothesis. Article 15 bis (4) (Alternative 2) accords the Security Council with the 
primary responsibility/competence to determine aggression; but provides options for 
other bodies to act as the external determining filter: Pre-Trial Chamber, General 
Assembly, International Court of Justice. This Proposal was subsequently circulated 
at the Review Conference at Kampala to reach an agreement upon the relevant 
external determining filter.  
Attention should also be drawn to Article 15 bis (5) of the 2009 SWGCA 
Proposal, which states: 
 
A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be 
without prejudice to the Court’s own findings under this statute. 
 
This is highly significant as it represents a consensus that any role of the Security 
Council (and/or General Assembly and International Court of Justice) with respect to 
aggression is only procedural in nature.732 The underlying basis for the argument 
against the ICC being bound by a pre-determination of the Security Council in 
relation to the exercise of jurisdiction over aggression is that the court will be subject 
to the political will of the Security Council, which could be detrimental to its integrity 
and the due process rights of the defendants.  
As this may place strain upon the presumption of innocence (Article 66 ICC 
Statute) which would be unfair towards the accused as the onus will fall upon the 
Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused. The burden of proof should not be shifted 
to the accused. An argument can be made that a determination that is not based on 
pre-determined rules of law should not bind the court, and more significantly, must 
not bind a defendant charged with the crime of aggression as it may be inconsistent 




                                                
732 Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1195. 
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6.4. Interpreting Article 5(2) in conjunction with Article 121 of the Rome 
Statute: the issue of state consent  
 
As the debate with respect to the exclusivity hypothesis advanced, a concomitant 
question of state consent began to emerge.733 This referred to whether the aggressor 
state had to consent to the jurisdiction of the ICC over its nationals for the crime of 
aggression. This was directly relevant to the question of the entry into force of the 
Amendments and played a significant role in the debate pertaining to how Article 5(2) 
was to be read in conjunction with Article 121; more specifically, which provision 
under Article 121 should serve as the entry into force mechanism.734 The SWGCA 
debated upon three possible interpretations of how the Amendments should enter into 
force under Article 121 in conjunction with Article 5(2): Article 121(3); Article 
121(4) and Article 121(5). 735 
6.4.1. Article 121(3) 
 
Also known as the “Adoption model” pursuant to Article 5(2), no ratification 
process was required as the Court could exercise jurisdiction over this crime once the 
resolution was adopted at the Review Conference.736 As Article 5(2) does not mention 
“amendment” but “adopted,” it can be suggested that this is consistent with Article 
121(3):   
 
The adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties 
or at a Review Conference on which consensus cannot be reached shall 
require a two-thirds majority of States Parties. 
 
                                                
733  See Stefan Barriga and Leena Grover, ‘A Historic Breakthrough on the Crime of 
Aggression’ 105 American Journal of International Law 517, 523–524. 
734 See Astrid Reisinger Coracini, ‘“Amended Most Serious Crimes”: A New Category of 
Core Crimes within the Jurisdiction but out of the Reach of the International Criminal Court’ 
(2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 699; Zimmermann refers to Article 121 as the 
relevant lex specialis, Andreas Zimmermann, ‘Amending the Amendment Provisions of the 
Rome Statute: The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression and the Law of 
Treaties’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 209, 212. 
735 Reisinger Coracini, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction Over the 
Crime of Aggression - at Last ... in Reach ... Over Some’ (n 717) 765. 
736 Roger Clark, ‘Ambiguities in Articles 5(2), 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute’ (2009) 41 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 413, 413, 415 and 417.  
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However, this argument was not sustainable.737 Pellet for example, argues that ‘it is 
scarcely possible to claim that adoption of a provision in accordance with Article 5(2) 
should not be analysed as an amendment, given that this provision refers explicitly to 
Articles 121 and 123, and that Resolution F itself states that ‘the provisions relating to 
the crime of aggression shall enter into force for the States Parties in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of this Statute.’738 There is also the issue of domestic process 
of ratification of treaties. Clark writes:  
 
some participants in the Special Working Group have argued that there are 
practical problems of how a State faced with a significant decision like this 
can cope with the necessary changes in domestic law without going through 
the ratification process. Some have been adamant that their Governments 
could not possibly contemplate an amendment of this magnitude that did not 
go through the ratification process and, since crimes are involved, legislative 
action would be necessary.739  
 
As Article 121(3) did not prove to be acceptable, the SWGCA focused their attention 
on Article 121(4) or (5) as potential entry-into-force mechanisms.740    




[…] an amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties one year after 
instruments of ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations by seven-eighths of them.  
 
                                                
737 McDougall (n 7) 239. see also Reisinger Coracini, ‘The International Criminal Court’s 
Exercise of Jurisdiction Over the Crime of Aggression - at Last ... in Reach ... Over Some’ (n 
717) 763–765.; Zimmermann (n 734) 212–213. 
738 Alain Pellet, ‘Entry into Force and Amendment of the Statute’, The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2002) 183. 
739 Clark, ‘Ambiguities in Articles 5(2), 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute’ (n 736) 417–418; 
see also Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1196. 
740 McDougall (n 7) 239. 
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This provision is considered to be the general rule, according to which, entry into 
force is applicable for all States Parties, giving rise to a coherent jurisdictional 
regime.741  
The legal implication of entry-into-force under Article 121(4) is that the 
concomitant jurisdictional regime would also encompass jurisdiction over non-states 
parties provided there is a nationality or territoriality link to the State Party as 
contained in Article 12(2).  Thus, the jurisdictional regime would be identical to the 
other core crimes. This was of particular importance to all of the African states, 
members of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and most Latin American and 
Caribbean countries,742 as they viewed that ‘requiring aggressor state consent would 
depart from the territoriality principle enshrined in Article 12(2) of the Statute and 
lead to impunity rather than preventing aggression and protecting potential victims of 
this crime.’743 The underlying rationale therefore is to encompass the broadest scope 
of jurisdiction over the crime to ensure that perpetrators could be punished 
accordingly.744  
An argument can be made that this provision is allegedly the correct entry into 
force mechanism as almost all the proposed amendments do not technically involve 
any amendments to Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute.745 For example, Clark 
argues ‘adding new crimes like drugs or terrorism to Article 5(1) is subject to Article 
121(5); completing the negotiation on Article 5(2) is subject to Article 121(4).’746  He 
adds that he personally thinks ‘the argument in favour of the seven-eighths solution is 
stronger on the basis of the plain language and it is consistent with the complex 
preparatory history.’ 747     
                                                
741 Article 121(6) offers States Parties that have not accepted the Amendment the possibility 
of opting out of the Rome Statute. 
742 Barriga and Grover (n 733) 524. 
743 ibid. 
744 Barriga labels this as “Camp Protection” as these delegations wanted a jurisdictional 
regime that was mainly protective in nature, and with effect beyond just States Parties’; 
Stefan Barriga, ‘Exercise of Jurisdiction and Entry into Force of the Amendments on the 
Crime of Aggression’ in Gerard Dive, Benjamin Goes and Damien Vandermeersch (eds), 
From Rome to Kampala: The first 2 amendments to the Rome Statute (Bruylant 2012) 45. 
745 Reisinger Coracini, ‘“Amended Most Serious Crimes”: A New Category of Core Crimes 
within the Jurisdiction but out of the Reach of the International Criminal Court’ (n 734) 704.; 
See also Hans-Peter Kaul, ‘Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction’, The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002) 605. 
746 Clark, ‘Ambiguities in Articles 5(2), 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute’ (n 736) 416. 
747 ibid 426. 
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Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force 
for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the 
deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State 
Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by 
that State Party's nationals or on its territory. 
 
This provision stipulates that the amendment enters into force only with respect to the 
accepting State Party.748 As such, this reflects the premise that States do not have 
legal obligations under treaties they have not consented to. The ramification of this is 
that there is a rather fragmented jurisdictional regime pertaining to the crime of 
aggression, as the amendments only enter into force for States Parties that have 
ratified. 749  
There were two interpretations of the second sentence of Article 121(5) that were 
advanced in the SWGCA: i) a negative interpretation; ii) a positive interpretation. 
Both interpretations are central to the question of whether aggressor state consent is 
necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction.  
i. Article 121(5) with a positive interpretation 
 
This interpretation takes into consideration that Article 121(4) is the general rule 
relating to amendments; Article 121(5) therefore is the exception to this general 
rule.750 Thus, it should not be considered as a specific rule which creates a separate 
jurisdictional regime pertaining to consent, but should be read in the light and purpose 
of the other provisions of the Rome Statute, and ‘so far as it may have a limiting 
                                                
748 Reisinger Coracini, ‘“Amended Most Serious Crimes”: A New Category of Core Crimes 
within the Jurisdiction but out of the Reach of the International Criminal Court’ (n 734) 706. 
749 ibid 706. 
750 See Article 121(4).   
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effect on other provisions’ should be ‘construed narrowly in order to respect the 
integrity of the Statute.’751  
A narrow interpretation, i.e. a positive interpretation accepts that the Court shall 
not actively exercise jurisdiction with respect to a crime committed by the national of 
the State Party or on its territory. However, this does not rule that jurisdiction may 
still be established over the crime pursuant to the existing framework under Article 
12(2). In other words, jurisdiction may still nevertheless be exercised if the crime was 
committed against the territory of a State Party that has ratified.  
With respect to the crime of aggression, the State Party that has not ratified is 
placed on the same locus standi as a non-State Party with respect to the crime covered 
by the relevant amendments, as the Court is nevertheless able to exercise jurisdiction 
in accordance with its existing framework under Article 12(2).752 The consent of the 
aggressor state is not strictly necessary as jurisdiction is nevertheless delegated to the 
ICC on the basis of territorial criminal jurisdiction upon the ratification and 
acceptance of the aggressed state of the Amendments. This is consistent with the 
ordinary jurisdictional regime contained within Article 12 of the Rome Statute, the 
purposes of the ICC, and the principles of international law that regulate the 
competence ICC as an international tribunal under international law.  Pellet submits:  
 
Entry into force of an amendment to Article 5 to 8 leaves both third States and 
those who, though parties to the Statute, have not ratified the amendment in an 
exactly identical position: each are unaffected by the amendment. The fact that 
the amendment may apply not to them as States, but, should the case arise, to 
their nationals (and without any discrimination between nationals of States 
Parties to the Statute and those of third States) has absolutely nothing to do with 
the amending procedures; it is the normal consequence of territoriality of penal 
competence.753 
                                                
751 Reisinger Coracini, ‘“Amended Most Serious Crimes”: A New Category of Core Crimes 
within the Jurisdiction but out of the Reach of the International Criminal Court’ (n 734) 707, 
718.; For a contrary view, see Zimmermann (n 734) 217. 
752 See McDougall (n 7) 243; Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1197; Reisinger Coracini, 
‘“Amended Most Serious Crimes”: A New Category of Core Crimes within the Jurisdiction 
but out of the Reach of the International Criminal Court’ (n 734) 707, 718. 
753Pellet, ‘Entry into Force and Amendment of the Statute’ (n 736) 182; Reisinger Coracini, 
‘“Amended Most Serious Crimes”: A New Category of Core Crimes within the Jurisdiction 
but out of the Reach of the International Criminal Court’ (n 734) 707–708, 718; Dapo 
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ii. Article 121(5) with a negative interpretation 
 
This interpretation derogates from the existing framework under Article 12(2). It 
excludes nationals from States Parties that have not ratified regardless of whether the 
other State Party has the competence to transfer its criminal jurisdiction to the ICC 
under the territoriality principle. Instead, there is the need for both jurisdictional links 
between both States to be cumulative in the sense that the crime of aggression must be 
committed by a national of a ratifying State Party against the territory of a ratifying 
State Party.754  Reisinger Coracini observes that:  
 
Unlike Article 12(2), Article 121(5) does not distinguish between different 
‘trigger mechanisms’ Therefore the same preconditions arguably need to be 
established, even upon a referral by the UN Security Council. As a 
consequence states parties would to a large extent be able to shield their 
nationals from the Court’s jurisdiction over crimes covered by an 
amendment.’755 
 
She suggests that this interpretation implies that States Parties that have not ratified 
the Kampala Amendments, i.e. non-ratifying States Parties would also be excluded 
from jurisdiction under Security Council referrals.756 This was discussed in the 
SWGCA, where some delegations agreed that ‘while this reading may be undesirable 
from a political perspective, it was nevertheless the only option under the current 
language of the article.’757  
However, the view that ultimately prevailed was that this provision did not apply 
to Security Council referrals.758 These delegations argued:  
 
                                                                                                                                      
Akande, ‘Prosecuting Aggression: The Consent Problem and the Role of the Security 
Council’ [2010] Working Paper, Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict 2, 28. 
754 Reisinger Coracini, ‘“Amended Most Serious Crimes”: A New Category of Core Crimes 
within the Jurisdiction but out of the Reach of the International Criminal Court’ (n 734) 707. 
755 ibid. 
756 ibid; See also Giorgio Gaja, ‘The Long Journey Towards Repressing Aggression’ in 
Antonio Cassesse, Paola Gaeta and John Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2002) 439. 
757 SWGCA Report 2008 (November), para.9.  
758 SWGCA Report 2008 (November), para.10. 
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The Security Council could have the competence to refer cases involving the 
crimes of aggression to the Court with respect to non-States Parties, and it 
would therefore be illogical to preclude that possibility with respect to certain 
States Parties. Given the role of the Security Council under the Charter with 
respect to aggression, it would furthermore be particularly unconvincing to 
argue that the Council had less influence in triggering investigations into the 
crime of aggression than with respect to other crimes. […] Furthermore, 
article 121, paragraph 5, dealt with the issue of consent to be bound, which 
was irrelevant in the context of a Security Council referral.759  
 
The other main problem with this interpretation is that non-ratifying States Parties are 
on a different locus standi than non-States Parties. Article 121(5) refers specifically to 
a State Party that has not ratified the amendments, which suggests that a crime of 
aggression committed by a non-ratifying State Party’s national or on its territory is 
inherently excluded from the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
However there is nothing in the provision that precludes jurisdiction over non-
states parties.760 This suggests that the jurisdictional links under Article 12(2) may 
apply to non-states parties but not to a non-ratifying State Party. The underlying 
rationale is that States Parties consented to the unamended Statute and should thus be 
protected from obligations from the amended Statute that they did not ratify or 
accept.761  
Reisinger Coracini on the other hand, questions whether such a self-privilege is 
acceptable under the object and purpose of the Statute?762  It was generally agreed 
within the SWGCA that the provisions on aggression ‘should avoid unequal treatment 
of non-States Parties and States Parties in this respect.’763  It is worth mentioning that 
at the SWGCA, there were suggestions that an amendment could be made to Article 
                                                
759 SWGCA Report 2008 (November), para.8. 
760 Reisinger Coracini, ‘“Amended Most Serious Crimes”: A New Category of Core Crimes 
within the Jurisdiction but out of the Reach of the International Criminal Court’ (n 734) 700. 
761 Zimmermann (n 32) 211, 218. 
762 Reisinger Coracini questions 'is such a self-privilege acceptable under the object and 
purpose of the Statute’, Reisinger Coracini, ‘“Amended Most Serious Crimes”: A New 
Category of Core Crimes within the Jurisdiction but out of the Reach of the International 
Criminal Court’ (n 734) 711.     
763 See SWGCA Report 2008 (November), paras.10,13; see also ‘Jurisdiction Scenarios 
regarding Article 121(5) Second sentence’, in 2008 SWGCA Report (November) Annex 
(Appendix) II;  reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 620; McDougall (n 7) 247–248.   
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121(5) or possibly by other means, to clarify the issue above and to prevent future 
confusion.764 However, this was countered by discussion that complications might 
arise from the need to choose the correct amendment procedure to amend Article 
121(5). 765  
My view is that the positive interpretation allows for a more consistent reading of 
Article 121(5) with the provisions within the Rome Statute in the light of their object 
and purpose. This way, the provision does not appear to create an arrangement 
requiring state consent, which departs from the existing jurisdictional regime of the 
ICC and/or discrimination between States Parties that have not ratified and non-States 
Parties. Ultimately, the conundrum pertaining to the two differing interpretations of 
Article 121(5) is the result of ambiguous drafting.766   
iii. Article 121: An open question  
 
The problem with Article 5(2) is that it appears to be incompatible with Article 
121,767 which gives rise to a “fundamental ambiguity” with respect to the entry into 
force and the question of state consent.768 To reiterate, the first interpretation of 
“adoption” under Article 121(3) was dropped relatively quickly. On the other hand, 
Article 5(2) does not mention “entry into force” which places it at odds with both 
Article 121(4) and Article 121(5). Clark has insightfully clarified that ‘the preparatory 
work on Articles 5 and 121 is not conclusive on this crucial point of the applicable 
procedure. It is, however, worth rehearsing for what light it does shine on the 
matter’.769 He explains that Articles 5(2) and 121 of the Rome Statute were drafted 
and formulated by two different working groups independently, which makes it rather 
difficult to reconcile.770 This conundrum was left and passed on to the Review 
Conference.   
 
                                                
764 SWGCA Report 2008 (November) para.10. 
765 SWGCA Report 2008 (November) para.10; See also McDougall (n 7) 242. 
766 Akande, ‘Prosecuting Aggression: The Consent Problem and the Role of the Security 
Council’ (n 753) 28. 
767 See Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1215. 
768 Clark, ‘Ambiguities in Articles 5(2), 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute’ (n 736) 413. 
769 ibid.  
770 ibid 413, 421–425; see also Zimmermann (n 734) 216. 
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6.5. Pushing forward at Kampala 
  
Pursuant to Article 5(2), the Review Conference needed to adopt the definition of 
the crime of aggression and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression. The objective was to achieve this by consensus.771 As the 
definition of the crime was already accepted by consensus at the ASP in February 
2009,772 the entire negotiations at Kampala relating to the crime of aggression focused 
upon the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. There was also the issue of the 
correct entry into force mechanism, which as examined above, represented more than 
just a drafting technicality. It had direct implications on the question of state consent 
in the absence of a Security Council referral.   
As the SWGCA had already proposed a consensus definition of the crime of 
aggression in February 2009,773 the remainder issues at the Review Conference, were:   
i) Whether the consent of the alleged aggressor state is a pre-requisite for a 
proprio motu investigation and state referral with respect to a crime of 
aggression.774   
ii) the role of the UN Security Council, i.e. whether the ICC may only proceed 
on the basis that the Council had actively determined an act of aggression had 
taken place, or if there are alternative options with respect to the 
determination of an act of aggression.  775 
Prince Zeid, acting as the Chairman of the SWGCA during the Review Conference 
announced in his Introductory Remarks (1 June): 
 
it is clear that two issues – the question of acceptance by the aggressor State, 
and the jurisdictional filter – are the main hurdles that we have to clear in 
order to arrive at an acceptable solution. We have a mandate from the Rome 
Conference to arrive at an acceptable provision on the crime of aggression, 
                                                
771 See Blokker and Kress (n 715). 
772 Barriga and Grover (n 733) 521–522. 
773 Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 24. 
774 Prince Zeid had conducted an informal “roll call” which provided an insight to the position 
of States Parties; reprinted in a footnote in Barriga and Grover (n 733) 524. 
775 See Wenaweser (n 715) 884.    
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and we are called upon by the rules of procedure to make every effort to find a 
consensus.776 
 
Ambassador Wenaweser, who acted as the President of the Review Conference, 
reflected post-Kampala that ‘on both topics delegations held strong and seemingly 
irreconcilable positions usually presented as positions of principle. The two issues 
were also to some extent interlinked, which further complicated the matter.’777   
It was also revealed by others who were present at Kampala that ‘the best 
negotiation strategy was to focus the debate to the greatest extent possible on the 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, and to first seek an agreement on the role of 
state consent. Only once such an agreement was reached could it be hoped that France 
and the UK would move away from their adamant insistence on SC monopoly. 
Fortunately, the strategy ultimately prevailed.’778  
6.5.1. Preface: eliminating two jurisdictional filters 
 
The Chairman’s first Revised Conference Room Paper779 dealt immediately with 
the issue of the jurisdictional filter. It suggested deleting the two options of the 
General Assembly and the International Court of Justice as a jurisdictional filter in the 
case of a lack of determination by the Security Council in the first instance. It is 
interesting to note the footnote to proposed Article 15 bis(1): 
 
The suggestion has been made to add a paragraph delaying the exercise of 
jurisdiction, e.g. “The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes 
of aggression committed after a period of [x] years following the entry into force 
of the amendments on the crime of aggression.” Such a paragraph would only be 
relevant in case of article 121, paragraph 5, of the Statute were to be applied.  
                                                
776  2010 Introductory Remarks by the Chairman (1 June) [in Kampala]; reprinted in Barriga 
and Kress (n 6) 736.  
777 Wenaweser (n 715) 884. 
778 Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1201. 
779 ‘Conference Room Paper on the Crime of Aggression’, RC/WGCA/1/REV.1, 6 June 
2010; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 743; see Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on 
the Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 47. 
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6.5.2. Phase One: The Argentina, Brazil and Switzerland proposal  
 
Argentina, Brazil and Switzerland put forward a joint initiative and submitted a 
non-paper (“ABS Proposal”) on the 6th June 2010.780 This non-paper represents the 
first phase towards achieving the final compromise as it enacted considerable interest 
amongst delegations. It addressed the issue of state consent by considering the 
Security Council referral trigger mechanism separately from the other two trigger 
mechanisms under Article 13, i.e. state referrals and proprio motu.781 This provided 
the innovative platform for advancement, as it focused the substantive question of 
state consent directly to the relevant trigger mechanisms.  
With respect to the former, in accordance with Article 13(b), the entry into force 
mechanism was to be Article 121(5), whilst Article 121(4) would govern the entry-
into-force for State referrals and proprio motu once the seven-eighths majority of 
ratifications were obtained. In the light of the high threshold of ratifications, the 
jurisdictional regime envisaged to apply to the latter was identical to the other core 
crimes under Article 5(1) which would thus encompass both non-ratifying States 
Parties and non-States Parties.  
The ABS Proposal received a mixture of both praise and disapproval the next 
day. 782 Nevertheless, the Proposal was considered to be “extremely useful”783 in 
advancing the negotiations. 784  This was subsequently incorporated into the 
Chairman’s Second Revised Conference Room Paper on the Crime of Aggression.785 
In this Paper, Article 15 bis was split into: i) Article 15 bis (state referral, proprio 
                                                
780 Wenaweser (n 715) 885.     
781 Article 15 bis (1) The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as 
defined in article 8 bis in accordance with article 13 (a) and (c), subject to the provisions of 
this article.  
782 In the 2010 WGCA Report, it was stated that ‘these ideas were welcomed by some 
delegations as a creative attempt to attract consensus. It was suggested flexibility was needed 
regarding the entry into force mechanisms, as the respective provisions in the Rome Statute 
seemed to ambiguous and not to apply well to the crime of aggression, which was already 
contained in article 5 of the Rome Statute. Other delegations expressed concern about the 
legal and technical feasibility of an approach that would draw on elements of both paragraphs 
4 and 5 of article 121 of the Statute. Concern was expressed that a creative interpretation of 
these provisions could harm the Court’s credibility’, Report of the Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression, RC/5 in Review Conference Officials Records, RC/11, Part II, Annex 
III, 45, para.14. 
783 Barriga and Grover (n 733) 525. 
784 Wenaweser (n 715) 885.  
785 ‘Conference Room Paper on the Crime of Aggression’, RC/WGCA/1/Rev.2, 7 June 2010, 
in WGCA Report, Appendix I; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 754. 
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motu) and Article 15 ter (Security Council referral). 786  However, Prince Zeid 
emphasized in his Introductory Remarks that ‘splitting 15 bis into two provisions 
does, however, and I would like to underline this, not mean that the conference room 
paper now endorses the idea of also splitting the entry into force procedures, by using 
both 121(4) and 121(5). The conference room paper continues to be neutral on this 
issue of the entry into force procedure (…).’787   
The ABS Proposal was so politically useful because it would have been difficult 
otherwise for Ambassador Wenaweser and Prince Zeid to construct the demarcation 
between the trigger mechanisms because ‘such a move would have been appeared 
biased toward the permanent members of the Security Council,’788 as it would have 
been implied that the other two trigger mechanisms should be dropped in the light of 
the difficulty in reaching an agreement.789  
6.5.3. Phase Two: The Canadian proposal  
 
The Canadian delegation put forward their own proposal on the 8th June 
(“Canadian Proposal”), which refocused on the issue of state consent of the aggressor 
state with respect to state referrals and proprio motu investigations. This Proposal can 
be seen to reflect elements from the negative interpretation of Article 121(5). 
Attention should be drawn to proposed Article 15 bis (2):  
 
Where the Security Council has not made such a determination within six (6) 
months after the date of notification and where a State Party has declared its 
acceptance of this Paragraph, at the time of its deposit of its instrument of 
ratification or acceptance or at any time thereafter, the Prosecutor may proceed 
with an investigation of a crime of aggression provided that: 
 
                                                
786 In the Introductory Remarks by the Chairman (8 June), he said ‘my expectations that 
splitting the old 15 bis into two provisions, along exactly those lines, will help us sharpen our 
discussions on the question of consent, and on the question of the filter’; reprinted in Barriga 
and Kress ibid 761. 
787 ibid 762.  
788 Barriga and Grover (n 733) 525. 
789 ibid. 
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(a) the Pre-trial Chamber has authorized the commencement of the investigation 
in respect of a crime of aggression in accordance with the procedure contained 
in article 15; and  
 
(b) [all state(s) concerned with the alleged crime of aggression] the state on whose 
territory the alleged offence occurred and the state(s) of nationality of the 
persons accused.   
6.5.4. Phase Three: The Argentina, Brazil, Switzerland and Canada proposal  
 
The delegations from Argentina, Brazil, Switzerland and Canada engaged in 
closed multilateral consultations and surprised the remaining delegations by 
producing a combined non-paper (“ABCS non-Paper”) two days before the end of the 
Conference.790 The starting premise for this non-paper was that in the case of a 
Security Council referral, there would be no further conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Court. Thus, the focus was on conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction for the other two trigger mechanisms: state referrals and proprio motu.  
The following provisions played a significant role in the final compromise:  
 
Article 15 bis 
Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (State referral, proprio 
motu) 
4. (Alternative 2) 
… 
4 bis. The Court may exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression committed 
by a State Party’s nationals or on its territory in accordance with article 12, unless 
that State Party has filed a declaration of its non-acceptance of jurisdiction of the 
Court under paragraph 4 of this Article.  
 
4 ter. Such a declaration may be submitted to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations at any time before December 31, 2015 or, in the case that ratify or accede to 
the Rome Statute after that date, upon ratification or accession. This declaration may 
e withdraw at any time, in which case the Court, subject to the provision of paragraph 
1, may exercise its jurisdiction in respect of the State concerned.  
 
4 cor. In respect of a State which is not party to this Statute, the Court shall not 
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as provided for in this article 
when committed by that State’s nationals or on its territory.   
 
                                                
790 Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 50–51; 
Wenaweser (n 715) 885; Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1203–1204.        
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The ABCS non-Paper was considered seriously by Ambasador Wenawesser and 
Prince Zeid because it represented a significant political development in the 
negotiations. There appeared to be compromise between conflicting positions with 
respect to the issue of state consent.791 The proposed provision was predicated upon 
Article 12 Rome Statute albeit two qualifications: i) allowing any State Party to file a 
declaration of non-acceptance of jurisdiction; and ii) excluding non-States Parties.792 
For the delegations who were in favour of the jurisdictional regime under Article 12, 
to agree to the exclusion of non-States Parties entirely was a large concession. 
Likewise, for the delegations who were in favour of state consent, the inclusion of 
Article 12 was a large compromise.793 The ABCS Proposal gave rise to many 
informal bilateral and group consultations for the next day and a half.794  
6.5.5. Phase Four: the final stages, the role of the President of the Review Conference 
 
At the conclusion of the work of the Working Group, the negotiations were then 
presided over by the President of the Review Conference, who put forward the first 
non-Paper (“President’s First Paper”) at the plenary of the Review Conference in the 
morning of Thursday, 10 June 2010.795 This non-Paper appeared to closely mirror the 
ABSC non-Paper:  
  
1. Decides to adopt the amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (hereinafter “The Statute”) contained in annex I of the present resolution, which 
are subject to the rafication or acceptance and shall enter into force in accordance with 
article 121, paragraph 5 (bold in original text). 
 
Two additional provisions have been put forward under Article 15 bis (1): 
 
1 bis  The Court may, in accordance with article 12, exercise jurisdiction with 
respect to an act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State has 
lodged a declaration of non-acceptance with the Registrar.  
 
I ter The Court may not exercise jurisdiction with respect to an act of 
aggression committed by a Non-State Party (bold included in original text). 
 
                                                
791 see Barriga and Grover (n 733) 526; Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime 
of Aggression’ (n 446) 51. 
792 Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1204. 
793 Barriga, ‘Exercise of Jurisdiction and Entry into Force of the Amendments on the Crime of 
Aggression’ (n 744) 45–46. 
794 Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 51. 
795  ‘Draft Resolution: The Crime of Aggression’, informal non-paper submitted by the 
President of the Review Conference, originally dated 10 June 2010, 10.00am; reprinted in 
Barriga and Kress (n 6) 774. 
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With respect to Security Council referrals, a footnote pertaining to Articles 15 ter 
reads:  
 
The suggestion has been made to delete paragraphs, 2, 3 and 4. This would 
dispense the need for a determination of an act of aggression by the Security 
Council in order to proceed, bearing in mind that this article should not 
negatively affect the ability of the Security Council to exercise its competence 
under Art. 13 (b). (bold included in original text). 
 
The President’s legal advisor, Barriga reveals that this suggestion was made in 
bilateral consultations and was then being openly tested.796 
When speaking to the Plenary, Ambassador Wenawesser addressed the opt-out 
mechanism: 
 
You know that a number of states have circulated suggestions to this effect 
and have in their suggestions outlined something that would usually be 
referred to as an “opt out” under article 121(5) of the Rome Statute. This has 
met with quite some legal criticism as I understand it and this is why we have 
redrafted this approach in a new paragraph 1 bis of article 15 bis. Under this 
approach, this would not constitute an “opt out” of the amendment, much 
rather it would be a declaration that would affect a State Party’s acceptance 
already given under article 12(1). So this approach is very strongly based on 
article 12 of the Rome Statute and the very specific manner in which the crime 
of aggression is already reflected in the Rome Statute.797 
 
 Half a day later, he circulated the second non-paper (“President’s Second Paper”).798 
The following provisions are worth reproducing:  
 
1. Decides to adopt, in accordance with article 5, paragraph 2, of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter: “the Statute”) the amendments to the 
Statute contained in annex 1 of the present resolution, which are subject to ratification 
                                                
796 Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 52. 
797 2010 Introductory Remarks by the President (10 June, 11.00am); reprinted in Barriga and 
Kress (n 6) 780; In a reflection written post-Kampala, Ambassador Wenaweser states, ‘I 
presented it to the plenary as a sui generis solution on the basis of the acceptance already 
given by states parties under Article 12 of the Rome Statute, which as possible due only to the 
specific placement of the crime of aggression in the Statute, Wenaweser (n 715) 886–887. 
798  ‘Draft Resolution: The Crime of Aggression’, informal non-paper submitted by the 
President of the Review Conference, 10 June 2010, 11.00pm; reprinted in Barriga and Kress 
(n 6) 147. 
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or acceptance and shall enter into force in accordance with article 121, paragraph 5; 
and notes that any State Party may lodge a declaration referred to in article 15 
bis prior to ratification or acceptance.  
[…]  
4. Also decides to review the amendments on the crime of aggression seven years 
after the beginning of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. 
 
Article 15 bis: 
 
1 bis. The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of 
aggression committed at least five years after the adoption of the amendments 
on the crime of aggression and one year after the ratification or acceptance of 
the amendments by thirty States Parties.  
 
1 ter. The Court may, in accordance with article 12, exercise jurisdiction over a 
crime of aggression, arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party, 
unless that State Party has previously declared that it does not accept such 
jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar. The withdrawal of such 
a declaration may be effected at any time and shall be considered by the State 
Party within three years.  
 
1 quarter. In respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall 
not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by that 
State’s nationals or on its territory. (bold included in the original text) 
 
Another important modification can be seen in Article 15 bis (4) (Alternative 2) that 
the Pre-Trial Division instead of the Pre-Trial Chamber has to authorize the 
commencement of the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression where no such 
determination of the State act of aggression is made by Security Council.799 With 
respect to Security Council referrals, under Article 15 ter, the provisions from the 
previous paper which require a determination by the Security Council have been 
deleted.   
                                                
799 Introductory Remarks by the President 10 June, 11.30 pm; reprinted in Barriga and Kress 
ibid 787. 
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On the last day of the Review Conference, the President put forward a 
Preliminary Compromise Proposal.800 
 
15 bis 
4. Where no such determination is made within six months after the date of 
notification, the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a 
crime of aggression, provided that the Pre-Trial Division has authorized the 
commencement of the investigation in respet of a crime of aggression in 
accordance with the procedure contained in article 15, and the Security Council 
had not decided otherwise in accordance with Article 16. 
 
5. The Court may not exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in 
accordance with article 15 bis until States Parties so decide no earlier than 2017. 
 
In a reflection written post-Kampala, Ambassador Weneweser writes: 
 
At this point, less than 24 hours before the end of the Conference, my 
assessment of the political dynamic at the Conference was such that the 
submission of a text that provided for an alternative in case of a Security 
Council inaction was the logical next step – although I was aware that this 
might raise serious objections. I therefore informally consulted the most 
important stakeholders in the late morning of Friday 11 June, on the basis of a 
short non-paper. The paper suggested the Pre-Trial Division as an additional 
filter to the Security Council, and sought to balance this choice in two ways: 
first, it made a specific reference to Article 16 of the Statute and the 
competence of the Security Council to suspend ICC Proceedings. Second, it 
delayed the activation of the ICC’s jurisdiction by at least seven years, and in 
doing so gave precedence to the Security Council filter: the ICC’s jurisdiction 
under 15 ter would automatically be activated after seven years, unless states 
parties decided otherwise. The more controversial jurisdiction under 15 bis, 
on the other hand, would require an active decision by states parties (…) 
[Italics added]801  
                                                
800 2010 President’s Preliminary Compromise; reprinted in Barriga and Kress, ibid 789. 
801 Wenaweser (n 715) 886–887. 
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The final non-Paper (“President’s Third Paper) marked the final compromise proposal 
and was presented to the plenary at 4.30pm. It contained inter alia the additional 
condition of ‘a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of 
States Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute.’ Under 
both Article 15 bis and 15 ter, paragraph 3, a provision is to be inserted for the 
delayed entry into force. Article 15 bis(8) had added “in accordance with article 16.” 
Ambassador Weneweser further reflects:  
 
Direct talks between the most interested parties continued well into the 
evening with an extended and at times irrational argument over this aspect of 
the final package. In the end, they were unsuccessful. Given the high stakes 
and the late hour, I put a final proposal on the table, which today is the text of 
paragraph 3 of Articles 15 bis and 15 ter of the Rome Statute: the activation of 
both triggers is thus subject to a future decision of states parties, to be taken 
after 1 January 2017 by at least an absolute majority of two-thirds of states 
parties.802 
 
This “final proposal” was made verbally, and the final revised draft resolution was put 
to the Review Conference, where the resolution was adopted by consensus at 
12.20am.803  
6.5.6. The importance of consensus  
 
The Rome Statute provided no clear instructions how to amend the Statute to give 
effect Article 5(2), which is why it is presumed that the Review Conference has the 
competence under international law to adopt the sui generis regime pertaining to the 
crime of aggression. 804 The fact that the Kampala Amendments were adopted by 
                                                
802 ibid 887; the 2010 President’s Final Compromise Proposal reads: 15 bis (3) The Court 
shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with this article, subject 
to a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is 
required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute; 15 ter (3) The Court shall exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with this article, subject to a decision 
to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is required for the 
adoption of an amendment to the Statute,  reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 804. 
803 Barriga, ‘Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 446) 57. 
804 For presumed legality see Certain Expenses of the United Nations (n 29) 168. 
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consensus is significant as it is symbolic that every State Party present at the Review 
Conference had adopted the sui generis regime.  
From a political perspective, the consensus is indicative that the crime of 
aggression was an important issue, requiring engagement from all present States 
Parties to create a sense of unity. Blokker and Kress reveal that ‘almost every State 
Party from the outset indicated that it had strong preference for consensus decision-
making or even that it did not want to vote as this would be divisive for the ICC.’805 
The unspoken compliance pull of aiming for consensus can be seen in the following 
example: before the adoption of resolution RC/Res.6, the representative of Japan had 
announced that ‘it is with a heavy heart that I declare that, if all the other delegations 
are prepared to support the proposed draft resolution as it stands, Japan will not stand 
in the way of a consensus.’806  
6.6. The Kampala Compromise 
 
In the light of the above, the term Kampala Compromise is apt to describe the 
amendments on the crime of aggression, which were the result of the highly complex 
and conflicting interests within the States Parties, which inevitably led to significant 
concessions on all sides as the ‘logical consequence of aiming for consensus.’807   
Under Article 1 of the Kampala Amendments, the Review Conference:  
 
Decides to adopt, in accordance with article 5, paragraph 2, of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter: “the Statute”) the 
amendments to the Statute contained in annex I of the present resolution, 
which are subject to ratification or acceptance and shall enter into force in 
accordance with article 121, paragraph 5; and notes that any State Party may 
lodge a declaration referred to in article 15 bis prior to ratification or 
acceptance. 
                                                
805 Blokker and Kress (n 715) 891. 
806 Statement by Japan, Statements by States Parties in explanation of position before the 
adoption of resolution RC/Res.6 on the crime of aggression; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 
6) 810.    
807 Blokker and Kress (n 715) 891; Ambassador Wenaweser had affirmed ‘few had expected – 
or even thought feasible – a consensus in Kampala on a comprehensive package on the crime 
of aggression. That this proved possible in the end was due to the very positive negotiating 
dynamic in Kampala, whih found its most important expression in the willigness of all sides 
to make massive concessions’, Wenaweser (n 715) 887. 
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There are three important points to note. First, the Amendments are adopted in 
accordance with Article 5(2). Second, the Amendments shall enter into force under 
Article 121(5). 808 Third, the declaration pursuant to Article 15 bis allows a State 
Party to lodge a declaration with the Registrar that it does not accept the Court’s 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, an “opt-out” clause (Article 15 bis 4).  
The jurisdictional regime of the crime of aggression in the Kampala Amendments 
was the result of concessions and compromise in the light of two concomitant issues 
that encompassed seemingly irreconcilable positions: i) the role of the Security 
Council; ii) and the need for consent by the alleged aggressor state. This led to the 
separation of the trigger mechanisms, whereby state referrals and proprio motu 
investigations are governed by Article 15 bis, whilst Security Council referrals fall 
under Article 15 ter.   
6.6.1. The entry into force and the conditions of jurisdiction: A tale of frustration   
 
The entry-into-force mechanism is Article 121(5), while the jurisdictional regime 
is predicated upon Article 15 bis and Article 15 ter. As already produced above, 
Article 121(5) states:  
Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force 
for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the 
deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State 
Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by 
that State Party's nationals or on its territory.  
 
The first sentence specifies the entry into force, whilst the second sentence pertains to 
jurisdiction of the Court over the crime covered by the amendment. Thus, the entry-
into-force mechanism is directly relevant to the jurisdictional regime of the Court 
over the crime covered by the amendment. However, the second sentence does not 
appear to fit entirely with the jurisdictional regime contained within the Kampala 
Amendments, as pointed out by Zimmerman, ‘both Article 15 bis and Article 15 ter 
contain significant deviations from the amendment provisions contained in the ICC 
                                                
808 Zimmermann (n 734) 212–215. 
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Statute itself, and, in particular, Article 121(5) thereof.’809 Per contra, Article 15 ter 
does not necessarily deviate from the second sentence of Article 121(5) because the 
Court may ordinarily exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-State Parties in 
situations of Security Council referrals.810 Any contention thus stems from how 
Article 121(5) should be read in relation to Article 15 bis.   
In my view, the most logical approach is to create a demarcation between the 
entry into force of the amendments (first sentence), and the jurisdiction (second 
sentence). The first sentence of Article 121(5) is to be read only in the context of the 
entry-into-force of the Kampala Amendments.811 The text of OP1 can be read to 
support this, as it only mentions “entry into force” in accordance with Article 121(5) 
and does not make any explicit reference to jurisdiction.   
This way, the mechanism for the entry-into-force of the amendments for each 
individual ratifying State Party is a separate matter from the jurisdictional regime of 
the Court with regard to the crime of aggression. Thus, upon entry into force of the 
amendments on the crime of aggression, the jurisdictional regime is not necessarily 
the one as contained within the second sentence of Article 121(5) as it is predicated 
upon the conditions pursuant to Article 15 bis and Article 15 ter.   
  As can be expected, this interpretation is not so readily accepted. Manson for 
example, argues that ‘the Art. 121(5) reference in OP1 comes together with ‘the 
baggage’ of the second sentence, to which it is tied in the Statute, whether welcome or 
not.’812 This suggests that the jurisdictional regime of the crime of aggression should 
be read in accordance with Article 121(5). His argument that Article 121(5) should be 
read in its entirety is not unreasonable. Yet, the interpretation that calls for a 
demarcation between the first sentence and the second sentence of Article 121(5) is 
tenable because the nature of the conditions of jurisdiction pertaining to the crime of 
aggression, which was ultimately adopted by the Review Conference is sui generis in 
nature. Article 5(2) Rome Statute is the lex specialis which provided the ASP/Review 
                                                
809 ibid 220; See McDougall (n 7) 250. 
810 Article 13 Rome Statute; Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’ (n 698) 618. 
811 Barriga, ‘Exercise of Jurisdiction and Entry into Force of the Amendments on the Crime of 
Aggression’ (n 744) 31,34,46.; For a contrary position see Robert Manson, ‘Identifying the 
Rough Edges of the Kampala Compromise’ (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 417, 426; Kress 
and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1214.     
812 Manson (n 811) 426; For a different view, McDougall writes that 'if Article 121(5) is not 
understood as applying to the crime of aggression as a matter of law, there is no legal 
impediment to the severing of the second sentence’, McDougall (n 7) 252.  
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Conference with the legal basis to adopt this sui generis regime pertaining to the 
entry-into-force and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction for the crime of 
aggression. This way, the amendments shall enter into force for those States Parties 
which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or acceptance, whilst the jurisdictional regime is a separate matter of 
interpretation.   
As this section now continues to examine the sui generis jurisdictional regime 
over the crime of aggression, Article 15 bis will be focused upon, especially in the 
light of how the provision should be read together with Article 121(5). The findings 
are directly relevant to the jurisdictional regime over the crime of aggression in 
situations of state referrals and proprio motu investigations, as at present, the 
jurisdictional regime over the crime of aggression in relation to state referrals and 
proprio motu is not entirely clear and there are differing positions in relation to the 
correct regime.813 Therefore, the answer stems from the correct interpretation of 
Article 121(5) and Article 15 bis(4).   
6.6.2. The jurisdictional regime over the crime of aggression  
i. State Referrals and proprio motu: Article 15 bis 
 
There are two aspects to the jurisdictional regime under Article 15 bis: 
substantive conditions and procedural conditions. The former relates directly to the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the individual for the crime of aggression, whilst the 
latter refers to pre-determination that the state act element of the crime is present.  
A. The substantive conditions  
 
The crux of the substantive conditions is encapsulated in Article 15 bis(4):  
 
The Court may, in accordance with Article 12, exercise jurisdiction over a 
crime of aggression, arising from an act of aggression committed by a State 
Party, unless that State Party has previously declared that it does not accept 
                                                
813 See Zimmermann (n 734) 224; Milanovic, ‘Aggression and Legality: Custom in Kampala’ 
(n 579) 182; Reisinger Coracini, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction 
Over the Crime of Aggression - at Last ... in Reach ... Over Some’ (n 717) 771–781; see also 
Statement by Japan, Statement of States Parties in explanation of position before the adoption 
of resolution RC/Res.6 on the crime of aggression; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 810. 
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such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar. The withdrawal 
of such a declaration may be effected at any time and shall be considered by 
the State Party within three years. 
 
The specific reference to Article 12 makes it worthwhile to reproduce the provision in 
its entirety. Article 12: 
 
(1) A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of 
the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.  
 
(2) In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:  
 
 (a)  The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, 
if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of 
registration of that vessel or aircraft;  
 (b)  The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.  
 
(3) If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under 
paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The 
accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in 
accordance with Part 9. 
 
Pursuant to Article 12(1), it can be deduced that all States Parties to the Rome Statute 
have accepted jurisdiction with respect to the crime of aggression, which was already 
present under Article 5(1) at the adoption of the Statute.814 Article 12(2) stipulates 
that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction under the territorial or nationality principle 
provided that one of the parties to the proceeding is a State Party. As such, 
jurisdiction is not limited only to States Parties and may extend towards nationals of 
                                                
814 William Schabas and Sharon Williams, ‘Article 12’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 
(2nd edn, 2008). 
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non- States Parties under one of the aforementioned jurisdictional links above.  
Thus, a reference to Article 12 implies that the Court may exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression provided that one of the parties to the proceedings has 
ratified the Kampala Amendments. Provided the State Party wishing to initiate 
proceedings has ratified the Kampala Amendments, jurisdiction can be established 
under the territorial or nationality principle. It is not necessary for both aggressed and 
aggressor state to ratify the Amendments.  
It should be noted that Article 15 bis(4) stipulates that jurisdiction will be 
exercised over an act of aggression committed by a “State Party”, which infers that 
non- States Parties are excluded from jurisdiction. Article 15 bis(5) affirms this, by 
stating ‘in respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall not 
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by that State’s 
nationals or on its territory.’ Read together, these provisions suggest that the 
jurisdictional regime of the crime of aggression departs from an ordinary reading of 
Article 12. Also departing from the Rome Statute is the “opt-out” mechanism 
whereby a State Party declares that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a 
declaration with a Registrar.815 Presumably, it is intended that this declaration should 
be made prior to the commission of the crime of aggression.816 This appears to be 
contrary to the mechanism of “opt-in” where a State Party actively ratifies an 
Amendment.   
(i) Understanding the scope of jurisdiction that the ICC can exercise over the crime of 
aggression 
 
It is the reference to Article 12 which renders Article 15 bis(4) incompatible with 
the second sentence of Article 121(5). There are two conflicting views on how Article 
15 bis(4) is to be read in conjunction with Article 121(5): 
• The second sentence of Article 121(5) should prevail  
• Article 15 bis(4) should prevail  
                                                
815 It is interesting to note that some have questioned the decision to lodge the Declaration 
with the Registrar of the Court, as it is the Secretary-General of the United Nations who is the 
depository of instruments of accession under Article 125(3). As such, this raises the concern 
of untransparency, see Reisinger Coracini, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Exercise of 
Jurisdiction Over the Crime of Aggression - at Last ... in Reach ... Over Some’ (n 717) 775; 
McDougall (n 7) 265–266. 
816 See McDougall (n 7) 266. 
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The scope of jurisdiction that the ICC may exercise over the crime of aggression is 
predicated upon the correct interpretation of how these two provisions should be read 
together. The following tables best illustrate the differences between both approaches.  
 
Table 2: Prevalence of the negative interpretation of the second sentence of Article 121(5) 
 
Jurisdiction [A] SP [A]SP RA [A] SP OO [A] SP RA  
OO 
[A] NSP  
[V] SP No No No No No 
[V] SP RA No Yes No No No 
[V] SP OO No No No No No 
[V] SP RA 
OO 
No Yes No No No 
[V] NSP No No No No No 
      
 
Table 3:  The prevalence of Article 15 bis(4) 
 
 Jurisdiction [A] SP [A]SP RA [A] SP OO [A] SP RA 
OO 
[A] NSP  
[V] SP No Yes No No No 
[V] SP RA Yes Yes No  No No 
[V] SP OO No Yes No No No 
[V] SP RA 
OO 
Yes Yes No No No 




[A] – aggressor state; [V] – aggressed state; SP – State Party that has not ratified the Amendments; SP 
RA – State Party that has ratified the Amendments; SP OO – State Party that has not ratified the 
Amendments but has opted-out; SP RA OO – State Party that has ratified the Amendments and opted-
out; NSP – non State Party.  
 
As can be seen, the prevalence of Article 15 bis(4) gives rise to a broader 
jurisdictional scope than the interpretation which adheres to the prevalence of the 
negative interpretation of Article 121(5). Thus, both readings have significant 
differences with respect to the jurisdictional regime of the crime of aggression. This 
has practical ramifications relating to Court proceedings.     
i. The second sentence of Article 121(5) should prevail  
 
The first assumption is that those who hold this view, would argue that Article 
121(5) is to apply in its entirety.817 In other words, the first sentence and the second 
sentence must both apply. The next assumption is that those who subscribe to this 
                                                
817 Manson (n 811) 426. 
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view uphold the negative interpretation of the Article 121(5). This is arguably because 
Article 15 bis(4) appears to broadly reflect the positive interpretation of the second 
sentence of Art 121(5) Rome Statute, albeit the exclusion of non-States Parties 
entirely from the jurisdiction. Although Article 15 bis(4) is not entirely consistent 
with the positive interpretation, the crux of the matter is that it upholds that 
jurisdiction can be satisfied on either the nationality or territorial basis. This provides 
reason to believe that those who uphold the positive interpretation of the second 
sentence of Article 121(5) would be in favor of Article 15 bis(4) having prevalence.  
The negative approach on the other hand, holds that jurisdiction is available only 
when both the aggressed state (party) and the aggressor state (party) have ratified the 
amendments on the crime of aggression. It is the latter that is important because the 
underlying issue is that the aggressor state must specifically consent to the jurisdiction 
of the Court. Thus, both the territorial and nationality jurisdictional links must be 
cumulative for the Court to have jurisdiction over this crime.  
An argument in support of the negative interpretation of the second sentence of 
Article 121(5) can be made that RC/Res.5, which was also adopted at the Review 
Conference, amends Article 8 of the Rome Statute pursuant to Article 121(5). Hence 
the application of Article 121(5) should consistently apply to to the amendment to 
Article 8 and to the crime of aggression.818 The criticism of this approach however is 
that it appears to discard Article 15 bis(4), which is arguably contrary to the intention 
and efforts of the drafters of the Amendments to create the sui generis framework. 
ii. Article 15 bis(4) should prevail  
 
This approach adopts the proposed demarcation between entry into force and 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction as submitted above. The first sentence of 
Article 121(5) should be concentrated upon with regards to the entry-into-force of the 
Kampala Amendments:  
 
Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force 
for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the 
deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance.  
 
                                                
818 Zimmermann (n 734) 220. 
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This means that the amendments on the crime of aggression will enter into force for 
the relevant State Party individually, one year after the deposit of the treaty 
instrument. It has no bearing on the question of jurisdiction, which falls under the 
second sentence. Therefore, this interpretation involves an apparent severance of the 
first and second sentence of Article 121(5), holding only the former to be applicable 
with respect to the overall Amendments. This can be reaffirmed by arguing that OP1 
only mentions “entry into force” in accordance with Article 121(5).  
In other words, only the first sentence of Article 121(5) applies specifically in 
the context of entry-into-force, whilst the second sentence becomes effectively 
discarded. The conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction are to be governed by Article 
15 bis and ter. With respect to the former, in the conflict between the second sentence 
and Article 15 bis(4), it is the latter that prevails as the jurisdictional regime. Thus, the 
application of the first sentence of Article 121(5) as the entry-into-force mechanism, 
followed by Art 15 bis(4) as the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction give rise to 
a “sui generis” adoption regime.819  
The next stage of analysis is to find the legal reasoning that allows Article 15 
bis(4) to prevail over the second sentence of Article 121(5). Three arguments can be 
put forward. The first argument is that Article 15 bis(4) is the lex specialis which is 
why it can prevail over the second sentence of Article 121(5). It can be argued that 
Article 15 bis(4) is more specific as it relates directly to the jurisdiction for the crime 
of aggression, whilst the second sentence of Article 121(5) refers more generally to 
amendments to Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8. As such, it should prevail in the light of the 
jurisdictional regime over the crime of aggression. Alternatively, it can also be argued 
that Article 15 bis(4) is the lex posterior and should thus prevail.  
The second argument is predicated upon Article 12(1) as the lex specialis. 
This means that all State Parties have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression under Article 5(1). The second sentence of Article 121(5) is not relevant 
because the States Parties have already accepted jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. As such, it is inapplicable in the present context: Article 15 bis(4) will 
apply. 
                                                
819 Kress and von Holtzendorff argue that 'it is thus perfectly possible and hence preferable to 
construe the enabling resolution and draft Article 15 bis (4) of the ICC Statute harmoniously 
as both the wording of the latter provision and the genesis of the negotiations suggest it', 
Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1214.  
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The final argument is that the lex specialis is Article 5(2), which allowed the 
ASP to adopt a sui generis approach under the legal basis of creating the “conditions 
for the exercise of jurisdiction.”This sui generis approach appears to be predicated 
upon Article 5(1) and Article 12(1): that the crime of aggression is already present in 
the jurisdiction of the Court and that States Parties have already agreed to such.820 
Therefore, the second sentence of Article 121(5) does not necessarily apply, allowing 
the newly drafted Article 15 bis and Article 15 ter to apply as the “conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction.” In my view, this is the most convincing argument as the 
Review Conference has the legal competence under Article 5(2) to adopt a sui generis 
jurisdictional regime, which is not entirely consistent with the typical adoption 
process under the Rome Statute but nevertheless falls under the “conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction.”821  It is worth examining again the Statement of the Japanese 
delegation after the adoption of the Kampala Amendments:   
 
Article 5, paragraph 2, is invoked as the basis with respect to “amendment”, 
whereas article 121, paragraph 5, is invoked as the basis with respect to “entry 
into force”. This is a typical “cherry picking” from the relevant provisions 
related to the amendment, that is, in Japan’s view, very difficult to justify. We 
have serious doubt as to the validity of article 5, paragraph 2, as a basis of 
amendment to the Statute, if we adhere to a sound interpretation of the Rome 
Statute as agreed upon in Rome. The upshot is a highly accentuated 
complication in the legal relation after the amendment between States Parties, 
as well as the relation between States Parties and non-States Parties, which is 
extremely unclear and hard to understand.822 
 
That said, the Rome Statute did not provide clear instructions how to make the 
relevant amendments with respect to Article 5(2). Although “cherry picking”  is 
difficult to justify, it is to be presumed that the States Parties have the competence 
                                                
820 Wenaweser (n 715) 885; see also Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1215. 
821 Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1215; For a contrary position, see Zimmermann (n 
734) 226–227. 
822 Statement by Japan, Statements by States Parties in explanation of positions after the 
adoption of resolution RC/Res.6 on the crime of aggression; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 
6) 811–812.       
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under international law to implement Article 5(2) as they decide fit. 823 Furthermore, 
the sui generis adoption regime which encompassed the “cherry picking” was adopted 
by consensus.824 This justifies Article 15 bis(4) taking prevalence over the second 
sentence of Article 121(5). The Japanese Delegation continued to express: 
 
What happens to article 5, paragraph 2? 
How can we possibly delete article 5, paragraph 2, of the Statute in accordance 
with article 5, paragraph 2, itself? This is nothing but a “legal suicide” or 
“suicide of legal integrity.” 
 
Yet, the deletion of Article 5(2) appears to be logical in the context of the addition of 
Article 8 bis, Article 15 bis and Article 15 ter to the Rome Statute. This is because the 
definition of the crime of aggression and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction 
have been incorporated into the amended Statute.   
In the light of the present analysis, my view is that the intended jurisdictional 
scope that the Court can exercise over the crime of aggression is the one demonstrated 
in Table 3.  It is still necessary for one of the State Parties to the proceedings to ratify 
the Amendments as the entry into force for this relevant State is required to activate 
the jurisdictional regime under Article 12(2). Thus, if the aggressor State Party has 
ratified the amendments, jurisdiction may be exercised under the nationality principle 
(Article 12(2)(b)) and it is not necessary for the aggressed state Party to ratify. 
Alternatively, if the aggressed state Party has ratified, the jurisdictional link may be 
established under the territorial principle (Article 12(2)(a)) even if the aggressor State 
Party has not ratified.825  
Some may argue that the interpretation above is contrary to the VCLT, as Article 
40(4) VCLT stipulates that the amending agreement does not bind any State already a 
party to the treaty which does not become a party to the amending agreement.826 
                                                
823 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (n 29) 168; See Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 
133) 1215. 
824 Article 31(3)(a) VCLT 1969; see McDougall (n 7) 257. 
825 For an unfounded criticism of this interpretation, see Beth Van Schaack, ‘Negotiating at 
the Interface of Power and Law: The Crime of Aggression’ (2011) 49 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 507, 598. 
826 Beth Van Schaack, ‘The Aggression Amendments: Points of Consensus and Dissension’ 
[2011] Santa Clara University Legal Studies Research Paper No.7-11 1, 2; Zimmermann (n 
734) 210. 
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However, the chapeau of Article 40(1) states that paragraph (4) applies ‘unless the 
treaty otherwise provides.’ As the Rome Statute has provided under Article 5(2) for a 
sui generis regime pertaining to the crime of aggression, then Article 40(4) VCLT is 
not necessarily applicable.  
(ii) Opting-out 
 
Although the opt-out mechanism has led to much confusion, it is part of the 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5(2). In a similar manner 
to the exclusion of non-States Parties entirely from the jurisdiction of the Court, such 
mechanism is unprecedented within the Rome Statute. There are three questions that 
need to be addressed:   
i. What is the purpose of the opt-out mechanism? 
ii. Can States Parties that do not intend to ratify or accept the Amendments opt-
out?  
iii. How should the opt-out mechanism be interpreted as part of the condition for 
the exercise of jurisdiction?  
 
i. What is the purpose of the opt-out mechanism? 
 
The opt-out mechanism effectively excludes a State Party from jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression, by allowing it to derogate from Article 12(1) Rome Statute 
by a declaration that it does not accept the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. The opt-out also serves as derogation from Article 12(2) Rome Statute 
because it prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction even if the other State Party has 
ratified. Thus, the underlying rationale of the opt-out mechanism is to preserve the 
issue of state consent. As the declaration of non-acceptance of jurisdiction 
demonstrates an unequivocal dissent, the relevant State Party is excluded entirely 
from the jurisdiction of the Court.   
As the Rome Statute does not provide any basis to opt-out of Article 12, the 
competence and power to create such derogation must fall within the mandate 
conferred to the Review Conference by Article 5(2).827 When reflecting upon the 
                                                
827 See Reisinger Coracini, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction Over 
the Crime of Aggression - at Last ... in Reach ... Over Some’ (n 717) 777. 
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negotiation history, it can be recalled that Article 15 bis(4) was the result of a 
compromise between the Argentinian, Brazilian, Swiss Proposal and the Canadian 
Proposal.828The former represented those who envisaged the broadest jurisdictional 
regime possible, whilst the latter stood for state consent. The exclusion of non-States 
Parties from the jurisdiction represented a compromise on the part of those who 
wanted a broader jurisdictional regime as this meant that the Court would have a more 
limited jurisdictional regime for the crime of aggression compared to the other 
crimes.829 
On the other hand, those in favor of a consent based regime accepted a 
concession that States Parties did not have to specifically “opt-in” to the Court’s 
jurisdiction, but instead could “opt-out.” 830  The “opt-out” mechanism therefore 
represents a compromise between the objective of creating the broadest jurisdictional 
regime possible and the need for absolute state consent.831   
ii. Can States Parties that do not intend to ratify or accept the Amendments opt-out?  
 
The question is whether States Parties can “opt-out” in the absence of ratification 
or acceptance. This has interesting legal implications. The starting point is that the 
opt-out mechanism itself is contained within Article 15 bis(4), thus formulating part 
of the Amendments. The assumption therefore is that for such mechanism to apply, 
the Amendments would need to enter into force for the relevant State. However, it is 
interesting that OP1 notes: 
 
any State Party may lodge a declaration referred to in article 15 bis prior to 
ratification or acceptance.   
 
It does not appear to be necessary for the State Party to ratify or accept the Kampala 
Amendments in order to opt-out from the Court’s jurisdiction. However, the mention 
                                                
828 Barriga, ‘Exercise of Jurisdiction and Entry into Force of the Amendments on the Crime of 
Aggression’ (n 744) 45. 
829 ibid. 
830 ibid 46. 
831 Kress and von Holtzendorff write that 'the idea of an "opt-out" declaration was born 
precisely to bridge the gap between those in favor of applying the jurisdictional scheme under 
Article 12(2) of the ICC Statute without modification (ABS Proposal) and those in preference 
of a strictly consent-based regime (Canadian Proposal), Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 
1213.  
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of “prior to” bears the assumption that the relevant State Party has an intention to 
ratify or accept the Kampala Amendments at a subsequent stage. As there is no 
specific temporal condition, it can be assumed that there is no consecutive time frame 
between the declaration of non-acceptance and ratification or acceptance. In other 
words, there is no assigned time limit between the declaration of non-acceptance and 
the subsequent act of ratification or acceptance – only the assumption that relevant 
State Party intends to perform the latter.832 
Nevertheless, as the opt-out mechanism is contained in Article 15 bis(4) which is 
part of the Amendments, it appears that ratification (at some point) is necessary. This 
may appear to some to be rather absurd. Why would a State Party ratify the 
Amendments in the light of its intent to opt-out from the jurisdiction of the Court? A 
simple explanation could be that the entry-into-force of the Amendments for that 
particular State Party contributes towards the requirement of 30 ratifications. By 
ratifying then opting out or vice versa, the State Party assists with the activation of the 
Court’s jurisdiction over the crime without the concern of its own nationals being 
prosecuted. Such State Party is also in an advantageous position, as it can initiate 
proceedings against the aggressor state (party) but shields its nationals from 
jurisdiction if the situation is reversed (reference to Table 2).833 Indeed, some may say 
that this asymmetry introduces ‘a privilege that may also serve as an incentive to 
ratify the Statute.’834 
This, nevertheless, remains only an assumption because it is not clear as to 
whether the declaration of non-acceptance is linked or conditional upon the 
subsequent process of ratification or acceptance. The reality is that a State Party may 
very well opt-out without subsequent ratification or acceptance. Thus, the possibility 
should be acknowledged that States Parties that do not intend to ratify or accept the 
Amendments may choose to opt-out from the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. Reisinger-Coracini writes that: 
 
                                                
832 Reisinger Coracini, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction Over the 
Crime of Aggression - at Last ... in Reach ... Over Some’ (n 717) 777. 
833 See ibid 776; McDougall submits that ‘this benefit itself represents an abrogation of the 
negative interpretation of Article 121(5), which would have exempted the nationals and the 
territory of non accepting States Parties whether those States Parties were the victim or 
aggressor.’ McDougall (n 7) 255. 
834 Reisinger Coracini, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction Over the 
Crime of Aggression - at Last ... in Reach ... Over Some’ (n 717) 776. 
 278  
It is my understanding that only states parties that ratify the amendments may 
lodge a declaration of non-acceptance. The legal basis for the opt-out 
declaration is set forth in the amendments, which only enter into force for 
those states that have ratified them. A declaration of non-acceptance by a state 
party that does not ratify the amendments and remains party to the unamended 
treaty would be difficult to justify in light of the prohibition of reservation 
according to Art.120.835 
 
In an earlier publication, she submitted that:  
 
It will ultimately be up to the Court to decide whether a declaration of non-
acceptance would be covered by the undeniably wide discretion provided in 
Article 5(2) or whether such a declaration would amount to a prohibited 
reservation according to Article 120.836 
 
This draws attention to the possibility that in a situation where the aggressor state 
(party) has opted out from the jurisdiction of the Court, the aggressed state (party) 
may challenge such declaration. It is of course for the Court’s discretion as to whether 
to accept such declaration. In such a situation, the aggressor state (party) may choose 
to justify the legality of the declaration of non-acceptance under pacta tertiis nec 
nocent nec prosunt. As such, the relevant State Party does not necessarily have to 
ratify the amendments but may regard itself as a “third State” with respect to the 
amended Rome Statute. 837 An example where a “third State” is awarded such 
privilege can be seen in Article 12(3), which allows a non-State Party to accept the 
exercise of jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crime in question by lodging a 
declaration with the Registrar.  
 
                                                
835 Astrid Reisinger Coracini, ‘More Thoughts on “What Exactly was Agreed in Kampala on 
the Crime of Aggression”, 2 July 2010; available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/more-thoughts-
on-what-exactly-was-agreed-in-kampala-on-the-crime-of-aggression.  
836 Reisinger Coracini, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction Over the 
Crime of Aggression - at Last ... in Reach ... Over Some’ (n 717) 778.     
837Ibid; McDougall (n 7) 252. 
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iii. How should the opt-out mechanism be interpreted as part of the condition for the 
exercise of jurisdiction? 
 
If it is held that the ratification and acceptance or intended ratification and 
acceptance of the Amendments is a necessary requisite for the declaration of non-
acceptance to be legitimate, then the opt-out mechanism can be said to support the 
argument that the second sentence of Article 121(5) shall prevail. This is because the 
opt-out mechanism can only apply to a State Party that has ratified or accepted the 
amendments.  
On the other hand, if it is accepted that a State Party may opt-out without 
ratifying or accepting the amendments under pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, 
then this reinforces the interpretation that Article 15 bis(4) should prevail.838 Without 
having to ratify or accept the amendments, acceptance of and consent to jurisdiction is 
already present by virtue of Article 12(1) of the Rome Statute. Therefore, unless a 
State Party makes use of the opt-out mechanism, it is implied that the acceptance of 
and consent to the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime as aggression pursuant to 
Article 5(1) is still applicable.  
Although these arguments may appear to be logical, my view is that it is 
nevertheless necessary for the relevant State Party to ratify the Amendments for the 
Opt-out mechanism to have legal effect. This is consistent with the text of OP1 and 
Article 15 bis(4). Ultimately, it remains the discretion of the Court under Article 
119(1) to decide whether the State Party wishing to opt-out of jurisdiction has the 
legal basis to do so.    
B. The procedural conditions 
 
The procedural conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression for state referrals and proprio motu can be found in Articles 15 bis (6) – 
(8). It is worth producing these provisions in full.  
Article 15 bis(6):  
 
 
                                                
838 McDougall (n 7) 255. 
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Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed 
with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, he or she shall first 
ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of 
aggression committed by the State concerned. The Prosecutor shall notify the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situation before the Court, 
including any relevant information and documents.  
 
Article 15 bis(7): 
 
Where the Security Council has made such a determination, the Prosecutor 
may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression.  
 
Article 15 bis(8): 
 
Where no such determination is made within six months after the date of 
notification, the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a 
crime of aggression, provided that the Pre-Trial Division has authorized the 
commencement of the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression in 
accordance with the procedure contained in article 15, and the Security 
Council has not decided otherwise in accordance with article 16. 
 
As can be seen, the hypothesis that the Security Council has exclusive privilege to 
determine an act of aggression with respect to state referrals and proprio motu 
investigations was ultimately rejected. 839The Council nevertheless is given the 
priority of making a determination of aggression, which is consistent with Article 24 
of the UN Charter. However, the question is how ‘determination’ is to be considered. 
As Article 15 bis(6) does not specify that a determination should be made under 
                                                
839 France had expressed, ‘France has decided not to oppose the consensus, despite the fact 
that it cannot associate with this draft text as it disregards the relevant provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations enshrined in article 5 of the Rome Statute. In article 15 bis, 
paragraph 8, the text restricts the role of the United Nation Security Council and contravenes 
the Charter of the United Nations under the terms of which the Security Council alone shall 
determine the existence of an act of aggression. Under these conditions, France cannot depart 
from its position of principle’, Statement by France, Statements by States Parties in 
explanation of position after the adoption of resolution RC/Res.6 on the crime of aggression; 
reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 6) 811; see Blokker and Kress (n 715) 894.   
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Article 39, UN Charter or that the Council should be acting under Chapter VII, it is 
assumed that this is not necessary. In the present context, a determination of an act of 
aggression is not for the purposes of recommending enforcement collective measures 
in relation to a situation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Security Council would 
make a determination for the purposes of prosecution at the ICC in an ongoing 
situation of aggression. Thus, any determination of aggression for the purposes of 
Article 15 bis(4) is likely to be retrospective.  
It is not clear whether the Council needs to be specific that an act amounts to 
“aggression” or if words broadly along the basis of a “threat to the breach of 
international peace and security” may suffice. Presumably, there should be a specific 
determination of an act of aggression. In the case of a ‘negative determination,’ it is 
likely that this should be viewed in the same light as a non-determination and the 
Prosecutor may seek the Pre-Trial Division’s authorization after six months. This 
suggests that the ICC may reach a different conclusion than the Security Council in 
determining the existence of an act of aggression.  
Here, an interesting observation can be made. Leaving aside the underlying fact 
that the IMT and the Security Council are different types of international institutions, 
and that the NMT and ICC are also different in nature, the common underlying factor 
is that the IMT and the Security Council are considered to be of a higher authority on 
a hierarchical level than the NMT or the ICC. Nonetheless, the determination by the 
IMT was re-evaluated and a broader scope was adopted in the subsequent NMT. 
Likewise, the determination by the Security Council can be re-evaluated by the ICC, 
and it is within the discretion of the Pre-Trial Division to determine aggression.  
In any event, it should be remembered that in accordance with Article 15 bis (9), 
any determination by the Security Council shall be without prejudice to the Court’s 
own findings. Thus, the Court may come to its own findings with regard to the 
determination of an act of aggression. Also, Article 15 bis(8) specifically refers to 
powers of the Security Council, which allows the Council to defer an investigation or 
prosecution for a period of 12 months pursuant to a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.840 Not only does the reference to Article 16 respect the 
primacy of international peace and security under Chapter VII, allowing prevalence 
over the interests of justice, but serves to reassure the P5 that despite the rejection of 
                                                
840 E.g., SC Res.1442 (2002), renewed in SC Res 1487 (2003).  
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the exclusivity hypothesis, the Council still has the power to defer an investigation 
pertaining to the crime of aggression.  
The Pre-Trial Division of the Court was adopted as the jurisdictional filter when 
the Security Council fails to determine an act of aggression, which means that no less 
than six judges with predominantly criminal trial experience will convene in full 
session to decide upon authorizing the commencement of the investigation. 841 By 
comparison, three judges typically carry out the functions of Pre-Trial Chamber.842 
Therefore, choosing the Pre-Trial Division in lieu of the Pre-Trial Chamber as the 
jurisdictional filter provides an additional number of judges.843 Questions may arise 
with respect to the operation of how this Division will authorize the investigation for 
the crime of aggression844 – the contemplation of which exceeds the compass of this 
dissertation. Rather, it falls on to the Court to clarify Guidelines and/or the Rules of 
Procedure for how the judges should address this issue.845 It is also worth noting that 
Article 15 bis(5) / 15 ter(5) state: 
 
This article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the exercise of 
jurisdiction with respect to other crimes referred to in Article 5. 
 
This implies that during the delay period of six months, the need for pre-
determination of the state act element of the crime of aggression will not affect the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the other crimes if they are included in the same 
indictment against the defendant.  
C. Non-States Parties 
 
As mentioned above, non-States Parties are precluded from the jurisdiction of the 
ICC with respect to the crime of aggression (Article 15 bis(4) and bis(5)). Article 15 
                                                
841 Article 39, Rome Statute. 
842 Article 39(2)(b), Rome Statute.  
843 See Reisinger Coracini, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction Over 
the Crime of Aggression - at Last ... in Reach ... Over Some’ (n 717) 784. 
844 ibid. 
845  See Hans-Peter Kaul, ‘Kampala June 2010 – A First Review of the ICC Review 
Conference’ (2010) 2 Goettingen Journal of International law 649, 664–665; see also 
McDougall (n 7) 272. 
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bis(5)846 specifically excludes jurisdiction over the nationals and territory of non-
States Parties.847 This amounts to an ‘element of reciprocity so far unknown to the 
Rome Statute.’848 The opt-out mechanism, which is also so far unknown to the Rome 
Statute, allows a State Party to be excluded entirely from the jurisdiction of the Court 
over the crime of aggression, which would place the relevant state on the same locus 
standi as non-States Parties.849  The exclusion of non-States Parties entirely from the 
jurisdiction of the Court has been criticized as being incompatible with the Rome 
Statute.850 Before the adoption of RC/Res.6, the Japanese delegate expressed a serious 
concern that the amendments ‘unjustifiably solidifies blanket and automatic impunity 
of nationals of non- States Parties: a clear departure from the basic tenent of Article 
12 of the Statute.’851 
The next question is whether Article 12(3) is applicable to the crime of 
aggression. This provision allows a non-State Party to declare that it accepts 
jurisdiction of the Court over the particular crime which must be read against Article 
15 bis (5). Can the latter be said to be lex posterior? 
Article 15 bis is not clear in this respect. An argument may be made that as there 
is no explicit provision otherwise, it can be assumed that non-States Parties can make 
a declaration under Article 12(3).852 Barriga however, submits that ‘this is not 
possible’853 and supports his claim by explaining that ‘the exclusion of the ad-hoc 
declarations under 12(3) is also confirmed by the drafting history of the 
understandings.’ 854  Indeed, at the early stages of the Review Conference, a 
provisional draft understanding read:  
 
                                                
846 It is interesting to note that the language used in Article 15 bis (5) is very similar to the text 
of the second sentence of Article 121(5). McDougall writes that this may suggest that a 
negative interpretation of the second sentence prevailed, McDougall (n 7) 256. 
847 Reisinger Coracini, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction Over the 
Crime of Aggression - at Last ... in Reach ... Over Some’ (n 717) 780. 
848 ibid. 
849 See McDougall (n 7) 257.   
850 See Zimmermann (n 32) 221-223. 
851 Statement by Japan, Statements by States Parties in the explanation of position before the 
adoption of resolution RC/Res.6 on the crime of aggression; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 
6) 810.  
852 See Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Court  
853 Barriga, ‘Exercise of Jurisdiction and Entry into Force of the Amendments on the Crime of 
Aggression’ (n 744) 41.    
854 Ibid.  
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It is understood, in accordance with article 11, paragraph 2, of the Statute, that 
in a case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise jurisdiction 
only with respect to crimes of aggression committed after the entry into force 
of the amendment for that State, unless the State has made a declaration under 
article 12, paragraph 3.855 
 
This provision was eventually deleted as a result of explicit requests by certain States 
Parties as there was concern that this would lead to an unfair advantage against States 
Parties.856 This is because non-States Parties would then be in a position to decide 
whether or not to participate in proceedings against States Parties. As such, 
McDougall believes that Article 15 bis (5) must be viewed as the lex specialis and 
apply as a blanket exception. 857 
Assuming that both States Parties that have not ratified and non-States Parties are 
on the same locus standi, a related question is whether the aggressed state (party) that 
has not ratified against can invoke a declaration under Article 12(3) to invoke ad hoc 
acceptance of jurisdiction. Kress and Von Holtzendorff suggest that this may be 
possible.858 The implications of this are that a State Party may wish to use Article 
12(3) instead of going through the domestic and international ratification process.859  
McDougall on the other hand disagrees, arguing that ‘the requirement that the 
aggression amendments must have been ratified by a State Party to enter into force 
under the first sentence of Article 121(5) is not remedied by an Article 12(3) 
declaration. […] the carefully balanced lex specialis regime established under Article 
15 bis militates against the application of Article 12(3). 860  My view is similar. Upon 
a straightforward reading of the text of Article 12(3), the provision appears to apply 
specifically to a “State which is not a party to this Statute.” To allow States Parties to 
use this provision as an ad hoc acceptance defeats the purpose of having a specific 
framework relating to the crime of aggression. Should States Parties wish to accept 
                                                
855 See McDougall (n 7) 263; Barriga, ‘Exercise of Jurisdiction and Entry into Force of the 
Amendments on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 744) 41.                   
856 McDougall, ibid; Barriga, ibid.   
857 McDougall (n 7) 263. 
858 See Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) footnote 117.       
859 Reisinger Coracini, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction Over the 
Crime of Aggression - at Last ... in Reach ... Over Some’ (n 717) 775–776.  
860 McDougall (n 7) 264. 
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the jurisdiction of the Court, they should ratify the Amendments pursuant to their 
domestic ratification process.  
D. The question of state consent  
 
In general, consent means that the State has agreed to the competence and 
jurisdiction of the international court or tribunal.861 The Monetary Gold principle was 
raised during the course of negotiations with respect to the Kampala Amendments.862 
In this case, the ICJ held that the consent of a State is necessary for adjudication upon 
its international responsibilities, even when the relevant State is not a party to the 
proceedings so long as the legal interests of that State would form the subject matter 
of the decision.863 Akande argues:  
 
Even if one assumes that the Monetary Gold doctrine applies to all 
international law tribunals, it will not, in most cases, be violated by the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over non-parties nationals in respect of 
official acts done pursuant to the policy of that non-party.864 
 
However, he departs from this position with respect to the crime of aggression. Here, 
he argues strongly in favor of the applicability of the Monetary Gold Principle: 
 
                                                
861 See  Akande, ‘Prosecuting Aggression: The Consent Problem and the Role of the Security 
Council’ (n 753). 
862 McDougall (n 7) 245; see also Akande, ‘Prosecuting Aggression: The Consent Problem 
and the Role of the Security Council’ (n 753) 18. 
863 The ICJ held “to adjudicate upon the international responsibility of Albania without her 
consent would run counter to a well-established principle of international law embodied in the 
Court's Statute, namely, that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its 
consent. […] In the present case, Albania's legal interests would not only be affected by a 
decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision. In such a case, the Statute 
cannot be regarded, by implication, as authorizing proceedings to be continued in the absence 
of Albania.” Monetary Gold Removed from Rome (Italy v France, United Kingdom and 
United States) I.C.J. Rep [1954] (hereinafter “Monetary Gold”) 33 -34; This principle was 
subsequently applied by the Court in the Case concerning East Timor, where the Court held 
‘whatever the nature of the obligations invoked, the Court could not rule on the lawfulness of 
the conduct of a State when its judgment would imply an evaluation of the lawfulness of the 
conduct of another State which is not a party to the case. Where this is so, the Court cannot 
act, even if the right in question is a right erga omnes’, Case concerning East Timor (Portugal 
v Australia) I.C.J Rep [1995] 90 (hereinafter “Case concerning East Timor”), para.29. 
864 Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-
Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’ (n 698) 635. 
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the ICC, in cases of aggression, is not only called upon to determine individual 
criminal responsibility but is also being asked to make determinations of State 
responsibility under the law relating to the use of force. For the Court to make 
these determinations, it would need to consider the conduct of the relevant 
States […] The fact that the determination of state responsibility by the ICC is 
a prerequisite to determination of individual liability immediately implicates 
the principle of consent in cases where the State that is alleged to have 
committed the act of aggression is not a party to the ICC, or has accepted the 
jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to aggression.865 
 
The underlying rationale is that ‘the ICC will not be engaged in making 
determinations about a State’s legal responsibility, nor will it need to do so, in order 
to convict an individual for war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. 
However, the position is different with respect to aggression.’866 That said, it is not 
entirely accurate that the crime of aggression differs from the other Rome Statute 
crimes in this respect. The perpetration of war crimes, crimes against humanity or 
genocide may also directly or indirectly involve considerations of the conduct of a 
State.867 McDougall rightly points out that ‘there may be political, as opposed to 
legal, consequences for States as a result of aggression rulings, but this falls outside 
the Monetary Gold principle.’868 
Furthermore, with respect to the question of state responsibility, Article 25(4) 
Rome Statute stipulates: 
 
no provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall 
affect the responsibility of States under international law.  
 
It can be inferred that individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression is 
without prejudice to state responsibility for an act of aggression. To be more specific, 
                                                
865 Akande, ‘Prosecuting Aggression: The Consent Problem and the Role of the Security 
Council’ (n 753) 17, He adds ‘in the case of ICC jurisdiction over aggression by a non-
consenting State, the only way in which the ICC may convict for aggression is first to decide 
on State responsibility and then on individual responsibility. In such cases involving non-
consenting States, the ICC would be acting contrary to the consent principle’, id.  
866 ibid 16. 
867 See also McDougall (n 7) 245–246.   
868 ibid 245. 
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there are different legal consequences pertaining to each set of responsibility. Thus, 
the determination of an act of aggression is for the purposes of executing legal 
consequences against the perpetrator of the crime of aggression and not for enforcing 
legal consequences against the aggressor state for state responsibility.   
Be that as it may, one more factor should be taken into consideration. This is the 
question of whether the determination of an act of aggression or successful conviction 
of a perpetrator for the crime of aggression may amount to satisfaction for the 
aggressed state as a legal remedy against the aggressor state. If so, a strong argument 
can be made that consent of the aggressor state is indeed necessary as satisfaction 
amounts to a legal consequence under state responsibility. Nevertheless, even if the 
determination of an act of aggression does not amount to satisfaction, the question of 
consent is still important and is directly linked to the jurisdictional regime.  
E. How should consent be expressed?  
 
Consent of a State Party to the jurisdiction of the Court over the core crimes 
under Article 5(1) is represented by ratifying the Rome Statute. In the context of the 
crime of aggression, explicit consent to the Court’s jurisdictional regime is evidenced 
by ratifying the Kampala Amendments. By contrast, a non-ratifying State Party does 
not appear to consent to the jurisdictional regime of the crime of aggression. 
However, this is not necessarily true. An argument can be made that non-ratifying 
States Parties have nevertheless consented to the jurisdiction regime of the ICC over 
the crime of aggression by virtue of Article 5(1) and Article 12(1) of the Rome 
Statute.  This suggests that consent can be either specific or implied. The former is 
evident by the ratification of the Kampala Amendments, whilst the latter appears to be 
predicated upon an interpretation of Article 5(1) and Article 12(1).   
Akande argues that ‘consent given by those States to the Statute in general cannot 
be regarded as consent to the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.’869 
He continues ‘a party that does not accept an amendment to which the provision 
relates does not consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over that crime.’870 
Be that as it may, pursuant to Article 15 bis (4), States Parties may make a declaration 
of non-acceptance of jurisdiction – the ramifications of which precludes the State 
                                                
869 Akande, ‘Prosecuting Aggression: The Consent Problem and the Role of the Security 
Council’ (n 753) 26. 
870 ibid 28. 
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Party from the jurisdiction of the court over the crime of aggression entirely. Thus, 
the concept of specific consent becomes reversed because the State Party is allowed to 
specify its non-consent to jurisdiction. For the opt-out mechanism to make sense, it is 
presumed that the consent of all States Parties is implied pursuant to Article 5(1) and 
Article 12(1) until or unless it makes a declaration of non-acceptance of jurisdiction 
under Article 15 bis(4). In a way, the opt-out mechanism is symbolic of a safeguard 
for States Parties to ensure that consent is represented.871 As submitted by Kress and 
von Holtzendorff:  
 
To not require the ratification of the alleged aggressor State Party, but to grant 
that state the right to opt out, amounts to a ‘softened consent-based regime’ 
that is situated somewhere between the two poles and is, therefore, a suitable 
basis from which to create a compromise.872 
 
In my view, it is negligent to assume that state consent is entirely irrelevant with 
respect to Article 15 bis. This is evident by two factors: i) the opt-out mechanism and 
ii) the exclusion of jurisdiction over non-States Parties. Thus, it is clear that consent is 
implied. It is not strict in the sense of the negative interpretation of the second 
sentence of Article 121(5) which implies an “opt-in” as opposed to “opt-out” 
mechanism where the State Party has to ratify the relevant amendments. Instead it is 
assumed that when acceding to the Rome Statute, States Parties have already 
indicated their consent to the jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance 
with Article 12(1), as recalled in the preamble to Resolution RC-Res.6. Thus, the onus 
is placed on States Parties to opt-out if they do not intend to consent to the jurisdiction 
of the crime of aggression. This has been labelled as the ‘softly consent-based pillar’ 
of the Kampala compromise.873   
Therefore, it is submitted that state consent is a condition for the exercise of 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Kampala Amendments. The nature of such consent need 
not be specific or explicit, but is implied so long as the State Party has not opted-out 
of the jurisditional regime over the crime of aggression.  
                                                
871 See Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1213. 
872 ibid. 
873 ibid 1215. 
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ii. Security Council referrals: Article 15 ter 
 
Unlike state referrals and proprio motu investigations, the jurisdictional regime 
pertaining to Security Council referrals is relatively straightforward. Article 15 ter (1) 
stipulates:  
 
The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in 
accordance with Article 13, paragraph (b), subject to the provisions of this 
article. 
 
The jurisdiction over Security Council referrals is subject to the activation of the 
Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 15 ter (2) and 15 ter (3).874  Article 13(b) Rome 
Statute refers to a ‘situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations.’ By encapsulating the existing jurisdictional 
regime of Security Council referrals, this means that the Court can investigate and 
exercise jurisdiction over all of the four core crimes without having to make any 
differential treatment with respect to the crime of aggression.  
There is no legal prerequisite of a determination that an act of aggression has 
occurred under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This means that the Council does not 
necessarily need to make a specific determination of an act of aggression under 
Article 39; it shall suffice to refer the “situation” to the Court.875 The Security Council 
therefore has the discretion to decide how it refers the situation to the court, the 
‘“green light” is implied in its referral of a respective situation to the ICC.’876  In any 
event, if such determination is made, Article 15 ter(4) reaffirms that this shall be 
without prejudice to the Court’s own findings under this Statute, which inherently 
serves to uphold due process for the accused. Such determination nevertheless will 
have a persuasive effect on the Court’s consideration of the state act element of the 
crime. For example, it is likely that the Court will find that such use of force was 
unauthorized by the Council.   
                                                
874 Cf. Understanding One, Kampala Amendments, Resolution RC/Res.6.  
875 See Kress and von Holtzendorff (n 133) 1211–1212. 
876 Blokker and Kress (n 715) 893.    
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The procedural implications of Security Council referrals are that proceedings 
may take place faster, as the Prosecutor is able to proceed with the investigation 
without submitting it to the control of the Pre-Trial Chamber.  Also, under Article 53 
Rome Statute, the Prosecutor has the discretion to decide whether there is a sufficient 
basis for prosecution and is thus under no duty or obligation to initiate investigations 
upon the referral by the Security Council.   
The issue of state consent is not relevant in situations of a Security Council 
referral. This is reflected in Understanding Two: 
 
It is understood that the Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression on the basis of a Security Council referral in accordance with 
article 13, paragraph (b), of the Statute irrespective of whether the State 
concerned has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in this regard. 
6.6.3. Future states parties 
 
The Japanese delegate raised the question: 
 
What happens to a non-State Party that desires to accede to the Rome Statute 
after the adoption of the amendments? How can we be certain that such a 
newly acceding country will be bound by the amended Rome Statute, while 
we see no provisions stipulating about the entry into force of the amendments 
per se?877  
 
It can be assumed that future State Parties will be bound by the aggression 
amendments. This is consistent with Article 40(5) of the VCLT:  
 
Any State which becomes a party to the treaty after the entry into force of the 
amending agreement shall, failing an expression of a different intention by 
that State: (a) be considered as a party to the treaty as amended; and (b) be 
                                                
877 Statement by Japan, Statements by States Parties in explanation of position after the 
adoption of resolution RC/Res.6 on the crime of aggression; reprinted in Barriga and Kress (n 
6) 811. 
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considered as a party to the unamended treaty in relation to any party to the 
treaty not bound by the amending agreement.878 
 
In any event, Article 15 bis(4) encompasses the opt-out mechanism, which allows the 
newly acceded State Party to declare its non acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression should it chose to do so. This neatly avoids the question 
of whether ratification of the amendments are necessary for the opt-out mechanism to 
take legal effect as it is assumed that the newly acceded State Party has consented to 
the amended Rome Statute.  
6.7. The International Criminal Court as an enforcement mechanism   
  
The analysis above has delineated the jurisdictional regime of the ICC over the 
crime of aggression in situations of state referrals and proprio motu, and Security 
Council referrals. This makes it possible to understand to what extent the ICC is 
representative of the legal interests of the aggressed state (and the international 
community) with respect to the prosecution of the crime of aggression.  
There is a preliminary consideration which first needs to be addressed: this is the 
procedural issue of complementarity. The admissibility of cases to the ICC is 
predicated upon the mechanism of complementarity (Article 17 Rome Statute). 
Complementarity means that in situations where both States Parties and the ICC have 
concurrent jurisdiction, the former should have the primary competence to facilitate 
investigations/prosecutions. Thus, the case is inadmissible if the State Party is 
conducting an investigation or prosecution unless there is reason to believe that the 
State is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out such proceedings (Article 17(1) 
Rome Statute). Therefore, complementarity serves as a procedural bar to the ICC 
where it must first be satisfied that there is judicial inactivity on the relevant domestic 
level or that the relevant State is unwilling/unable to genuinely carry out an 
investigation or prosecution in the interests of justice subsequent to the 
commencement of the proceedings.879  
As discussed in Chapter III, the ratification of the Rome Statute is representative 
of a delegation of competence by the State Party to the ICC to prosecute individuals 
                                                
878 SWGCA Report 2008 (November), para.17. 
879 For a general understanding of complementarity, see Darryl Robinson, ‘The Mysterious 
Mysteriousness of Complementarity’ (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 67. 
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under the national or territorial principle. This signifies that prosecution at the ICC is 
in the interests of the international community.880 Complementarity ensures that it is 
only in a situation where domestic courts do not have jurisdiction under the 
nationality or territorial principle that the ICC assumes its jurisdictional competence 
over the crime (or are unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute or investigate). 
Thus, the legal interests of State Parties are preserved as domestic courts have the 
priority of prosecution in situations of concurrent jurisdiction.  
As discussed above, pursuant to Article 15 bis, the conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction can be summarized as follows. First, both the aggressed state and 
aggressor state must be a State Party to the Rome Statute. Second, one of the parties 
to the intended proceedings must have ratified the Kampala amendments. This 
represents the delegation of domestic competence of the ratifying State Party to the 
ICC to prosecute the crime of aggression under either the nationality or territorial 
principle of jurisdiction. Third, the aggressor state (party) must not have opted-out. As 
demonstrated in the Tables above in section 6.6.2, if the aggressor state (party) has 
opted out, it is excluded entirely from the jurisdictional regime over the crime of 
aggression. The aggressed state may of course choose to challenge the legality of the 
adoption procedure and/or opt-out declaration, and it is for the Court under Article 
119 Rome Statute to settle such dispute.  
As can be seen, the jurisdictional regime under Article 15 bis excludes non-States 
Parties. Thus, in a situation where the aggressor state is a non-State Party, its nationals 
are precluded entirely from the jurisdiction of the Court. This may be so even if the 
aggressed state party has ratified the amendments.  In this case, the ICC is unable to 
carry out the legal interest of the aggressed state (party). Similarly, if the aggressed 
state is a non-State Party, its legal interest is excluded from the ratione personae 
jurisdiction of the Court even if the aggressor state is a ratifying State Party. 
Therefore, in situations where the aggressor state is a non-State Party, or a State Party 
that has opted-out, the legal interests of the aggressed state, regardless of whether it is 
a State Party, or has ratified the Kampala Amendments, can be represented at the ICC 
only if the Security Council makes a referral pursuant to Article 15 ter.   
                                                
880 Akande writes that proprio motu investigations may be considered as an expression of the 
‘joint authority of those states to prosecute’, Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’ (n 698) 626. 
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Overall, it appears that the jurisdictional regime of the ICC is rather limited, 
which means that the scope whereby the ICC may act in the interests of the aggressed 
state to prosecute the crime of aggression is also rather limited. In particular, the 
exclusion of non-States Parties entirely from the jurisdictional regime significantly 
limits the effectiveness of the Court as an enforcement mechanism. Such asymmetry 
between State Parties and non-State Parties is indeed regrettable,881 but ironically 
gave rise to a step forward in international law, as it was one of the substantial 
concessions that allowed the Kampala Amendments to be adopted by consensus.  
It is worth recalling that the underlying rationale behind excluding non-States 
Parties and States Parties that have opted-out is the need for consent to the 
jurisdictional regime of the ICC over the crime of aggression. The question of consent 
in the negotiations was directly relevant to the legal interests of the aggressor state, 
which appear to have prevailed over the interests of the aggressed state for the ICC to 
serve as an enforcement mechanism over the crime of aggression. Upon examining 
the balance between the legal interests of the aggressor state and the aggressed state 
with respect to enforcement against the crime of aggression at the ICC, an observation 
can be made that the jurisdictional regime over the crime of aggression at the ICC is 
indicative of the former prevailing over the latter.   
On the domestic level, assuming that the aggressed state has prescribed the crime 
of aggression in its domestic legislation, its courts may exercise territorial criminal 
jurisdiction against a national from the aggressor state. By ratifying the Kampala 
Amendments, the aggressed state (party) may then delegate this competence to the 
ICC. Under international law, such delegation can be made without the consent of the 
aggressor state. However, the need for the consent of the aggressor state, regardless of 
how ‘softly based’, appears to prioritise the interest of the aggressor State over the 
aggressed state, as the latter has a legal interest for the prosecution for a crime 
committed against its territory.     
Indeed States Parties who were involved in the negotiation process leading to the 
Kampala Amendments had legal interests both ways – it was in their interests to 
protect their nationals from prosecution at the Court without their consent to the 
jurisdictional regime over the crime of aggression; yet it was also in their interests as 
                                                
881 ibid 649–650. 
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a potential victim of the crime of aggression to ensure that the jurisdictional regime at 
the ICC may represent their interests.  
That said, it should not be forgotten that the question of aggressor state consent 
was directly predicated on the exclusivity hypothesis of the Security Council. The 
political reality is that France and the UK were more likely to agree to the non-
exclusivity of the Security Council as a jurisdictional filter if aggressor state consent 
was an underlying requirement. Aggressor state consent in the absence of 
determination by the Security Council therefore played a large role as leverage, which 
allowed the two members of the P5 to concede on their monopoly point. This may 
account for a large part of the reason why the legal interests of the aggressor state 
appear to prevail over the legal interests of the aggressed state with respect to the ICC 
as an enforcement mechanism over the crime of aggression.   
6.8. Conclusion  
 
At present, it remains to be seen whether the jurisdiction of the ICC over the 
crime of aggression will be activated in 2017. Be that as it may, the role of the ICC as 
an enforcement mechanism against the crime of aggression can nevertheless be 
contemplated. It appears that the Kampala Compromise encapsulates a rather limited 
jurisdictional regime over the crime of aggression. There is still uncertainty over the 
scope of the jurisdictional regime in situations of state referrals and proprio motu as 
there are different interpretations that come into play with respect to Article 121(5) 
and Article 15 bis (4). As submitted in this chapter, my view is that the first sentence 
of Article 121(5) relates to the entry-into-force mechanism of the Kampala 
Amendments, while Article 15 bis (4) applies as the conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction. Thus, in the conflict between the second sentence of Article 121(5) and 
Article 15 bis (4), the latter prevails.  
This means that at least one of the States Parties to the proceedings must ratify 
the Kampala Amendments, as jurisdiction will be applicable pursuant to Article 12(2) 
of the Rome Statute under the nationality principle (Article 12(2)(b)) or the territorial 
principle (Article 12(2)(a)). The aggressor state does not necessarily have to be a 
ratifying State Party, as ratification by the aggressed state is sufficient to establish a 
jurisdictional link under the territorial principle. That said, the aggressor state must 
not have opted-out from the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of aggression. If 
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it has done so, then it is excluded entirely from proceedings even if the aggressed 
state (party) has ratified the Kampala Amendments.  
The opt-out mechanism and the exclusion of non States Parties from the 
jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of aggression in situations of state referrals or 
proprio motu is indicative that state consent (of the aggressor state) is necessary for 
the jurisdictional regime of the Court to apply. Such consent need not be explicit in 
the form of a ratification of the Kampala Amendments, but is implied so long as the 
State Party has not opted out of jurisdiction pursuant to Article 15 bis (4). By contrast, 
in situations of Security Council referrals, the consent of the aggressor state is not 
necessary for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.  
  This Chapter has shown that the jurisdictional regime of the ICC over the crime 
of aggression is rather limited, especially with regard to state referrals and proprio 
motu. Thus, the legal interests of the aggressed state and the international community 
may often be excluded from the competence of the Court to prosecute nationals from 
the aggressor state. The protection of the interests of the aggressed state can go only 
as far as Court has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.  
Nevertheless, the ICC is not the only enforcement mechanism. As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, domestic courts are also competent to serve as an 
enforcement mechanism against the relevant perpetrators. Thus, the aggressed state 
may also consider domestic courts as an enforcement mechanism. This is consistent 
with the mechanism of complementarity enshrined within the Rome Statute (Article 
17), which gives priority to domestic prosecution in situations of concurrent 
jurisdiction.  
It should be appreciated that although the jurisdictional regime pertaining to the 
crime of aggression is not perfect, it is nevertheless a phenomenal achievement. Prior 
to the Review Conference, many were skeptical as the question of the role of the 
Security Council and the concomitant question of state consent gave rise to seemingly 
irreconciliable positions. Under the legal mandate provided by Article 5(2) and a 
spirit of positive cooperation, the Review Conference adopted a sui generis regime by 
consensus. Thus, subsequent and inevitable legal ambiguities with respect to the 
interpretation of the Kampala Amendments should not undermine the historical 
significance of this consensus agreement.   
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Chapter VII. Prosecution of the crime of aggression 
at domestic courts 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
Domestic courts represent an enforcement mechanism against the crime of 
aggression. As mentioned in the previous chapter, complementarity ensures that in 
situations where the ICC and domestic courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression, the latter should have the priority of prosecution. It has been 
pointed out that this preserves the legal interests of the State Party, by allowing it to 
retain its competence to prosecute the crime. That said, it has been argued that 
complementarity should not apply to the crime of aggression,882 which suggests that 
prosecution of the crime should not take place in domestic courts. For example, Van 
Schaack generally discourages the ASP and the rest of the international community 
from domestic prosecutions of the crime of aggression and argues ‘to the extent that 
the crime of aggression is ever prosecuted beyond the nationality state, it is done in an 
international, rather than domestic, forum.’883 The underlying hypothesis of this 
argument is that domestic courts are not competent forum for prosecuting the crime of 
aggression, thus the ICC should have de facto exclusive jurisdiction. This was the 
position of the ILC in the Draft Code of Crimes. In its Report to the General 
Assembly, it was stated that ‘the crime of aggression was inherently unsuitable for 
trial by national courts and should instead be dealt with only by an international 
court.’884 As such, the proposed framework of enforcement against the crime of 
                                                
882  See Jennifer Trahan, ‘Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the International 
Criminal Court’s Crime of Aggression? Considering the Problem of “Overzealous” National 
Court Prosecutions’ (2012) 45 Cornell International Law Journal 569; Van Schaack, ‘Par in 
Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression’ (n 15); see also 
Pal Wrange, ‘The Crime of Aggression and Complementarity’, International Criminal 
Justice: Law and Practice from the Rome Statute to its Review (Ashgate 2010); Roger Clark, 
‘Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression’, The International Criminal Court and 
Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011); Nicolaos 
Strapatsas, ‘Complementarity and Aggression:  A Ticking Time Bomb?’ in Carsten Stahn and 
Larissa van den Herik (eds), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (TMC 
Asser Press 2010).  
883 Van Schaack, ‘Par in Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the Crime of 
Aggression’ (n 15) 137. 
884 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-seventh session, 2 
May to 21  
July 1995 (A/50/10), Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, vol.II(2), at 39.  
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aggression was that the ICC should have exclusive de facto jurisdiction, thereby 
serving as the sole enforcement mechanism.  
As the hypothesis that the ICC should have de facto jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression is contrary to the premise of this dissertation that international law relies 
on both the ICC and domestic courts as enforcement mechanisms against the crime of 
aggression, the question of domestic prosecution will be addressed as a preliminary 
issue (section 7.2). This Chapter will proceed to examine, and then challenge the 
underlying rationale put forward by the ILC (section 7.2.1) as to why domestic courts 
are not competent forum for prosecution (with the exception of the aggressor state 
wishing to initiate proceedings). In addition, recent developments will also be 
presented to demonstrate why the position of the ILC in the Draft Code of Crimes is 
not sustainable. Thus, it is substantiated that domestic courts are competent forum for 
the prosecution of aggression. From this premise, the legal interests of the forum state 
may be contemplated (section 7.2.2).   
The Chapter will then continue to examine other concerns that arise (section 7.3) 
with respect to determining the state act element of the crime (section 7.3.1) and the 
elements of individual conduct (section 7.3.2) and whether and to what extent they 
may be overcome. The final section (section 7.4) focuses on the procedural bars that 
come into play, and contemplates whether and to what extent they may be overcome.  
It should be clarified from the outset that this Chapter focuses on domestic 
prosecution for the crime of aggression from a legal analysis, leaving aside political 
considerations or ramifications. As such, the question is to be differentiated from 
‘should the crime of aggression be prosecuted in domestic courts,’ as the latter 
appears to be more of a policy question as opposed to legal question.     
7.2. The question of domestic prosecution  
 
It has been questioned whether domestic courts are competent fora to prosecute 
the crime of aggression. The hypothesis is that the ICC should have de facto exclusive 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 885 As such, complementarity is not entirely 
applicable to the crime of aggression.886   
                                                
885 In general see Van Schaack, ‘Par in Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and 
the Crime of Aggression’ (n 15); see also Article 8, Draft Code of Crimes.  
886 ibid 155; see also Trahan (n 882).     
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This section will now examine and challenge this hypothesis to demonstrate that 
it is not sustainable. It is submitted that domestic courts are indeed competent fora 
with respect to prosecution; thus complementarity is applicable to the crime of 
aggression in the same way as it is to the other core crimes in Article 5(1) of the 
Rome Statute.  
7.2.1 The International Law Commission and the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind 
 
In the Draft Code of Crimes, Article 8 stipulates:  
 
Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court, each 
State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over the crimes set out in articles 17, 18, 19 and 20, irrespective of 
where or by whom those crimes were committed. Jurisdiction over the crime 
set out in article 16 shall rest with an international criminal court. However, a 
State referred to in article 16 is not precluded from trying its nationals of the 
crime set out in that article.  
 
Thus, two separate jurisdictional regimes are proposed: jurisdiction for the crimes 
contained in Articles 17 to 20 (genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against UN 
and associated personnel and war crimes) and jurisdiction for the crime set out in 
Article 16 (crime of aggression). The former refers to concurrent jurisdiction of an 
international criminal court and jurisdiction of national courts for the crime of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against UN and associated personnel and 
war crimes (the “other crimes”) predicated on universal jurisdiction (‘irrespective of 
where or by whom those crimes were committed’), whilst the latter envisages an 
exclusive jurisdiction of an international criminal court with regard to the crime of 
aggression, with the singular exception of the aggressor state trying its nationals.   
In the Commentaries to the Draft Code of Crimes, an explanation for the different 
jurisdictional regimes was provided:  
 
This principle of exclusive jurisdiction is the result of the unique character of  
the crime of aggression in the sense that the responsibility of an individual for 
participation in this crime is established by his participation in a sufficiently 
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serious violation of the prohibition of certain conduct by States contained in 
Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations. The aggression 
attributed to a State is a sine qua non for the responsibility of an individual for 
his participation in the crime of aggression. An individual cannot incur 
responsibility for this crime in the absence of aggression committed by a state. 
Thus, a court cannot determine the question of individual criminal responsibility 
for this crime without considering as a preliminary matter the question of 
aggression by a State. The determination by a national court of one State of the 
question of whether another State had committed aggression would be contrary 
to the fundamental principle of international law par in parem imperium non 
habet.887  
 
Two main points can be ascertained. First, the state act of aggression is a necessary 
pre-requisite in order to determine individual criminal responsibility for the crime of 
aggression. Second, as the domestic court of one State has to consider whether 
another State has violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, this would violate the 
principle par in parem imperium non habet (also phrased as “par in parem non habet 
imperium”); this can be broadly understood to mean that one state cannot exercise 
jurisdiction over acts committed by another state, as “one State has no power over 
another.”888  
The consideration of the legality of the use of force with respect to Article 2(4) 
UN Charter does not appear to be the reason why the ILC believed that the 
international court should have exclusive jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
because there was no objection to a State whose leaders participated in the act of 
aggression from carrying out proceedings:  
 
                                                
887 Commentaries on the Draft Code of Crimes, 30.   
888  See Yoram Dinstein, ‘Par in Parem Non Habet Imperium’ [1966] Israel Law Review 407, 
413–415;Van Schaack, ‘Par in Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the Crime 
of Aggression’ (n 15) 149; Kelsen writes that ‘sovereignty is sometimes defined as supreme 
“power.” In this connection, power means the same as authority, namely legal power, the 
competence to impose duties and confer rights’, Hans Kelsen, Peace Through Law (2008 
Reprint of first edition 1944) 35. 
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this is the only State which could determine the responsibility of such a leader 
for the crime of aggression without being required to also consider the 
question of aggression by another State.889  
 
Thus, the problem appears to be the consideration of the forum state of the legality of 
the use of force by another state and the issue of par in parem non habet imperium.   
Van Schaack refers to this issue as a problem with domestic prosecution for the crime 
of aggression, which is why the ICC should assume the ‘posture of de facto 
exclusivity over the crime of aggression vis-à-vis domestic courts.’890  She writes: 
 
domestic courts hearing aggression cases not involving their own nationals 
will essentially be sitting in judgment over the acts of a co-equal sovereign. 
The need to rule on the commission state’s act of aggression implicates the 
principle of foreign sovereign immunity and its underlying philosophy, the 
maxim par in parem imperium non habet (‘an equal has no power over an 
equal’).891 
 
Yet, she neglects to contemplate or elaborate further how par in parem imperium non 
habet shall apply with respect to the crime of aggression,892 and more importantly 
whether or not this is a non-derogable principle. Thus, the question is whether par in 
parem non habet imperium serves as an insurmountable procedural barrier for 
prosecution of the crime of aggression in domestic courts. This question will be 
discussed separately later in this Chapter (section 7.3.1). At present, it is not necessary 
to examine par in parem imperium non habet in order to discredit the hypothesis that 
the ICC should have de facto exclusive jurisdiction on the basis that domestic courts 
are not competent fora. Three other reasons can be identified as to why the 
aforementioned position of the ILC in the Draft Code of Crimes is unsustainable.  
                                                
889 Commentaries on the Draft Code of Crimes, 30. 
890 Van Schaack, ‘Par in Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the Crime of 
Aggression’ (n 15) 136. 
891 ibid 149.  
892 Van Schaack submits that ‘prosecuting the crime of aggression domestically in situations 
other than following a change in regime will inevitably generate intense charges of 
politicization from within and outside the prosecuting state. Domestic aggression cases will 
no doubt exacerbate relations between states involved in situations already disrupted by a 
putative act of aggression’, ibid 150. 
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First, regardless of whether par in parem non habet imperium may arise in 
domestic proceedings, the competence of states to codify the crime of aggression into 
domestic legislation is not affected. Each State has the discretion to codify the crime 
of aggression into its domestic legislation, which includes the jurisdictional scope that 
it wishes to prescribe over this crime. 
Second, some states have actually codified the crime of aggression in their 
domestic criminal legislation.893 In an extensive comparative study of domestic 
legislation pertaining to the crime of aggression, Reisinger Coracini identified that all 
states that have the crime of aggression in their national legislation have incorporated 
jurisdiction under the territorial principle,894 the protective principle,895 and even the 
universality principle. 896 With respect to the universality principle, she observes that 
a number of legislations provide ‘blanket universal jurisdiction clauses’ that allow 
‘prosecution of non-nationals for crimes committed abroad against foreigners, if such 
crimes are proscribed by a recognized897 norm of international law or an international 
treaty binding upon that state.’898   
                                                
893 See Reisinger Coracini, ‘National Legislation on Individual Responsibility for Conduct 
Amounting to Aggression’ (n 431) 547–578; Reisinger-Coracini has observed that the 
following countries have codified aggression as a crime within their criminal codes: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina (criminal codes of the Federation, Brcko Disrict 
and Republika Srpska), Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, 
Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Russian Federation, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, at footnote 29. 
894 She observes that ‘every state, which is the victim of an act of aggression, may establish 
jurisdiction on the principle of territoriality’, ibid 564.  
895 She observes that ‘a number of states provide for jurisdiction upon the protective principle, 
where that state’s interests are violated’ and refers as examples to Art.15(3)(2) Armenian 
criminal code; Art.132 Bosnian criminal code (Brcko district); Art.9 Estonian criminal code; 
Art.5(3) Georgian criminal code; Art.6, para.4, Kazakh criminal code [footnote 128], ibid.  
896 e.g., Article 11(3) Moldovan Criminal Code states: If not convicted in a foreign state, 
foreign citizens and stateless persons without persons without permanent domiciles in the 
territory of the Republic of Moldova who commit crimes outside the territory of the Republic 
of Moldova shall be criminally liable under this Code and shall be subject to criminal liability 
in the territory of the Republic of Moldova provided that the crimes committed are adverse to 
the interests of the Republic of Moldova or to the peace and security of humanity, or 
constitute war crimes including crimes set forth in the international treaties to which the 
Republic of Moldova is a party; Article 6(1) Bulgarian Criminal Code states: foreign citizens 
who have committed abroad crimes against peace and humanity, whereby the interests of 
another state or foreign citizens have been affected’, ibid 564–565.  
897 ibid 564. 
898  Reisinger Coracini refers to Art.15(3)(1) Armenian criminal code; para.8 Estonian 
criminal code; Art.5(2) and (3) Georgian criminal code, Art.6, para.4 Kazakh criminal code; 
Art.15(2) Tajik criminal code in footnote 136; She subsequently elaborates that ‘depending 
on the specific formulation and interpretation of such a clause, it may apply to the crime of 
aggression as a crime under customary law, or as a crime defined by treaty law, if the state in 
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Third, a significant development that clearly departs from the position of the ILC 
is that the Review Conference did not establish that the ICC should have exclusive 
jurisdiction for the crime of aggression. In the drafting process, during the 
negotiations of the SWGA, the concept of complementarity was touched upon, albeit 
somewhat briefly.899 According to the 2004 Princeton Report, ‘there was general 
agreement that no problems seemed to arise from the current provisions being 
applicable to the crime of aggression’900 and that concerns ‘could be addressed 
through interpretation of the provisions of the Statute and therefore no amendments 
would be required.’901 It was concluded that: 
 
Articles 17, 18, and 19 were applicable in their current wording and the points 
raised merited being revised once agreement had been reached on the 
definition of aggression and the conditions for exercise of the Court’s 
jurisdiction.902 
 
The significance of this is that by agreeing that complementarity should apply to the 
crime of aggression in the same way as the other crimes in Article 5(1) of the Rome 
Statute, it is inferred that domestic courts may retain their position as the primary 
forum of prosecution.903 The Review Conference had not intended for the ICC to have 
de facto exclusive jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.    
                                                                                                                                      
question is a party to the London Agreement or the Rome Statute. In the latter case, the 
prerequisite prescription might already be met, since the Statute confirms the existence of 
individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression and lists it as one of the “most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” falling within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. From a more cautious approach, complete international proscription 
may only be assumed, once a provision on aggression is adopted and binding upon a State 
Party. Some states however, do not only require the international prescription of the crime in 
this context, but only accept the establishment of universal jurisdiction if explicitly foreseen 
by an international treaty obligation’, ibid 565.   
899 See Princeton Report (2004) paras. 20 – 27; Wrange (n 882) 592.   
900 Princeton Report (2004), para 21. 
901 Princeton Report (2004), para 26. 
902 Princeton Report (2004), para.27.   
903 Clark is of the opinion that the complementarity doctrine applies as it does in respect of 
the other crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, see Clark, ‘Complementarity and the Crime 
of Aggression’ (n 882).  
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In the light of these developments, it is submitted that the correct legal position is 
that both domestic courts and the ICC may have concurrent jurisdiction for the crime 
of aggression.904   
7.2.2. The legal interests of the forum state   
    
In Part II of this dissertation, it was submitted that prosecution of the crime of 
aggression in domestic courts by the aggressed state is directly representative of its 
legal interests, as the court is enforcing sanctions against a duty-barer for failure to 
comply with international obligations. Also, there is symbolic significance in the State 
or Crown bringing an action directly against the perpetrator of the crime for wrongful 
conduct committed against the state. In Chapter V, it was also discussed that it may be 
possible for domestic courts to make reparation orders against the defendant in 
addition to a successful conviction. However, the focus of this Chapter will be 
prosecution for the purposes of establishing individual criminal responsibility – and 
not individual civil responsibility.  
The starting point is that the aggressed state has a legal interest to be the forum 
state for the prosecution of the crime of aggression. This is because the alleged 
perpetrator of the crime of aggression has acted in breach of duty to comply with 
obligations owed to it to refrain from the relevant prohibited conduct. Suffice it to 
say, if the aggressed state intends to act as the forum state, the crime of aggression 
must already be prescribed in its domestic legislation under the territorial principle of 
jurisdiction at the time when the crime was committed.     
That said, the aggressor state also has a legal interest to be the forum state for the 
prosecution of the crime of aggression if the alleged perpetrator is a national. Indeed, 
it is hardly contestable that a state has a legal interest to prosecute its nationals for 
wrongful conduct in breach of domestic legislation. For this to be possible, the crime 
of aggression must be prescribed in domestic legislation under the nationality 
principle of jurisdiction. It is worth noting that domestic prosecution of the crime of 
aggression in the aggressor state may be considered as satisfaction (Article 37, 
ARSIWA) under international law for the aggressed state.905  
                                                
904 See Wrange (n 882) 599. 
905  Case concerning the difference between New Zealand and France concerning the 
interpretation or application of two agreements concluded on 9 July 1986 between the two 
States and which related to the problems arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair Decision of 
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Therefore, both the aggressor state and the aggressed state have a legal interest to 
be the forum state for the prosecution of the crime of aggression. It is not within the 
compass of this section to examine which forum is more convenient or whether the 
legal interests of one state to act as the forum state should prevail over the other. 
Aside from the domestic and international political ramifications of domestic 
prosecution of the crime of aggression in both potential forums, there are also 
practical difficulties. Examples of the latter include factors such as fact-finding and 
gathering evidence, finding witnesses, arrest of the alleged perpetrator – especially if 
the forum state is the aggressed state, resources and judicial infrastructure. That said, 
such practical difficulties are not unique only to the crime of aggression and could 
also easily arise with respect to the other core crimes.   
An interesting aspect to be considered is the question of whether a bystander state 
may have a legal interest to act as a forum for the prosecution of the crime of 
aggression under the universality principle, i.e. to exercise universal jurisdiction.  
Presumably, the bystander state intending to prosecute has already prescribed the 
universality principle as a base for jurisdiction in its domestic legislation, and wishes 
to exercise universal jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.906   
As there has been no direct injury or wrong committed against the bystander 
state, it may be rather difficult to argue that there is a legal interest under international 
law to prosecute the individual for committing the crime of aggression against the 
aggressed state. As argued by Akande: 
 
when domestic courts prosecute for aggression they are not acting in the 
collective interest. […] domestic courts prosecuting for aggression are 
exercising a form of self help and are acting to protect domestic interests.907 
 
A contrary argument can be made that the obligations owed by the duty-bearer to 
refrain from conduct pertaining to the crime of aggression is owed to the international 
community as a whole. Thus, enforcement against the responsible individual for the 
                                                                                                                                      
30 April 1990, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 30 April 1990, Volume XX, 215-
284 (hereinafter “The Rainbow Warrior Case”), 272; see also Commentaries on ARSIWA, 
106. 
906 See Reisinger Coracini, ‘National Legislation on Individual Responsibility for Conduct 
Amounting to Aggression’ (n 431) 564–565. 
907 Akande, ‘Prosecuting Aggression: The Consent Problem and the Role of the Security 
Council’ (n 753) 35. 
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breach of such wrongful conduct is in the interests of the international community. It 
is not the place of this Chapter to discuss enforcement measures for violations of 
obligations erga omnes. Instead, the angle that will be focused upon is whether there 
is universal jurisdiction under international law for the crime of aggression.908  
Scharf examines the legal status of the IMT trial at Nuremberg as whether this 
‘should be viewed as having applied a collective form of establishing the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, or whether it should instead be viewed as a court of the occupying powers 
applying the territorial jurisdiction of Germany over the accused Nazis.’909 He finds 
the former type of jurisdiction more convincing, 910 and continues to submit that ‘it is 
reasonable for states to conclude that Nuremberg and its progeny provide a customary 
international law basis for prosecuting the crime of aggression under universal 
jurisdiction.’911 He further relies upon the Lotus principle,912 stating that ‘those who 
seek to argue that the exercise of domestic universal jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression is invalid must surmount a large hurdle.’913  
However, this does not seem to be so readily accepted. Clark for example, 
appears to disagree with Scharf, as he submits that:  
 
It is very doubtful that under current customary law it can be asserted 
unequivocally that aggression ‘is’ subject to universal jurisdiction.914  
 
Akande similarly expresses that ‘there is no rule (and indeed no precedent) which 
permits universal domestic jurisdiction for aggression.’ 915  Yet, this does not 
                                                
908 See Michael P Scharf, ‘Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression’ (2012) 53 
Harvard International Law Journal 358, 358; Roger O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: 
Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 735, 745; 
Alejandro Chehtman, The Philosophical Foundations of Extraterritorial Punishment (Oxford 
University Press 2010) 115–139; Clark, ‘Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression’ (n 
882) 730–732.     
909 Scharf (n 908) 374.     
910 ibid 375–379. 
911 ibid 379.  
912 The Court held that ‘far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States 
may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, 
property, and acts outside their territory, [international law] leaves them in this respect a wide 
measures of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules,’ S.S. Lotus 
(Fr. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (Ser.A) No.10, at 18.  
913 Scharf (n 908) 380. 
914  Clark, ‘Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression’ (n 882) 731–736. 
915 Akande, ‘Prosecuting Aggression: The Consent Problem and the Role of the Security 
Council’ (n 753) 35. 
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necessarily mean that the crime of aggression falls into a separate legal category as an 
international crime than the other crimes. In my view, the same norms of customary 
international law that criminalise the conduct relating to the other core crimes also 
apply to the crime of aggression. However, it can be said that these norms of 
customary international law are more developed for the other crimes and more 
specific (e.g. through state practice and codification in Statutes of international courts 
& tribunals; and treaties) and have given rise to a rule of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
under international law.  
For example, there are treaties that give rise to individual criminal responsibility 
for some international crimes, e.g. the Convention against Torture (1984). These 
treaties can be said to provide a rule for extraterritorial jurisdiction for the crimes they 
prescribe between States Parties. 916  Although such rule of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
is only applicable between State Parties to the particular treaty as they have consented 
to such jurisdiction for the specified crime, these treaties may nonetheless be 
considered as part of state practice that there is universal jurisdiction for such 
crimes.917 At present, there are no such multilateral treaties that criminalise nor confer 
a rule of extraterritorial jurisdiction for the crime of aggression.  
                                                
916 Such treaties may confer specific rules of jurisdiction for the specified crime by imposing 
an obligation upon state parties to codify the crime into domestic legislation, e.g. Articles 2, 
4, 5 Convention against Torture 1984; or general obligations on State Parties to codify the 
crime into national legislation, e.g. Article 5 of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Such treaties may also provide an obligation to 
extradite or prosecute in circumstances where an alleged perpetrator is in their territory, e.g. 
Articles 7 and 8 Convention against Torture 1984; see also Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The Penal 
Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law’ (1983) 15 Case Western Journal 
of International Law 27, 27.  
917 Akehurst writes that ‘treaties are part of State practice and can create customary rule if the 
requirement of opinio juris are met, e.g. if the treaty or its travaux préparatoires contain a 
claim that the treaty is declaratory of pre-existing customary law. Sometimes a treaty which is 
not accompanied by opini juris may nevertheless be imitated in subsequent practice; but in 
such cases it is the subsequent practice (accompanied by opinio juris), and not the treaty, 
which creates customary rules’, Michael Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’ 
(1975) 47 British Yearbook of International Law 1, 53; In the Eichmann case, the court held 
that, ‘the abhorrent crimes defined in [the Israeli Law] are not crimes under Israeli law alone. 
These crimes, which struck at the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of nations, 
are grave offences against the law of nations itself (delicta juris gentium). Therefore, so far 
from international law negating or limiting the jurisdiction of countries with respect to such 
crimes, international law, is, in the absence of an International Criminal Court, in need of the 
judicial and legislative organs of every country to give effect to its criminal interdictions and 
bring the criminals to trial. The jurisdiction to try crimes under international law is 
universal.’(1986) 36 ILR 18, 26. 
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Nevertheless, this rule is still emerging for the crime of aggression as pointed out 
by Clark that ‘universal jurisdiction for the crime of aggression, is thus a work in 
progress and we are just at the beginning.’918  At present, there is very limited practice 
of states that have prescribed the universality principle in relation to the crime of 
aggression.919 Thus, it is presumed that a bystander state has a legal interest in being 
the forum state as part of the international community of states as a whole; however, 
it is left open as to whether bystander states may exercise universal jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression.   
The next question is how this relates to complementarity and prosecution at the 
ICC. As discussed in the previous chapter, complementarity is representative of 
preserving the legal interests of states parties by allowing them to retain priority of 
prosecution in situations of concurrent jurisdiction. Article 17 of the Rome Statute is 
not specific with regard to which state needs to have jurisdiction over a case in order 
for the case to be inadmissible. Thus, it is presumed that in a situation of aggression, 
the states which may have jurisdiction over the case for purposes of Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute, are the aggressed state and the aggressor state. This means that in 
situations of concurrent jurisdiction, the aggressor state or aggressed state has the 
priority of prosecution. It is left open as to whether a bystander state may be 
considered as a state for the purposes of Article 17 of the Rome Statute.    
7.3. Concerns that arise with respect to domestic prosecution for the crime of 
aggression  
 
The substantive elements of the crime of aggression involve the state act element 
of the crime and the elements of the crime pertaining to individual conduct. The 
domestic court that is undertaking proceedings will have to deal with both these 
substantive elements of the crime, upon which, some concerns arise. In relation to the 
state act element of the crime, the first concern revolves around whether the act of 
aggression needs to be determined by the Security Council prior to a domestic court 
                                                
918 Clark, ‘Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression’ (n 882) 735. 
919 Astrid Reisinger Coracini, ‘Evaluating Domestic Legislation on the Customary Crime of 
Aggression under the Rome Statute’s Complementarity Regime’ in Carsten Stahn and Goran 
Sluiter (eds), The ICC’s Emerging Practice: The Court At Five Years (2009) 564–565.  
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initiating proceedings. 920 The second concern is the issue of the determination of an 
act of aggression and par in parem non habet imperium.   
With respect to the elements of crime pertaining to individual conduct, there is 
the question of the potential scope of perpetrators that can be prosecuted for the crime 
of aggression. In particular, whether the leadership element is a necessary pre-
requisite for determining the scope of perpetrators. Concomitant to the scope of 
perpetrators is the question of immunities of foreign state officials in criminal 
jurisdictions, and whether and to what extent this procedural bar may be overcome.  
7.3.1. The state act element of the crime 
i. Is there a need for external determination of an act of aggression by the Security 
Council?  
 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, one of the most contentious issues during 
the negotiations leading up to Kampala was the role of the Security Council in 
determining the state act element of the crime, i.e. an act of aggression. The final 
result was the adoption at Kampala of specific procedural conditions relating to 
determining the existence of an act of aggression pursuant to Article 15 bis(6) – 
Article 15 bis(9). This raises the question of whether domestic prosecution should 
also be subject to a specific procedural mechanism that encompasses the Security 
Council with respect to determining the state act element of the crime.  
The following submission by Van Schaack will serve as the starting point for this 
discussion: 
 
Domestic prosecution for the crime of aggression will not benefit from the 
procedural regime – including painstakingly negotiated judicial and political 
controls established by the ASP to manage prosecutions of the crime of 
aggression.921 
 
This was submitted as a reason why domestic prosecution for the crime of aggression 
is problematic. In my view, her criticism is rather unfounded. The ‘painstakingly 
                                                
920 Van Schaack, ‘Par in Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the Crime of 
Aggression’ (n 15) 151.  
921 ibid 215. 
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negotiated judicial and political controls’ that she refers is presumably the mechanism 
pursuant to Articles 15 bis (6) – Article 15 bis (8), which facilitates the primary 
position of the Security Council to determine the act of aggression, followed by a six 
months delay before the Pre-Trial Division can authorize an investigation.  Domestic 
courts simply do not benefit or need to benefit from this ‘painstakingly negotiated 
judicial and political controls’ because such mechanism is non-applicable.  
There is a fundamental difference between domestic courts and the ICC: the former is 
an enforcement mechanism within the relevant State, whilst the latter is an 
enforcement mechanism created by a multilateral treaty.  
Furthermore, Article 5(2) Rome Statute explicitly provided that any conditions 
for the exercise of jurisdiction must be consistent with the purposes of the UN 
Charter. As such, it is Article 5(2) Rome Statute that gave rise to the ‘painstakingly 
negotiated judicial and political controls’ to manage to prosecutions of the crime of 
aggression at the ICC – it is unlikely that there is a somewhat similar provision in the 
constitution of the relevant state with respect to domestic prosecution of the crime of 
aggression.  
First and foremost, the decision whether to prosecute a crime as grave as the 
crime of aggression is made by the State wishing to initiate proceedings in accordance 
with the underlying constitutional and administrative standards and procedures: it is 
an entirely internal process. In comparison, the ICC also has its own internal 
procedures with respect to the admissibility and initiation of investigations and 
proceedings. Therefore, both enforcement mechanisms operate on entirely different 
levels and a ‘painstakingly negotiated judicial and political control’ that applies to an 
international institution has no relevance to a domestic enforcement mechanism.  
Furthermore, and more importantly, domestic courts do not have a relationship 
with the Security Council, or with the Pre-Trial Division of the ICC. As pointed out 
by Cassese, the Security Council:  
 
has no primary and exclusive responsibility in the field of international 
criminal liability of individuals (be they state officials or agents of a non-state 
entity) for aggression. It follows that a decision of the Security Council 
condemning actions by states as aggression may have no direct impact on 
courts empowered to adjudicate crimes of aggression. Courts are free to make 
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any finding in this matter regardless of what is decided by the Security 
Council in the area of state misconduct and consequent responsibility.922 
 
Wrange has also argued that:   
 
It would be quite difficult to argue that current international law requires that a 
SC decision is a procedural condition for states to prosecute the crime of 
aggression. (…) I cannot really see how one could formulate an argument that 
it would be an existing procedural requirement for domestic prosecutions. 
Either national legal systems have jurisdiction, or they do not; general 
international law cannot possibly require that states defer to an institution 
created by a treaty.923  
 
Domestic prosecution of the crime of aggression, like other international crimes is 
considered as internal affairs of a State. As such, the Security Council is unlikely to 
intervene in any form of domestic proceedings. States do not have any obligations to 
confer a role to the Security Council to determine the existence of an act of aggression 
as a pre-requisite for domestic prosecution for the crime of aggression. By contrast, 
the Security Council may defer prosecutions for the crime at the ICC because Article 
16 of the Rome Statute governs such competence. Also, the determination of an act of 
aggression under Article 39 of the UN Charter is different than the determination for 
the purposes of ascertaining the state act element of the crime. This is because 
determination under Article 39 of the UN Charter is for purposes of authorizing 
collective enforcement measures under Chapter VII for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, whilst, on the other hand, determination to ascertain 
the state act element of the crime is a retrospective decision strictly for the purposes 
of prosecuting the relevant individual. As such, the latter does not fall within the 
ambit of Article 39 of the UN Charter.  
This however, does not mean that domestic courts may not make references to 
any prior findings by the Security Council or the General Assembly of the existence 
of an act of aggression. For example, the sequence of events is that one of the UN 
organs had determined the existence of an act of aggression; and post-conflict, either 
                                                
922 Cassese (n 226) 846.    
923 Wrange (n 882) 602. 
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aggressor or aggressed state has decided to initiate proceedings against the 
perpetrator. In this situation, the state wishing to prosecute may rely on the findings 
by the Security Council or General Assembly to demonstrate the existence of an act 
of aggression. This may help to carry an element of persuasion that it is in the public 
interest to conduct such proceedings. Although such external findings may be 
persuasive and helpful to establish the state act element of the crime, they should be 
without prejudice to the findings of the domestic court with respect to fact-finding and 
the consideration of the legality of the use of force to avoid affecting the due process 
rights of the defendant.  
Another hypothetical situation could arise where the ICJ has determined that an 
act of aggression has occurred in an Advisory Opinion about the legality of the use of 
force in the particular situation, or in a Contentious Case between the aggressor state 
and the aggressed state as to the legality of the use of force. As a result of this finding, 
either aggressor or aggressed state may then wish to initiate proceedings against the 
perpetrator. The State wishing to prosecute may then rely on the findings of the ICJ to 
argue the existence of the aggression. Once again, this should be without prejudice to 
the findings of the domestic court. 
If domestic courts choose to rely on previous findings by external UN organs to 
determine the existence of an act of aggression, this should be regarded as permissive 
as opposed to obligatory. External UN organs are not expected or required to form 
any part of the determination process and thus do not and should not play any direct 
role in helping domestic courts prosecute the crime of aggression.  As pointed out by 
Cassese:  
 
one of the merits of the distinction between two different regimes of 
responsibility lies in, among other things, enabling courts that try persons 
accused of aggression legitimately to embrace a judicial approach which may 
differ from political stand taken by international political bodies such as the 
UNSC.924   
 
 
                                                
924 Cassese (n 226) 846.   
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ii. Determining an act of aggression and par in parem non habet imperium  
 
As mentioned above (section.7.2.1) the ILC submitted par in parem non habet 
imperium as the underlying reason why domestic courts are incompetent fora for 
prosecution of the crime of aggression. The question was raised as to whether par in 
parem non habet imperium serves as an insurmountable procedural barrier for 
prosecution of the crime of aggression in domestic courts.   
The first step is to examine the meaning of par in parem non habet imperium. 
Although the origins of this Latin phrase can be traced all the way back to canon 
law,925 in a more contemporary context its literal meaning can be understood as ‘one 
State has no power over another.’926 Yet, power in the present context is not so 
helpful as the underlying issue is the exercise of jurisdiction by the forum state over 
an act committed by a foreign state. Thus, it is more relevant to understand par in 
parem non habet imperium as ‘one state shall not have jurisdiction over another 
state.’927 That said, there are situations when the forum state would have competence 
over the act of the foreign state in question because there is a jurisdictional nexus with 
the perpetrator of the crime. It would then appear that there are two competing legal 
interests: the forum state to exercise jurisdictional competence; and the foreign state 
to have its official acts precluded from the jurisdiction of the former.    
In the present context, the states with the competing interests are the aggressor 
state and the aggressed states. Despite the lack of current state practice of the 
domestic prosecution of the crime of aggression, it should be noted that every state 
that has codified the crime of aggression in its domestic legislation has included the 
territorial principle of jurisdiction.928 Thus, not only has the perpetrator allegedly 
                                                
925 Dinstein, ‘Par in Parem Non Habet Imperium’ (n 888) 407–408.  
926  ibid 413–415; Van Schaack, ‘Par in Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and 
the Crime of Aggression’ (n 15) 149.  
927 Kelsen, Peace Through Law (n 888) 35; Dinstein, ‘Par in Parem Non Habet Imperium’ (n 
888) 416.; Lord Wright in Compania Naviera Vascongado v S.S. Cristina states that ‘the 
principle “par in parem non habet imperium”, no State can claim jurisdiction over another 
Sovereign State.” Compania Naviera Vascongado v S.S. Cristina [1938] A.C 485 at 502; In 
Jones v Saudi Arabia, Lord Bingham stated that ‘based on the old principle par in parem non 
habet imperium, the rule of international law is not that a state should not exercise over 
another state a jurisdiction which it has but that (save in cases recognised by international 
law) a state has no jurisdiction over another state’, Jones v Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, 
para.14. 
928  Reisinger Coracini, ‘National Legislation on Individual Responsibility for Conduct 
Amounting to Aggression’ (n 431) 564.  
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committed an international crime, but also a domestic crime pursuant to the criminal 
code of the aggressed state. There is no dispute that when a crime has been committed 
on (or against) the territory of the forum state, there is a legal interest for the state in 
question to prosecute the individual regardless of his/her nationality. This is known as 
the territorial competence (jurisdiction) of the forum state.  It is this rule of territorial 
jurisdiction that will come into conflict with par in parem non habet imperium.  
When contemplating the underlying norms, the conflict is between the norms that 
attach specific sanctions on individuals for violations of international law to refrain 
from the crime of aggression and the norms that give rise to sovereign equality of 
states. It is suggested that the former should prevail, as these norms are more specific 
and of customary international law nature (lex specialis principle).929 In other words, 
because customary international law attaches sanctions directly on individuals in the 
event of breach of obligations to refrain from conduct relating to an act of aggression, 
these norms should prevail over the norms that give rise to sovereign equality of 
states. This is consistent with Kelsen’s submission that par in parem non habet 
imperium, as a rule of positive international law, is subject to some exceptions which 
must be established by ‘special rules of customary or contractual international law.’930 
Thus, the more specific rule of territorial jurisdiction should prevail over par in parem 
non habet imperium, which means that the latter is not applicable when the forum 
state is the aggressed state.  
In addition to the lex specialis principle, there are other reasons, in my view, as to 
why par in parem non habet imperium should not come into play when the forum 
state is the aggressed state. First, par in parem non habet imperium which preserves 
the sovereign equality of states, cannot logically apply when the forum state is the 
aggressed state because it would deprive the state from its sovereign prerogative as 
the rights-holder of the enjoyment of the protection of the norms that criminalise 
aggression from its legal interest to enforce legal consequences against the duty-
bearer of these norms for wrongful conduct committed against its territory. It is 
submitted that domestic prosecution of the crime of aggression is a form of self-help 
                                                
929 Michael Akehurst, ‘The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law’ (1975) 47 British 
Yearbook of International Law 273, 274–275; see also Niels Petersen, ‘Customary Law 
Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of State Practice in International Norm 
Creation’ 23 American University International Law Review 275, 287.   
930 Kelsen, ‘Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International 
Law’ (n 299) 159. 
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by the aggressed state as it is representative of the enforcement of legal consequences 
against a legal personality that has committed wrongful conduct against it.  
Second, par in parem non habet imperium should not apply in situations when 
the aggressed state is the forum state as this would inhibit an enforcement mechanism 
that international law relies upon from carrying out sanctions against an individual 
who has acted in breach of duty to refrain from conduct pursuant to the crime of 
aggression. Thus, this would also paradoxically undermine the sovereign equality of 
states because the aggressed state is precluded from exercising its legal interest under 
international law to enforce legal consequences against the individual(s) responsible 
for committing a crime against its territory.   
Suffice it to say, this is rather conceptual, and it is ultimately for the forum state 
to decide whether this procedural bar to jurisdiction should apply in domestic 
proceedings against the crime of aggression.  
7.3.2. The elements of the crime pertaining to individual conduct: the question of the 
leadership element 
 
The leadership element has been examined throughout this dissertation and need 
not be repeated here.  The question is whether the leadership element is a necessary 
pre-requisite for an individual to be prosecuted at a domestic court for the crime of 
aggression. 931 According to the study conducted by Reisinger Coracini, states that 
have codified the crime of aggression in their domestic legislation have been mainly 
silent about the leadership element.932  This appears to be consistent with customary 
international law, as neither the IMT Charter nor Control Council Law No.10 
explicitly provided a leadership element. At the IMT, each defendant was assessed on 
a case-by-case basis, primarily with respect to his relationship with Hitler, followed 
                                                
931  Reisinger Coracini, ‘National Legislation on Individual Responsibility for Conduct 
Amounting to Aggression’ (n 431) 553,555. 
932ibid 553; she further observes that ‘an implicit reference to criminal responsibility of 
persons in a superior position can be found in the criminal codes of Montenegro and Serbia. 
Next to any person who “calls for or instigates aggressive war”, “anyone who orders waging 
war” is liable for punishment.’ (Art.442 Montenegrin criminal code, Art 386 Serbian criminal 
code) Comparably, the Croatian criminal code specifies waging a war of aggression as 
“commanding an armed action of one state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another state.” (Article 157(3) Croatian Criminal Code). The 
conduct verbs “order” and “command” imply the existence of a hierarchical, superior-
subordinate relationship and thus limit criminal responsibility to persons in a position to give 
such orders or commands”, also that Estonia expressly punishes ‘a representative of the state 
who threatens to start a war of aggression’ (Para.91 Estonian criminal code). 
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by the scope of the underlying powers that his official position entailed. At the NMT, 
the underlying pre-requisite for the leadership element was that the individual must be 
in a position on the policy level, where they could inter alia “formulate and excecute 
policies” (Farben); and/or to “shape or influence” policies (High Command). It is also 
worth remembering that the Krupp Tribunal did not rule out industrialists from being 
on the policy level.933 Although there is no leadership element per se that forms a 
substantive element of the definition of the crime in customary international law, the 
findings of the NMT may nevertheless be instructive in determining the scope of 
perpetrators that can be prosecuted in a domestic court.    
In Chapter III, it was discussed how the Kampala Amendments put forward a 
narrower scope of perpetrators than Nuremberg by creating a leadership element that 
constituted a substantive part of the definition, i.e. ‘a person in a position effectively 
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.’ Post-
Kampala, some States Parties have implemented domestic legislation incorporating 
the Kampala Amendments verbatim;934 therefore including the leadership element.935 
For these states, the leadership element is a necessary pre-requisite for an individual 
to be prosecuted in a domestic court, as it is a substantial part of the definition of the 
crime. Although there is no legal requirement for States Parties to implement the 
Rome Statute, or the Kampala Amendments, into their domestic legislation, it is 
perhaps in the interests of the ratifying State Party to do so because complementarity 
works on a same perpetrator same crime basis. If the defendant prosecuted in a 
domestic court of a State Party that has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression may 
not satisfy the leadership element in the Kampala Amendments, the situation may still 
be admissible to the ICC with an indictment against another accused.    
In general, it can be presumed that a broader scope of perpetrators may be 
prosecuted at domestic courts (customary international law) than at the ICC (Kampala 
Amendments.936 The discretion is ultimately for States whether to incorporate a 
leadership element into their domestic legislation or to leave it open, which means 
                                                
933 Heller observes that there was no explanation as to why industralists were held to a 
different mens rea than other types of defendants, Heller (n 336) 196.          
934 See Meagan Wong, Germany and Botswana ratify the Kampala Amendments on the crime 
of aggression, at http://www.ejiltalk.org/germany-and-botswana-ratify-the-kampala-
amendments-on-the-crime-of-aggression-7-ratifications-23-more-ratifications-to-go. 
935 e.g. Article 103 Slovenian Criminal Code.  
936 See Heller (n 336). 
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that domestic courts may prosecute a broader scope of perpetrators than the ICC.937 
Be that as it may, customary international law is sufficiently clear that only 
individuals who have high-level positions within the political or military action of a 
State may be prosecuted for the crime of aggression.938 Also, customary international 
law does not exclude non-state actors from the scope of perpetrators that may be 
responsible for the crime of aggression. 939    
7.4. The question of immunities of state officials for international crimes in 
foreign domestic courts 
 
Immunities of state officials in foreign domestic courts can be seen as a 
derivative from the international law doctrine of state immunity.940 The idea is that a 
domestic court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over a foreign state official 
either because (a) his/her official position in the hierarchy of a state is symbolic of 
state sovereignty; or his/her official position requires inviolability in foreign domestic 
courts for smooth facilitation of international relations; (b) the act in question was 
committed in the official capacity of a state. The former is known as immunity ratione 
personae (personal immunity); whilst the latter is known as immunity ratione 
materiae (functional immunity). Both nuances of immunity of state officials will be 
examined with particular reference to how they may apply to domestic prosecution 
for the crime of aggression; and whether and to what extent they may be overcome.  It 
should be noted from the outset that the present analysis refers specifically to 
immunities of states officials in the context of criminal jurisdiction, and not civil 
jurisdiction.    
                                                
937  For a criticism of this, see Van Schaack, ‘Par in Parem Imperium Non Habet: 
Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression’ (n 15) 148–154. 
938 Article 16 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
stipulates ‘an individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participates in or orders the 
planning, preparation, initiating or waging of aggression committed by a State shall be 
responsible for a crime of aggression.’ In the Commentary, it was explained that ‘these terms 
must be understood in the broad sense, that is to say, as referring, in addition to the members 
of a Government, to persons occupying high-level posts in the military, the diplomatic corps, 
political parties and industry, as recognized by the Nurnberg Tribunal, which stated that 
‘Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself. He had to have the cooperation of 
statesmen, military leaders, diplomats and businessmen’, Commentaries on the Draft Code of 
Crimes, 43. 
939 Cassese (n 618) 846.; for a criticism, see Van Schaack, ‘Par in Parem Imperium Non 
Habet: Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression’ (n 15) 152. 
940 Dapo Akande, ‘International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court’ (2004) 
98 American Journal of International Law 407, 409. 
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As a preliminary issue, it is important to understand the relationship between 
immunities of state officials in foreign domestic courts and jurisdiction. Both are 
separate concepts and should not be conflated.941  Jurisdiction in this context means 
that the crime in question has already been prescribed in the domestic legislation of 
the forum state; and that the relevant domestic court is able to exercise jurisdiction 
over the defendant.942 Immunities, as such, imply an exception from the jurisdictional 
competence of the forum state.943 This was expressed in the Joint Separate Opinion of 
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant case at the ICJ: 
  
"Immunity" is the common shorthand phrase for "immunity from jurisdiction". 
If there is no jurisdiction en principe, then the question of an immunity from a 
jurisdiction which would otherwise exist simply does not arise. [...]  
"Immunity" and "jurisdiction" are inextricably linked.944   
 
Indeed, for procedural convenience, a court may decide to view jurisdiction and the 
concomitant immunities from this jurisdiction for foreign state officials 
simultaneously, and/or the latter before the former.945 Alternatively, as pointed out by 
Douglas, ‘more often than not […], the forum court considers the question of 
entitlement to state immunity before the question of jurisdiction.’946 He submits that 
‘this practice is undesirable because it places undue pressure on the test for state 
immunity by denying the doctrine of jurisdiction in international law its role as a filter 
on the cases that can properly be subject to the adjudicative competence of the forum 
state’s courts.’947  
Regardless, the procedural approach by domestic courts should not detract from 
the underlying issue that the forum state must have adjudicatory jurisdiction before 
                                                
941 Ibid 407;  Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, 
and Foreign Domestic Courts: A Reply to Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah’ (2011) 22 
European Journal of International Law 849, 852. 
942 Zachary Douglas, ‘State Immunity for the Acts of State Officials’ (2012) 82 British 
Yearbook of International Law 281, 297–301. 
943 ibid 299. 
944 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 
Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2002, [Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and 
Buergenthal], 64.  
945 Douglas (n 942) 297. 
946 ibid 285. 
947 ibid 344. 
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the state official invokes immunity.948 Simply put, if there is no jurisdiction, then 
immunities cannot be pleaded, as there is nothing to be immune from.  
7.4.1. Immunity Ratione Personae  
 
Certain state officials are able to plead immunity from jurisdiction of a foreign 
domestic court by virtue of their official status in the government. Immunity ratione 
personae is attached directly to the particular official position for the entirety of the 
duration that the state official remains in office.949  The nature of this immunity 
encompasses an absolute exception to both civil and criminal jurisdiction in a foreign 
domestic court for acts committed both in public and private capacity.950 In other 
words, a state official that is able to plead immunity ratione personae is exempted 
from any form of proceeding in a foreign domestic court for acts that he/she may have 
committed in the official capacity of a state, and/or acts committed in private. Such 
acts could be committed prior to entry to office or during term.  
The ICJ in the Arrest Warrants case identified these state officials as ‘holders of 
high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs.’951 The inclusion of Ministers for Foreign Affairs in this 
category of state officials has been subject to criticism.952 It need not be answered 
here whether customary international law provides immunity ratione personae for 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs.953 That said, it is worth noting that the Dutch Expert 
Report on the Immunity of Foreign State Officials has included Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs within the Categories of Persons that enjoy personal immunity.954 Thus, it can 
be inferred that in practice, states would likely recognise that immunity ratione 
personae applies to Ministers of Foreign Affairs.  
There appear to be two broad rationales for this nuance of immunity. First, the 
state official has attained a position in the hierarchy of a state that is symbolic of state 
                                                
948 ibid 297. 
949 Akande, ‘International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court’ (n 940) 409. 
950 Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah, ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and 
Foreign Domestic Courts’ (2011) 21 European Journal of International Law 815, 819–820.     
951 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, (hereinafter “Arrest Warrant case”), 3, para.51  
952 Akande, ‘International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court’ (n 940) 412. 
953 Akande and Shah (n 950) 824–825. 
954 Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law, Advisory Report on the 
Immunity of State Officials, Advisory Report No.20, the Hague May 2011 (Hereinafter 
“Dutch Expert Report on Immunities”) Section 4, 28-30. 
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sovereignty.955 The arrest, prosecution and subsequent punishment of serving Heads 
of State and/or Heads of Government will effectively interfere with the internal 
governance of the foreign state.956  Second, this type of immunity provides for the 
smooth facilitation of diplomatic relations, as these state officials need to be able to 
carry out their tasks in foreign states without the possibility or risk of being arrested 
and prosecuted.957 This was held by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrants case, where it was 
concluded that ‘the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, 
throughout the duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and that 
inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of authority of another 
State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties.’958 
As the crime of aggression is a leadership crime, it is very likely that the 
defendant will belong to this particular category of state officials that may plead 
immunity ratione personae in the domestic courts of the forum state.  
7.4.2. Immunity Ratione Materiae  
 
In addition to immunity ratione personae, customary international law also 
confers immunity rationae materiae on state officials from jurisdiction of the forum 
state when the act or crime in question was committed in the official capacity of the 
state.959  For purposes of this dissertation, such acts shall be known as “sovereign 
acts.” When it is established that an act is a sovereign act, norms relating to 
jurisdiction provide an exception from the jurisdiction of the forum state for the state 
official. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY had observed:  
 
[State] officials are the mere instruments of a State and their official action can 
only be attributed to the State. They cannot be the subject of sanctions or 
penalties for conduct that is not private but undertaken on behalf of the State. 
In other words, State officials cannot suffer the consequences of wrongful acts 
                                                
955 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No.3) [2000] 1 
A.C. 147 (hereinafter “Pinochet No.3”), as per Lord Millett at 269 
956 See Akande and Shah (n 950) 824. 
957 The ICJ noted that immunities under customary international law for Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs is ‘to ensure the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective 
States.’ Arrest Warrant Case (n 951) para.53. 
958 Arrest Warrants Case (n 951) para. 54. 
959 Akande and Shah (n 950) 826. 
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which are not attributable to them personally but to the State on whose behalf 
they act: they enjoy so-called ‘functional immunity’. This is a well established 
rule of customary international law going back to the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, restated many times since.960 
 
The norms that give rise to this type of immunity are attached to the sovereign act 
rather than the status of the official, which is why state officials that have acted in the 
capacity of the state may plead this immunity even if they no longer hold office, e.g., 
former heads of states and former state leaders. Non-state officials that have acted on 
behalf of the state and are indicted for conduct that can be considered as sovereign 
acts of the foreign state may also arguably plead this type of immunity.961   
The common understanding is that prosecution of the individual may be the 
indirect exercise of jurisdiction by the forum state over the foreign state, as there is 
the need to assess the legality of the conduct in question – which was committed in 
official state capacity.962 Indeed, if the act is a sovereign act, it is attributable to the 
State, which implies state responsibility.  This is how there is a clash between 
interests of the forum state (territorial competence) and the foreign state (non-
interference with acta jure imperii). The norms that give rise to state immunity come 
into play and create an exception to jurisdiction over the individual to preclude the 
forum state from calling upon the responsibility of the state for the act in question, 
allowing the sovereignty of the foreign state to prevail.  
Douglas points out that by pleading immunity ratione materiae, the state official 
is effectively implying that the proper defendant in the proceeding should be the 
State.963  Thus, in addition to acting as a procedural bar to jurisdiction of the forum 
state, immunity ratione materiae also has the effect of serving as a defence for the 
                                                
960 Prosecutor v Blaskic (Objection to the Issue of Subpoena duces Tecum) IT-95-14-AR 108 
(1997), 110 ILR (1997) 607, at 707, para.38. 
961 Akande and Shah (n 950) 825; see also Akande, ‘International Law Immunities and the 
International Criminal Court’ (n 940) 412–413. 
962 In Zoernsch v Waldock, it was held that ‘a foreign sovereign government, apart from 
personal sovereigns, can only act through agents, and the immunity to which it is entitled in 
respect of its acts would be illusory unless it extended also to its agents in respect of acts done 
by them on its behalf. To sue an envoy in respect of acts done in his official capacity would 
be, in effect, to sue his government irrespective of whether the envoy had ceased to be ‘en 
poste’ at the date of his suit’, Zoernsch v Waldock [1964] 1 WLR 675, at 692.  
963 Douglas writes that 'where foreign state officials are the named defendants, they can only 
benefit from their state's jurisdictional immunity if the foreign state itself is, by operation of a 
rule of law, the proper defendant in the action', Douglas (n 942) 321.     
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defendant as ‘it indicates that the individual office is not to be held legally responsible 
for acts, that, in effect, are those of the state.’964   
However, it must be clarified that although immunity ratione materiae may serve 
as a defence in the particular case to which it applies, it does not have a substantive 
effect because it does not exonerate the individual from his/her criminal 
responsibility. 965 The effect is procedural in nature because it implies that the 
domestic court is not the appropriate forum for proceedings.  The state official may be 
prosecuted in either the foreign state or an international court or tribunal that has 
jurisdiction over the crime and individual.  
Immunity ratione materiae only applies to the court of the forum state that has 
decided to adhere to the norms that provide an exception to jurisdiction, and only 
upon the relevant individual.  Thus, if other individuals are also accused, they may be 
prosecuted if the forum state has jurisdictional competence. The emerging trend 
appears to be that immunity ratione materiae does not apply with respect to 
prosecution for international crimes.966  Three broad theories have been identified as 
the reason why state officials may no longer successfully plead immunity ratione 
materiae if it is alleged that they have committed international crimes:  
i) International crimes cannot be considered as sovereign acts committed by 
the state for the purposes of immunity ratione materiae;967 
ii) The prohibition of international crimes has attained jus cogens status;968  
iii) There is universal jurisdiction over international crimes (genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, torture), and the rule of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction will prevail over immunity.969   
   
                                                
964 Akande and Shah (n 950) 817. 
965 Arrest Warrants Case (n 951) para 60. 
966 Dutch Expert Report on Immunities (n 954) 17-20; for a different view, see Bing Bing Jia, 
‘The Immunity of State Officials for International Crimes Revisited’ (2012) 10 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1303; Akande, ‘International Law Immunities and the 
International Criminal Court’ (n 940) 413–414.  
967 Pinochet No.3 (n 955) as per Lord-Browne Wilkinson (205); Lord Hutton (263). 
968 See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, 99 (hereinafter “Jurisdictional Immunities of the State”) 
para.80.  
969 Pinochet No.3 (n 955) as per Lord Philipps 190; see also Akande and Shah (n 950) 828.  
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i. International crimes cannot be considered as sovereign acts committed by the state 
for the purposes of immunity ratione materiae 
 
If the conduct in question, i.e. the international crime, is not considered as a 
sovereign act of the foreign state, it follows that the state official may not plead 
immunity ratione materiae as there is no legal basis for doing so. The idea is that the 
act in question is an international crime, thus it is automatically ruled out as a 
sovereign act to detach the act in question from the norms that attract an exception to 
jurisdiction over the state official. Simply put, if international crimes are not 
recognized as sovereign acts, there is no immunity ratione materiae.  
The argument is that acts that are inherently regarded as unlawful under 
international law cannot simultaneously be recognized as sovereign acts for the 
purposes of immunity ratione materiae. This is because international law cannot 
simultaneously prohibit certain acts and yet attach immunity to such acts. Therefore, 
it is only logical that acts that are violations of international law should not be 
regarded as official functions of the state.  This was expressed by some of the Lords 
from the House of Lords in the UK, in the case, Pinochet No.3.970 Lord Browne-
Wilkinson questioned ‘how can it be for international law purposes an official 
function to do something which international law itself prohibits and criminalises?’971 
Similarly, Lord Hutton said:  
 
The alleged acts of torture by Senator Pinochet were carried out under colour 
of his position as head of state, but they cannot be regarded as functions of a 
head of state under international law when international law expressly 
prohibits torture as a measure which a state can employ in any circumstances 
whatsoever and has made it an international crime.972 
 
 This reasoning is prima facie problematic and contrary to the purposes of immunity 
ratione materiae. This immunity serves to preclude the forum state from considering 
a sovereign act of the foreign state regardless of the legality of the act in question. If 
the criterion for the recognition as a sovereign act is that the underlying act must be 
                                                
970 Pinochet No.3 (n 955).    
971 Pinochet No.3 (n 955) ibid 205. 
972 Pinochet No.3 (n 955) ibid 262; see also Douglas (n 942) 323–324, 338. 
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lawful under international law, then the foreign state’s interests for an exception to 
jurisdiction can only prevail if the conduct is lawful. This suggests that the norms that 
allow an exception to jurisdiction are predicated upon the lawfulness of the conduct of 
the foreign state. This is incorrect.   
In general, the determining factor whether the act/crime in question is a sovereign 
act is not and should not be predicated upon the legality of the conduct under 
domestic or international law. Instead, the purpose behind such acts should be 
considered pursuant to how they were executed.973 Thus, the criteria should be to 
examine the nature of the act in question as to whether it was committed in official 
capacity and not whether the conduct was the result of breach of obligations placed 
directly on individuals. Furthermore, the step towards ascertaining that the act in 
question is an international crime may still involve considering the legality of the act 
in question, which is contrary to the purposes of immunity ratione materiae if the 
interests of the foreign state are concerned.  
Overall, it is submitted that international crimes should be considered as 
sovereign acts, provided they satisfy the common test that the act in question was 
conducted by the state official in the capacity of his/her duties under the authority of 
the foreign state. It is inherently the underlying nature of how and why the act was 
committed that determines whether an act is a sovereign act, and not its status under 
international law. Bearing in mind that the state act element of the crime is a 
necessary pre-requisite of the crime of aggression, it is questionable as to whether the 
crime of aggression can be disregarded entirely as a sovereign act. This is because an 
act of aggression is part of the substantive definition of the crime and must be 
established prior to the ascertainment of individual criminal responsibility.  
Furthermore, regardless of the legality of the use of force of the aggressor state, 
one would struggle to argue that the initiation, planning, preparation and waging an 
act of aggression was not committed by the defendant in the official capacity of the 
aggressor state or in public power. As the act of aggression encompasses the 
machinery of a state, it is difficult to suggest that the method of the individual who 
initiated, planned, prepared or waged an act of aggression was not conducted in the 
official capacity of the state and/or that such actions are not to be considered as 
official functions of his/her position.   
                                                
973 Akande and Shah (n 950) 832. 
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ii.  The prohibition of international crimes is jus cogens  
 
There are two broad arguments. First, an international crime amounts to a 
violation of peremptory norms, hence it cannot be recognised as a sovereign act.974 
However, it is not for the forum state to predicate immunity ratione materiae on the 
legal status of the sovereign act, but on the underlying nature of the act being 
committed in the official capacity of the State. If the forum state does not recognise 
the norms of immunity ratione materiae on the basis that the breach of peremptory 
norms does not amount to a sovereign act(s), it is inherently making an assessment of 
conduct of the foreign state. This is contrary to the norms that give rise to immunity 
ratione materiae in the first place.      
Second, the norms that prohibit international crimes are jus cogens, which would 
prevail and ‘overcome all inconsistent rules of international law providing for 
immunity.’975 Lord Millett put forward a similar argument in Pinochet No.3:  
 
international law cannot be supposed to have established a crime having the 
character of a jus cogens and at the same time to have provided an immunity 
which is co-extensive with the obligation it seeks to impose.976  
 
However, the question is whether the jus cogens norms that prohibit international 
crimes really come into direct conflict with the norms that provide an exception to 
jurisdiction over state officials.977 The former applies directly against individuals to 
refrain from international crimes, from which no derogation can be made (substantive 
in nature), whilst the latter applies to the rule of jurisdiction to create an exception for 
the state official (procedural in nature). One set of norms applies directly against 
towards the individual, whilst the other set of norms applies to the rules of jurisdiction 
of the forum state.  
                                                
974 Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (n 143) 325; see also Douglas (n 
942) 341–342.  
975 Akande and Shah (n 950) 828.; this was one of the arguments submitted by Italy at the ICJ, 
in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 973) 34. 
976 Pinochet No.3 (n 955) 278. 
977 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 968) 140, para.93; see also Jia (n 966) 1315.  
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As such, there is no actual conflict of norms, as ‘two sets of rules address 
different matters.’978 The ICJ held: 
 
The rules of State immunity are procedural in character and are confined to 
determining whether or not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in 
respect of another State. They do not bear upon the question whether or not 
the conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was lawful or 
unlawful.979   
  
This reflects an argument made earlier by Fox:  
 
[s]tate immunity is a procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a national 
court. It does not go to substantive law; it does not contradict a prohibition 
contained in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts any breach of it to a 
different method of settlement. Arguably, then, there is no substantive content 
in the procedural plea of State immunity upon which a jus cogens mandate can 
bite.’980    
 
It should be clarified that the prosecution of international crimes is not jus cogens.981 
Orakhelashvili is of the contrary opinion that ‘jus cogens norms relating to 
international crimes do not just prohibit the relevant conduct but also criminalize it 
with peremptory effect once the criminality of conduct is part of jus cogens, so are the 
rules regarding prosecution.’982However, it is not convincing that the rules regarding 
prosecution of international crimes constitute jus cogens. As observed by Jia, ‘state 
practice has yet to recognise any obligation erga omnes to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over claims arising from alleged breaches of peremptory norms of 
international law.’983 Orakhelashvili further elaborates that:  
                                                
978 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 968) 140, para 93. 
979 Ibid. 
980 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 525. 
981 Akande and Shah (n 950) 836. 
982 Orakhelashvili, ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic 
Courts: A Reply to Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah’ (n 941) 851–852. 
983 Jia (n 966) 1315.; see also Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah, ‘Immunities of State 
Officials, International Crimes and Foreign Domestic Courts: A Rejoinder to Alexander 
Orakhelashvili’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 857, 860. 
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Preventing, through immunity, the injured entity from claiming remedies for 
the breach of jus cogens is therefore substantially more than erecting a 
procedural bar – it is essentially a denial of the normative status of the 
substantive rule that has been violated. An abstractly valid prescription that 
cannot produce legal effect in relation to violation is simply not a legal rule.984 
 
According to his argument, if the aggressed state is prevented from claiming a 
remedy, i.e. prosecuting the perpetrator for the crime of aggression, immunity has the 
effect of being more than a procedural bar because it denies the substantive effect of 
executing a sanction against an individual for committing an international crime.985 I 
disagree. As held by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrants Case:  
 
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are 
quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, 
criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity 
may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot 
exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility.986  
 
Last but not least, Orakhelashvili had also observed that ‘the courts which uphold 
the state immunity for breaches of peremptory norms mostly ignore the question of 
the nature of the act in question and do not address it.’987 Although he intended for 
this to be a criticism, my view is that the approach of these courts is consistent with 
the purposes of immunity ratione materiae. The underlying basis for whether an act is 
a sovereign act is not predicated on its compliance with obligation erga omnes, but 
instead the purpose and method of how it was facilitated with respect to the foreign 
state.   
 
                                                
984 Orakhelashvili, ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic 
Courts: A Reply to Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah’ (n 941) 852.   
985 Orakhelashvili goes one step further to suggest that immunity inevitably gives rise to 
impunity, see Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (n 143) 358.  
986 Arrest Warrants Case (n 951) para 60.  
987 Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (n 143) 326. 
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iii. There is universal jurisdiction over international crimes   
  
This was expressed by Lord Phillips in Pinochet (No.3): 
 
International crimes and extra-territorial jurisdiction in relation to them are 
both new arrivals in the field of public international law. I do not believe that 
State immunity ratione materiae can co-exist with them. The exercise of 
extra-territorial jurisdiction overrides the principle that one State will not 
intervene in the internal affairs of another. It does so because, where 
international crime is concerned, that principle cannot prevail … once extra-
territorial jurisdiction is established, it makes no sense to exclude from it acts 
done in an official capacity.988   
 
Thus, when there is universal jurisdiction over international crimes, the rule of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction may prevail over the norms that provide an exception to 
jurisdiction over the individual for acts done in an official capacity.989  
However, it is questionable as to whether this argument is relevant to the crime of 
aggression, as it is still undecided whether international law provides a rule of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction for the crime of aggression.990 Therefore, the question is 
whether a rule of territorial jurisdiction may also prevail over immunity ratione 
materiae. Returning to the underlying rationale, the reason a rule of jurisdiction 
prevails over the norms that provide an exception to jurisdiction for the purposes of 
immunity ratione materiae, is the need to establish individual criminal 
responsibility.991As submitted by Akande and Shah, ‘the newer rule of attribution 
supersedes the earlier principle of immunity which seeks to protect non-
responsibilty.’992 From this premise, it can be argued that the rule of territorial 
jurisdiction should also be able to prevail over the norms that provide an exception to 
jurisdiction for the purposes of immunity ratione materiae.  
                                                
988 Pinochet No.3 (n.955) 190.    
989 see Akande and Shah (n 950) 843. 
990 Akande has expressed that he does not believe that there is universal jurisdiction for the 
crime of aggression, Akande, ‘Prosecuting Aggression: The Consent Problem and the Role of 
the Security Council’ (n 753) 35. 
991 Dutch Expert Report on Immunities (n 954) 19.  
992 Akande and Shah (n 950) 840. 
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In my view, as customary international law allows sanctions to be executed 
against the relevant duty-bearers for the failure to comply with their duty to refrain 
from international crimes, it is logical that procedural rules like immunities over state 
officials for sovereign acts should not apply in a domestic court whereby the forum 
state has the jurisdiction to determine upon the substantive nature of the act in 
question for the purposes of enforcement. Thus, in a situation where the forum state is 
the aggressed state, an argument can be made that immunity ratione materiae is non-
applicable to the defendant because international law relies on the domestic court as 
an enforcement mechanism to exercise sanctions against the duty-bearer for failure to 
comply with international obligations.993 Furthermore, this is in the legal interests of 
the aggressed state.  
7.5. Domestic prosecution of the crime of aggression: overcoming procedural 
bars 
 
This Chapter has focused upon two procedural bars that come into play: par in 
parem non habet imperium; and immunities from jurisdiction for state officials.  The 
former acts as a procedural bar that precludes the forum state from exercising 
jurisdiction over the legality of the act of aggression, whilst the latter precludes a state 
from exercising jurisdiction over an individual that has participated in conduct 
relating to the alleged act because of the nature of his/her position in government 
(immunity ratione personae) or the nature of the act committed (immunity ratione 
materiae).  It is important to understand that there must first be jurisdiction before 
either type of immunities may be pleaded, i.e. that the forum state is in a position to 
initiate proceedings against the defendant for the crime of aggression.    
With respect to the first barrier, it is submitted that if par in parem non habet 
imperium acts as a procedural bar in situations when the forum state is the aggressed 
state, this would paradoxically undermine its sovereignty because it is inherently 
precluded from its modus operandi to enforce legal consequences against the 
individual who has committed a crime against its territory. Thus, it has been 
submitted that par in parem non habet imperium cannot logically co-exist with a rule 
of jurisdiction under the territorial principle (section 7.3.1.ii). The underlying 
argument is predicated upon the jurisdictional nexus between the victim state and the 
                                                
993 Douglas (n 942) 338. 
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individual for committing the crime of aggression against its territory. It is important 
to note that ‘sitting in judgment over the acts of a co-equal sovereign,’994 when 
considering the legality of the use of force during the prosecution of the crime of 
aggression is to satisfy the state act element of the crime and not to enforce legal 
consequences against the aggressor state.   
  If and upon overcoming par in parem non habet imperium, jurisdiction can be 
established, the forum court may then have to decide whether to allow an exception to 
jurisdiction over the state official by applying the norms that give rise to either 
immunity ratione personae or immunity ratione materiae. As aggression is 
essentially a leadership crime, it is likely that the individuals who may be prosecuted 
will be able to plead immunity ratione personae by virtue of their position in 
government being a symbolic representation of the state. Alternatively, if the 
individual does not fall within the category of those who may plead immunity ratione 
personae, they may be able to plead immunity ratione materiae.   
It is submitted that the norms that give rise to immunity ratione personae will 
apply as an exception to jurisdiction from the forum court regardless of whether or 
not customary international law provides a rule of jurisdiction over the individual for 
the relevant crime. This should not be interpreted to trivialize the significance of the 
rule of jurisdiction over the individual, but rather to give precedence to the principle 
of non-intervention of the domestic affairs of a foreign state. The arrest, detainment, 
prosecution and subsequent imprisonment of a State leader represent an intervention 
in the domestic political structure of a foreign State. Such inviolability should not be 
interpreted as impunity, as it merely suggests that the present relevant domestic forum 
is not the appropriate forum for prosecution. An alternative forum, such as the 
domestic court of the foreign state and/or the ICC may be contemplated. Of course, 
whether prosecution can actually take place in the domestic court of the foreign state 
and/or the ICC may not always be likely.  
On the other hand, it is suggested that the norms that give rise to immunity 
ratione materiae may not be applicable in situations where the defendant is indicted 
for an international crime. This is because a newer, and more specific rule of 
                                                
994 Van Schaack, ‘Par in Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the Crime of 
Aggression’ (n 15) 149; for an account of when states have ‘sat in judgment’ over other 
states, see Strapatsas (n 882) 455–456.   
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customary international law that attaches sanctions against an individual for the crime 
of aggression should be allowed to prevail over the rule of immunity ratione materiae.  
It should be clarified that these norms exist on different levels. The rule(s) of 
jurisdiction that allow sanctions to be exercised against individuals is substantive in 
nature. International law relies on this rule of jurisdiction to enforce sanctions against 
the individual. On the other hand, the norms that allow exceptions from jurisdiction 
are procedural in nature as there is no actual substantive effect on the legality of the 
conduct or responsibility of the individual. It can therefore be said that the norms that 
provide a rule of jurisdiction do not directly affect the norms that allow an exception 
to jurisdiction because one is substantial in nature, and the other is procedural. 
In theory, if the domestic court of the aggressed state or bystander state is 
contemplating whether to allow an exception to jurisdiction for the state official, then 
it is already presumed or satisfied that there is a rule of jurisdiction. This rule of 
jurisdiction, be it territorial or extraterritorial, allows sanctions to be executed against 
the individual. Thus, it can be assumed to prevail over the norms that give rise to par 
in parem non habet imperium. Likewise, this rule of jurisdiction should also prevail 
over the norms that give rise to immunity ratione materiae. For international law to 
be internally consistent, the rule of jurisdiction that attaches sanctions directly against 
the individual for the crime of aggression, it is suggested that this rule overcomes both 
par in parem non habet imperium and immunity ratione materiae. This way, domestic 
courts may fulfill their role as enforcement mechanisms against the norms that 
crimalise aggression.  
7.6. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has challenged and rejected the hypothesis that domestic courts are 
incompetent fora for prosecution of the crime of aggression and that the ICC should 
have de facto exclusive jurisdiction. As such, it is submitted that both domestic courts 
and the ICC serve as enforcement mechanisms under international law against the 
norms that criminalise aggression.    
Both aggressor state and aggressed state may serve as the forum state for the 
prosecution of the crime of aggression. With respect to the former, the legal interest 
can be established under the nationality principle, while the legal interest of the latter 
may be established under the territoriality principle. It can also be said that 
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prosecution in domestic courts of the aggressor state may amount to satisfaction for 
the aggressed state. Thus, the legal interests of the aggressed state are still represented 
even when the forum state is the aggressor state.  
It is submitted that unlike the ICC, there is no need for a pre-determination of an 
act of aggression by the Security Council for a domestic court to prosecute the crime 
of aggression. Be that as it may, if the Security Council or General Assembly has 
determined the existence of an act of aggression, the forum state may rely on these 
findings as grounds to initiate proceedings against the relevant perpetrator of the 
crime of aggression. Thus, such determinations may carry persuasive value with 
respect to establishing the state act element of the crime of aggression. 
It is also argued that par in parem non habet imperium is not necessarily an 
insurmountable procedural bar to domestic prosecution for the crime of aggression. In 
a more specific context whereby the forum state is the aggressed state, par in parem 
non habet imperium cannot logically apply as the victim of the crime of aggression is 
then precluded from enforcing legal consequences against an individual for wrongful 
conduct committed against its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, this would 
paradoxically undermine the sovereign equality of states on a judicial level as it 
precludes a state (aggressed) from exercising its legal interests under international law 
to enforce sanctions against an individual responsible for committing a crime against 
its territory. It is suggested that par in parem non habet imperium should not be 
applicable in domestic courts when the forum state has a legal interest in enforcing 
sanctions (criminal) against the perpetrator. That said, this is a rather conceptual 
argument, and it is ultimately for the forum state to decide in practice whether this 
procedural bar to jurisdiction should apply.  
As there is no strict requirement for States Parties who have ratified the Kampala 
to implement the amendments into their domestic legislation, it is questionable as to 
whether States Parties will choose to incorporate the leadership element within Article 
8 bis(1) into their criminal codes. As such, it appears that there is a broader scope of 
perpetrators that can be prosecuted in domestic courts than at the ICC, which may 
arguably even encompass non-state actors. Be that as it may, the general presumption 
is that the crime of aggression is a leadership crime, which suggests that only state 
officials of the highest capacities will be prosecuted. Thus, it is likely that immunities 
of state officials will come into play. If the defendant may plead immunity ratione 
personae, this nuance of immunities would afford full immunity from the criminal 
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jurisdiction of the forum state. With respect to immunity ratione materiae, it is argued 
that in situations whereby the forum state is the aggressed state, immunity ratione 
materiae is non-applicable to the defendant as the forum state has a legal interest in 
the enforcement of sanctions (criminal) for the failure to comply with international 
obligations to refrain from conduct relating to the crime of aggression.  
It is submitted that the jurisdictional rule concomitant to the legal interest of the 
aggressed state to enforce sanctions (criminal) against the perpetrator of the crime of 
aggression should prevail over the procedural bars to jurisdiction. The question, 
which was left open, is whether a bystander state may have a legal interest to act as a 
forum for the prosecution of the crime of aggression under the universality principle, 
i.e. to exercise universal jurisdiction.  
Aside from the domestic and international political ramifications of prosecution 
of the crime of aggression in a domestic criminal court, there are also practical 
difficulties. Examples of the latter include factors such as fact-finding and gathering 
evidence, finding witnesses, arrest of the alleged perpetrator – especially if the forum 
state is the aggressed state, resources and judicial infrastructure. That said, such 
practical difficulties are not unique only to the crime of aggression and could also 
easily arise with respect to the other core crimes.   
 Although at present, it is rather unlikely that domestic prosecution for the crime 
of aggression may take place, some states have the crime of aggression in their 
domestic codes while some States Parties have adopted the Kampala Amendments, 
which means that in situations of concurrent jurisdiction, they will have the priority of 
prosecution. Domestic prosecution for the crime of aggression may indeed become a 
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Conclusion 
 
This dissertation studied the crime of aggression from a public international law 
perspective. Part I examined the criminalisation of aggression under international law. 
Part II considered how the primary norms under international law that prohibit an act 
of aggression interplay with the norms that criminalise aggression, and how this gives 
rise to responsibility on the secondary level in such a way that individual criminal 
responsibility is predicated upon state responsibility. Part III examined whether and to 
what extent international law protects the interests of the aggressed state by means of 
prosecution at either the ICC or in domestic courts.    
This dissertation has delineated how responsibility for the crime of aggression 
should be attributed under international law to the aggressor state and the perpetrator 
of the crime by focusing upon the intrinsic link between the state act of aggression 
and the crime of aggression. It is by better understanding this intrinsic link that it can 
be appreciated how the breach of the primary norms that prohibit aggression and the 
norms that criminalise aggression give rise to legal consequences at the secondary 
level of individual criminal responsibility (Chapter IV). Adopting the premise that the 
aggressed state as the victim of the crime of aggression has a legal interest in the 
enforcement of criminal sanctions against the perpetrator (Chapter V), this 
dissertation considered the extent to which the ICC (Chapter VI) and domestic courts 
(Chapter VII) are able to protect this interest.  
In my view, the most important findings of this dissertation can be stated in the 
following terms. First, this dissertation has examined the definition of the crime of 
aggression under international law (Part I). The present definition of the crime of 
aggression under customary international law originated from the definition of crimes 
against peace pursuant to the Nuremberg principles (Chapter II). There are two 
substantive components of the crime: the state act element of the crime (the state act 
of aggression) and the elements of the crime pertaining to individual conduct 
(planning, preparation, initiation or waging/execution; and mens rea).  
The structure of the definition of the crime of aggression is formed by the 
primary norms that prohibit aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression. 
These norms place obligations on states to refrain from an act of aggression (Chapter 
I) and on individuals to refrain from conduct pertaining to the state act of aggression, 
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respectively (Chapters II and III). The definition of the crime demands that an act of 
aggression must be established to exist before the conduct of the individual can be 
assessed (Chapters II and III).  
It is generally assumed that the crime of aggression is a leadership crime that may 
only be committed by persons in a sufficiently high-ranking position. Although the 
definition of the crime of aggression in the Kampala Amendments has specified a 
leadership element as a substantive component of the crime (“control or direct”), this 
is not entirely consistent with the definition under customary international law 
(“shape or influence”).  
Second, this dissertation has explained the intrinsic link between the state act of 
aggression and the crime of aggression that is part of the definition of the crime of 
aggression (Chapter IV). It explains that the intrinsic link exists on two levels. On the 
primary level, there are three inter-related points of distinction between the norms that 
prohibit aggression and the norms that criminalise aggression: i) there are two 
different conducts under international law (act of aggression and crime of aggression); 
ii) there are two different legal personalities under international law (aggressor state 
and perpetrator of the crime); iii) there are two different legal frameworks that are 
applicable (jus ad bellum and international criminal law). This is why in a situation of 
aggression there is a violation of both sets of norms, and both the aggressor state and 
perpetrator of the crime have failed to perform their duties to comply with their 
respective obligations under international law. Yet, this does not explain the intrinsic 
link.  
Instead, it is the point of intersection between the norms that prohibit aggression 
and the norms that criminalise aggression, which clarifies why the crime of 
aggression is predicated on an act of aggression. The act of aggression committed by 
the aggressor state was facilitated by the conduct of the individual in his/her 
participation in one of the modes of perpetration, as part of his/her official capacity as 
part of the organ of the state. By identifying this intersection, it can be understood that 
the crime of aggression is predicated on the act of aggression because the norms that 
prohibit the modes of perpetration, planning, preparation, initiation or waging, run in 
parallel with the norms that prohibit an act of aggression, and each set of norms 
cannot exist independently of each other.  
On the secondary level, the linkage between individual criminal responsibility 
and state responsibility whereby the latter gives rise to the former has the purpose of 
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identifying a breach on the primary level of the norms that prohibit aggression and the 
norms that criminalise aggression. Thus, state responsibility of the aggressor state is 
indicative of the defendant having acted in breach of the parallel set of obligations to 
refrain from the modes of perpetration. This should satisfy the state act element of the 
crime. For example, the elements pertaining to individual conduct, i.e. the actus reus 
and mens rea will need to be established in addition to the state act element of the 
crime, in order for the perpetrator to be found criminally responsible for the crime of 
aggression.  
Despite the parallel existence of state responsibility and individual criminal 
responsibility for aggression, there should be a dichotomy between both sets of 
responsibilities with respect to legal consequences against the aggressor state and the 
perpetrator of the crime of aggression. For the purpose of prosecution, the 
establishment of state responsibility for an act of aggression is to find a breach of 
primary obligations by the defendant, and not to invoke legal consequences against 
the aggressor state. That said, an open question is whether this may nevertheless 
amount to satisfaction against the aggressor state. Whatever the best view may be, 
prosecution for the crime of aggression is intended to enforce legal consequences 
against the perpetrator of the crime, and not against the aggressor state.   
It is submitted in this dissertation that the attribution of conduct to the relevant 
duty-bearer with respect to the definition of the crime of aggression is demarcated 
into the ‘act of aggression’ (aggressor state) and ‘planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging/execution’ (perpetrator of the crime). The significance of this demarcation is 
that the definition of the crime of aggression preserves a dualist structure of 
responsibility whereby the aggressed state has a legal interest to invoke legal 
consequences against both the aggressor state (state responsibility) and the perpetrator 
of the crime (individual criminal responsibility). Prosecution of the crime of 
aggression does not absolve the responsibility of the aggressor state or protect the 
legal interests of the aggressed state in relation to the legal consequences pursuant to 
the secondary norms of state responsibility.  
Third, this dissertation establishes that the aggressed state is the victim of the 
crime of aggression because it is the rights-holder of the enjoyment of the protection 
afforded by the norms that criminalise aggression, and has suffered from the breach of 
primary obligations by the perpetrator of the crime (Chapter V). Although this is 
fairly uncontested, it is nevertheless an important submission because the general 
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assumption under international criminal law is that victims of international crimes are 
natural persons. Not wanting to depart entirely from the general concept of victims in 
international criminal law, it is suggested that natural persons who are injured in a 
situation of aggression (as a result of the act of aggression and crime of aggression) 
should be qualified as the victims of war crimes (provided the constitutive elements of 
war crimes are present) and not the crime of aggression. This is consistent with the 
applicable legal framework in a situation of aggression (jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello). Be that as it may, it is also suggested that natural persons may be considered as 
indirect victims of the crime of aggression, and may thus be recognised as 
beneficiaries of the enjoyment of protection from the implementation of the norms 
that criminalise aggression. It is submitted that the status of natural persons as 
beneficiaries to receive reparations at the ICC is a tertiary right conferred by the 
Rome Statute. Thus, it is unlikely that natural persons may be entitled to such 
reparations for the crime of aggression in another forum.  
Fourth, this dissertation examines the enforcement mechanisms that international 
law relies upon to execute criminal sanctions against perpetrators for the crime of 
aggression (Part III), with particular reference to whether, and to what extent, the 
legal interests of the aggressed state are protected. The first part of the question, i.e. 
‘whether’, refers to whether prosecution of the crime of aggression can take place at 
the ICC or domestic courts. It is anticipated that prosecutions may take place at the 
ICC subject to the activation of its jurisdiction in or after 2017, and following 30 
ratifications (Chapter VI), and that prosecutions may take place in domestic courts 
provided the forum state has codified the crime of aggression in its domestic 
legislation (Chapter VII).  
Although in principle, prosecution of the crime of aggression may be carried out 
at the ICC or in domestic courts, such prosecution may be rather unlikely in practice. 
The jurisdiction of the Court may remain dormant if there are insufficient ratifications 
of the Kampala Amendments. There is also the possibility that neither aggressor state 
nor aggressed state intends to initiate proceedings in their domestic courts for the 
crime of aggression. Be that as it may, the assumptio is that in principle, prosecution 
of the crime of aggression may take place in both the ICC and domestic courts.  
The second part of the question (to what extent are the legal interests of the 
aggressed state protected) may appear rather theoretical as the jurisdiction of the ICC 
remains to be activated, and despite the codification of the crime of aggression in the 
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domestic legislation of some states, there is no practice of domestic prosecution for 
the crime of aggression. Be that as it may, in accordance with the principle of 
complementarity (Article 17 Rome Statute), in situations of concurrent jurisdiction 
between the ICC and a domestic court of a State Party, the latter has priority of 
prosecution. Indeed, some of the States Parties that have ratified the Kampala 
Amendments have already incorporated the crime of aggression into their domestic 
legislation. Thus, domestic prosecution for the crime of aggression may become an 
issue of practical importance.  
This dissertation has considered whether and to what extent concerns that arise in 
relation to domestic prosecution for the crime of aggression may be overcome 
(Chapter VII). It is suggested that the procedural bar to jurisdiction, par in parem non 
habet imperium, is not applicable in a situation where the forum state is the aggressed 
state as its legal interest in the enforcement of legal consequences against a subject 
that has committed an internationally wrongful act against its territory should not be 
precluded. That said, it is entirely at the discretion of the forum state whether par in 
parem non habet imperium is applicable, which would thereby preclude the former 
from initiating proceedings over the crime of aggression.  
As it is highly likely that the defendant is a state official, there is the question of 
whether immunities from criminal jurisdiction may be successfully pleaded. It is 
submitted that if a defendant is able to plead immunity ratione personae, this will be 
upheld in the domestic court of the forum state. In the event that a defendant is able to 
plead immunity ratione materiae, the norms that allow this exception to jurisdiction 
are not applicable as the rule of customary international law that allows for legal 
consequences to be enforced against an individual for an international crime should 
prevail. Furthermore, such an exception to jurisdiction should not be applicable, as it 
would have the effect of precluding the aggressed state from its legal interests to 
enforce legal consequences.   
It is difficult to conclude with certainty that the procedural bars to jurisdiction, 
i.e. par in parem non habet imperium and immunities of state officials for 
international crimes, are not applicable when the forum state is not the aggressor state. 
There is a possibility that they may be applicable, thereby precluding the forum state 
from initiating proceedings over the crime of aggression. However, there is also a 
possibility that they may not be applicable, thus allowing the forum state to prosecute 
the crime of aggression.  
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The general rule is that domestic prosecution for the crime of aggression should 
be considered on a case-by-case basis. It is at the discretion of the forum state 
(aggressor state or aggressed state) whether to prosecute the crime of aggression or 
not. Although both states have a legal interest in acting as the forum state, this does 
not necessarily mean they will initiate proceedings, as other internal and external 
factors come into play, e.g. public interest/opinions and political considerations with 
respect to foreign states. This dissertation has left open the question whether a 
bystander state has a legal interest to act as a forum state and exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression.  
The findings of this dissertation in relation to prosecution at the ICC (Chapters III 
and VI) suggest that it will be rather difficult for an act of aggression to be prosecuted 
as a crime of aggression. First, the definition of the crime of aggression in Article 8 
bis (1) encompasses a rather high threshold for the state act element of the crime to be 
satisfied. Thus, it is clear that not all acts of aggression committed by States can 
satisfy the state act element within the definition of the crime of aggression pursuant 
to Article 8 bis (1) of the Kampala Amendments. Only an act of aggression by its 
“character, gravity and scale” constitutes a “manifest violation” of the UN Charter. 
(Chapter III). For the purposes of specificity, Article 8 bis (2) encompasses a 
definition of an act of aggression, which upon closer examination, is the incorporation 
of Articles 1 and 3 of the definition pursuant to GA Resolution 3314 (XXIX)1974. 
Concerns with regard to the specificity of the provisions of GA Resolution 3314 
(XXIX)1974 as a basis for individual criminal responsibility are refuted by pointing 
out that the definition of an act of aggression in Article 8 bis(2) of the Kampala 
Amendments does not give rise to individual criminal liability because it is not the 
state act element of the crime per se; the latter is found in Article 8 bis(1). Further, the 
SWGCA had adopted the most pragmatic approach by relying on the normative 
definition of aggression under international law pursuant to GA Resolution 3314 
(XXIX)1974. In any event, the act of aggression under Article 8 bis (2) must be read 
in the light of the threshold under Article 8 bis (1) to qualify for the state act element 
of the crime of aggression.  
Indeed, the threshold for the use of force to be considered as an act of aggression 
for the purposes of fulfilling the state act element of the crime of aggression appears 
to be set higher than the threshold under jus ad bellum. This has lead to concerns that 
the normative definition of an act of aggression under jus ad bellum pursuant to GA 
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Resolution 3314(1974) may be diluted or eclipsed. A related concern has also been 
put forward that a high threshold of the state act element will have the unintended 
effect of indirectly condoning the use of force and acts of aggression. Both of these 
concerns have been rejected as obligations on States pursuant to the prohibition of the 
use of force under jus ad bellum are unaffected by the definition of the state act 
element under Article 8 bis (2) of the Kampala Amendments. Regardless of whether 
individuals who are part of the state organ may face criminal prosecution for the 
crime of aggression, the prohibition against an act of aggression is peremptory in 
nature, which in addition to obligations erga omnes on States to refrain from the use 
of force, entails particular legal consequences under the secondary rules of state 
responsibility against the aggressor state (Chapter I).  
Second, state referrals and proprio motu investigations (Article 15 bis) require 
the need for prior external determination of an act of aggression, which must be 
satisfied before the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a 
crime of aggression. The Security Council is given the primary role to determine an 
act of aggression. It is presumed that determination of an act of aggression is 
retrospective in this regard, and not for the purposes of making recommendations 
under Chapter VII for the maintenance of international peace and security. Be that as 
it may, it is unlikely that the Security Council would reach such a determination in 
practice. In the absence of a determination, the Prosecutor may seek the Pre-Trial 
Division’s authorization for the commencement of the investigation in respect of a 
crime of aggression after six months after the date of notification. The ICC may reach 
a different decision than the Security Council with regard to the determination of an 
act of aggression. The political and procedural implications of having two external 
determining mechanisms suggest that prosecution of the crime of aggression may be a 
long process. Furthermore, the Security Council may defer an investigation or 
prosecution of the crime of aggression for a period of 12 months.    
Third, the sui generis jurisdictional regime raises the question of (aggressor) state 
consent with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction over its nationals for the crime of 
aggression. This is directly relevant to the question as to whether the aggressor state 
must ratify the Kampala Amendments in order for the jurisdictional regime to be 
applicable over its nationals for the crime of aggression. It is submitted that the 
consent of the aggressor state should be upheld because prosecution of the crime of 
aggression at the ICC can be regarded as a form of satisfaction for the act of 
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aggression. That said, consent need not necessarily be expressed through the act of 
ratification the Kampala amendments. The sui generis jurisdictional regime over the 
crime of aggression is premised on implied state consent of States Parties to the Rome 
Statute, as evident by the exclusion of non-states parties and the opt-out declaration 
provided in Article 15 bis(4).  
 Thus, for the jurisdictional regime over the crime of aggression to be applicable, 
it suffices that either the aggressor state or the aggressed state has ratified the 
Kampala Amendments so that the underlying jurisdictional links can be established 
under the national or territorial principle. Notably, the aggressor State must not have 
opted-out of the jurisdictional regime entirely. Be that as it may, the jurisdictional 
regime over the crime of aggression appears nevertheless to be rather limited in scope 
as it excludes non-states Parties, and allows States Parties to opt-out. It can be 
assumed that the role of the ICC as an enforcement mechanism against the 
perpetrators of the crime of aggression is expected to be rather limited in practice. 
That said, it is perhaps premature to assess the effectiveness of the Court as an 
enforcement mechanism as it remains to be seen whether the jurisdiction of the ICC 
over the crime of aggression will be activated in or after 2017. In the meantime, the 
symbolic significance of the adoption of the Kampala Amendments by consensus 
should not be undermined.   
As a general observation, it can be said that while the contemporary international 
legal order recognises the importance of legal interests of the aggressed State, that 
legal consequences are invoked against the perpetrator of the crime of aggression, it 
has not yet generated structures and institutions that would be necessary to effectively 
implement responsibility for conduct affecting these interests. Notwithstanding, it is 
hoped that the findings of this dissertation contribute to a comprehensive 
understanding of the crime of aggression in public international law. In addition to 
clarifying the conceptual elements of the crime of aggression, it is hoped that this 
dissertation has helped to clarify at least some of the uncertainties that practitioners 
may have with respect to the crime of aggression.  
The recognition of individual responsibility for a crime that is addressed solely at 
the protection of the aggressed State, and not individuals, may be read to suggest a 
significant shift in the structure of the international legal order. The proposition that 
individuals are subjects, and States objects or beneficiaries of rules of international 
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law certainly seems to be a striking departure from the orthodox view that States were 
exclusive subjects of international law. However, the intrinsic link between individual 
and State responsibility demonstrated in this thesis ensures that the crime of 
aggression simultaneously fits within the traditional inter-State model of international 
law and confirms the shift of the contemporary legal order towards greater legal 
appreciation of various roles that individuals may play.  
As there is still general disagreement by States Parties with respect to the entry-
into-force of the Kampala Amendments and the jurisdictional regime of the ICC over 
the crime of aggression, it is hoped that the findings of this research in relation to 
these issues will help to clarify the situation. It is also hoped that this research may 
put into perspective the legal interests of the aggressor state, the aggressed state and 
the perpetrator of the crime of aggression in a situation of aggression. From a 
practitioner’s perspective, the assessment of injury to natural persons in a situation of 
aggression (as a result of an act of aggression and crime of aggression) in accordance 
with the applicable legal framework may also be useful in relation to legal 
proceedings.  Last but not least, it is hoped that the findings of this research will help 
an aggressed state to understand better its legal interests under international law in 
relation to legal consequences for the aggressor state that has committed an act of 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt aansprakelijkheid voor het misdrijf agressie vanuit 
het perspectief van internationaal publiekrecht. De staat getroffen door agressie heeft 
een rechtmatig belang in de vestiging van de individuele strafrechtelijke 
aansprakelijkheid voor het misdrijf agressie en het instellen van strafrechtelijke 
sancties tegen de dader. Individuele strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid voor het 
misdrijf agressie valt samen met staatsaansprakelijkheid voor een daad van agressie. 
Dit betekent dat het verbod op agressie twee verschillende verplichtingen van twee 
verschillende rechtssubjecten betreft. Staten zijn verplicht zich te onthouden van 
daden van agressie tegenover andere staten; individuen zijn verplicht af te zien van 
het misdrijf agressie. Bij agressie gaat het dus om een schending van internationale 
verplichtingen van een staat (de onrechtmatige daad agressie) en van een individu (het 
misdrijf agressie). 
Agressie kent een bijzondere vorm van aansprakelijkheid onder internationaal 
publiekrecht, waarin een individu handelt in strijd met een internationale verplichting 
die de bescherming van een andere staat tot doel heeft. Dit is in tegenstelling tot 
andere internationale misdrijven, zoals het misdrijf genocide, misdrijven tegen de 
menselijkheid of oorlogsmisdrijven, die ter bescherming van individuen dienen. Het 
misdrijf agressie verschilt intrinsiek van deze misdrijven. Volgens de amendementen 
op het Statuut van Rome inzake het Internationaal Strafhof, aangenomen tijdens de 
Herzieningsconferentie in Kampala in 2010, evenals internationaal gewoonterecht, is 
een daad van agressie een essentieel element van de juridische definitie van het 
misdrijf agressie. Voordat strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van een individu kan 
worden vastgesteld moet het eerst duidelijk zijn dat de staat zijn verplichting om van 
agressie af te zien heeft geschonden. 
De definitie van het misdrijf agressie betreft dus twee verschillende schendingen 
van internationaal publiekrecht door twee verschillende rechtssubjecten. De vraag 
blijft echter hoe internationale aansprakelijkheid moet worden toegerekend aan, 
respectievelijk, de agressieve staat en de individuele dader, en waarom 
aansprakelijkheid van deze laatste afhankelijk is van de daden van de eerste. 
Internationaal publiekrecht biedt het juridisch kader voor een analyse van de 
wisselwerking tussen internationale rechtsregels die de daad van agressie verbieden 
en het individuele misdrijf van agressie strafbaar stellen.  
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Dit proefschrift analyseert de voorwaarden voor internationale aansprakelijkheid 
van zowel staten als individuen voor agressie. Op basis van deze analyse schetst het 
proefschrift het rechtmatig belang van de getroffen staat betreffende de vaststelling en 
de implementatie van individuele strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid.  
Deel een schetst de achtergrond van het misdrijf agressie door eerst te 
onderzoeken hoe internationaal recht agressie verbiedt, oftewel welke verplichtingen 
het oplegt aan staten om zich te onthouden van de daad van agressie. Daarna 
bestudeert het hoe internationale rechtsnormen agressie criminaliseren, waarmee ze 
verplichtingen opleggen op individuen om af te zien van het misdrijf agressie.  
Hoofdstuk een beziet de daad van agressie door de staat door de lens van het 
toepasselijke internationaal juridisch raamwerk, namelijk het jus ad bellum. Het 
hoofdstuk legt uit dat staten zowel de plichtdragers als de rechthebbenden zijn van de 
normen die agressie verbieden, waaruit blijkt dat onder internationaal recht 
staatsaansprakelijkheid kan worden toegerekend aan de agressieve staat voor de daad 
van agressie. 
Hoofdstuk twee onderzoekt de herkomst van de normen die agressie 
criminaliseren door misdrijven tegen de vrede onder het Internationale Militaire 
Tribunaal te Neurenberg te bestuderen.  Ten tijde van dit Tribunaal bestonden de 
bovengenoemde rechtsnormen nog niet.  Echter, hierna kristalliseerden  misdrijven 
tegen de vrede zich uit in de Principes van Internationaal Recht Erkend in het 
Handvest van het Tribunaal van Neurenberg en de Jurisprudentie van het Tribunaal 
(de “Neurenbergse Principes”). Dit vormt een aanwijzing voor  het bestaan van 
directe verplichtingen van individuen om zich te onthouden van het misdrijf agressie 
(synoniem met misdrijven tegen de vrede), waarbij de schending van deze 
verplichtingen leidt tot directe rechtsgevolgen voor de betreffende individuen. Op 
basis van de vooronderstelling dat de definitie van misdrijven tegen de vrede de status 
van internationaal gewoonterecht heeft verkregen kunnen het statelijke element van 
het misdrijf, namelijk de daad van agressie door de staat, en de individuele elementen 
van het misdrijf agressie (de actus reus  en de mens rea), worden vastgesteld. 
Hoofdstuk drie bestudeert vervolgens de definitie van het misdrijf agressie zoals 
recentelijk aangenomen in de amendementen op het Statuut van Rome inzake het 
Internationaal Strafhof tijdens de Herzieningsconferentie in Kampala in 2010 (de 
“Kampala amendementen”). Het hoofdstuk stelt dat een vermeende situatie van 
agressie moet voldoen aan twee vereisten van de definitie van het misdrijf agressie. 
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Ten eerste moet onder Artikel 8 bis, lid 2, van het Statuut van Rome (zoals herzien) 
worden vastgesteld dat de staat militair geweld heeft gebruikt tegen de soevereiniteit,  
de territoriale integriteit of de politieke onafhankelijkheid van een andere staat, of op 
enige andere wijze in strijd met het Handvest van de Verenigde Naties. Ten tweede 
moet vervolgens worden vastgesteld dat deze daad van agressie vanwege haar “aard, 
ernst en schaal” een “onmiskenbare schending van het Handvest van de Verenigde 
Naties” vormt onder Artikel 8 bis, lid 1. Zodra het statelijke element van het misdrijf 
is vastgesteld onder Artikel 8 bis, lid 1, wordt onderzocht of de gedaagde in een 
positie verkeert (of zich daarvan bewust is) om controle uit te oefenen over of leiding 
te geven aan het politieke of militaire optreden van de Staat, en of hij/zij de daad van 
agressie heeft gepland, voorbereid, in gang heeft gezet of heeft uitgevoerd. Uit een 
vergelijking met de definitie van de Neurenbergse Principes blijkt dat het misdrijf 
agressie in de Kampala Amendementen significant meer gedetailleerd en specifiek is 
wat betreft het statelijke element en dat het expliciete leiderschapscriterium leidt tot 
een beperktere groep van mogelijke daders die onder deze definitie vervolgd kunnen 
worden. 
Deel twee beziet hoe de verplichtingen van staten om zich te onthouden van 
daden van agressie verbonden zijn met de verplichtingen van individuen om af te zien 
van het misdrijf agressie, en hoe dit geïnterpreteerd moet worden in het licht van de 
individuele strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid. Hoofdstuk vier onderzoekt de 
verwantschap tussen de agressieve staat en de dader van het misdrijf agressie. Het 
hoofdstuk onderzoekt het intrinsieke verband tussen het misdrijf agressie en de 
statelijke daad van agressie (het primaire niveau) en tussen individuele strafrechtelijke 
aansprakelijkheid voor het misdrijf agressie en staatsaansprakelijkheid voor de daad 
van agressie (het secundaire niveau).  
Het proefschrift identificeert de verschillen en het kruispunt tussen de 
rechtsnormen die agressie verbieden en de normen die agressie criminaliseren. 
Hierdoor is het mogelijk de wisselwerking tussen deze normen op het primaire niveau 
te schetsen, namelijk hoe de verplichtingen van staten om zich te onthouden van de 
daad van agressie betrekking hebben op de verplichtingen van individuen om af te 
zien van het gedragingen die gerelateerd zijn aan de daad van agressie. Dit biedt een 
beter inzicht in de reden waarom de staatsaansprakelijkheid voor de daad van agressie 
een sine qua non is voor individuele strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid voor het 
misdrijf agressie.  
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Hoofdstuk vijf betoogt dat de getroffen staat, als rechthebbende onder de 
rechtsnormen die agressie criminaliseren, het slachtoffer van het misdrijf agressie is. 
De getroffen staat heeft daarom een direct rechtsbelang bij de handhaving van de 
rechtsgevolgen ten aanzien van dader van het misdrijf agressie. Echter, deze stelling 
lijkt af te wijken van het algemeen geaccepteerde slachtofferbegrip in internationaal 
strafrecht, waarbij het om natuurlijke personen gaat. Twee aspecten behoeven verdere 
discussie. Ten eerste onderzoekt het hoofdstuk of natuurlijke individuen aangemerkt 
kunnen worden als slachtoffer van het misdrijf agressie en de repercussies hiervan op 
vervolging bij het Internationaal Strafhof. Ten tweede, als het slachtoffer van het 
misdrijf agressie inderdaad de getroffen staat is rijst de vraag hoe dit gezien moet 
worden binnen het normatieve kader betreffende de rechten van individuele 
slachtoffers. In het bijzonder behandelt het hoofdstuk of, en zo ja, in hoeverre, de 
getroffen staat de begunstigde kan zijn van herstelbetalingen voor het misdrijf 
agressie van de dader van het misdrijf (individuele civielrechtelijke 
aansprakelijkheid). 
Deel drie onderzoekt de handhaving van rechtsnormen die agressie 
criminaliseren, met bijzondere aandacht voor de volgende mechanismes onder 
internationaal recht: het Internationaal Strafhof en nationale gerechten. Hoofdstuk zes 
analyseert vervolging van het misdrijf agressie bij het Internationaal Strafhof. Op dit 
moment moet de rechtsmacht van het Internationaal Strafhof over het misdrijf 
agressie nog worden geactiveerd. Om deze reden legt het hoofdstuk uit hoe de 
inwerkingtreding van de Kampala Amendementen en de voorwaarden voor de 
uitoefening van rechtsmacht over het misdrijf agressie zich tot elkaar verhouden. Het 
hoofdstuk verdiept zich in het bijzonder in de sui generis rechtsmacht over het 
misdrijf agressie. In navolging van de Kampala Amendementen maakt het hoofdstuk 
onderscheid tussen : i) aangiftes door staten en onderzoeken uit eigen beweging; ii) 
aangiftes door de Veiligheidsraad. Ten aanzien van deze eerste categorie is een 
bijkomende vraag of toestemming van de agressieve staat noodzakelijk is om het 
misdrijf agressie te kunnen vervolgen bij het Internationaal Strafhof; en verder, of een 
dergelijke toestemming expliciet moet worden gegeven in de vorm van ratificatie van 
de Kampala Amendementen. Het hoofdstuk betoogt dat toestemming van de 
agressieve staat inderdaad vereist is, aangezien vervolging bij het Internationaal 
Strafhof voor het misdrijf agressie kan uitmonden in genoegdoening als vorm van 
herstel voor een internationale onrechtmatige daad. Echter, toestemming hoeft niet te 
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worden gegeven door middel van ratificatie, aangezien de sui generis rechtsmacht 
gegrond is op impliciete toestemming van alle Staten die partij zijn bij Statuut van het 
Internationaal Strafhof. Dit kan worden afgeleid van twee punten: i) Staten die geen 
partij zijn worden volledig uitgesloten; ii) Staten die partij zijn mogen een verklaring 
afleggen dat zij de rechtsmacht van het Hof over het misdrijf agressie niet accepteren. 
Om deze reden mag het Hof rechtsmacht uitoefenen over het misdrijf agressie in 
situaties waarin één van de Staten die partij zijn bij de Kampala Amendementen is 
betrokken.  
Hoe het ook zij, de rechtsmacht van het Internationaal Strafhof over het misdrijf 
agressie is relatief beperkt, in het bijzonder met betrekking tot aangiftes van staten en 
onderzoeken uit eigen beweging. Om deze reden reikt de bescherming van het 
rechtsbelang van de getroffen staat enkel zover als de rechtsmacht van het Hof over 
het misdrijf agressie.  
Hoofdstuk zeven analyseert nationale vervolging van het misdrijf agressie. Het 
hoofdstuk betwist en verwerpt de hypothese dat nationale gerechten niet de 
competente fora zijn voor vervolging van het misdrijf agressie. De correcte zienswijze 
is dat nationale gerechten en het Internationaal Strafhof parallelle bevoegdheid 
hebben over het misdrijf agressie. Vervolging kan plaatsvinden in zowel de 
agressieve als de getroffen staat en het is een open vraag of derde staten vervolging 
mogen instellen tegen het misdrijf agressie onder het principe van universele 
rechtsmacht. Het hoofdstuk behandelt of, en in hoeverre, de volgende vragen met 
betrekking tot nationale vervolging kunnen worden beantwoord: of een daad van 
agressie moet worden vastgesteld door de Veiligheidsraad voordat een nationaal 
gerecht vervolging kan instellen; hoe een nationaal gerecht een daad van agressie 
vaststelt; hoe het leiderschapscriterium geïnterpreteerd dient te worden en de 
bijkomende vraag of de strafrechtelijke immuniteit van buitenlandse ambtsdragers 
van toepassing is. 
Samenvattend, er is geen vereiste dat de Veiligheidsraad een daad van agressie 
vaststelt voordat een nationaal gerecht het misdrijf agressie kan vervolgen. 
Desalniettemin kan een dergelijke vaststelling overtuigende waarde hebben om het 
statelijke element van het misdrijf agressie te staven. Het hoofdstuk ontwikkelt een 
conceptueel argument met betrekking tot de vraag of een nationaal gerecht het 
bestaan van een daad van agressie van een buitenlandse staat mag vaststellen. Gezien 
het rechtsbelang van de getroffen staat in de handhaving van de rechtsgevolgen tegen 
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een vermeende dader van het misdrijf agressie zouden procedurele bezwaren niet in 
de weg moeten staan van een vaststelling dat een buitenlandse staat een daad van 
agressie heeft gepleegd. In dit geval overtreffen de belangen van de getroffen staat die 
van de agressieve staat.  
In aanmerking genomen dat het misdrijf agressie een leiderschapsmisdrijf is lijkt 
de exceptie van immuniteit ratione personae te gelden. Echter, de exceptie van 
immuniteit ratione materiae zou niet toepasbaar moeten zijn aangezien de forum staat 
een rechtsbelang heeft bij de handhaving van de rechtsgevolgen tegen de dader 
vanwege schending van internationale verplichtingen.  
Evenwel is het uiteindelijk aan de forum staat om te beslissen of hij vervolging in 
gang zet en rechtsmacht uitoefent. De vraag of nationale rechtsvervolging kan 
plaatsvinden verschilt van de vraag of vervolging plaats zou moeten vinden, gezien de 
vele praktische en politieke overwegingen die meespelen.  Hoewel het 
onwaarschijnlijk lijkt dat nationale rechtsvervolging voor het misdrijf agressie 
daadwerkelijk plaats zal vinden, hebben sommige staten het misdrijf agressie toch in 
hun nationale wetgeving opgenomen. Verder kunnen Staten die partij zijn bij het 
Statuut van Rome en die de Kampala Amendementen hebben aangenomen overgaan 
tot rechtsvervolging onder het principe van complementariteit, in geval van parallelle 
rechtsmacht. Om deze reden zou nationale rechtsvervolging van het misdrijf agressie 
toch ooit realiteit kunnen worden.  
Dit proefschrift betoogt dat het intrinsieke verband tussen de statelijke daad van 
agressie en het misdrijf agressie op twee niveaus bestaat met betrekking tot  het 
misdrijf. Op het primaire niveau kan het intrinsieke verband worden aangetoond door 
het punt te identificeren waar de rechtsnormen die agressie verbieden en de normen 
die het criminaliseren elkaar doorkruisen, aangezien dit bewijst dat beide normen 
parallel aan elkaar lopen en dat de een niet kan bestaan zonder de ander.  Op het 
secundaire niveau dient het kruispunt van staatsaansprakelijkheid en individuele 
strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid als indicator van een schending van beide 
rechtsnormen op het primaire niveau. Staatsaansprakelijkheid van de agressieve staat 
is dus een noodzakelijke voorwaarde van het misdrijf agressie, omdat het aantoont dat 
de betreffende individuen een parallelle verplichting, namelijk om zich te onthouden 
van gedragingen betreffende het statelijke element van de daad van agressie, hebben 
geschonden. Een individu is dus enkel aansprakelijk onder internationaal recht voor 
de schending van de verplichtingen betreffende het misdrijf van agressie en niet voor 
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het statelijke element van de daad van agressie. Het  proefschrift concludeert dat de 
huidige internationale rechtsorde het rechtmatig belang van de getroffen staat om 
rechtsgevolgen in te stellen tegen de dader van het misdrijf agressie erkent, maar dat 
het nog niet de benodigde rechtsregels en instituties heeft gegenereerd om dit belang 
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